CALL FOR TRANSNATIONAL JIHAD

Lashkar-e-Taiba 1985-2014

Arif Jamal

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by Arif Jamal

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To the victims of Islamist terrorism in Pakistan, India, and beyond, and those who have laid their lives fighting it

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This book is the result of my research spread over some 18 years. During these 18 years, a large number of people helped me, not only to do research on the Jamatud Dawa, but also on other organizations and issues related to Islamist terrorism in South Asia and beyond. Unfortunately, most of these people must remain anonymous for obvious reasons.

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INTRODUCTION

Three events that took place in 1979 set in motion forces that to this day shape the Muslim world. Nineteen-seventy-nine started with the exit of the Shah of Iran, and the return of the Ayatollahs in Iran who eventually attained power. Towards the end of 1979, hundreds of jihadist Salafists, known as Juhayman's Ikhwan, rebelled against the House of Saud in Saudi Arabia and occupied the Ka'aba, Islam's holiest shrine. After having failed to crush the jihadist-Salafist rebellion, the Saudis asked for help from France, and allowed the French officials to enter Mecca, even though Saudis consider it un-Islamic to allow non-Muslims to enter Mecca and Medina. The Saudis arrested the rebel leader, Juhayman al-'Utaybi, and the self-anointed Mahdi, Muhammad bin Abdallah al-Qahtani, and executed them along with scores of others after summary trials. As the year came to an end, Babrak Karmal replaced Afghan President Hafiz Ullah Amin as the Soviet tanks and armor rolled into Afghanistan.

As Juhayman's Ikhwan were headquartered in Mecca, they had won over a number of Salafists worldwide to their cause. Juhayman's Ikhwan included members from many countries, including Egypt, Pakistan, and the United States. Those who died during the rebellion or were arrested and later executed "made only a tiny fraction of the group which had spread across the world. Others spread out to the rest of the world with Juhayman's agenda."[1] Mohammed Shawqi Islambuli, who had been influenced by Juhayman's thought, brought Juhayman's writings with him to Egypt. The writings influenced his brother, Khaled Islambuli, so

much that he shot and killed President Anwar Sadat in 1981. Subsequently, a 438-page book of Juhayman's epistles and attached commentary became popular in Egypt.[2] Many of Juhayman's direct accomplices survived prisons and joined al-Qaeda in the mid and late 1980s. One of these survivors, Mohammad Amir Sulayman Saqr, arrived in Afghanistan in 1987, and became al-Qaeda's most prized document forger, producing passports and other documents facilitating terrorists' travel.[3] Palestinian preacher Isam al Barqawi (aka Abu Mohammed al Maqdisi) popularized Juhayman's ideology in the mujahideen camps in Afghanistan. Abdellatif al Derbas, al Maqdisi's brother in law, was a close supporter of Juhayman and was arrested after the rebellion, spending several years in Saudi jails. Al Maqdisi wrote the book, "The Clear Proofs that the Saudi State is infidel," a popular read among the jihadists.[4] Some of Juhayman's Ikhwan, including Syed Allama Badiuddin Shah Rashdi (aka Pir Jhanday Shah [Allama Rashdi for short]), Hamid Mohammad Bahaziq, Mahmood Mohammad Ahmed Bahaziq (aka Abu Abdel Aziz [Mahmood Bahaziq for short]), Hassan As-Sareehi (aka Abu Abdur-Rahman As-Sareehi), and Ahmad Saad al-Ghamdi (founding official of the *al-Hayyat al-Ighasa al-Islamiyya al-Alamiyya* [International Islamic Relief Organization, or IIRO]), and their Pakistani members founded the Markaz Dawat wal Irshad (MDI) in circa August 1987. The MDI was renamed the Jamatud Dawa (JuD) in December 2001.

The Meccan rebellion was the first jihadist operation by a truly international jihadist group. Few understood its significance at the time because of its failure. The Saudis took it as a mere rebellion and handled it as a law and order issue. They crushed it with the help of French counter-terrorism experts. The danger the ideology of Juhayman's Ikhwan posed, and still poses, revealed itself slowly. In 2004, Prince Khalid al Faisal, Governor of the supposed Mahdi's home province of Asir, said, "We have eliminated the individuals who committed the Juhayman crime, but we have overlooked the ideology that was behind the crime. We've let it spread in the country, ignoring it as if it did not exist."[5] He was right. Juhayman's ideology has survived in the shape of two international jihadist organizations: al-Qaeda and the MDI/JuD, which is often

erroneously referred to as the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). The MDI/JuD grew out of Juhayman's ideology while al-Qaeda espoused it much later. While the former has been crushed considerably, the latter has emerged as a far bigger threat to international peace. This book explains how this has happened.

During her visit to India in April 2012, U.S. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Wendy Sherman announced a $10 million reward for information leading to the arrest of Hafiz Saeed, and another $2 million reward for information leading to the arrest of Hafiz Abdur Rehman Makki, head of the JuD's Department of Foreign Affairs (and brother of Hafiz Saeed's first wife, Maimoona). The U.S. Department of Treasury also declared Hafiz Saeed a Specially Designated National under Executive Order 13224.[6] The announcement of a $10 million bounty turned Hafiz Saeed into the second most wanted terrorist in the world, the first being the head of al-Qaeda, Ayman Mohammed Rabie al-Zawahiri, who carries a reward of $25 million on his head. There was an adverse reaction in Pakistan. Pakistani Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gillani said that the American reward was a "negative message" and would "further widen the trust deficit" between the two countries. Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan, then leader of the opposition in the National Assembly, said, "Today, Hafiz Saeed has been targeted. Tomorrow, any other ordinary Pakistani citizen can get the same treatment."[7] Little did he realize that Hafiz Saeed was no ordinary Pakistani. Hafiz Saeed himself ridiculed the announcement of the bounty on his head.

Later, the State Department clarified that the $10 million would be paid for "information leading to [Hafiz] Saeed's prosecution, not about his location."[8] The clarification gave the JuD and its supporters more reason to ridicule. Hafiz Muhammed Masood, the Information Secretary of JuD, said, "By seeking evidence, they are acknowledging that they don't have any evidence against him... After all these years, with all the intelligence they have and all the investigators, they are giving money for evidence?"[9] Masood was at least partially right. The announcement for the bounty says that

Hafiz Saeed is "a former professor of Arabic and Engineering."[10] In reality, he taught neither Arabic nor engineering. He taught only Islamic Studies at the University of Engineering and Technology (UET) in Lahore. The announcement also gives his date of birth as June 5, 1950,[11] whereas his actual date of birth is March 1948.[12] The MDI/JuD and Hafiz Saeed has become shrouded in myths and speculation. One such myth is that Abdullah Azzam was one of the founders and financers of the MDI. This myth has survived to this day although there is no primary or secondary evidence to substantiate it. Apparently, the source of the myth is Amir Hamza's passing remark that Hafiz Saeed had been introduced to the concept of jihad by Abdullah Azzam in circa 1980. In truth, Abdullah Azzam moved to Islamabad in November 1981,[13] and started giving lectures at the International Islamic University in Islamabad in the evenings. If Hafiz Saeed attended these lectures, it would have been only for a few times as he went to Lahore to teach at the University of Engineering and Technology in 1981. In 1982, Saeed went to study for two years at the Malik Saud University in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.[14]

Although the United States designated the LeT as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) on December 24, 2001, there had been little interest in the group until terrorists struck Mumbai in November 2008. Most research on terrorism revolved around al-Qaeda and its affiliates until the JuD terrorists struck U.S. citizens in Mumbai on November 26, 2008. A little over two years before the November 2008 terrorist attacks, U.S. Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker advised India not to blame Pakistan for the 2006 Mumbai train blasts in which more than 200 persons died and more than 700 were injured. He also advised New Delhi that it should resolve the issue through "direct contact" with Islamabad. He said, "India should communicate with Pakistan by having direct contact instead of talking about the Mumbai train blasts in the public."[15] Unfortunately, most of the research on the JuD/LeT now revolves around the November 2008 Mumbai attacks. The reason is the U.S. government, academia, and policy practitioners still look at the MDI/LeT through the prism of the November 2008 terrorist attacks in which several U.S. citizens died. When the U.S. government

announced bounties on Hafiz Saeed and Abdur Rehman Makki, the JuD said the United States had announced the bounties because of their opposition to the possible restoration of NATO supply routes to Afghanistan. State Department spokeswoman Victoria Nuland said, "No, it has everything to do with Mumbai and his brazen flouting of the justice system."[16] This book is an attempt to fill the vast gaps that exist in research on the JuD/LeT.

The JuD is perhaps the most proscribed terrorist group in the world. Since the United States designated the LeT as an FTO on December 24, 2001, a number of U.N. member countries have designated it and its reincarnations and affiliate departments as terrorist organizations.[17] After the United Nations implicated the JuD/LeT and several of its leaders in December 2008 in the Mumbai terror attacks, Pakistan arrested several suspects, including LeT Operational Commander Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi. The government also put Hafiz Saeed under house arrest on charges unrelated to terrorism. The published reports and interviews with the JuD/LeT leaders show that the arrested JuD/LeT leaders have led quite comfortable lives in jails, from where they continue to lead their group's activities. They were also allowed to meet and sleep with their wives, a luxury not given to other prisoners. Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi even fathered a son who is being raised as a LeT jihadist. Pakistani jihadists nicknamed Lakhvi Jr. as Maulana Adialvi.[18] As the international pressure on Pakistan kept relenting, Pakistani courts released Hafiz Saeed in June 2009, after Advocate General Punjab Raza Farooq suddenly informed the Supreme Court that the Punjab government wanted to withdraw the appeal because the Punjab government did not have enough evidence against Hafiz Saeed.[19]

Hafiz Saeed lied low for several months after his release before he re-emerged on the political scene in early 2010 as the head of a politico-religious party, the JuD. Soon he became a darling of the Pakistani media, and even started appearing on evening talk shows. There is perhaps no popular TV talk show that has not hosted him since, many of whom having hosted him repeatedly. TV anchors

crossed, and continue to cross, all limits to portray him as a peaceful *alim* heading a charity. In these talk shows and televised interviews, he is never asked any probing questions or reminded of his pre-9/11 statements. In some TV shows where the audience also participates, TV anchors make it clear to them that they are not allowed to ask questions on themes such as jihad. Several TV anchors act more as spokespersons of the JuD rather than independent anchors.[20] Many TV anchors, either out of conviction or of desire to be on the right side of the Pakistani military, fight on behalf of Hafiz Saeed on social media when they are not doing it on the mini-screen. The new description of the JuD as a politico-religious party and charity has helped the party to widen its support base in the middle class as well.

It is quite understandable why the Pakistani media are interested in portraying the JuD as a politico-religious party. However, the portrayal of the JuD as a charity in the western media is mind-boggling. Most of the western media, including big names such as Reuters,[21] VOA,[22] Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty,[23] and the Guardian,[24] routinely describe the JuD as a charity instead of a terrorist organization. The portrayal of the JuD/LeT as a charity is not limited to the western media. Some of academics in the west commit the same mistake. Humeira Iqtidar, for example, sees secularizing Islamists in the JuD,[25] while Masooda Bano describes the JuD as a group of "rational believers." Dr. Ayesha Siddiqa rightly says about them that "Bano has tried to awkwardly fit new institutional economics with her study of madrassahs and in doing so, tried rationalizing militants including that of the JuD. Both ladies are well anchored in British academia"[26] and determine part of the discourse on the JuD.

There is evidence that the Americans were not interested in making Pakistan close the jihad factory, at least until the Mumbai terror attacks in November 2008. The Americans were interested only to dismantle al-Qaeda and other jihadi groups that posed a direct threat to the West, particularly the United States. French terrorist Brigitte testified on several occasions that CIA officials, accompanied by Pakistani soldiers, had been visiting the LeT training locations when he was receiving training at those camps. Before the raids, the Pakistani military officials asked them to clear the

training camps of any military activity, requesting that foreign terrorists such as Brigitte leave the training camps. Brigitte said, "I can remember four raids by the Pakistani Army. They always asked the foreign volunteers, of whom I was one, to clean up the camp and particularly to collect the cartridge cases and cartridges. There were no more than 15 Pakistani soldiers who came to carry out these checks with the same number of Americans. We were told that they were CIA agents who had come to check for the presence of foreign mujahadins."[27] Brigitte stayed at the camp for only six weeks during the winter of 2001-2002 before he returned to Paris in early 2002.[28] Four visits by CIA officials to a LeT training camp in six weeks show that the CIA was trying to keep a close watch on the jihadi scene in Pakistan. This also shows that the Americans were fairly tolerant of the Pakistani jihadi groups if they did not threaten the United States and its interests. My interviews with Pakistani security officials between September 2001 and September 2007 corroborate what Brigitte has revealed. However, during this time period, there was less and less cooperation between the United States and the military regime in Pakistan. By November 2008, the Americans had lost the opportunity they had in the early 2000s to make Pakistan stop using jihad as an instrument of its defense policy.

In June 1993, I was having my evening walk in the middle class neighborhood known as G-8 in Islamabad when I saw dozens of madrassah students carrying sticks and marching as a military unit around the main market in the neighborhood. A young man who appeared to be an imam of a mosque was leading them. I was just a few years into my journalistic career as a reporter for the English language daily newspaper, *The Muslim*, in Islamabad. Out of curiosity, I followed them. As the sun was about to set, the group headed to the local mosque where they said their *maghreb* prayers (fourth daily ritual prayer at sunset). The next day, I returned to the same street a little earlier and waited outside the same mosque in the hope that the group would come to the street again. As expected, the same group came out of the mosque 15

minutes after the *asr* prayers (third daily ritual prayer), carrying sticks and bamboos. Marching in military unit style, they made a round of the neighborhood for an hour or so and returned to the same mosque just before the *maghreb* prayers. I was alarmed and decided to go inside the madrassah and speak to them after the prayers. The students and the imam told me that they were preparing for jihad. When I told them the jihad in Afghanistan was over, they said they were preparing to wage jihad in Pakistan and the rest of the world. This was my first encounter with the Pakistani mujahideen. Based on these interviews, I wrote two articles in the daily *The Muslim*.[29] This was the beginning of my interest in Islamism and jihadism, which has kept growing with the passage of time.

Two-and-a-half-years later, on November 1, 1995, I was travelling from Islamabad to Lahore by bus. When the bus reached Gujranwala, 40 miles from Lahore, it was stopped by a group of bearded men. They had long hair and sported unkempt beards. They wore Afghan-style military fatigue jackets and their *shalwars* (baggy pants) were cut short just below mid-calf. One of them was carrying a Kalashnikov. Two of them boarded the bus. One of them went directly to the driver and asked him to turn off the music and hand over all music discs and cassettes to him. Looking at the Kalashnikov, the bus driver simply complied. Meanwhile, the other mujahid had started his sermon to the passengers. He said that Islam forbids listening to music and smoking tobacco, and he asked the passengers to abandon immoral habits and come to the MDI offices in their cities to learn Islam. Most passengers seemed to have agreed with him. None of the passengers dared stop them even though there were those who did not like being delayed. These mujahideen, I later learned, were practicing what they had learned in the MDI's 21-day proselytizing course *daura-e suffa:*

In about 30 minutes the bus reached Muridke, stopped in front of the Markaz Taiba (an MDI/JuD's educational complex where they also hold annual *ijtima'* [congregation]), and several passengers who had come to attend the annual congregation exited the bus. I was tempted to leave the bus as well, even though I was going to Lahore that day. Ultimately, my curiosity got the better of me, and I stepped off the bus. The Kalashnikov-toting men

were guarding the Markaz Taiba. At the main gate, dozens of mujahideen carried out body searches before allowing people into the main area. This was the first day of the annual congregation. The highlight of the congregation was the severed head of an Indian soldier on display. An LeT militant, Abu Haibat, had recently killed this soldier and brought his head to Pakistan. The MDI decided to put the severed head on display for the congregation.[30] My impression was that it was the biggest gathering I had seen in my life, including the political rallies led by Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, and religious gatherings such as the Tablighi Jamaat congregations. Only subsequent MDI/JuD annual congregations have been bigger than the 1995 annual congregation.[31] This was my first encounter with the MDI/LeT, which grew with the passage of time.

Between 1995 and September 2007, when I moved to the United States permanently, I covered the MDI/LeT and its reincarnation, the JuD, extensively for different publications and for my books. During this period, I missed few important events organized by the MDI/JuD. I visited all their *muaskars* (training camps) repeatedly to see their training and to interview the militants. During my 18 years of research, spanning most of my journalistic career, I accumulated an un-matched number of MDI/JuD publications, books, pamphlets, flyers, and audio-visual media, which give a very clear inside view of the group. Unfortunately, the JuD editors have been self-censoring their publications and other media more and more strictly in the post-9/11 period. I have compensated this with other sources. Between 1995 and September 2007, I interviewed hundreds of MDI/JuD militants, from Hafiz Saeed to ordinary foot soldiers of the jihadist militia. I first met with Hafiz Saeed in November 1995 at the annual congregation, but published my first interview with him in *The News on Sunday* in November 1998.[32] I have met and interviewed him umpteen times since then. These interviews are a goldmine, and I have used much of this primary material to write this book, focusing on JuD/LeT's transnational jihad. Since September 2007, I have closely followed the JuD/LeT with the help of research assistants and colleagues in different cities of Pakistan.

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Using the primary sources has not been easy. The MDI/JuD publications and the leaders in their interviews have not been precise. The following example shows how careless they are sometimes about dates and numbers. In its issue of May 2001, a report on its annual congregation the previous month, Naveed Qamar reports that, in his address to the annual congregation in April 2001, Hafiz Saeed said there were 150 deaf and dumb mujahideen attending the annual congregation. In the same article, the same reporter said there were 250 deaf and dumb people attending the annual congregation.[33] In such cases, I used conservative figures if there was no way to ascertain it otherwise. Even if the endnotes mention only one primary source, I have tried to ascertain each piece of information from more than one source. Some journalists and authors have done good work in this field, although it is not possible to name them individually. I have liberally benefitted from all of their research.

In this book, without going into a discussion of the greater and lesser jihads, I have used the word jihad in the sense of *qital* (killing), or an armed jihad. This is how MDI/JuD understands the word. In fact, in most cases, they use either the word *qital* or the expression *jihad-o-qital* (jihad and killing) in their texts and speeches. JuD/LeT spokesman Abdullah Muntazar writes, "Quraan uses the word *'Qital'* for armed Jihad. *Qital* is from *'qatl'* which means 'killing'. So killing and being killed is a part of Islam and in Quraan and Hadeeth, Allah and His last Prophet tell the believers that if they kill a non-believer or got killed by a non-believer they will get paradise without being questioned on the Day of Judgment."[34] The confusion over the meaning of jihad is due to western experts' lack of access to original MDI/JuD sources and lack of knowledge of the history of Islam. Islam evolved over 23 years and passed through several phases from being quite peaceful to quite violent. The Prophet of Islam, Muhammad, started his life as a prophet in Mecca with his call to Islam in a peaceful way. When persecution of the Muslims in Mecca became unbearable, he decided to take his Muslim followers to Medina. In Medina, he claimed to have

received the revelation, "Sanction is given unto those who fight because they have been wronged; and Allah is indeed able to give them victory (Al-Hajj: 39)," which allowed the Muslims to fight back. When the Muslims became stronger, fighting was made binding on them in the revelation, "Warfare is ordained for you, though you dislike it (Al-Baqarah: 216)." MDI/JuD ideologue Abdus Salaam Bin Muhammad says that this verse is binding on all the Muslims who came after Muhammad till they achieve the eight objectives,[35] which are unlikely to be achieved till the Day of Judgment.

I have used MDI or JuD to describe the group as a whole instead of LeT throughout this book. The name of the jihadi group was the Markaz Dawat wal Irshad (MDI) that was renamed the Jamatud Dawa in December 2001. Both international media and academia have described the MDI and JuD as Lashkar-e-Taiba, as does the title of this book. This has created a lot of confusion over the group that has served the JuD well. Before December 2001, the MDI/JuD officials regretted that the world did not pay enough attention to the MDI and its work, and the LeT had attracted out-of-proportion attention because of jihad. In 1999, Hafiz Saeed remarked to me, "We are a lot bigger than the LeT." This changed after December 2001. The JuD leaders never lose an opportunity to repeat that the JuD is separate from the LeT. Privately they say, to use the words of Sheikh Yaqub, "We will return under the banner of the Lashkar-e-Taiba one day."[36] The army the Prophet of Islam led into Mecca was also called the Lashkar-e-Taiba, or the Army of Medina. The MDI/JuD considers itself the continuation of the same Army of Medina led by Islam's Prophet. The MDI/JuD claims it also has the same goal based on its understanding of early Prophetic history: to conquer the entire world. The LeT was and still is just one of its *'shu'ba'* (department) which wages jihad in Indian Kashmir and India. It is the Department of Foreign Affairs under Hafiz Abdul Rehman Makki,[37] which wages jihad in the rest of the world, excluding Pakistan. The different departments of the MDI/JuD guard their turf as jealously as any department of any other organization would. I have used the name of the LeT only in the context of Kashmir

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and India, and the MDI or JuD to describe the group as a whole throughout this book. I have used the MDI to describe the group in the pre-December 2001 context and the JuD in the post-December context. When the context spans the entire life of the group, I have described it as MDI/JuD. However, I have kept the LeT and its several variations such as Lashkar-e-Taiba in the citations. I have used the words Lashkar-e-Taiba in the title of the book because of general familiarity with the name.

There is some confusion about the relationship between the Pakistani military and the ISI in the Western media and academia. I do not differentiate between the military of Pakistan and ISI as most Westerners do. The ISI is an arm of the Pakistani military like any other department, such as the Punjab Regiment and Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) departments. The ISI has civilian employees and informants at the lowest level, but all of its officers are military officers. The ISI is supposed to function similarly to the CIA and DIA. However, the CIA is a civilian organization while the ISI is not. Although the ISI head, usually a Lt. General, is theoretically supposed to report to and take orders from the prime minister, in practice he never does. Rather, there is abundant evidence that he reports to and takes orders from the army chief. Theoretically, the ISI head can be an officer from the Pakistan Air Force and Navy, or even a civilian. For example, Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto appointed a retired general as its head in her first stint as prime minister. However, the ISI officers stopped reporting to him, and instead reported to the second in command of the ISI, who was a serving military officer. This military officer reported to and took orders from the army chief in return. In this book, I have named the ISI only as an executive branch of the Pakistan Army and not as an independent intelligence agency in the sense other intelligence agencies such as the CIA, DGSE, or RAW are.

Pakistan started using jihad as an instrument of its defense policy soon after the partition of British India into Pakistan and India in August 1947. Both countries wooed the Maharaja of the erstwhile princely state of Jammu and Kashmir. When the Maharaja dragged his feet on making the decision, Pakistan sent in armed tribesmen in September 1947 to ignite rebellion against the

Maharaja. The tribesmen's invasion forced the Maharaja to sign the Instrument of Accession to India. Subsequent events led to the first war between the two countries, which ended in December 1948, by which time the Pakistan Army had occupied approximately one-third of the territory. Pakistan calls the territory under its control Azad Kashmir while India calls the state "Jammu and Kashmir." Pakistan calls the territory under Indian control as "Occupied Kashmir," or "Held Kashmir," while Indians call the territory under Pakistani control as Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir or POK. I have called the territory under Pakistan's control as Pakistani Kashmir and the territory under Indian control as Indian Kashmir only to differentiate the divided state. Pakistan, India, and Nepal call their currencies "rupee" or "rupees" and historically used the sign R. (singular) and Rs. (plural). I have used PRs. to denote Pakistani rupees, IRs. to denote Indian currency, and NRs. to denote Nepalese currency in this book. Unfortunately, some of the sources I had to use in this book did not differentiate between the three currencies. I left them as such instead of speculating. I have used conversion rates at the time.

In South Asia, they have a unique and complex system of names. I have used the oriental way of using either the full names or the way they are used in South Asia instead of the last names in order to avoid confusion. Also I have used the original citations from the JuD literature instead of correcting them before using them.

The book is divided into twelve chapters. Although the JuD is constantly evolving, it has retained many of the early ideological influences and operational features. The first chapter gives the origins and early history of the MDI/LeT. The MDI came into being during the Afghan jihad. Based on primary sources, this chapter shows that the surviving members of Juhayman's Ikhwan, who staged a rebellion against the Saudi regime in November 1979, gathered Pakistani Ahle Hadith jihadists and founded the MDI in 1987.

The second chapter explains how the Ahle Hadith jihadists who became the founding members of the MDI started and

waged jihad in Afghanistan. It uncovers their links with the Afghan Salafists in the Afghan province of Nuristan. This chapter covers the period roughly from early 1980 (when the first Salafist student went to Afghanistan to fight the Soviets) to 1987 (when Juhayman's Ikhwan formally founded the MDI).

The third chapter covers the MDI's struggle to survive in its early period, until around 1993, when it formally formed the LeT, its armed wing, to wage jihad in Kashmir, and later India. In this period, the MDI established organizational links with one of the Afghan mujahideen groups known as Peshawar-7, as well as Abdur Rabb Rasul Sayyaf (now an Afghan parliamentarian), and later Sheikh Jamilur Rehman in Kunar. Both of them have left indelible influence on the JuD. This chapter covers the early formative period in which MDI's jihad was restricted to Afghanistan. During this period, it created its two most important departments, which later ran different jihads in the world: Lashkar-e-Taiba and the Department of Foreign Affairs. During this period, apart from jihad in Afghanistan, the MDI was involved mostly in missionary activities.

In 1993, the MDI founded its armed wing, LeT, which emerged to become the leading jihadi organization in Kashmir. The fourth chapter discusses the establishment of the LeT and how it waged jihad in Indian Kashmir. This chapter analyzes the LeT's objectives, tactics, and evolution of its guerrilla strategy (centered on the *fidayee* missions) in Indian Kashmir. This chapter also describes the military training camps of the MDI/LeT. It ran six principal training camps before the 9/11 attacks. However, they began setting up mobile camps after the 9/11 attacks. They also ran the biggest number of launching camps along the Line of Control (LoC) and the working boundary. This chapter identifies these camps and traces their history. It also describes what goes on in these camps around the year.

For the LeT, Indian Kashmir was just a gateway to India. The fifth chapter discusses how Juhayman's Ikhwan were also working in India to raise a jihadist group to fight the Indian state. Usually, LeT's jihad in India (outside Kashmir) is thought to have started with an attack on laborers in Himachal Pradesh in 1998. In truth,

Juhayman's Ikhwan had founded and funded groups much earlier. Apart from profiling the jihad in the Indian heartland, this chapter analyzes the LeT's tactics and strategy in India.

The sixth chapter explains why and how the LeT organized the Mumbai terror operation on November 26, 2008. It shows that the government of Pakistan, under the influence of its military, is holding only a sham trial of the culprits, and that there is no hope of the perpetuators of the Mumbai carnage coming to justice. India has arrested one of the ten attackers, Mohammed Ajmal Amir Kasab, while the United States. nabbed David Headley. Later, India succeeded in getting Syed Zabiuddin Syed Zakiuddin Ansari (aka Abu Jundal) extradited from Saudi Arabia. They have given extremely valuable information about the planning and execution of the operation. I have heavily depended on these statements and court documents because most of the writing on the 11/26 Mumbai attacks are just a rehash of these statements and documents.

The ISI had set up its intelligence infrastructure in countries around India, particularly Nepal, before jihad in Indian Kashmir started. When the jihad started in 1988, the ISI and some Kashmiri jihadist groups used that intelligence infrastructure to plan and launch the jihad. Later, the ISI helped develop their jihadist infrastructure in these countries. Some of these jihadist groups, including the MDI/JuD, started their own jihad in these countries. The seventh chapter explains MDI/JuD's jihad in the countries encircling India. Taking advantage of ISI help, the MDI/JuD built its Indian Ocean Command in these countries.

The eighth chapter covers the MDI's transnational jihad in countries where there were already some members and supporters of Juhayman's Ikhwan. It shows how a small group of a few Pakistani Salafist mujahideen evolved into a formidable jihadi network with the financial help of Juhayman's Ikhwan. The chapter discusses hitherto unknown contacts of the LeT and tells how it established its units in various parts of the world. This chapter discusses MDI's jihad in countries where they practically took part in armed jihad. It also discusses MDI's jihad in Bosnia, which is often mistakenly considered as al-Qaeda's jihad. This chapter covers

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roughly the period from 1987 to September 11, 2001.

Soon after the formation of the MDI, its leaders established contacts with international jihadist groups on all continents, as far as the United States. The ninth chapter covers MDI's jihad in countries where the JuD is in the preparatory phase and plans to start jihad later. MDI/JuD is recruiting and building its infrastructure in these countries. JuD's preparations are at different stages in these countries. The tenth chapter continues the same theme

The eleventh chapter covers MDI/JuD's efforts to build jihadist infrastructure in the United States. It describes and analyzes different efforts by the MDI/JuD to build its infrastructure and recruit in the United States. It also shows that the United States has been high on its agenda. One reason is that one of the founders of MDI is an American Muslim. His real identity is still unknown, and mystery surrounds him. According to one source, he was one of the two surviving Juhayman's Ikhwan who were handed over to the CIA after the Mecca rebellion was crushed in 1979. Many of the surviving members of Juhayman's Ikhwan came to the United States in the early 1980s and fundraised for the mujahideen fighting in Afghanistan. He is said to have helped them to fundraise and recruit in the United States.

The twelfth chapter explains how the JuD imparts training. It also explains the philosophy behind the JuD training. The chapter explains that the public donations are the biggest source of JuD funds. This also shows how deep the organization has penetrated in the Pakistani society. It also discusses different sources of funds for building and keeping the huge jihadist infrastructure. The twelfth chapter is followed by the concluding chapter.

Arif Jamal
United States

Chapter One

THE MECCAN REBELLION

Total calm prevailed over Mecca, Islam's holiest city, on November 20, 1979, which fell on Muharram 1, 1,400 according to the Islamic lunar calendar. The world of Islam had just moved into the 15th century. As the color of the sky started turning pinkish from greyish, the *muezzin* in the Ka'aba started calling the faithful to the first daily ritual prayer with the call of *Allaho Akbar* (God is Greatest). It was not only the first ritual prayer of the day but also the first of the 15th century according to the Islamic lunar calendar. Only about 20 days earlier, Muslims from all over the world had performed their *hajj* (annual Muslim pilgrimage to the Ka'aba in Mecca). Most of them had returned to their countries, but a large number of them remained in Mecca, waiting for their flights. While they waited for their flights, they rushed to the Ka'aba each day to perform some of their five daily prayers. The majority of those who gathered to say their prayers on this day were Muslims from outside of Saudi Arabia.

Within a few minutes, Imam Mohammed Ibn Subeil, wearing a beige-colored robe, appeared among the crowd and went on to lead the prayers. Facing the Ka'aba, for the next few minutes, the imam read his prayers in Arabic. Few among his audience understood the meaning. But, after having performed *hajj*, all of them felt assured of entering paradise on the Day of Judgment. In between, the imam prostrated on the ground towards the Ka'aba. On cue, thousands of faithful followed him and prostrated themselves on the ground. As the imam turned his face towards

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his right, and then towards his left, wishing peace to all in order to conclude the prayers, there were gunshots. The stunned worshippers saw a gunman rushing towards the imam. Equally stunned were the guards who escaped or surrendered once the gunmen shot two of them dead. Few amongst the present realized that a rebellion against the House of Saud was taking place.

As utter confusion reigned in the compound of the Ka'aba, the 43-year old leader of the rebels, Juhayman al-'Utaybi, emerged from amongst the crowd. Surrounded by his bodyguards, he quickly elbowed his way towards the imam. Like a pious Salafist, he was wearing the traditional Arab white robe, cut short just below mid-calf. His shoulder length hair blended into his unkempt beard. He rudely pushed the imam aside and seized the microphone in which the imam said his prayers. Confused worshippers rushed toward the nearest gates, but were pushed back by the armed followers of Juhayman. Finding them trapped by the unknown rebels, some of them started chanting *Allaho Akbar*, a cry for help in times of distress. Others soon joined them, making it louder. Juhayman's men also joined them in chanting *Allaho Akbar*, which is also a battle cry. By this time, the rebels had taken their positions around the compound. The takeover of Islam's holiest place took only a few minutes. Juhayman was in complete control.[1]

As the people calmed down, Juhayman used the public address system in the Ka'aba to give his followers instructions in Arabic: "If you see a government soldier who wants to raise his hand against you, have no pity and shoot him because he wants to kill you. Do not hesitate."[2] Juhayman and his aides explained the purpose of their actions in Arabic. They told their audience that the prophecy of the Prophet of Islam had come true and the promised Mahdi, an apocalyptic figure, had appeared and among them. According to the Islamic scriptures, the Mahdi will appear just before the Day of Judgment and conquer the entire world for the Muslims. He will appear at the Ka'aba in Mecca where he will swear allegiance and perform a sit-in. An army from Tabuk, now in northwestern Saudi Arabia, will come to fight him but will be destroyed. The Mahdi will then go to Medina and fight the *Dajjal* (Antichrist). From Medina, he will go to Palestine and fight and kill

the Jews. Jesus Christ will descend from heavens and break the cross and kill the swine. They will pray together at the Umayyad Mosque in Syria before the Day of Judgment takes place. Although the Islamic scriptures do not say when the Day of Judgment will take place, there used to be a widespread belief among Muslims that the first day of the 15th century would bring the end of the world.

The takeover of the Holy Ka'aba was meticulously planned. The rebels knew that the Saudi police and other security forces were extraordinarily inefficient and would not be able to dislodge them from there. Many of the rebels were studying at the academy within the precincts of the Ka'aba, and they used their knowledge of the premises to entrench themselves. The government was constructing part of the Ka'aba compound at that time and the construction company's vehicles had unhindered access through a door-less opening under the Fatah Gate. The security men of the Ka'aba let the rebels drive three pickup trucks through this passageway for a modest bribe of 40,000 Saudi Ryals.[3] The trucks carried weaponry, ammunition, and food, and were parked in the basement of the Ka'aba. Juhayman, accompanied by the presumed Mahdi, joined the rebels and moved stashes to the student quarters in the basement in the evening prior to the day they seized the Ka'aba. Now they were retrieving those weapons.

As the news of the Meccan rebellion reached King Khaled bin Abdulaziz al Saud, he assembled some of the senior Saudi *ulema* in the Maazar Palace. The goal was to seek a *fatwa* (unbinding religious edict in Sunni Islam) to use violence against the rebels, as it is a grave sin to use force in the holy mosque. The assembly of *ulema* decided that they should support the House of Saud at that time. They agreed to issue the *fatwa* in exchange for some promises. The regime had to be stopped and then rolled back. It had to put an end to women on television, ban licentious films, and prohibit alcohol. Most importantly, the regime had to put the petrodollars to spread the Wahhabi version of Islam, not only to reform Muslims, but also infidels. In short, as some Saudi princes later said, "The ulema essentially asked al Saud to adopt Juhayman's agenda in exchange for their help in getting rid of Juhayman

himself."[4] Yaroslav says, "As is often the case in the kingdom, this quid pro quo was implied, and not necessarily enshrined in clear, unambiguous words. But nobody questioned the meeting's outcome: the royal household accepted the bargain."[5]

Backed by the *fatwa*, the Saudi security forces prepared an operation to flush out the rebels from the Ka'aba. However, the Saudi security forces were and remain pathetically inefficient and not trained or equipped to carry out a sophisticated anti-terrorist operation. The rebels put up a determined resistance. After the passage of more than a week, the Saudi regime realized they needed foreign help. Prince Turki bin Faisal decided to seek out French help and a three-member anti-terrorist squad was soon on its way to Saudi Arabia. Finally, the Saudi forces flushed out Juhayman's Ikhwan from the Ka'aba. Saudi Interior Minister Prince Nayef claimed that the Saudi military had killed some 117 rebels. He also claimed that the Saudi military lost 127 men and 450 were injured.[6] On January 9, 1980, 63 rebels were beheaded in public executions. At least 26 pilgrims also died.[7] Other adult rebels were killed in the following months. However, the teenage supporters were put behind bars. The police claimed that they had arrested 170 rebels, including 23 women and children.[8]

Juhayman's Ikhwan was a radicalized faction of a much bigger Salafist organization, Al-Jama'a al-Salafiyya al-Muhtasiba[9] (Salafist Group that Commands Right and Forbids Wrong), or JSM. JSM and Juhayman's Ikhwan survived the Meccan rebellion and have subtly played a significant role in shaping politics in Saudi Arabia and beyond. Thomas Hegghammer calls this strain "rejectionist Islamism" which is distinct from Wahhabi Islamism, al-Sahwa al-Islamiyya (Islamic Awakening), and Jihadist Salafism.[10] The group stresses the literalist interpretation of the Islamic scriptures, pathological hate for politics, and active rejection of the state and its institutions. The group's roots can be traced to the early 1940s, if not earlier, when the paths of the South Asian Ahle Hadith and Saudi Wahabbists started crossing. The marriage between the South Asian Ahle Hadith and Saudi Wahabbists gave birth to the Salafism

which JSM and MDI/JuD later espoused. The marriage between the South Asian Ahle Hadith and Saudi Wahabbists also coincided with renewed U.S. interest in the Near East.

Towards the end of the Second World War, in 1938, American engineers explored the first oil well in Saudi Arabia. In 1945, U.S. President Frankin D. Roosevelt and the ageing Saudi Arabian King, Abdelaziz, dined together aboard the USS Quincy in Egypt's Great Bitter Lake, and sealed a lasting strategic alliance. As Aramco received the monopoly over the Saudi oil industry, thousands of Americans started pouring into Saudi Arabia. This did not go well with the Saudi clergy. 'Abd al-'Aziz b. Baz (Bin Baz for short), then in his early clerical career, issued a fiery *fatwa*, supporting the extension of the ban on any non-Muslim presence in Mecca and Medina to the entire Arabian peninsula. Bin Baz wrote: "It is illicit to employ a non-Muslim servant, whether male or female, or a non-Muslim driver, or a non-Muslim worker in the Arabian Gulf, for the Prophet... commanded that all Jews and Christians be expelled, and only the Muslims remain... The presence of infidels, male or female, poses a danger to Muslims, their beliefs, their morality, and their children's education."[11] Osama bin Laden used the same hadith and logic to declare jihad against Jews and Crusaders in 1998.

The *fatwa* infuriated King Abdelaziz and he jailed Bin Baz. He was released only after he agreed to temper his criticism of modernization in the kingdom by backing the Saudi regime in the future. There was no real change of heart, however. When he came out of the jail, he attacked the display of royal portraits in the official building. "It is not permissible to hang pictures on a wall... Instead, it is compulsory to obliterate these pictures. Hanging a picture may lead to exalting or worshipping it, particularly if the picture is that of a King,"[12] said one of his *fatawa* (pl. of *fatwa*). In another *fatwa*, he crossed more limits and declared tobacco as illicit as pork and alcohol. Barbershops were also supposed to be forbidden. He even forbade the clapping of hands because it copied Western ways.[13] When a newspaper proposed to allow female teachers in boys' elementary schools, he was furious. "This suggestion has been inspired by Satan or some of his deputies...

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and is pleasing to our enemies and the enemies of Islam... This is because, when a boy reaches ten years old, he is considered an adolescent. Someone like him can even get married and do what men do."[14]

In the 1940s, it looked as if the House of Saud was pushing the kingdom towards modernity while the Wahhabi establishment was pulling it back to the Middle Ages. The rise of Arab nationalists and Baathists in some countries in the 1950s and 1960s brought them again closer sending shockwaves to other Gulf States. It pushed the Muslim Brothers (*Ikhwanul Muslimeen*) out of their countries to the states in the Gulf, including and particularly in Saudi Arabia. Prince Faisal bin Abdulaziz Al Saud who became the Crown Prince in 1953 after his brother King Saud bin Abdulaziz Al Saud came into power, created a lot of space for the Wahhabi establishment to counter Arab nationalists and Baathists. This is the time when the star of Bin Baz and other obscurantist clerics began to rise. In the wake of the first repression by Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt in 1954, many Brothers took refuge in Gulf states, including in Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia even granted citizenship to some of them. After the formation of the United Arab Republic (UAR) in 1958, many Syrian Brothers also went to different states in the Gulf, particularly Saudi Arabia. Persecution of Muslim Brothers in Iraq started soon after the Iraqi military under Abd al-Karim Qasim in July 1958. The Iraqi Brothers had to follow their Egyptian and Syrian Brothers to different states, including Saudi Arabia.

In 1961, as part of the anti-Nasser apparatus, Sheikh Mohammad bin Ibrahim, then head of the Saudi official education institution, created the Islamic University of Medina[15] with the help of Crown Prince Faisal bin Abdulaziz, and appointed Bin Baz as its head. The Islamic University of Medina aimed at encouraging *dawa* (proselytizing) and *hisba* (enforcement of Islamic laws). In May 1961, King Saud announced that only individuals "who have been driven from their country after having been robbed, abused and tortured,"[16] would operate the university, giving a big boost to the Muslim Brothers. In 1962, Saudi Arabia established the Muslim World League, in which the Muslim Brothers had a less

central role because it was supposed to be a forum of Islamic movements from all over the Muslim world. The Muslim Brothers were represented by Said Ramadan, son-in-law of Hassan al-Banna, and Jordanian Kamil al-Sharif.[17]

Bin Baz invited a Syria-based scholar of Islam, Mohammad Nasir al-Din al-Albani (1914-99), to teach at the university. Al-Albani had become known for reviving a medieval sect, *Ahl al-Hadith* (people of hadith), which emerged in the eighth century to oppose the use of reason in Islamic matters. The Ahle Hadith sect was revived in the early 19th century again in British India. They believed that only the hadith[18] could provide answers to matters not treated in the Quran. Of the four Sunni schools of jurisprudence, only the Hanbali School followed the Ahl al-Hadith. However, with the passage of time, the Hanbalis also started following the rulings of their earlier scholars instead of using their own *ijtihad* (diligence/Islamic legal term for independent reasoning) based on Quran and hadith. Al-Albani accused the Wahhabis of following the footsteps of the Hanbalis who believed in *ijtihad*, but practiced *taqlid* (the practice of following any one of the four Sunni Schools of Jurisprudence). He had also developed his own peculiar views on the authenticity of hadith, particularly on Islamic rituals. Many of these views were sometimes opposed to Wahhabi views. Al-Albani was finally expelled from Medina in 1963.[19]

In 1964, backed by the Saudi clergy led by clerics like Bin Baz, King Faisal bin Abdulaziz came to power. As soon as he came to power, he started raising the budgets for the religious establishment, which led to the birth of Islamist groups and increased their influence. One such group was *al-Sahwa al-Islamiyya* (Islamic Awakening). *Al-Sahwa al-Islamiyya* had been developing on university campuses from the late 1950s. The *al-Sahwa al-Islamiyya* aimed at reforming the Saudi state, but never questioned its legitimacy. The development of *al-Sahwa al-Islamiyya* coincided with the arrival of a large number of Muslim Brothers members to Saudi Arabia who wanted to avoid persecution in their own countries. These educated Muslim Brothers immigrants from countries like Egypt and Syria formed the backbone of the Saudi academia and intelligentsia. The same Muslim Brothers influenced the *al-Sahwa al-*

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Islamiyya, which came to be a blend of the Wahhabis on social issues and the Muslim Brothers on political issues. Slowly, *al-Sahwa al-Islamiyya* started receiving patronage from the Wahhabi establishment, which remained unsatisfied with the House of Saud. Even the pro-Islamist measures by King Faisal bin Abdulaziz did not satisfy Bin Baz, who kept issuing his obscurantist *fatawa* till his death. He issued a *fatwa* in 1993 claiming the earth is flat, and those who claim it is round are atheists and deserve punishment,[20] which is death. However, the senior *ulema* had learnt the lesson that King Abdelaziz had taught Bin Baz back in the 1940s. They kept their theory and practice apart and their rejection of modern ways never led to open opposition to the royal family.[21]

King Faisal bin Abdulaziz called for coordination and mutual aid between Muslim countries and revived pan-Islamism as part of Saudi foreign policy doctrine, but not as a political unification of the Muslim world. King Faisal's concept of 'Muslim solidarity' (*al-tadamun al-islami*) was largely a counterweight to President Nasser's secular Arab nationalism. King Faisal bin Abdulaziz's doctrine of pan-Islamism aimed at building an alliance in the Muslim world against Egypt. Hegghammer argues that this also served as a source of political legitimacy for the regime. He writes, "However, it also served a domestic political purpose namely to boost the Saudi regime's religious credentials. Containing the birthplace of Wahhabism and the cradle of Islam, Saudi Arabia had made religious identity a key pillar of its legitimacy. Leading and helping the Muslim nations was King Faisal bin Abdulaziz's way of laying claim to religious integrity."[22]

Alongside the *al-Sahwa al-Islamiyya*, another extremist Islamist strain was emerging in the 1960s, which was represented by *Al-Jama'a al-Salafiyya al-Muhtasiba* (JSM). Hegghammer and Lacroix have described this strain as rejectionist Islamism, or neo-Salafism,[23] A small group of students of Islam, led by Juhayman, founded the JSM in the mid-1960s. The group included Nasser ben Hussain, Sulaiman ben Shteiwi, and Saad al-Tamimi.[24] A lesser-known name for this group was *Al-Jamaa ad-Dawa al-Muhtasiba* (Predication Group

that commands virtue and combats sin).[25] The JSM was tremendously influenced by Al-Albani's religious views, which formed the ideological foundations of the organization.[26] This group was involved in *dawa* among Medina's poor. They believed that Islam, including the official Saudi version known as Wahhabism, needed to be purified from *bid'a* (Reprehensible innovation in Islam). Another of their objectives was to stem the rising influence of non-Salafi ideologies, such as the Tablighi Jamaat and the Muslim Brotherhood.[27] Before taking on the name of *Al-Jama'a al-Salafiyya al-Muhtasiba*, the JSM acted as a group of vigilantes involved in enforcing their interpretation of Islam in certain parts of Medina. These vigilantes used to go around and destroy photographs and images in public. This went unnoticed until 1965, when a group of them destroyed a large number of display windows with female mannequins in Medina.[28] Many of them were arrested and imprisoned for a week or so. Two foreign students, Abd al-Rahman al-Khaliq from Egypt, and Umar al-Asghar from Jordan, both of whom were involved in the vandalizing, were expelled. Abd al-Rahman al-Khaliq went to Kuwait and founded *Jami'at ihya' al-turath al-Islami* (Revival of Islamic Heritage Society or RIHS) in December 1981, while Umar al-Asghar emerged as a leading ideologue of the Jordanian Muslim Brothers.[29]

The vigilantes started organizing themselves after they were released. They decided to call their group *Al-Jama'a al-Salafiyya*. The group maintained contacts with, and enjoyed support among, the leading Saudi *ulema*, including Bin Baz and Abu Bakr al-Jaza'iri. They considered Bin Baz as their ideological sheikh. When they approached him for advice on the eve of the foundation of the JSM, he encouraged their initiative and advised them to add the word *al-Muhtasiba* at the end of their group's name.[30] Bin Baz thus became the official spiritual guide of the group and appointed Abu Bakr al-Jaza'iri as his deputy.[31] Nasser al-Huzeimi later explained, "The name meant that the group expected to get rewarded by God alone for their actions. And so the group was publicly launched as an Islamic preaching group."[32] The group set up its first headquarters in a large house in the area of El-Hora El-Sharqyia, rented by Bin Baz for them. Bin Baz and some other sheikhs

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(religious leaders) from Medina, including Sheikh Abu Bakr al-Jaza'iri, Ali al-Mazru', Sheikh Muqbil Ibn Haadee al-Waadiee, Sa'd Nada (of Jama'at Ansar al-Sunna al-Muhammadiyya of Egypt), Allama Rashdi, and Al-Albani came to give religious lectures here.[33] According to al-Huzeimi, "The group had its own *Shura* Council (consultative council), which would meet and discuss things in private without the knowledge of Bin Baz and the other sheikhs."[34] Al-Huzeimi says their concept of monotheism was "taken from the books of Salafist religious scholars, particularly those of Sheikh Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab (1703-1792), Taqi al-Din Ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328), and Sheikh Ibn al-Qayyim (1292-1350). Their rejection of sectarianism and weak Hadiths was probably taken from the writings of Sheikh Mohammed Nasser al-Albani (1914-1999), and his disciples."[35]

The patronage from Bin Baz and Abu Bakr al-Jaza'iri encouraged more people to join the group. In the early 1970s, they moved to a building in Medina called *Bayt al-Ikhwan* (The House of the Brothers) where they held daily classes and weekly conferences to promote their sect's beliefs. As the group grew in numbers, they organized it under six administrative groups, one of which was initially headed by Juhayman. However, the influence of Al-Albani was most important. Al-Albani was a powerful proponent of Wahhabism in terms of *'aqidah* (creed), but had disagreements with Wahhabi *ulema* in so far as the *fiqh* (law) was concerned. According to Al-Albani, there is a fundamental contradiction within the Wahhabi tradition. In theory, the Wahhabi *ulema* place exclusive reliance on the Quran, the Sunna, and the consensus of *al-salaf al-salih* (the pious ancestors), but in practice they almost exclusively rely on Hanbali jurisprudence for their *fatawa*. This turns them into *muqqallidun* (followers of any one of the four Sunni Schools of Jurisprudence). According to Al-Albani, this is also true of Muhammad bin 'Abd al-Wahhab himself whom he describes as Salafist in creed, but not in *fiqh*. To be a Salafist in *fiqh*, Al-Albani makes hadith "the central pillar of the juridical process, for hadith alone may provide answers to matters not found in the Quran without relying on the school of jurisprudence."[36] Al-Albani's focus makes the science of hadith

into *'ilm al-rijal* (the science of men), or *'ilm al-jarh wa-l-ta'dil* (the science of critique and fair evaluation). His branch of Islamic knowledge evaluates morality, which is necessary for the reliability of the transmitters. Al-Albani believes in re-evaluating all hadiths, including the two *sahihs* of Bukhari and Muslim. Al-Albani excludes independent reasoning from the process of evaluating: "the critique of the *matn* (the content of the hadith) should be exclusively formal, i.e. grammatical or linguistic; only the *sanad* (the hadith's chain of transmitters) may be properly put into question."[37]

The new methodology to judge the hadith led Al-Albani to conclusions that were contrary to most schools of Islamic jurisprudence, including Hanbali/Wahhabist jurisprudence. In his book, *The Prophet's Prayer Described*, and later in *The Abridgement of the The Prophet's Prayer Described*, he wrote that Muslims can pray both barefooted and whilst wearing shoes.[38] He also declared the *mihrab*s, the niches in a mosque for the imam to lead the prayers, *bid'a*. Al-Albani strongly opposed taking part in politics, saying, "the good policy is to abandon politics," which shows his opposition to the Muslim Brotherhood.[39] Al-Albani challenged the legitimacy of the Wahhabi establishment by challenging their methodology. From the very beginning, Wahhabism has been the principal religious tradition that has been monopolized by a small religious aristocracy from Najd, centered around Muhammad bin 'Abd al-Wahhab and his descendants (known as the al-Sheikh). Only a small number of other families have been able to penetrate this circle.[40] Al-Albani's claim of being more faithful to the spirit of Wahhabism than 'Abd al-Wahhab himself made the former's ideas very popular among Salafist youth.[41] In his book, *The Veil of the Muslim Woman*, he argued that Muslim women need not cover their face, a position unacceptable to Wahhabis. This sparked a controversy and he was asked to leave the Kingdom in 1963. He went back to live in his country of birth, Syria, and later in Jordan in 1979.[42]

The JSM placed more and more stress on the literal understanding of the Quran and hadith and rejected *taqlid* even of scholars revered in the Wahhabi tradition, including Ibn Hanbal, Taqi al-Din Ibn Taymiyya, and Ibn 'Abd al Wahhab.[43] If destroying

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the images of living beings was tolerable by the Wahhabi establishment, the Wahhabi establishment felt threatened by some other practices. Following Al-Albani's interpretation, they believed that Muslims should break their fast during Ramadan not when the sun sets, but when the sunlight disappears. However, the fast can be broken in a room with closed windows. They prayed in the mosques while wearing sandals. There was no *mihrab* (niche) in the mosque in the Bayt al-Ikhwan because they thought the niche was a *bid'a*.[44]

This created serious friction between the Wahhabi establishment and the JSM. A group of Wahhabi clerics led by Abu Bakr al-Jaza'iri visited the *Bayt al-Ikhwan* to dissuade them from their practices in the summer of 1977. Abu Bakr al-Jaza'iri ended up clashing with Juhayman. This caused a split in the JSM with a minority, including most of the historical leaders, leaving the group. The hardline majority stood by Juhayman and pledged to continue their work, and Juhayman emerged as the sole leader of the JSM.[45] In December 1977, a few months after the split in the JSM, the Saudi government cracked down on Juhayman's Ikhwan. They arrested some 150 members and leaders of the JSM. However, Juhayman himself escaped[46] and lived in the northern desert regions, and reemerged only on November 20, 1979 in the Grand Mosque of Ka'aba. In the northern desert regions, he was accompanied by a group of three to five loyal followers. Juhayman kept in touch with his group in the cities through this group of loyalists. He spent these two years in the desert region to organize the November 1979 attack. Being that Juhayman was dyslexic, he recorded his messages on cassette tapes and dictated pamphlets to Muhammad bin Abdallah al-Qahtani, the future Mahdi. Although none of these cassettes have survived, the twelve pamphlets have. However, only eight of them were signed by Juhayman. These pamphlets were printed by al-Tali'a press in Kuwait as it was not possible to have them printed in Saudi Arabia. Interestingly, they had been approved by no other than Bin Baz.[47]

In late 1978, Juhayman claimed that Muhammad bin Abdallah al-Qahtani was the promised Mahdi. Al-Qahtani possessed many, if not all, the attributes of the promised Mahdi mentioned in the

relevant hadiths. First, his name was Muhammad bin Abdallah. Second, he belonged to the *ashraf*, the prophet's lineage. Third, his physical appearance was in accordance with descriptions in the *hadith*.[48] In 1979, Juhayman claimed that prophet Muhammad and God visited him in dreams and told him that al-Qahtani was the Mahdi who had been sent to cleanse the earth from corruption. Al-Qahtani also claimed he had a similar vision. Al-Qahtani then married Juhayman's sister.[49] Not all of his followers agreed with the designation of al-Qahtani as the Mahdi, which led to another split in the group. Those who remained with Juhayman formed the hardcore group that stormed the grand mosque in Mecca on November 20, 1979.[50]

After the events of 1979, we see two distinct currents in the Ahle Hadith community. The first group was in the majority. The majority of the Ahle Hadith *ulema*, particularly those who reached an institutional position in the Saudi system, gave undivided loyalty to the Saudi kingdom. Many of them supported the JSM in its early period. Rabee Ibn Haadee al-Madkhalee was one such *alim*. They even ignored the Ahle Hadith criticism of Wahhabism. They focused on their criticism of the *al-Sahwa al-Islamiyya*. Lacroix calls them loyalist Ahle Hadith. The second group was the rejectionist Ahle Hadith, which tried to keep the radical legacy of Juhayman alive without his insistence on messianism. The rejectionist Ahle Hadith included a large number of foreigners such as Sheikh Muqbil al-Waadiee. One possible reason was that they had little chance of going up the Saudi clerical ladder. However, the relationship between the rejectionist Ahle Hadith and the loyalist Ahle Hadith remained ambiguous but cordial. Rabee Ibn Haadee al-Madkhalee and Sheikh Muqbil al-Waadiee remained close. Members of one group could easily switch to the other group.[51] In many cases, the two groups patronized the same groups, such as Sheikh Jamilur Rehman in Afghanistan.[52]

The JSM had established contacts in the rest of the world with those who shared their ideology and worked to win over other Wahhabi/Salafist groups to their brand of Salafism. It had close

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links with *Jamaat Ansar al-Sunna al-Muhammadiyya* (Society of Supporters of Prophet Mohammad's Tradition) of Egypt whose leaders visited *Bayt al-Ikhwan* and gave lectures.[53] Many non-Saudi rejectionist Ahle Hadith *ulema* had returned to their own countries where they formed small independent groups or secret groups within larger Ahle Hadith organizations. At the time of the Meccan rebellion in November 1979, there were fairly large groups of rejectionist Ahle Hadith followers in Kuwait, Yemen, Pakistan, Sudan, Nigeria, Egypt, Myanmar, Afghanistan, and the Philippines, and in many other countries there were individuals who followed rejectionist Ahle Hadith creed. A large number of Juhayman's rebels who captured the Ka'aba in November 1979 were killed, and many of them were arrested by the Saudi security forces. The arrested rebels included citizens of a number of countries, including the United States. All of them were executed except two African-American converts who were handed over to the CIA after a brief detention. Their identity is still shielded by privacy laws.[54]

In the 1980s, hundreds of younger members left Saudi Arabia. Many of them went to Kuwait where the local chapter continued to work under Jabir al-Jalahma and Abd al-Latif al-Dirbas. Many went to Yemen and joined Sheikh Muqbil al-Waadiee,[55] a main figure in *al-Jamaa al-Salafiyya al-Muhtasiba*. During the December 1977 Saudi crackdown on the Juhayman group, the Saudi security forces also arrested Sheikh Muqbil al-Waadiee, who was released after more than a month as a result of intercession by *ulema* led by Bin Baz.[56] He was sent back to his native Yemen,[57] where he emerged as the country's most prominent Salafist scholar.[58] Many others went to Pakistan and joined Allama Rashdi[59] and the Karachi-based Abdullah Nasir Rehmani.[60] Allama Rashdi was arrested during the December 1977 Saudi crackdown on the Juhayman group. He was released after more than a month as a result of intercession by *ulema* led by Bin Baz.[61] He was sent back to Pakistan[62] but his son, Nureddin Sheikh Badiuddin, stayed in Saudi Arabia and was killed during the firefight with security forces during the rebellion.[63] Allama Rashdi was the *amir* of the Jamiat Ahle Hadith Sindh[64] and had taught in Saudi Arabia for a few years. The institutions where he taught included the Darul-Hadith al-Khayriyyah, Mecca. He also

taught classes in the Ka'aba and the Masjidun-Nabawee (Mosque of the Prophet). His students included towering Salafist *ulema* such as Sheikh Rabee Ibn Haadee al-Madkhalee and Sheikh Muqbil al-Waadiee.[65] After the failure of Juhayman's rebellion in Mecca, Allama Rashdi, Abdullah Nasir Rehmani, and other Pakistani members of Juhayman's Ikhwan focused on capturing the leadership of the small Pakistani Ahle Hadith community. Many of Juhayman's Ikhwan also went to take part in the Afghan jihad. Many of them gathered under the leadership of Allama Rashdi and founded the MDI in 1987.

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CHAPTER TWO

THE ORIGINS OF JAMATUD DAWA

In 1980, when the Afghan jihad started, the Ahle Hadith community in Pakistan was very small. It was organized around Ahle Hadith madrassahs and under different factions of the Jamiat Ahle Hadith (JAH) which had no popular appeal. The JAH had been opposing General Muhammad Ziaul Haq's Martial Law regime from the beginning, and also staged sit-ins against the regime. These were the reasons why the ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence) did not draw any faction of the JAH into the Afghan jihad. Also, JAH continued their missionary work and stayed away from armed jihad, as it feared it might annihilate the small group.[1] However, it did not ban participation in the Afghan jihad by its members as individuals. A number of the JAH members fundraised for the Afghan mujahideen.[2] In the first two years of the Afghan jihad, only one Ahle Hadith student from Pakistan, Abdul Qahhar, is known to have gone to Afghanistan to take part in jihad sometime in early 1980s. He went to Afghanistan with Irshad Ahmed, a Deobandi student from Jamiyya Binori Town Karachi.[3] Irshad Ahmed and his companions had formed *Jamiat Ansar-ul-Afghaneen* (Party of the Friends of the Afghan people) and were fighting the jihad alongside an Afghan Deobandi group, *Harakat-e-Inqilab-e-Islami Afghanistan*, of Maulana Nasrullah Mansoor.[4] The group was later named Harakatul Jihad al-Islami (HuJI) at the start of the jihad in Indian Kashmir.

It took more than two years for another couple of Ahle Hadith students to come to Afghanistan. Another Deobandi

mujahid, Maulana Fazlur Rehman Khalil (who later founded Harakatul Mujahideen), recruited three students from the Jamiyya Mohammadiyya (a leading Ahle Hadith madrassah in Gujranwala in Pakistani central Punjab), and Jamiyya Salafiyya in Faisalabad in early 1982. One of these students was Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi, who is currently LeT's operational head.[5] They also joined *Jamiat Ansar-ul-Afghaneen*. The group stayed and fought the Soviets at different places in the valley of Arghoon in the Afghan province of Paktika for the next seven months.[6] Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi came back to Pakistan in mid-1982 and recruited a few more students from different Ahle Hadith madrassahs and went back to Afghanistan. This increased the number of Ahle Hadith mujahideen to six[7] out of eleven Pakistani mujahideen.[8] Interestingly, only the three founding members of the *Jamiat Ansar-ul-Afghaneen* were Deobandi. The remaining two were Brelvi.[9] They were all sent to the *Muaskar Abdul Hameed* at Arghoon in Paktika Cantonment[10] where they underwent military training under Commander Fareedud Deen. Commander Fareedud Deen had built his training camp in the tunnels along the mountain passes where they were safe from bombardments from the Soviet planes. They used the makeshift rooms in these tunnels as prison cells for the captured Soviet and Afghan communists.[11] In 1982, the Ahle Hadith group went to fight alongside the Jalalud Din Haqqani group, but they faced the same discrimination at the hands of Hanafi commanders. The relationship did not last more than a few weeks.[12]

Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi had earlier studied at the Jamiyya Salafiyya in Faisalabad between 1979 and 1981, and at Madrassah Taleemul Quran in Mamoon Kanjan, in Pakistani southern Punjab between 1981 and 1982.[13] Several of the teachers at the Jamiyya Mohammadiyya, Hafiz Abdus Salam and Khalid Girjakhi, were supporting jihad in Afghanistan.[14] Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi is the brother of Hifazur Rehman Lakhvi and Waheedur Rehman Lakhvi, and their father Azizur Rehman Lakhvi was principal of Jamiyya Abu Huraira Renala Khurd in Pakistani central Punjab, who died in January 1992. Hifazur Rehman replaced his father as the principal of Jamiyya Abu Huraira Renala Khurd. Waheedur Rehman Lakhvi is also a jihadist commander. Their mother, who was known by

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her *kunya* (honorific title or teknonym) of Umme Zakiur Rehman, established a madrassah for girls, Jamiyya Aeysha Siddiqa, in Renala Khurd. She had also received jihadi training although she is not known to have taken part in any armed jihad. She died in December 1993.[15]

Abdul Qahhar and Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi appear to have tolerated Deobandi rituals and education at Deobandi camps till 1982, although the Deobandi mujahideen often ridiculed them. Some of the Pakistani and Afghan mujahideen even called them '*kafir*' because of their Ahle Hadith religious practices.[16] The Ahle Hadith mujahideen felt stronger and confident with the arrival of the third batch. They gradually challenged Deobandi beliefs and rituals. The relationship between the Deobandi teachers and Ahle Hadith mujahideen became strained and tensions rose between them. At one point, the Ahle Hadith mujahideen asked Maulana Irshad Ahmed to teach them only the translation of the Quran instead of books on Hanafi jurisprudence. Maulana Irshad Ahmed angrily refused. The Ahle Hadith mujahideen responded by holding a separate class among themselves in the early afternoon to study the translation of the Quran.[17]

This did not solve the problem or reduce the tension between the Deobandi trainers and Ahle Hadith mujahideen. Although the Pakistani Ahle Hadith mujahideen in the *Jamiat Ansar-ul-Afghaneen* numbered more than the others, the Afghan mujahideen from the *Harakat-e-Inqilab-e-Islami* Afghanistan supported the Deobandi Pakistani mujahideen. When it became impossible to stay together, the Ahle Hadith group returned to Pakistan and continued their studies and missionary work. However, that only increased the mutual hatred between the two groups. Maulana Irshad Ahmed refused to give them fares to return. He also refused to share the war booty with them. After a long discussion, he gave them a few hundred rupees, hardly enough to reach Pakistan. Finally, they surrendered their arms and left the *Muaskar Abdul Hameed* in Afghanistan on November 13, 1982.[18] Since there was no public or private transport, and they did not have enough money to hire a separate vehicle to travel, they had to walk on foot for five days to reach the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. After this bitter episode,

the Deobandi mujahideen stopped recruiting from the Ahle Hadith madrassahs. The participation of the students from the Ahle Hadith madrassahs in the Afghan jihad virtually came to an end. The next year, they discovered another front in Nuristan where the Ahle Hadith Afghans were fighting jihad.[19]

The credit for showing the Pakistani jihadis the path to Nuristan goes to Khalid Girjakhi who was heading a Juhayman's Ikhwan's cell in central Punjab. Girjakhi was probably the second most important Pakistani *alim*, after Allama Rashdi, in Juhayman's Ikhwan's Pakistani network. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Girjakhi was *nazim* (organizer) of Jamiat Ahle Hadith, which later became Markazi Jamiat Ahle Hadith (MJAH), in the Gujranwala District in 1980. He had links with Juhayman's Ikhwan through Hamid Mohammad Bahaziq (Hamid Bahaziq for short), and later through his younger brother, Mahmoud Mohammad Ahmed Bahaziq (aka Abu Abdel Aziz [henceforth Mahmoud Bahaziq]).[20] Hamid Bahaziq had translated '*Al-Muhallah*' of Imam Ibne Hazm for whom he is said to have great regard.[21] Girjakhi was also the vice *amir* of a small mujahideen group, *Tanzeemul Mujahideen* (Organization of the mujahideen), which considered itself the continuation of the 19th century jihadi movement led by Shah Ismail and Syed Ahmed Brelvi.[22] The Tanzeemul Mujahideen had strong ties with the Salafists in the Afghan province of Nuristan. The Girjakhi cell started supporting the mujahideen in Afghanistan as early as late 1978.[23] The Girjakhi cell also started receiving huge funds from the Saudi Juhayman's Ikhwan around 1982,[24] and sent all these funds and arms to 'Ahle Hadith' mujahideen, particularly in Nuristan. They also fundraised in Pakistan for the Nuristani Ahle Hadith Islamists and mujahideen, and encouraged Ahle Hadith madrassahs students to go to Nuristan and fight alongside the Ahle Hadith mujahideen. They invited students from Nuristan to come to study in the Pakistani Ahle Hadith madrassahs, as well as publishing and distributing advertisements across the country.[25]

Juhayman's Ikhwan cell headed by Girjakhi seems to have been fairly large. Other known Pakistani members of Juhayman's Ikhwan included Hafiz Abdus Salam of Jamiyya Mohammadiyya, Gujranwala, Qari Yahya of Jamiyya Islamiyya Chah Shahaanwala,

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Gujranwala, Qari Ismat Ullah Zaheer, *khateeb* Qila Deedar Singh, Gujranwala, Abdul Aziz Nuristani of Jamiyya Asriyya Peshawar, Maulana Abdur Rehman of Jamiyya Abu Bakr, Gulshan-e-Iqbal, Karachi, and Haji Mohammad Ahmed Lohia, a resident of Bahadarabad, Karachi. One of their members, Mujahid Islam, was based in Kuwait.[26] Although his nationality is not known, his name is very Pakistani. Many Kuwaitis were actively involved in forming the MDI.[27] This was not the only cell of Juhayman's Ikhwan. There were other cells of Juhayman's Ikhwan active in Pakistan.[28]

Inspired by stories of jihad by the Nuristani students, Girjakhi travelled to Nuristan in the summer of 1982, while Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi and his group were still fighting jihad in Paktika.[29] Girjakhi and Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi's group returned to Pakistan in the autumn of 1982. Before returning to Pakistan after a few months, Girjakhi and the Nuristani leaders agreed that Nuristan would send students to Pakistani Ahle Hadith madrassahs, particularly the Jamiyya Mohammadiyya in Gujranwala, and Pakistani Ahle Hadith would send their students to fight alongside the Nuristani mujahideen.[30] When Girjakhi learnt about Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi's experience in Paktika, he advised him to go to Nuristan. Encouraged by his teacher, Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi and four other students[31] went to Nuristan in 1983. Another teacher in the Jamiyya Muhammadiyya, Qari Mohammad Yahya, paid for the travel expenses.[32] In 1984, Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi took another group to Nuristan. This group included his teacher Abdul Mannan Nurpuri. On their return, Abdul Mannan Nurpuri wrote a pamphlet, *Aina-e-Nuristan*, to encourage other Ahle Hadith students to go to Nuristan.[33] The Ahle Hadith city-state in Nuristan was very welcoming towards the Pakistani Ahle Hadith mujahideen. One of the reasons for this was that all the leading Ahle Hadith mujahideen in Nuristan had studied in the Pakistani madrassahs.[34] Nuristan was the only front where the Pakistani Ahle Hadith mujahideen went to wage jihad in Afghanistan until the end of 1987 when they found other fronts. The Ahle Hadith city-state in Nuristan was the model of the early Ahle Hadith mujahideen who wanted to implement it in Pakistan.

Afghanistan's Nuristan Province was carved out of the northern parts of the Laghman Province and Kunar Province in 2001.[35] However, the region commonly referred to as Nuristan before 2001 also included some parts of Nangarhar Province. It is situated in the southern slopes of the Hindukush range and in the northeastern part of the country. Nuristan spans the basins of the Alingar, Pech, Landai Sin, and Kunar rivers, and is surrounded by the Badakhshan Province in the north, Kapisa Province in the West, Laghman Province and Kunar Province in the south, and Pakistan in the east. Most parts of Nuristan remain largely inaccessible by road and rail. There was once a road between Kabul and Barg Mataal in the time of King Daud, but it was ruined with the passage of time.[36] There is also a road that linked Nuristan with Badakhshan. Nuristan is also linked with Nangarhar by road.[37] Nuristan had and still has closer links and bonds with Chitral (Pakistani Kafiristan), which is more integrated with the mainland Pakistan. There are four tracks which link Nuristan with Chitral in Pakistan. However, most parts of these tracks can only be used on foot.

Islam failed to make inroads in the difficult-to-penetrate Nuristan, and the people continued their old religious practices until the end of 19th century. The Hanafi *ulema* from the rest of Afghanistan avoided travelling to this region because of hardships they would have suffered. King Abdur Rahman Khan conquered the Nuristan region in 1890s. Nuristan was known before as Kafiristan (Land of Unbelievers) because the Nuristanis practiced animism. He forcefully converted them to Islam and renamed the region as Nuristan, or the Land of Divine Light. A large number of them who refused to leave their indigenous beliefs migrated to the adjoining Chitral in British India (now in Pakistan), which was also known as Kafiristan.[38] After the conquest of Nuristan by Amir Abdur Rehman in 1890s, more *ulema* from Nuristan went to Pakistan to study in madrassahs through Chitral than to the rest of Afghanistan. Most of them went to Deobandi madrassahs. However, some of them from eastern Nuristan went to Ahle Hadith madrassahs. Three of them particularly influenced the events in eastern Nuristan (or northern Kunar before 2001) where they

had assumed the leadership role before the Saur 1978 Revolution. Their influence was slowly increasing in Central Nuristan. Three *ulema* played a leading role in establishing a city-state called the *Dawlat-e Inqilabi–yi Islami-yi Nuristan* (Revolutionary Islamic State of Nuristan) in Nuristan in the wake of the Saur 1978 revolution: Maulana Ibrahim, Maulana Mohammad Afzal, and Maulana Mohammad Ishaq.

Maulana Ibrahim was one of the first Salafist clerics from Nuristan. He was born in a Hanafi family in 1933 in Peshawar in eastern Nuristan. He acquired his primary education in his village, where he studied *Hidaya,* a book on Hanafi jurisprudence, from his maternal uncle. At the age of 20, he went to study at a madrassah at Tehkaalbala near Peshawar in Pakistan to study the Quran and the book of *Mishkat* from Maulana Abdullah Jan. He converted to Salafism when he was studying under Maulana Abdullah Jan,[39] and went to Gujranwala from Tehkaalbala to study the *Sahih* of Imam Bokhari from Hafiz Mohammad Sahib Gondalwi. He could speak Arabic, Persian, Urdu, and Pushtu, in addition to his mother tongue Nuristani.[40] Another early Salafi cleric was Maulana Mohammad Afzal, who was born in 1925[41] in the village of Nekmook, in eastern Nuristan. His father, Syed Mohammad, was a locally known Hanafi *alim.* He studied in different madrassahs in Gilgit-Baltistan, Mingora, and Swat in Pakistan for three years. After returning from Pakistan, he went to study in Kabul. However, he returned to Pakistan after a couple of years.[42] In the eighth year of his education, he came to Darúluloom Haqqania Akora Khattak in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and completed *daura-e hadith* (course in hadith).[43] The real change of heart came when he joined Darul Quran at Panjpir, a village in the Swabi District of Khyber-Pukhtoonkhwa, where he was influenced by *takfiri* ideology.[44] After returning to Nuristan, he joined the Jamiat Islami of Mullah Rabbani for a while but left it to do Salafist politics. Another prominent cleric from Nuristan was Maulana Mohammad Ishaq. He also acquired religious education in Hanafi madrassahs, but converted to the Salafist school of thought.

The Nuristani Salafists announced the establishment of the Revolutionary Islamic State of Nuristan and chose Maulana Ibrahim

as their *amir* in a meeting in October 1978.[45] They then started preparing for jihad against the communist regime in Afghanistan. However, two years after the Saur Revolution, Maulana Ibrahim withdrew in favor of Maulana Mohammad Afzal,[46] who belonged to Kam tribe, and became head of the foreign affairs department.[47] However, before the Nuristani Salafists could carry out armed attacks against the communists, the mujahideen from Darra Kalam and Ashok rebelled and attacked the local cantonment in Western Nuristan. The mujahideen from the valley of Waigul in Central Nuristan followed and attacked a local police station. This encouraged the Nuristanis, and they brought arms and ammunition from the tribal areas of Pakistan. Led by Maulana Abdullah Sher Gul (aka Maulana Abdullah Taveel, who had also studied in the Jamiyya Mohammadiyya in Gujranwala),[48] around 400 mujahideen attacked the Kamdesh cantonment. They also took over the town of Barg-e-Mataal in eastern Nuristan. The mujahideen retreated to Badakhshan when the communist regime in Kabul sent reinforcements to reoccupy Kamdesh.[49] While retreating to Nuristan, they destroyed all the tombs, shrines, *aastanas* (the residential quarters of a *pir,* or saint), usually next to the attached shrine) they came across during their raid on Badakhshan. In eastern Nuristan, they also destroyed Deewana Baba's center, which was the biggest mystic center in eastern Nuristan.[50]

The city-state of Nuristan erected a rudimentary state structure in the "liberated" areas of Nuristan. To take advantage of its strategic position – given by the road built by King Amir Abdur Rehman in the late 19th century – they also restricted the passage of other Afghan mujahideen from the liberated territory without a heavy toll, up to 20 percent.[51] They set up a consular office of the city-state of Nuristan in Chitral.[52] One of the major jobs of this consular office was to issue permission to mujahideen organizations to pass through the city-state of Nuristan. The mujahideeen organizations had to give written applications, stating the number of mujahideen, animals, and other information to this office.[53] If the slogans are any guide to their intentions, the state aimed at conquering the whole world and establishing its Islamic system.[54] The Nuristani lands in the Upper Kunar remained politically

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separate from the Pashtun lowlands. Nuristan saw little warfare after the Saur 1978 Revolution because neither mujahideen nor the Afghan Communist government seemed interested in bringing it under their control. The *emirate* received financial support from some Salafist groups in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.[55] These Salafist groups included IIRO and RIHS.[56] In the late 1980s, Saudi Arabia recognized the city-state and helped it open its consulates in Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.[57]

In the city-state of Nuristan, the Islamic government imposed Islamic laws. They decided to impose the *sharia* (Islamic legal system) and *hudood* laws (punishments for theft, fornication, adultery, and apostasy)[58] in Nuristan because the state structure hardly existed in that part of Afghanistan. It was made obligatory to say prayers in congregation in the mosques. Nobody was allowed to stay at home after the *azaan* (call for prayers). Those who failed to say their prayers in congregations without any valid reasons were fined five rupees.[59] They introduced three prayer times instead of five and allowed wayfarers not to fast. It was declared a crime to shave the beard. Violators were punished by five lashes as were those who used tobacco which was also declared a punishable offence. Dance and music were also banned in the Islamic state.[60] The Islamic state appointed one *qazi* and one commandant for each settlement in the Islamic state. The job of the *qazi* was to award punishments according to the *sharia* and *hudood*, while the commandant enforced the *sharia* and *hudood*, and looked after administration and the defense department. In February 1984, Mohammad Umar and Bibi Kubra came to Qazi Maulana Abdullah bin al-Fazal voluntarily and confessed to have committed adultery. The *qazi* sentenced them to death by stoning, which they willingly accepted.[61] In the same month, the local *qazi*, Maulana Mohammad Ishaq, sentenced Behlool of Manda Gul to death under *hadd* and *qisas* (Islamic legal terms meaning retaliation or settlement of accounts. It follows the principle of an eye for an eye, or *lex talionis*, first set forth by Hammurabi) for killing another person from his own village. The family of the murdered person refused to take *qisas* whereupon the *qazi* handed the killer over to the family of the murdered person who killed him with the same knife at a big gathering.[62]

When Dr. Najeebullah's government fell in 1992 and the mujahideen took power in Kabul, Mujahideen President Burhanuddin Rabbani appointed Mullah Afzal his minister of *hajj* and charity in 1992. Many Nuristani Salafists fought alongside the MDI militants in Kashmir between 1992 and 1996.[63]

Like most Ahle Hadith *ulema*, Hafiz Saeed and Zafar Iqbal and the small group of their followers, who were to become the founding members of the MDI, had given little or no attention to the Afghan jihad until 1985. Both of them were teaching Islamic Studies at the University of Engineering and Technology (UET) in Lahore, and organized *daroos* (religious sermons) in the evening for a wider audience. Zafar Iqbal came from a Brelvi family and converted to Salafism under the influence of Hafiz Abdullah Bahawalpuri. Hafiz Saeed, who was born in March 1948,[64] came from a very religious Ahle Hadith family. He was the eldest of five siblings – three brothers and two sisters. His mother had memorized the Quran and opened a madrassah in the village where Hafiz Saeed and his siblings spent their early years memorizing the Quran. He married the daughter of Hafiz Abdullah Bahawalpuri, his mother's brother. After his marriage, he joined the University of Punjab in Lahore where he took part in student politics by joining the Islami Jamiat-e-Talaba (IJT), the student wing of the Jamaat-e-Islami of Pakistan (JeIP). Soon he became the *nazim* (lit. organizer–the head of the unit) of the IJT unit at the University of Punjab in Lahore.

Hafiz Saeed received his Masters in Islamic Studies in 1972, and another Masters in Arabic language in 1974 from the University of Punjab in Lahore.[65] After dismissing the democratically elected government of Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in July 1977, General Ziaul Haq inducted the JeIP people in the government. As part of this policy, General Haq's government appointed Hafiz Saeed as a Research Assistant in the Islamic Ideological Council in Islamabad.[66] Seven months later, he was appointed a lecturer of Islamic Studies at the UET in Lahore where he taught for the next

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25 years.[67] In 1981, the university nominated him for a scholarship award to study at the King Saud University in Riyadh. In Saudi Arabia, he attended lectures by different Salafist scholars, including Bin Baz. Hafiz Saeed later stated, "The time I spent with Sheikh bin Baz left a deep impression on my mind. If I had not met him, perhaps the idea of setting up Jamatud Dawa would not have come to me."[68] He came back from Saudi Arabia in 1983 and returned to teaching at the UET in Lahore. In 1984, the UET sent Zafar Iqbal to study at the King Saud University in Riyadh on a scholarship.

Hafiz Saeed and Zafar Iqbal converted some students to the Ahle Hadith creed before Hafiz Saeed left to Saudi Arabia. In the absence of Hafiz Saeed, Zafar Iqbal continued his *daroos* and converted some more UET students to Ahle Hadith Islam.[69] They formed Salafiyya Rising Engineers and organized Ahle Hadith students. '*Engineer*' Abdul Quddus *Salafi* became the first *amir* of the group.[70] Hafiz Saeed and Zafar Iqbal were their mentors. Both Hafiz Saeed and Zafar Iqbal had been indoctrinated in jihad during their stay in Saudi Arabia in the early 1980s. By 1985, Hafiz Saeed and Zafar Iqbal had become fairly inclined towards taking part in the Afghan jihad, but initially refused to take part in the jihad because none of the mujahideen party was following Salafist *manhaj* (path). They were looking for a Salafist group in Afghanistan to join. The Ahle Hadith *ulema* from Nuristan were also trying to draw more Pakistani Ahle Hadith ulema into their jihad. In 1985, the head of foreign affairs of the city-state of Nuristan, Maulana Mohammad Ibrahim, came to Pakistan and held meetings with Hafiz Saeed, among others. Like all other Afghan mujahideen groups, he had come to recruit from Pakistan. Hafiz Saeed invited him to address students at a function organized by Salafiyya Rising Engineers.[71] Maulana Mohammad Ibrahim tremendously influenced Hafiz Saeed and Zafar Iqbal, and the two started encouraging the Ahle Hadith to go to Nuristan and fight alongside the Nuristani Ahle Hadith.[72]

Maulana Ibrahim failed to win over any leader of the big Ahle Hadith parties, including all the factions of the JAH. However, as a result of these meetings, Hafiz Saeed's group decided to raise

funds for the Ahle Hadith in Nuristan. It started holding jihadi conferences at the Jama Mosque Ahle Hadith Chok Dalgaran in Lahore. They also started reaching out to traders for donations. Amir Hamza was asked to give Friday sermons in different cities instead of one mosque as a *khateeb*. The idea was to reach out to more people in order to raise funds for jihad in Nuristan.[73] To popularize the cause of Nuristan, Maulana Abdur Rehman Kailani wrote "*Sarguzasht-e-Nuristan*" (The Story of Nuristan), and Amir Hamza wrote "*Arabistan se Nuristan tak*" (From Arabia to Nuristan), which were widely distributed in Pakistan. By 1985, Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi had started spending more time in Nuristan than in Pakistan.[74] He usually came during the summer to recruit Pakistani boys to wage jihad in Nuristan. The number of Ahle Hadith students going to Afghanistan was growing, but quite slowly.[75] During his 1985 visit to Pakistan, Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi was quite encouraged to learn that Hafiz Saeed's group would be supporting jihad in Nuristan. He foresaw that this would help him recruit students from secular educational institutions, such as the UET in Lahore.[76] Hafiz Saeed had studied under leading Ahle Hadith teachers, both in Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. His teachers included Sheikh Ataaullah Hanif Bhojiani, Allama Rashdi, Hafiz Abdullah Bahawalpuri, Sheikh Muhammad Ali al-Kholi al-Masri, and Dr. Seeni. His teachers in Saudi Arabia included Bin Baz, Muhammad ibn Saalih al-Uthaymeen, Abdur Razzaq al-Afifi, and Safiur-Rahman Mubarakpuri.[77]

So far, few Pakistani Ahle Hadith boys had gone to Nuristan to wage jihad. The breakthrough came on July 4, 1986, when an eleven-member group of Pakistani Ahle Hadith mujahideen, the biggest so far, led by Abdur Rehman Kailani, left for Nuristan. The group included Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi, and Amir Hamza (who later emerged as one of the principal ideologues of the MDI/JuD), and Dr. Ahmed Javed, who later became a principal financer of al-Qaeda in Pakistan.[78] After a weeklong journey, the group reached Peshawaruk, the first village in Nuristan. They took another two days to reach Nek Mok, which was now called Saeedabad, the capital of the city state of Nuristan, staying there for a couple of weeks. During their stay in Nuristan, they received

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brief training in light arms from Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi. It was during this brief stay when the small Ahle Hadith group came into contact with Arab mujahideen for the first time. Those who imparted armed training to this small group included two Arab mujahideen, namely Abu Ali al-Saudi and Abu Baseer al-Phalasteeni.[79] They returned to Chitral on August 11, 1986. The teachers and participants raised funds to finance the journey, to stay, and for training in Nuristan.[80]

Between 1985 and 1987, the extremist Pakistani Ahle Hadith *ulema* and Juhayman's Pakistani Ikhwan, who were supported by the international community of Juhayman's Ikhwan with money, came closer and formed an informal alliance to take over the leadership of the Pakistani Ahle Hadith community. They faced an uphill task because the Ahle Hadith community had a history of taking part in elections. The small Ahle Hadith community in Pakistan was organized under the JAH from the late 1940s. The JAH had been founded soon after the partition of India in 1947 by, among others, Maulana Dawood Ghaznavi and Maulana Mohammad Salafi. Maulana Dawood Ghaznavi was the President of the Punjab branch of the Indian National Congress as well. He left the Indian National Congress and joined the All India Muslim League on the eve of Pakistan's creation in 1947. The Indian National Congress claimed to represent all Indians while the All India Muslim League, which became the Pakistan Muslim League after the creation of Pakistan, claimed to represent only the Muslims of British India. The JAH had been taking part in the national elections and had also held intra-party elections to choose the office-bearers, including its *amir*. Being a politician, Maulana Dawood Ghaznavi favored an elected hierarchy for the JAH. However, other non-political founding *ulema* such as Hafiz Mohammad Gondalvi, Hafiz Abdullah Muhhadis Ropri, and Maulana Mohiuddin Lakhvi opposed this. But political founders such as Maulana Dawood Ghaznavi and Maulana Abdullah Salafi succeeded in having their way. In early 1980s, MJAH *amir* Maulana Fazlul Haq refused to hold elections to elect the next *amir* after completing the five-year term. The

MJAH faced huge chaos. In an effort to keep the MJAH united, both groups agreed to appoint Allama Rashdi as their joint *amir*. Allama Rashdi stepped down when he failed to convince the rival groups to set up a *shura* system and not to go for intra-party elections.[81]

Consequently, a large group split from the MJAH and formed JAH under the leadership of Allama Ehsan Ilahi Zaheer (Allama Zaheer for short).[82] The new group appointed Maulana Mohammad Hussain Shaikhupuri as its *Nazim-e-Aala* (Chief Organizer). Maulana Shaikhupuri later resigned because he found Allama Zaheer too political. Under the leadership of Allama Zaheer, the JAH became a populist and an extremely sectarian party. Allama Zaheer wanted to turn the JAH into a fully-fledged political party. However, the pro-jihad and anti-election lobby bitterly opposed him. The pro-jihad lobby, which included leading Ahle Hadith *ulema*, such as Hafiz Mohammad Yahya Aziz Mir Mohammadi (Mir Mohammadi for short), Maulana Shaikhupuri, Hafiz Abdus Salam Bhutvi, and Maulana Abdul Aziz Nuristani, supported Allama Rashdi for *sharia* legal leadership of the JAH.[83] However, the pro-election lobby was numerically stronger. The pro-jihad Ahle Hadith *ulema* were the same who later supported, if not actively founded, the MDI.

The pro-jihad *ulema* rightly concluded that it would not be possible to wean the JAH away from the politics of elections. They formed the Rabita Ulema Ahle Hadith (League of Ahle Hadith Ulema) to concentrate on spreading the Salafist message of the Quran. The Rabita Ulema Ahle Hadith included some of the prominent names among the Ahle Hadith ulema, such as Allama Rashdi, Abdullah Nasir Rehmani, Maulana Shaikhupuri, Maulana Abdul Qadir Ropri, Abdullah Bahawalpuri, Mir Mohammadi, Hafiz Abdur Rehman Madni, Hafiz Saeed, and Zafar Iqbal.[84] Hafiz Saeed and Zafar Iqbal were likely the only unknown members of the group at that time. They had been brought in by Allama Rashdi, who also helped Hafiz Saeed to be nominated as the spokesman for the group. The group started holding religious gatherings across the country where they attacked the politics of elections and democracy. The conflict between the two groups became more intense by the day. In March 1987, part of the JAH leadership,

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including Allama Zaheer, was eliminated in an explosion in Lahore. The perpetrators of this explosion still remain unknown. After the death of Allama Zaheer, the conflict between the two factions of the JAH, led by Mian Fazle Haq and Professor Sajid Mir (who replaced Allama Zaheer), became even sharper. Although Allama Zaheer had put the JAH on the path of elections, a small group of *ulema* led by Hafiz Abdullah Bahawalpuri opposed the politics of elections of the JAH. This group of *ulema* continuously tried to wean the JAH away from the electoral politics.

Against this background, sometime in 1986, Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi and his small group started working to formally form a jihadi group modeled after the *Jamiat Ansar-ul-Afghaneen*. They were unaware of Juhayman's Ikhwan's plans to take over the leadership of the Ahle hadith community in Pakistan. By this time, some prominent Deobandi ulema, such as Maulana Taqi Usmani and Maulana Rafi Usmani, had started patronizing the Pakistani Deobandi jihadist group, *Jamiat Ansar-ul-Afghaneen*. The Ahle Hadith group consisted mostly of some madrassah students, none of who were considered suitable to head such a group. They withheld the decision to formally announce the group while they launched a nation-wide search for a suitable patron. Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi sent Amir Hamza to contact Hafiz Saeed and convince him to lead the new group, which he accepted after a few meetings.[85] About this time Khalid Girjakhi introduced Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi to Mahmoud Bahaziq (aka Abu Abdel Aziz), who met at the Jamiyya Mohammadiyya in Gujranwala. The members of Juhayman's Ikhwan who survived the Meccan rebellion had learnt their lessons and decided to form a global organization to achieve the objectives Juhayman failed to achieve. Among the survivors in Juhayman's Ikhwan, Hamid Bahaziq had an elevated status. Hamid Bahaziq had instructed his younger brother, Mahmoud Bahaziq, to form a global jihadist organization based in Pakistan. For this purpose, the younger Bahaziq had moved to Pakistan under the pretext of taking part in the Afghan jihad. Mahmoud Bahaziq had become deeply involved in the Afghan jihad. He had taken his first

wife and son to Afghanistan where the whole family fought against the Soviets.[86] The meeting between Mahmoud Bahaziq and Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi proved fruitful. Instead of forming his own small group, Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi decided to follow Mahmoud Bahaziq. Later, when Hafiz Saeed agreed to join the jihad in Afghanistan, Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi introduced Mahmoud Bahaziq to Hafiz Saeed and Zafar Iqbal.[87] Hafiz Saeed did not take long to join Mahmoud Bahaziq as well. They all decided to form a new jihadist group to wage global jihad while they continued taking over the leadership of the Ahle Hadith community. They decided that Hafiz Saeed and his Pakistani group would be the public face of the group while the real powers would lie with the Juhayman's Ikhwan.

In the summer of 1987 at a consultative meeting in Lahore chaired by Allama Rashdi, they decided to form the Markaz Dawat wal Irshad (MDI). Allama Rashdi became its de facto *amir* as the group continued its struggle to gather all Ahle Hadith groups under its umbrella. Allama Rashdi appointed a secret *shura*, which consisted of survivors of Juhayman's Ikhwan, who also financed the MDI in the early years. They included Hamid Bahaziq, Mahmood Bahaziq, Hassan As-Sareehi (aka Abu Abdur-Rahman As-Sareehi), (also founding official of the IIRO),[88] and Abdullah al-Hussain. They were all from Saudi Arabia except for Abdullah al-Hussein, who was from the United States. He is perhaps the most mysterious founding member of the group. Most accounts agree that he was a rich American businessman and one of the main financers of the MDI in the early years. However, some sources say he was one of the two Americans who survived the Meccan Rebellion and were handed over to the CIA in January 1980. They also constituted an open *shura*, which included, in order of seniority,[89] Hafiz Abdullah Bahawalpuri, Mir Mohammadi, Maulana Mohammad Hussain Shaikhupuri, Hafiz Abdus Salaam Bhutvi, Hafiz Abdul Ghaffar Awan, Hafiz Saeed, Zafar Iqbal, and Amir Hamza.[90] They appointed Hafiz Saeed as the *mudeer* (office manager) of the MDI.[91] Hafiz Mohammad Saeed was one of Allama Rashdi's favorite Pakistani students.[92] As *mudeer*, Hafiz Saeed was the public face and spokesman for Juhayman's Ikhwan in

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Pakistan. Other Pakistani founding members included Mohammad Siddique, Hafiz Mohammad Waseem, *Engineer* Abdul Quddus *Salafi*, Sheikh Mohammad Naeem, Haji Nazeer, Haji Mohammad Saeed, Mohammad Ramzan Asri, and Mohammad Yahya Mujahid.[93] The MDI was formed as an *idara* in 1987. Few, if any, thought it would soon morph into a huge transnational jihadi organization. The group decided to meet periodically and give advice to the MDI *amir* on issues of *dawa* and jihad.

Abdullah Sibt, a supporter of Juhayman's Ikhwan and one of the founders of RIHS, was one of the main financers of the MDI in the early years. It is not clear how much say he had in the day-to-day decision making. Sibt is a Kuwaiti citizen who moved to Dubai in 1985. He was a trader and businessman. Arif Javed Mohammadi represented RIHS in Pakistan and channeled funds to jihadist organizations in Pakistan, Kashmir, and Afghanistan. *Lajnat al-Birr al-Islamiyya* or *Jamiyyat al-Birr al-Islamiyya*, the precursor to the Benevolence International Foundation (BIF), was also one of the principal financers of the MDI in the 1990s and early 2000s. It was established in 1987 in Pakistan and Saudi Arabia by, among others, Sheikh Adel Batterjee, a powerful Saudi businessman in Jeddah. It was heavily staffed by the Juhayman's Ikhwan. The U.S. government designated him as a terrorist tin December 2004. He claimed to be a former chairman of WAMY as well. He reportedly founded BIF as an "affiliate" branch of WAMY.[94]

Although the MDI focused on uniting the Ahle Hadith community under one *sharia* legal *amir* and taking over the leadership of the Ahle Hadith community during the 1987-1992 period, it did not ignore building the national and transnational jihadi infrastructure. Soon after the foundation of the MDI, Allama Rashdi consulted the MDI *shura* and asked the MDI members, who numbered a few dozen, to hold *dawa* and jihad conferences all over Pakistan. They aimed to create an atmosphere of an *emirate* and jihad. Allama Rashdi in particular asked Zafar Iqbal and Hafiz Saeed to impart jihadist ideological training to the cadres. He also asked Hafiz Saeed to establish organizational links with Afghan Ahle

Hadith groups. The MDI also published pamphlets against democracy and for *dawa* and jihad, most of which were written by Hafiz Abdullah Bahawalpuri and Amir Hamza.[95] Hafiz Saeed himself was asked to preach in Baghbanpura neighborhood in Lahore where the UET was located. Recalling those days, Hafiz Saeed later said, "We started on a small scale by printing literature and going to teach people in their own drawing rooms. Those days, I used to go around on a bicycle. Our focus was on areas around Engineering University, which is situated in Baghbanpura in Lahore."[96] As part of its missionary agenda, the MDI held its first annual congregation in March 1988 at the reform center of Mir Mohammadi, an MDI *shura* member, at Bonga Balochan 'al-Badr' Bhaiphero in central Punjab. The second annual congregation was also held at the same place in March 1989. At the same time, the MDI started publishing its monthly magazine, *Mujallah ad-Dawa*. The third annual convention was held in Muridke from November 14 to 16, 1990, attended by some 10,000 people.[97] By this time, it had opened offices in Lahore, Gujranwala, Rawalpindi, Faisalabad, Bahawalpur, Multan, Peshawar, Hyderabad, Karachi, and Muzaffarabad. The MDI had come of age.

Allama Rashdi also asked Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi, Amir Hamza, and Abdul Qahhar to make arrangements to give jihadist weapons training to the MDI cadres.[98] In accordance with his orders, an eighty-member convoy of Salafist *ulema* and youth started its first jihadist journey on August 10, 1987 with Zafar Iqbal as their *amir* from the UET in Lahore to visit the areas where Shah Ismail Shaheed had fought the British and the Sikhs in the early 19th century.[99] This was the first effort of the MDI to give some jihadist training to its cadres. The students from the Jamiyya Salafiyya Faisalabad who had formed an Ahle Hadith organization called *'Usratul Badr'* (the al-Badr family) outnumbered others in the convoy. They travelled by train from Lahore to Rawalpindi from where they hired two buses to reach Tawhidabad in the province of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa.[100] On the evening of August 11, 1987, they commenced training by listening to the lectures of Zahur Ilahi and Fazl Ilahi (the father and brother of Allama Zaheer respectively) on the lives of the companions of Prophet Mohammad. Zahur

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Ilahi gave an hour-long lecture on the importance of piety that followed the *fajr* prayers (first daily ritual prayer before dawn) the next day. They divided the group into eight smaller groups under different *amirs*. They gave Islamic names to the groups such as *Usratud Dawa, Usratul Jihad, Usratul Tawhid*, etc. Then they were asked to march to the hill town of Ayubia in northern Punjab and back on foot, which consumed the entire day. There, Hafiz Saeed and Zafar Iqbal delivered lectures and returned to Tawhidabad the same evening. In the evening at Tawhidabad, Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi, Amir Hamza, and Abdul Qahhar, the only ones with jihad experience, talked about their experience in Nuristan.[101]

The next day, August 12, 1987, the training started with the lecture of Qari Abdul Hadi on the Quran. This was followed by physical training at a nearby hill under the guidance of Mohammad Idrees, a martial arts expert. From here the convoy went to Kalabagh, a small town known for its small Ahle 'Hadith population, where Hafiz Saeed gave a lecture on jihad before the *zuhr* prayers (second daily ritual prayer after midday) at the local mosque. Sheikh Ibrahim al-Urdani (a Jordanian mujahid) also joined them and spoke to the audience in the evening. Later, Syed Abdul Hannan Shah (the principal of the *Madrassatul Salafia ila Dawatul Haqq* in Quetta) and Nasrullah Kakar (the president of the Islami Youth Force of Balochistan) joined the convoy as well. He was a former student of Medina University and was living in Quetta at that time.[102] The following day, August 13, the group started the day by saying their *fajr* prayers. Afterwards, Hafiz Saeed delivered his lecture, which was followed by several other lectures. Then, the group did some exercises as part of their preparation for jihad and boarded the buses, setting out to Rawalpindi. They reached Rawalpindi via Abbottabad in the afternoon, where they split. The large group went back to Lahore with Hafiz Abdullah as their *amir*. However, a six-member group continued its journey towards Peshawar with Hafiz Saeed as their *amir*. (When two or more MDI/JuD members get or work together, one of them assumes the role of group *amir*.) In Peshawar, they went to different mosques in and around Peshawar and delivered sermons on jihad and the ills of democracy.[103]

In Peshawar, as Allama Rashdi had ordered them, Hafiz Saeed and other MDI leaders met with leaders of the Ittehad Islami Afghanistan, led by Sheikh Abdur Rabb Rasul Sayyaf.[104] The objective of the meeting was to request Sheikh Sayyaf to train the MDI mujahideen. Hafiz Saeed was reluctant to send boys to Nuristan, although Nuristan had offered to train the MDI cadres for jihad. He believed that the difficult and expensive journey would discourage new mujahideen. Hafiz Saeed had met Sheikh Sayyaf in Saudi Arabia. However, he does not seem to have remained in contact with him or his men as he joined the jihad only after the formation of the MDI. The Ittehad Islami Afghanistan agreed to give military training to the MDI members. The MDI sent its first group of 21 men to the training camp run by the Ittehad Islami Afghanistan on August 29, 1987. The first group included Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi and Amir Hamza. The Ittehad Islami Afghanistan took them to their *muaskar* at Sadda in the Kurram Agency in the Pakistani tribal areas where hundreds of Arab mujahideen were receiving training. There were some 300 mujahideen from the Philippines alone.[105] The groups of the MDI leaders and cadres kept coming to this *muaskar* for training. As Hafiz Saeed had not received jihadist training until this time, he came to the Sadda camp to receive training in the second group in fall 1987.[106]

Once ready to fight, the MDI mujahideen went to the forward positions in the Afghan province of Paktia. They operated from the *Muaskar Maasada* (Den of Lions) near the village of Jaji in Paktia along with Arab mujahideen. The Arabs had set up the biggest *muaskar* at a place called Maasada. Arab mujahideen from 36 countries were based in that *muaskar* at the time. Osama bin Laden is usually given credit for establishing this *muaskar*. The Ittehad Islami Afghanistan was one of the Afghan groups that were controlling this region where Arabs had set up many posts. They allotted one of the posts called Mecca to the MDI.[107] Along with the fighters of the Ittehad Islami Afghanistan and other Arab fighters, they carried out attacks on Soviet troops and installations from here. They later set up another post, Markaz 'Medina,' at a hilltop in Jaji in Paktia in 1987, which was later turned into a fully-

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fledged *muaskar*. Former Yemeni army captain Abul Bara gave advanced military training to them at the Mecca post. Ibrar Khan (who later died in Indian Kashmir) and Dilshadd Ahmad (aka Abdur Rehman Ad-Dakhal, who later headed the LeT chapter in the Indian Kashmir) were among the early trainees in this camp. It was here that the MDI leaders came in contact with hundreds of Arab mujahideen and built links which have lasted to this day. One of these Arab mujahideen was Osama bin Laden. Hafiz Saeed's devotion to jihad impressed Osama bin Laden so much he gave Saeed a jeep.[108] This led to their life long personal friendship. The MDI started sending its cadres to Maasada directly after Hafiz Saeed returned to Pakistan.[109] However, the links between the MDI and the Ittehad Islami Afghanistan kept growing. By this time, the MDI had become part of the international Salafist network of mujahideen. Two mujahideen from the MDI, Abu Suffiyan and Shaffqat, were already fighting alongside the mujahideen from that *markaz*. The MDI mujahideen also fought alongside the Arab mujahideen at the Shinwari Markaz near Kabul.

The undeclared but de facto *amir* of the MDI was Allama Rashdi who presided over all MDI meetings and took all critical decisions. Allama Rashdi not only acted as the *amir-e ijtimah* (leader of the congregation) at the annual congregations, but also led the Friday prayers with which the annual congregations ended from the beginning until his death in January 1996,[110] though he was fast losing control over the MDI in the last two years of his life. MDI publications referred to Hafiz Saeed as *mudeer* till February 1994 when a report on the Jihad-e-Hind Conference in *Mujallah ad-Dawa* called Hafiz Saeed the *amir* of MDI for the first time. However, the same report states that Allama Rashdi delivered the *khutba-e-masnoona*[111] (a sermon in the tradition of the prophet of Islam, Muhammad, usually delivered before Friday prayer.). Since, according to the Islamic tradition, only the *amir* of the Muslim community or his nominee has the right to deliver the *khutba-e-masnoona*, it is clear Allama Rashdi was still at least *de jure amir* of the MDI. Many Ahle Hadith *ulema*, including the leaders of the

MDI, did not take Hafiz Saeed very seriously as an Islamic scholar because he was not a graduate of a madrassah. Hafiz Saeed was at the bottom of the MDI hierarchy in the early years. This is also reflected in reports in the MDI in-house publications. A report on an important meeting of MDI *ulema* mentions the names of the participants in this order: Sheikhul Hadith Hafiz Sanaullah Madni from Lahore, Hafiz Abdur Rashid Azhar from Islamabad, Hafiz Abdus Sattar al-Hammad from Faisalabad, Maulana Abdus Salam Kailani from Lahore, Hafiz Abdul Ghaffar Awan from Faisalabad, Qari Mohammad Aziz from Lahore, Professor Abdul Hakeem Saif from Qasur, Maulana Ghulam Ullah from Faisalabad, and Hafiz Mohammad Saeed.[112] The mention of Hafiz Saeed's name at the end shows his lower status in the hierarchy at that time. However, this was to change soon. Hafiz Saeed's group succeeded in taking over full control of the MDI machinery by 1996.

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CHAPTER THREE

BRANCHING OUT

In 1987, the Pakistani founders and supporters of the MDI who numbered only a few dozen were still convinced they would succeed in uniting the tiny Pakistani Ahle Hadith community under one *sharia* legal *amir*. There has always been a section of the MDI campaign in favor of a *sharia* legal *amir* for the Ahle Hadith community. Their immediate goal was to compete with and ultimately replace the Pakistani Deobandi mujahideen in Afghanistan. The JeIP and Deobandi parties had taken the center stage of Islamist politics in Pakistan. The Ahle Hadith could assert and achieve their goals of *dawa* and jihad only by uniting the Ahle Hadith community under a *sharia* legal *amir*. For the next five years, they kept convincing the fellow Ahle Hadith *ulema* that they did not intend to form a rival political party like the MJAH, but that the objective of the MDI was to "prepare such people who revive Salafist ideology among the Ahle Hadith."[1] In other words, the MDI aimed "to gather the entire [Ahle Hadith] community, no matter to which party or group they belonged to, around one *manhaj* (path). The job of the MDI was only to organize the mission of *dawa* and make people understand the real *manhaj* [that of *dawa* and jihad] of the Ahle Hadith."[2] The MDI also defined the true task of the entire Ahle Hadith community as "[T]o call upon the people to Quran and Sunnah and wage jihad against all the obstacles and difficulties they face while doing this... Dawat and jihad are two sides of the same coin."[3] Only the *ulema* and the people of knowledge (*Ahl-e Hallo Aqad*) from amongst the Ahle

Hadith community were to get together and choose their *sharia* legal *amir*. The first priority of the MDI was to convince all the factions of the JAH to agree on a *sharia* legal *amir*.[4]

In 1987, the end of the Afghan jihad was still not in sight. The MDI might have succeeded in taking over the leadership of the Ahle Hadith community if jihad in Afghanistan had continued for another few years. However, in 1988, the Soviets withdrew and General Ziaul Haq died in a mysterious plane crash in August the same year. This changed the dynamics of Pakistani politics. It strengthened the pro-election faction in the JAH as political activity picked up in Pakistan. In the wake of General Haq's death, the pro-election faction in the JAH became more assertive and involved in the country's general elections. Consequently, the anti-election faction faded in the background. Benazir Bhutto won the general elections and came to power in December 1988. Under the Benazir Bhutto government, the Pakistan Army moved from the Afghan jihad to the Kashmir jihad. As the jihad in Kashmir escalated, President Ghulam Ishaq Khan dismissed the democratically elected government of Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto in a military-supported soft coup in August 1990. The ISI cobbled up the Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI) under the leadership of Nawaz Sharif to defeat Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. The ISI asked several religious parties to join the IJI. The ISI also asked the different factions of the JAH to join hands with the IJI. Soon thereafter, the MJAH (led by Allama Sajid Mir) and JAH (led by Sheikhul Hadith Maulana Mohammad Abdullah Gojranwalvi) ended their differences and formed the Muttahidda Jamiat Ahle Hadith, joining the IJI. The IJI defeated Benazir Bhutto's Pakistan Peoples Party and formed the government at the center under Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif.

Maulana Abdullah Bahawalpuri was in poor health at that time and was unable to take part in efforts to stop the Muttahidda Jamiat Ahle Hadith from joining the IJI. He died of a heart attack in April 21, 1991.[5] His death was a serious loss to the anti-election lobby in the small Ahle Hadith community, which started losing to the pro-election lobby after his death. The term of the Muttahidda Jamiat Ahle Hadith leaders was coming to an end. Allama Rashdi

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presided over a meeting of MDI *ulema* held at the MDI headquarters at Chamberlain Road in Lahore on May 26, 1991.[6] The meeting again declared that the constitution of the Muttahidda Jamiat Ahle Hadith was contrary to *sharia* principles. The meeting decided to send a delegation to the Muttahidda Jamiat Ahle Hadith leadership and inform them about their point of view. The meeting also formed a group of *ulema*, led by Mir Mohammadi, which would present the recommendations to the Muttahidda Jamiat Ahle Hadith leaders.[7] Muttahidda Jamiat Ahle Hadith leaders did not respond to the letter.

In December 1991, one of the factions of the Muttahidda Jamiat Ahle Hadith (led by Moeenud Din Lakhvi) named Mir Mohammadi, a founding member of the MDI *shura*, as its *amir* for the interim period. Moeenud Din Lakhvi was the cousin of Azizur Rehman Lakhvi,[8] father of Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi. Moeenud Din Lakhvi supported the MDI, but also participated in party and national elections. He was very close to General Ziaul Haq. One day after his nomination, Mir Mohammadi declared that his priority was to unite all of the factions of the JAH under a *sharia* legal *amir* who would be chosen by the people of knowledge instead of the members of parties,[9] as stipulated in the constitution of the party. The MDI wasted no time to support naming Mir Mohammadi as the permanent *amir* of the Ahle Hadith community.[10] On December 14, 1991, 500 Ahle Hadith *ulema* gathered in the MDI offices in Lahore and asked the Muttahidda Jamiat Ahle Hadith to make Mir Mohammadi permanent *amir* and give all *sharia* legal powers to him. The MDI made three demands to the Muttahidda Jamiat Ahle Hadith and other Ahle Hadith parties: making Mir Mohammadi *sharia* legal *amir*; unifying all Ahle Hadith groups under one united Ahle Hadith party, and cleansing the Ahle Hadith community of all "dirty democratic ideas."[11]

Soon after taking over the leadership of the Muttahidda Jamiat Ahle Hadith, Mir Mohammadi formed a central working committee, which included representatives from all factions of the JAH. However, he failed to keep the Muttahidda Jamiat Ahle Hadith united when his rival faction, led by Allama Sajid Mir, called a meeting of the Supreme Council on April 15, 1992 without

his permission. Mir Mohammadi had to resign on April 15, 1992. The Muttahidda Jamiat Ahle Hadith became Markazi Jamiat Ahle Hadith (MJAH).[12] Domestic Saudi politics created divisions within the *ulema* group. Moreover, Saudi Arabia officially extended its support to the MJAH. On the other hand, Juhayman's Ikhwan and other Pakistani extremist Ahle Hadith *ulema* in the MDI stopped their efforts to unite the Ahle Hadith community under one *sharia* legal *amir* and decided to build the MDI as an international jihad machine. However, the jihadist faction in the MDI had grown stronger between 1987 and 1992, and had also won critical support from the ISI to advance their jihadist agenda in return for taking part in the jihad in Indian Kashmir. The next four years saw an intense power struggle between the *ulema* group, led by Allama Rashdi, and the jihadist faction, led by Hafiz Saeed and Zafar Iqbal within the MDI. The members of the *ulema* group in the MDI slowly left the group, and Allama Rashdi died in 1996, making it possible for Hafiz Saeed to take over the MDI.

The Ahle Hadith/Salafists were and are a tiny minority in Afghanistan. They are scattered all over the country. In addition to Nuristan, they had some following in the Province of Kunar where there were several Ahle Hadith/Salafist groups doing missionary work. In the 1970s, the most important Salafist group in Kunar was Ummatul Muslimeen (The nation of Muslims). Its first *amir* was Sheikh Abdul Mateen, but Mohammad Hussain, (aka Sheikh Jamilur Rehman) replaced him after some time.[13] Pakistan had encouraged Afghan leaders such as Gulbadin Hekmatyar, Burhanud Din Rabbani, and Yunus Khalis to come to Pakistan in the mid-1970s as part of its policy of destabilizing the government in Kabul. Sheikh Jamilur Rehman had also joined them in Peshawar before the Soviet invasion. In Pakistan, Sheikh Jamilur Rehman had allied with the Hizbe Islami Afghanistan (HIA). After the Saur Revolution in April 1978, his group started jihad against the Communist regime of Nur Mohammad Tarakai. In 1980, the Salafist groups in Kunar gathered in an alliance led by Sheikh Jamilur Rehman.[14]

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After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, a number of Afghans moved to Pakistani areas along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. Sheikh Jamilur Rehman established shelters for women and orphanages for children in Pakistani tribal areas adjacent to Kunar, particularly Mohmand, Bajaur, and Dir. He also built mosques and madrassahs in the Afghan refugee camps in these areas. He established madrassahs at Tamergarah, Bajaur, and Chitral. The bigger madrassahs were named Jamiyya Salafiyya, and the smaller ones were named after different companions of the prophet. The students of these madrassahs who were getting organized under the flag of the Tanzeem-i-Talaba Salafiyya (Salafist Students Organization) used to go to wage jihad against the Soviet Army in Afghanistan during summer holidays.[15] In 1983, as his group established control over parts of Kunar, he split with HIA and established a city-state of "Islamic Emirate of Kunar."[16] In 1983, he founded the *al-Jamat as-Salafiyya*, which was later renamed the Jamatud Dawa ilal Quran wal Sunnah (JDQS) in 1984.[17] He published two periodicals: *Dawa* and *al-Mujahid*.[18]

Sheikh Jamilur Rehman was born in the village of Langalam in Kunar. He had two wives and eight sons.[19] He acquired his elementary education from the Jama Mosque in Asadabad. At the age of 15, he came to study at the Darul Uloom al-Islamiyya in Swat. From there, he went to study hadith in Charsadda under Maulana Abdul Mannan and Maulana Abdur Rehman Mainvi. Both these *shuyukhul hadith* (hadith experts) were inclined towards Salafist theology. Later, he went to study under Maulana Ghulam Ullah in Rawalpindi. In spite of being a Hanafi, he was also inclined towards the Salafist thinking. All these three sheikhs had been influenced by the Takfiri ideology of Panjpir. Sheikh Jamilur Rehman studied the books of Ibn Taymiyya and Hafiz Ibne Hajr.[20] Later, he went to study from Maulana Tahir in the village of Panjpir. Sheikh Jamilur Rehman used to be a royal guest in Saudi Arabia.[21] In Afghanistan, while Sheikh Sayyaf was the favorite of the Saudi intelligence, the Saudi Wahhabi establishment favored Sheikh Jamilur Rehman.[22] The Saudi religious establishment favored him because they thought he was doctrinally purer than Bin Laden and Maktaba Khidmat, which was dominated by the Muslim

Brotherhood.[23] Both the JDQS and MDI considered Al-Albani as a contemporary Imam Bokhari. *Al-Mujahid* published Al-Albani's interview in early 1990, which was reproduced by *Mujallah ad-Dawa* in April 1990. The introduction named Al-Albani as the contemporary Imam Bokhari.[24]

In fall 1987, the MDI decided to fight along with the JDQS mujahideen in Kunar. The first group of MDI fighters, led by Hafiz Saeed, went to the JDQS camp Huzaifa bin Yamaan in the Bajaur Agency, located in the Pakistani tribal areas along the Afghan border in the 1987 winter.[25] At the camp Huzaifa bin Yamaan, they were told to go to the frontlines in Kunar because they were all trained fighters. From now onward, the MDI mujahideen fought alongside both the JDQS and the Ittehad Islami Afghanistan of Sheikh Sayyaf, and Arab mujahideen in Paktia. They went to fight as far as Qandahar, where Sheikh Jamilur Rehman had set up another *markaz* (camp). The JDQS had set up its biggest camp, *Ghund Abdullah bin Masood,* at a mountain in Kunar.[26] It took them five hours to climb the mountain and reach the *markaz* at the mountain peak. The MDI mujahideen also fought alongside the JDQS in Nangarhar in December 1988.

The mujahideen rushed in to replace the Soviets who pulled out their troops from Kunar in September 1988. There were two main contenders for power in Kunar: the JDQS and the HIA led by Gulbadin Hekmatyar. The JDQS insisted on taking over control of the province, setting up an *emirate*, and imposing the *sharia* legal system, while the HIA insisted on holding elections to choose the future rulers. In a meeting with the HIA on October 17, 1988, the JDQS agreed to hold elections, even though it thought it contrary to Islamic injunctions.[27] They agreed to elect a 100-member *shura* (consultative council). Both the JDQS and the HIA had 45 members each, while other groups sent three members each. Mullah Afzal refused to take part in the elections and nominated three members.[28] In an interview, Sheikh Jamilur Rehman claimed that his group had won 45 seats while the HIA won only 35 seats. The remaining 20 seats went to several obscure groups.[29] The JDQS claimed victory

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in the ensuing elections.[30] The HIA rejected their claim to victory by accusing them of rigging the election, which resulted in a stalemate. However, it later agreed to accept Sheikh Jamilur Rehman as the *amir*. The two parties signed an agreement on March 10, 1989. Four commanders from each side signed the agreement, which was written on the letterhead of the HIA. Saudi and international support to Afghan mujahideen groups such as the HIA dried up after the Soviets agreed to withdraw from Afghanistan in February 1988. However, some groups such as the JDQS kept receiving funds from private Arab sources. Moreover, in 1989, many Arabs, including Osama bin Laden, returned to their respective countries, while thousands of more Arab volunteers poured into Afghanistan and Pakistan from 1989 to 1992. Most of them went to join Sheikh Jamilur Rehman.[31]

By December 1989, the MDI mujahideen had trained and fought alongside the Arabs in Paktia for more than two years. During these years, it recruited hundreds of young boys and men, and opened offices in several cities of Pakistan. But winters in Paktia are harsh, and all the roads to the *muaskar* at Jaji in Paktia regularly become blocked because of the heavy snowfall for four to five months in winter. The MDI needed other training places and war fronts for the growing numbers of its recruits.[32] Kunar was ideal as there was a strong Salafist movement there. The MDI decided to move the training camp *Muaskar Taiba* to Tango in Kunar in January 22, 1990. Hafiz Saeed appointed Abdul Majeed Amjad (aka Abu Sakhar) as its first *amir*.[33] Thousands of mujahideen took militant training from this *muaskar*. They included the mujahideen from Kashmir, Sri Lanka, the Philippines, Bangladesh, Indonesia, and Malaysia, and some Arab countries.[34] The trainees there were given *sharia* punishments. Women were also trained here.[35]

Sheikh Jamilur Rehman inaugurated the Islamic *emirate* in Asadabad on May 9, 1990 and took over as the new emir of the *emirate*.[36] In his first address, he said, "Allah Almighty ordered his messenger to kill in the way of Allah till the sovereignty of Allah has been established... Kunar has been liberated. It is the duty of the *amir*, commanders, and *mujahideen* to voluntarily impose *sharia*

here. We feel the need to impose *sharia* and peace in this area. We started jihad only to achieve this objective... On the Day of Judgment we would not be able to accuse any party leader such as Hekmatyar, Sheikh Sayyaf if we did not do this today."[37] The new JDQS government started enforcing the *sharia*, *hudood*, and other Islamic laws and punishments, such as stoning. It began stoning adulterous couples to death and hanging killers in public. The JDQS government declared shaving of beards un-Islamic, and those who trimmed their beards were punished with lashes.[38] Barbers were forbidden to shave men's beards. They banned the smoking of tobacco and eating *nasvaar* (a very light intoxicant mostly grown in the Pushtun/ Afghan areas). They awarded 40 lashes each to three smokers and *nasvaar*-eaters.[39] The JDQS also banned films, music, and dance. They implemented *sharia* punishments soon after establishing the Islamic emirate. They arrested a couple and stoned them to death for having illicit sex.[40]

The JDQS-HIA alliance did not last long. In early 1990, a HIA *mujahid* named Soofi Ismael killed Maulana Azizullah, a leading Salafist leader in Kunduz, while he was returning from Eid prayers. Maulana Azizullah had set up a JDQS *markaz* in the area called Dashte Archi. Maulana Azizullah was relatively successful in converting Afghans to the Salafist creed. He had already converted a couple of hundred Afghans to the Salafist creed.[41] The murder of Maulana Azizullah rang alarm bells. The conflict between the JDQS and the HIA kept deepening with each passing day. The conflict intensified when the HIA gave sanctuary to two bandits who were wanted by the Islamic emirate. The HIA refused to surrender them in spite of appeals from the JDQS. The HIA mujahideen started kidnapping and killing the mujahideen and commanders of the JDQS. The HIA even fired missiles on the Islamic emirate from its *markaz* Sarkano. The JDQS retaliated by occupying it. The JDQS ultimately captured the bandits and punished them under *hudood* laws. All efforts for reconciliation between the two groups failed.[42]

The conflict between the JDQS and the HIA escalated in mid-August 1991. On August 30, 1991, Abdullah Rumi, an Egyptian thought to be linked to the Muslim Brotherhood, shot Sheikh

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Jamilur Rehman to death by firing three bullets into his forehead. He had just finished a meeting with an Arab delegation, negotiating reconciliation between the two.[43] The bodyguards of Sheikh Jamilur Rehman shot the killer dead on the spot. With the death of Sheikh Jamilur Rehman, the Islamic city-state in Kunar also fell.[44] The fighters of the HIA started wreaking revenge from everybody who supported the rule of Sheikh Jamilur Rehman. After the death of Sheikh Jamilur Rehman, Hekmatyar is said to have crossed into Afghanistan from Pakistan along with a big procession of HIA mujahideen. Hekmatyar entered Kunar by crossing the Nawa Pass. Thousands of tribesmen also joined this procession. All along the way, they were raising the slogan of *'wahabi kafir.'*[45] The HIA bombed the properties and killed hundreds of supporters of Sheikh Jamilur Rehman in Asadabad.[46] They beat and killed a number of Afghan and Arab supporters of Sheikh Jamilur Rehman and looted their property. They also looted the *Muaskar Taiba* run by the MDI in Kunar and beat some of the people there. The MDI accused the HIA mujahideen of having looted goods worth Rs. 10 million from the *Muaskar Taiba.* The HIA killed hundreds of Salafists over the next few days.[47]

As the situation deteriorated, Saudi Arabia sent a delegation to stop the conflict between the JDQS and the HIA. This delegation included Sheikh Abdallah bin Abdel Muhsen al-Turki, Rector of Imam Muhammad Ibn Saud Islamic University,[48] Imam of Ka'aba Sheikh Saleh bin Abdallah bin Hamaid, Abdallah bin Saleh al-Qaseer (who represented Bin Baz), and Ali bin Ibrahim al-Nimla. The *amir* of the JDQS, Sheikh Sami Ullah, and the *amir* of the HIA, Hekmatyar, signed an agreement under pressure from the Saudi emissaries to withdraw from each other's territory and restore the status quo ante. They also agreed to lift sieges, stop the bloodshed, and let food and other supplies move into Kunar. The agreement also set up an arbitration court.[49] The agreement had little impact on the ground because of the worsened relations between Saudi Arabia and JeIP and its Afghan affiliate, the HIA. The JeIP had been the major recipient of Saudi assistance before the Gulf War in 1991. However, relations between the Saudis and the JeIP deteriorated when JeIP leaders refused to support the Saudi Kingdom against

Iraq in the Gulf War in 1991.[50] Against this international background Sheikh Jamilur Rehman, just before his assassination, had performed *hajj* in Saudi Arabia, where he held a meeting with King Fahd bin Abdul Aziz. The meeting stipulated that Saudi financial assistance would now flow to Sheikh Jamilur Rehman and his JDQS instead of the HIA.[51] The Saudis were looking for new allies in the region. The JDQS was a serious and favorable candidate to win Saudi patronage. Amir Hamza alleges that the ISI helped the HIA to attack the JDQS. Amir Hamza writes, "How is it possible that the ISI was not aware of the onslaught by Hekmatyar? How could Hekmatyar enter Kunar in a victorious manner from Pakistan without taking permission from the ISI?"[52]

The situation took a turn in favor of the JDQS after the fall of Dr. Najibullah's regime in 1992. The mujahideen took power in Kabul. Burhanud Din Rabbani and Gulbadin Hekmatyar became the president and prime minister respectively in the new Afghan government. President Burhannudin Rabbani sent a special plane to Peshawar to bring JDQS *amir* Sheikh Samiullah and Sheikh Waliullah to Kabul. The mujahideen regime restored the Islamic city-state in Kunar and handed over control of Kunar to the JDQS, and decided to appoint a JDQS commander the provincial governor. Afghan President Rabbani appointed JDQS Amir Sheikh Sami Ullah his Adviser on Religious Affairs, and JDQS Commander Wali Ullah Minister for Transportation. President Rabbani carved a new province out of the region commonly known as Nuristan. He also appointed Mullah Mohammad Afzal as the *sarprast* (patron) and Hazrat Gul as the governor of that province. The installation of Salafist governments in two Afghan provinces was a boost for the MDI, which was preparing for its international jihadist role at that time. The new Afghan government handed the *Muaskar Taiba* back to the MDI. The MDI also opened a new *muaskar* under the name of Aqsa in Kunar.[53] However, the MDI's links with both the Nuristani Salafists and the JDQS came to an end once they joined the Taliban.[54] The MDI extensively networked and recruited in Nuristan and Kunar until 1996 when the Taliban threw them out of Afghanistan.

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The nature of Saudi and international politics started changing radically after Iraq, under Saddam Hussein, invaded Kuwait in 1990. The Saudi regime invited U.S. troops to defend Saudi territory. *Al-Sahwa al-Islamiyya* put up stiff resistance to the Saudi decision to call in foreign, in particular American, troops. However, they failed to create sustainable mobilization against the regime. By late 1992, the Saudi regime was already tightening the noose around the neck of the *al-Sahwa al-Islamiyya*. The Saudi regime started arresting the *al-Sahwa al-Islamiyya* leaders, as well as hundreds of rejectionists and jihadists, including some MDI members. The Saudi regime also started curbing the independent religious initiatives for fundraising. One of the targets was Haramayn Foundation, which was launched in 1992 by Sururis, a faction of the Saudi Muslim Brothers, to counter the humanitarian fundraising by the Muslim Brotherhood.[55] Till then, the humanitarian field was considered the preserve of the Muslim Brotherhood, which also controlled the World Muslim League and IIRO.[56] The Haramayn Foundation cut all links to the *al-Sahwa al-Islamiyya* opposition to survive, even removing Abdallah al-Jilali from the Board of Directors, although he was one of the founders. By early 1993, the Sururis had started unequivocally supporting the Saudi regime. On July 10, 1993, the regime promoted Bin Baz to the position of general *mufti* of the kingdom (*mufti 'amm li–l-mamlaka*), which was kept vacant since the death of Muhammad Ibrahim. With the promotion, Bin Baz lost many of his powers[57] and the MDI lost a friend in a high place in Saudi Arabia.

There was another wave of arrests after the November 1995 attack on a U.S. training facility in Riyadh and Khobar Towers in June 1996. The Saudi regime again arrested a number of *al-Sahwa al-Islamiyya* as well as rejectionist and jihadist activists, including some MDI militants. The Saudi regime also pressed Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, who had formed a government for the second time in Pakistan in 1993, to extradite *al-Sahwa al-Islamiyya* members and rejectionist jihadists. The Pakistani government arrested and extradited several of them, including Hassan As-Sareehi, to Saudi Arabia where he remained incarcerated in prison. By 1995, *al-Sahwa al-Islamiyya* was already crushed. Most of the arrested

opposition leaders and cadres were slowly released after 1997.[58] Hassan As-Sareehi is known to have conceived and planned the spectacular Lion's Den Operation against the Soviet Army in Jaji, Afghanistan, in 1987. In this operation, he led mujahideen, including Osama bin Laden, Abu Zubair Al-Madani, and Sheikh Tameem Adnani, while Sheikh Abdullah Azzam was in the second line of the front. As-Sareehi trained Ibn Khattab from the time he came to Afghanistan as a young teenager until he left for Tajikistan as a top commander. Pakistan handed over As-Sareehi to Saudi Arabia in return for two of the topmost Pakistani drug smugglers on death row in Saudi Arabia. As-Sareehi underwent severe torture in Saudi jails. His Saudi interrogators are said to have stretched his neck away from his body and permanently disabled him. He can no longer turn his neck from side to side. He was stripped naked and given electric torture. His family was not allowed to see him.[59]

According to the Movement for Islamic Reform in Arabia (MIRA), the dissidents included high profile people like Palestinian Professor Muhammad Yusuf Abbas, Sheikh Abdallah Azzam's caliph [successor] at Maktab Khadamat al-Mujahideen, and Mahmoud Bahaziq. They were kept at the most notorious jail in the Kingdom: Ar-Ruwais Prison.[60] Mahmoud Bahaziq was released after 15 months but was not allowed to leave the country.[61] After his release from the Ar-Ruwais Prison in 1998, he addressed the MDI's annual congregation in November 1999 by telephone. Mahmoud Bahaziq visited Pakistan in September 2000.[62] He again came to Pakistan and gave a sermon at the *Muaskar Abdullah bin Masood* in June 2001.[63] Another mujahid affiliated with the MDI who was arrested by Saudi security forces was Abu Asim Al-Makki (aka Muhammad Hamdi Al-Ahdal). He became famous for his heroic role in the battle for Tishin, Bosnia, in 1992. He lost one leg and one arm was paralyzed. Abu Asim was also severely beaten by Saudi security forces. According to one account, "the interrogators beat him with baton on his disabled limbs and spat in his face. His face also looks like he has undergone severe physical and mental torture."[64]

Most non-Ahle Hadith parties such as JeIP had supported Iraq against Saudi Arabia during the Gulf War of 1991.[65]

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Consequently, Saudi Arabia had started slowly shifting its patronage to Ahl-e Hadith groups in Pakistan. However, the arrest and torture of MDI commanders created a permanent rift between the MDI and the Saudi regime. By early 1995, the Saudis also started pressing Pakistani Ahle Hadith *ulema* to distance themselves from the MDI. Consequently, another group of *ulema* split from the MDI in July 1995 and joined the MJAH, the Tehreekul Mujahideen, or both. They included Abdullah Nasir Rehmani and Mohammad Hussain Shaikhupuri. The Saudis had assured them that Saudi patronage would be shifted to the TM.[66] The Haramayn Foundation and WAMY also shifted their financial support to the TM, which revived the group. WAMY even created a Committee for Kashmiri Youth to fund jihad in Kashmir to take back space from the MDI/LeT. Chairman of the WAMY Committee for Kashmiri Youth, Dr. Abdel Hameed Y. al-Mazroo,[67] and WAMY Secretary General, Dr. Maneh Hammad al-Johani,[68] took personal interest to strengthen the TM. The TM leadership made efforts to create formal and durable links with the MJAH. In September 2000, several TM leaders, including Abdullah Nasir Rehmani, Amir Abdullah Ghazali, and Jamilur Rehman (not to be confused with Sheikh Jamilur Rehman of Afghanistan), made a one-month visit to Saudi Arabia, in August 2000. They met several high level Saudi officials, and sought Saudi patronage. By this time the TM had established its jihadist credentials, claiming that it had lost 600 militants in Kashmir jihad.[69] Their efforts soon bore fruit. In a meeting in Islamabad on June 12, 2001,[70] MJAH and TM signed an agreement, which turned the TM into the armed wing of the MJAH. MJAH *amir* Allama Sajid Mir said that the MJAH has put all the offices, mosques, and madrassahs at the disposal of the TM.[71] The MJAH began sending its members to receive jihadi training at the *Muaskar Abdullah bin Mubarak*, run by the TM.[72] The MJAH leaders visited the *Muaskar Abdullah bin Mubarak* in July 2001[73] to see the training. The TM opened an office in Saudi Arabia and appointed Abu Tahir its representative.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE WHOLLY OWNED SUBSIDIARY OF THE ISI

When the Soviets pulled out of Afghanistan in 1988, the Afghan jihad lost momentum. For a nascent militant group like the MDI, it was difficult to survive in the shifting geostrategic situation. However, Pakistan's ISI had prepared the ground for a new jihad in Indian Kashmir. Indian Kashmir was a new territory for the MDI, and like other jihadist groups in the region, it depended on Kashmiri groups for logistical support to operate there. The young boys from Indian Kashmir were more street fighters than guerrilla fighters, and hence needed militant training. The ISI did not have sufficient training facilities for the incoming Kashmiri boys at that time.[1] Therefore, the ISI connected the young Kashmiri fighters with Pakistani jihadist groups, such as the MDI. Although the original plan envisioned a limited role for the Pakistani jihadist groups, by 1989 the MDI began sending its own fighters into Indian Kashmir. From 1989 to 1992, the first wave of MDI fighters fought alongside some of the Kashmiri groups, such as al-Barq and Tehreekul Mujahideen (TM),[2] The first militant operation in Indian Kashmir which the MDI participated in took place on January 25, 1990 when "mujahideen gunned down one squadron leader and three pilots of the same Indian Air Force whose 704 sorties form 27 October to 17 November 1947 landed Indian army at Srinagar airport."[3] The MDI started setting up its jihadist infrastructure in Pakistani Kashmir as early as 1989, locating the

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first relief camp in Muzaffarabad (which housed 72 Kashmiri refugees) in early 1990.[4] In August 1992, the first group of LeT mujahideen crossed the LoC into Indian Kashmir independently, attacking a military convoy in the Kupwara District on August 26, 1992. The MDI claimed to have killed 19 Indian soldiers, including a captain in this operation.[5]

The pro-jihad and anti-elections JAH factions started supporting and joining the jihad in Kashmir from 1989 to 1992, though none of them had directly taken part in the Afghan jihad. Muttahidda Jamiat Ahle Hadith served as the political face of the MDI at that time and held a Jihad-e-Kashmir conference in Lahore on March 16, 1991. Maulana Moeenud Din Lakhvi presided over the conference, and former vice chancellor of Medina University, Abdullah Zaid, expressed the hope that Muttahidda Jamiat Ahle Hadith's struggle would liberate Kashmir. He also assured the conference of "cooperation" from the Saudi people, *ulema*, and government.[6] Sheikh Abdul Qavi, a teacher at Medina University, equated the Kashmir conflict with the recent Gulf conflict and expressed the hope that it too would be resolved.[7] The conference announced its support of the ISI-sponsored jihad in Indian Kashmir, and encouraged Muslims to join the jihad in Kashmir under the MDI. Another important Ahle Hadith group, which extended support to jihad in Indian Kashmir, was the Jamiat Ahle Hadith-Azad Kashmir (JAH-AK), which also held pro-jihad conferences to exhort people to join jihad in Indian Kashmir.

The tiny Pakistani Ahle Hadith community had a history of participating in the jihad in Kashmir in 1947. A leading Ahle Hadith *alim*, Maulana Fazal Ilahi Vazirabadi, had at that time written a tract to extend much-needed support to jihad in Kashmir, with no other religious party supporting Pakistan's secret jihad in 1947.[8] Vazirabadi was a follower of Sayyid Ahmed Khan of Rai Bareilly (1786-1831) and Shah Ismail (1779-1831), 19th century Ahle Hadith mujahideen who fought the British and Sikhs in what is now northwestern Pakistan. Vazirabadi was instrumental in sending Punjabi students to wage jihad in Afghanistan in 1915,[9] and in 1947 he again incited people to take part in the jihad in Kashmir. Abdus Salaam Bin Muhammad's tract, *Jehad in the Present Times*, borrowed

heavily from Vazirabadi's 1949 book, *The Problem of the Kashmir Jihad*, which was itself a response to JeI founder Sayyid Abul Ala Maududi's belief that only the state - not individuals - can make a call for jihad. Maududi, unlike like Vazirabadi, believed that it was for the Pakistani state to declare jihad to fight India's rule in Kashmir.

To become eligible to receive money and paramilitary training, all the militant groups operating in Indian Kashmir were, and are, required to register with the ISI, providing details about the strength of their groups and their training facilities. At the time of their registration, they have to provide details about the strength of their groups and training facilities. The ISI decides how many mujahideen a certain group can send across the LoC, and the groups are then required to periodically update the ISI about their members and operations to stay eligible to receive money. The ISI pays the entire amount of operational funding for jihad in Indian Kashmir to each group operating there, including living allowances to mujahideen from Indian Kashmir as they are not supposed to be working in Pakistan. The Pakistani members of Kashmiri groups, including the Hizbul Mujahideen, are required to pay for their living while in Pakistan. The ISI pays for the training of only those who are sent to Indian Kashmir. The groups are supposed to raise their own funds for other activities, including the training of militants who never go to Indian Kashmir.[10]

Being a Pakistani-Kashmiri party, the JAH-AK was not eligible to receive training or money from the ISI at that time. It formed its militant wing under the name of the Tehreekul Mujahideen (TM) in February 1990. The JAH-AK had strong links with Ahle Hadith groups in Indian Kashmir who sent their recruits to receive training in Pakistani Kashmir. At this time the ISI provided only a rudimentary two weeks worth of training, so the JAH-AK outsourced the training of its Ahle Hadith recruits to the MDI in Afghanistan. They sent two groups to the MDI camps, and the JAH-AK and MDI agreed that the latter would operate only in Pakistan. The MDI violated the agreement soon after the JAH-AK boys arrived at the training camps by trying to recruit them by offering more incentives. Hafiz Saeed even asked some of them

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to tell the Arab financers of the JAH-AK to give funding directly to the MDI. Finally, in the summer of 1993, the MDI announced the formation of the LeT as a separate department, with the MDI assuming the role of a political and missionary group. During this time, a power struggle ensued within the MDI, with the ISI supporting Hafiz Saeed and his jihadist group in their struggle to expel the *ulema* and take over leadership of the MDI from Allama Rashdi. The jihadist group, led by Hafiz Saeed and Zafar Iqbal, placed more stress on jihad as opposed to missionary work. Most of its members are not considered *ulema* as they did not hold a madrassa degree or had dropped out of madrassahs. Most Ahle Hadith *ulema* left the MDI in this period while Allama Rashdi lost control over the MDI in the years prior to his death in 1996.

Kashmiri Muslim separatists and Pakistani mujahideen groups claim that more than 100,000 people have died at the hands of the Indian army, yet no mujahideen publication or spokesman has ever given the source of this number. No one can explain how this number was arrived at, and the number appears highly exaggerated, with deaths increasing in number to make the situation look more dire as time passes. The Indian press and official reports put the number quite low. According to the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), which regularly monitors violence in South Asia, there were 47,234 incidents of terrorism from 1988 to 2001. The data on incidents of terrorism from 2002 to 2013 is not available. In the period from 1988 to 2013, 43,551 people died in terrorism-related incidents. Of them, 14,675 were civilian, 6,104 belonged to security forces, and 22,772 were terrorists. [11]

In the beginning of the jihad in Indian Kashmir, the Hizbul Mujahideen (JeI's armed wing) inflicted extreme atrocities on the tiny Hindu population in the Valley of Kashmir, on the orders of the ISI. The ISI wanted to push the Hindu population out of the state and make it a Muslim majority territory. The Hizbul Mujahideen massacred the Hindu population, and within the first two years of jihad had pushed virtually the entire Hindu population out of the Valley of Kashmir and into refugee camps in Jammu

and other parts of India.[12] By the time the LeT arrived in Indian Kashmir, there were few Hindus left to be killed. The ISI had asked the Hizbul Mujahideen and other Kashmiri militant groups to attack Hindu temples and properties, along with the Hindus themselves. When the LeT entered Indian Kashmir, it joined the Hizbul Mujahideen in attacking the Hindus and Hindu temples. The Indian Kashmir government told the state assembly that Muslim militants had damaged and vandalized 208 of the 438 Hindu temples in the Valley of Kashmir during the 20-year-old jihad. The Srinagar District suffered the most where the number of damaged temples stood at 57, closely followed by Anantnag District with 56 damaged temples. Kashmiri Pandit Sangarsh Samiti (KPSS), an advocacy group of Kashmiri Pandits, disputed the figures. They put the number of total vandalized temples at 550, and 50,000 *kanals*[13] of land that had been encroached. However, Sanjay Tickoo did not give the total number of temples in the valley.[14] In major attacks on Hindus, Islamist jihadists, mostly the LeT mujahideen, attacked and killed eight Hindus in 1997. By 2006, Islamists had killed over 600 additional Kashmiri Hindus.[15] In 1995, the LeT extended its operations into Jammu,[16] particularly the Districts of Rajouri, Poonch, and Doda.[17] The ISI wanted the LeT to do in Jammu what the Hizbul Mujahideen had done in the Valley of Kashmir: eliminate Hindus.

Jammu has a long history of communal politics and violence dating back to the pre-1947 era, second only to Punjab. For many in India, Jammu is a metaphor for India itself. Praveen Swami writes, "Terrorist activity here intervenes in all-India discourses, legitimizing itself as a defense of vulnerable Muslim communities. For Hindu communal politicians, similarly, terrorism is a platform through which their all-India concerns can be amplified and broadcast. Protecting the people from terrorism in Jammu is, for politicians of the Hindu right, an exercise in defending a besieged Hindu minority."[18] By 1992, the ISI had planned to open jihadi fronts in Jammu[19] with the goal of rekindling communal violence, turning the Indian Muslim population into mujahideen to be used

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against India.[20] By this time, the ISI had nearly sidelined other Kashmiri groups, turning the Hizbul Mujahideen, the armed wing of the JeIP, into the largest terrorist group. The LeT was the only Pakistani group which was interested in operating in Jammu at that time, as the Deobandi groups operating in Indian Kashmir were more interested in moving into the Indian heartland. Jammu proved more difficult to penetrate than they imagined. Only the LeT and Hizbul Mujahideen entered Jammu.

The first major terrorist attack in Jammu took place in the Kishtwar District in August 1993. Terrorists attacked and killed 18 Hindu bus passengers, leading to communal riots in the region and Hindu mobs attacking Muslim businesses and homes. In spite of an increasing presence of terrorists in the region, communal violence throughout Kishtwar remained low.[21] Between 1996 and 2001, violence shifted to the Doda District. According to the Indian Army Sector Commander of Kishtwar Brigade, Brigadier G. D. Bakshi, the LeT and Hizbul Mujahideen militants killed 310 Hindus in Doda from August 1993 to September 2001, the worst period.[22] There were 39 major massacres in Jammu and Kashmir from January 1996 to May 2006.[23]

As the Hizbul Mujahideen destroyed Hindu temples in the Valley of Kashmir, the LeT took up the same task in Jammu. However, whereas Hizbul Mujahideen operations mainly targeted Hindu temples, LeT operations also targeted a large number of Hindu civilians, not only in Jammu, but inside India as well. On September 24, 2002, two LeT terrorists launched an attack on the Akshardham Temple in the western Indian State of Gujarat, leaving 32 dead. Two months later, a group of militants attacked the Hindu temples of Raghunath and Panjbakhtar Jammu. A six-hour gun battle left twelve dead and more than 50 injured.[24] The attacks on Hindu temples in Indian Kashmir were part of LeT's grand strategy in India, designed to create communal tensions in a highly polarized India.[25] On July 23, 2002, Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) president Ashok Singhal said, "Jehadis should keep in mind that today Hindus are united and competent enough to protect their honor and dignity. What happened in Gujarat is a clear indication for jehadis that Hindus will not tolerate atrocities anymore."[26]

VHP senior vice-president Giriraj Kishore said that the terrorists who attacked the Raghunath temple could only succeed with the help of locals. He had recently threatened that the terrorists who attacked the temple "should also understand that they had many shrines related to their religion in the rest of the country, which can also be made targets."[27]

Each time the peace process between Pakistan and India began, the LeT carried out brutal massacres. On February 19, 1999, as Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee prepared to cross into Pakistan, militants attacked a marriage party at Bal Jaralan in Rajouri, killing two. The death toll would have been higher if not for two brothers, one from the Central Reserve Police Force, and the other from the Kashmir Rifles, who were on leave attending the marriage. The police and army later ambushed the LeT militants at Sewari, the village where the first communal massacre in Rajouri district took place in September 1997. In Mohra Fata hamlet of Khorbani, a remote village in Rajouri District, they massacred another family of four, and brutally massacred nine members of another family at Barhyana in Udhampur District the same night. Indian army intelligence intercepted radio signals on frequencies used by LeT supporters, saying to "give [Pakistani Prime Minister] Nawaz Sharif a present" by "turning the snow red."[28]

LeT mujahideen also carried out a brutal attack on families of the Indian Army. On May 14, 2002, three LeT militants wearing Indian Army uniforms boarded a Himachal Roadways bus at Kulu in Himachal Pradesh to Jammu. As the bus neared the army families' accommodations, they ordered the bus driver to take the bus to the cantonment. When he refused, the militants gunned down 31 people, including eight women and eleven children.[29] The mujahideen belonged to the Gujranwala District in Pakistani central Punjab, and had crossed the LoC on May 13. It took three hours for the Indian army to eliminate the *fidayee* attackers, who carried over 30 grenades, 2,000 rounds of ammunition, AK-47s, and Chinese pistols.[30]

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Although the jihad in Kashmir was and is against Hindus and other non-Muslims, the mujahideen routinely targeted Muslims for crimes such as supporting India, practicing obscenity, or for not adequately supporting the mujahideen. According to internal Union Home Ministry data, Muslims are the principal victims of the jihad. In 2005, just 54 of the 489 civilians killed by terrorists were Hindu. Only in 1990 did that figure cross 20 percent, which is considerably lower than the Hindu representation in the state's population.[31] On March 13, 2001, the LeT announced that they would execute those who accepted work for the Military Engineering Service (MES) or the Army Supply Corps (ASC). The next day, MES and ASC contractors placed an advertisement in the newspapers that said if they stopped their work, it would cause "indescribable trouble, in consequence of which their dependent families and those of others whose men are connected with them shall have to undergo sufferings and starvation." It appealed to the LeT to spare them,[32] an appeal the LeT refused to accept.

Jihadist groups waged war equally on obscenity in Indian Kashmir. In June 2005, LeT's top commander for northern Kashmir came down from the forests above the small mountain hamlet of Sumlar and told the people in the local mosque, "I don't want to see young girls and boys roaming around with mobile phones, for it will lead to immorality and vice." The LeT commander was a Pakistani national, known by his jihadist aliases Bilal, Salahuddin, and Haider. He ordered three teenage girls seen with cellphones to be brought into the mosque, and scolded them in public. A well-known LeT operative, Qayoom Nassar from Sopore's Batpora area, joined the LeT in 2000, murdering two Sopore residents in May 2006 for engaging in the anti-Islamic behavior of gambling.

The LeT has been waging jihad on Sufi Islam in Kashmir as well. Terrorist groups targeted Sufi shrines as early as 1989. In June 1994, LeT terrorists attacked the historic Baba Reshi shrine at Tangmarg, firing on the pilgrims, and in May 1996, attacked and laid siege on one of the most revered Sufi shrines in South Asia, Charar-e-Sharif, and destroyed the town's most prestigious seventh-century shrine. In June 2001, they hurled grenades again and killed four women.[33] In June 2005, the LeT attempted to kill the venerated

mystic Abdul Ahad in Sopore, a former police officer and one of the best-known custodians of Sufi Islam's traditions. Ahad survived the attack unhurt but two members of his congregation died, and nine were injured.[34] In 2000, LeT terrorists destroyed the tapestries Bafliaz residents had offered at the Sufi shrine of Sayyed Noor.[35] In June of the following year, militants attacked the shrine complex of Sheikh Noorud Din Wali, killing nine devotees, including six women and injuring hundreds of others.[36] In May 2005, LeT terrorists carried out an arson attack and destroyed the shrine of the Zainuddin Wali at Ashmuqam. A month later, LeT terrorist Bilal Magray attacked a congregation by throwing a grenade in Bijbehara and injured 15 people.[37]

As winter falls in the Kargil-Dras sectors on the LoC in Kashmir, Indian Army troops retreat to less cold areas due to the harsh winter. In the spring of 1999, when Indian soldiers returned to the Kargil heights, they unexpectedly received weapons fire. Many retreating soldiers were killed, unaware who the enemy was. In Pakistan, Pakistani and Pakistan-based Kashmiri jihadist groups, including the LeT, announced that their mujahideen had occupied the Kargil heights, claiming they did not receive any support from the Pakistan Army. The Pakistan-based Kashmiri jihadist groups nominated a spokesman who continuously issued press releases and gave interviews claiming successes against the Indian army. The initial low morale and confusion among the Indian military helped 'mujahideen' gain credence. However, the blurred picture became clearer as the world discovered that there were also Pakistani regulars among the mujahideen occupying the Kargil heights. By early June, the situation became quite clear, at least for the Indians, that there was not a single mujahid among the infiltrators.[38]

By this time, the Pakistanis were losing the war with the Indian army. The poorly planned Kargil operation was no longer sustainable, and the Pakistan Army approached the Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif government, which was unaware of the involvement of the Pakistani regulars, to speak to President Clinton and bail them out. Under this face-saving formula, Prime Minister Sharif

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went to Washington and held a meeting with President Clinton on July 4, 1999, with the request to stop the limited Kargil war from becoming a full-scale war. As a result of this meeting, Prime Minister Sharif asked the 'mujahideen' to climb down the heights, which they quietly did. After the humiliating loss of the Kargil war, the Pakistan Army set out to create a false narrative with the help of the jihadis and a supportive Pakistani media. The new military narrative was that the 'mujahideen' were on the verge of a great victory when Prime Minister Sharif betrayed them. Although no MDI mujahid had gone to fight in Kargil, the group continuously claimed it was fighting alongside the other mujahideen groups when Prime Minister Sharif stabbed the mujahideen in the back. Soon after the Sharif-Clinton meeting in Washington, the LeT introduced *fidayee* operations in Kashmir.

The first *fidayee* operation took place on July 12, 1999 when LeT mujahideen attacked and occupied a Border Security Force (BSF) camp in Baramula for three days, and killing 13 BSF personnel, including a DIG. The Indian army had to level the location in order to overpower Abu Salman Muhammad Akmal. On November 3, 1999, mujahideen occupied the high security Corps Headquarters of Badamibagh Cantonment in Srinagar, targeting and killing a number of soldiers. Among those killed included Indian army spokesmen, Major Parshotam and Colonel Bhatiya, Major Kumar, JCO BD Sharma, NCO SK Shukla, and NCO PK Mehra. Abu Muawwaz Muhammad Ameen from Bahawalpur also died in the operation. On January 1, 2000, mujahideen attacked an Indian army camp in Poonch City and killed as many as 35 Indian soldiers. Abul Qasim Muhammad Arshad of Bahawalnagar and Abu Suraqah Muhammad Amjad from Vehari District died. On March 21, 2000, *fidai* mujahideen carried out an 18-hour attack on a BSF camp in the Chanpura area of Srinagar, destroying the entire site. Over a dozen Indian soldiers died. The LeT lost Abu Muhammad Imran Butt from Gujranwala, and Abu Haris Muhammad Niaz from Sialkot District was killed.[39]

A *fidayee* operation is different from a suicide attack. In a *fidayee* operation, the terrorist makes every effort not to die although death is certain in the end. In a suicide operation, he commits

suicide to kill others. Although the LeT introduced *fidayee* operations formally in July 1999, all of its operations were *fidayee* in nature from the very beginning. In 1998, Khalid Walid (Hafiz Saeed's son-in-law, and an MDI official) told the *Herald*, "Only those of our men are captured who faint during the fight. Otherwise, we fight until death and do not surrender at any cost."[40] This is the reason why the Indian security forces have difficulty arresting LeT members.[41] According their own claims, the LeT carried out 98 *fidayee* attacks in Indian Kashmir in 1999 and 2000, killing 200 Indian soldiers and officers, while only eleven LeT militants died in these attacks.[42] Another spectacular *fidayee* attack was carried on the Red Fort in New Delhi in which twelve Indian soldiers died.[43] Within a month after the terrorist attack on the Red Fort in Delhi, a six-member LeT squad, disguised in BSF uniforms, tried to enter the heavily guarded Srinagar airport. The CRPF soldiers killed all of them in the three-hour fight that followed. Four CRPF soldiers and several passers-by also died.[44] In the first eleven years, the LeT killed 14,369 Indian soldiers while it lost 1,016 mujahideen.[45]

Hafiz Saeed stated that the LeT mujahideen carried out 15 *fidayee* attacks against Indian forces between April 28, 2000 and March 2001.[46] According to LeT Operational Commander, Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi, 95 *fidayeen* killed 891 Indian soldiers in 2000, while 24 of them laid down their lives in these operations. LeT claims to have killed 14,369 Indian soldiers from 1990 to 2001, the first eleven years against its own 1,100 martyrs, which shows the importance of *fidayee* operations.[47] The *fidayee* attacks attracted media attention in November 1999 when at least three LeT militants managed to enter the high security zone of Badamibagh Cantonment, 15 Corp Headquarters. For nearly twelve hours, the LeT militants killed armed and unarmed people and bombed buildings. Eight army personnel died in what was the LeT's most dramatic *fidayee* operation until then.[48]

Although it appeared to be declining in the second half of the 1990s, *fidayee* operations revived militancy in Indian Kashmir. According to Praveen Swami who quoted Indian official figures, "Since August 1999, 15 camps of Indian security forces have been stormed, illustrating the renewed ability of terrorist organizations,

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which had been virtually decimated four years ago, to wage war. Over 330 Indian troopers were killed in 1999, the highest number ever in Indian Kashmir's decade-long insurgency. Just 1,043 terrorists were eliminated until December 15, 1999, compared with 2,443 in 1996."[49] Just before dawn on July 22, 2003, three *fidayee* terrorists attacked the camp of the Electrical and Mechanical Engineers at Tanda near Akhnoor on the Pakistani border. One of them was killed at the gate of the camp and the other succeeded in killing six soldiers before he was also killed. The third hid himself, throwing a grenade at General Prasad when he came to the site after learning of the attack. They succeeded in killing Brigadier V.K. Govil, in charge of the 16 Corp Headquarters' Electrical and Mechanical Engineering battalion, and injured the Northern Command Chief, Lieutenant-General Hari Prasad, the senior-most officer to have sustained combat injuries during the 15-year insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir. The *fidayeen* nearly killed Lieutenant-General T.P.S. Brar, who commands the 175,000-strong 16 Corps, the largest formation of its kind in the world. Major-General T.K. Sapru, General Officer-Commanding of the Akhnoor-based 10 Division, Major-General D. Khanna, and Brigadier Baldev Singh were also injured.[50]

In 2001, there were 28 such attacks, yet only 10 attacks in 2002. In the first half of 2003, the number rose, with terrorists attempting 10 *fidayee* attacks in Indian Kashmir. In three cases, the number of security personnel killed was greater than the number of terrorists killed. The number of attacks is closely linked to the thaw in India-Pakistan relations. Eight of the ten attacks in 2003 happened after Prime Minister Vajpayee announced his peace initiative in May 2003.[51]

It was the Afghan Salafists who introduced the killing of their enemies by beheading or slitting their throats. In Afghanistan, the JDQS commonly beheaded or slit the throats of Afghan Communists and Soviet soldiers after capturing them. The MDI/JuD mujahideen adopted this tradition in Afghanistan, and later perfected it in other parts of the world such as Kashmir and

Bosnia. In December 1988, JDQS and MDI militias carried out a joint attack on Communist strongholds in Khiva outside Jalalabad in the Afghan province of Nangarhar.[52] Nuristani Salafists also joined them.[53] JDQS Chief Commander, Jaan Dad Khan, later claimed to have slit the throats of more than 100 Communists after the fall of Khiva in 1988.[54] Soon after the formation of the LeT, its mujahideen started slitting the throats of Hindus and Indian soldiers in Indian Kashmir. LeT mujahideen slit the throats of two BSF soldiers whom they had captured on June 8, 1993.[55] The MDI/JuD broadcasted brutality as a badge of honor.

Journalist Zaigham Khan, who spent several days among the LeT militants and interviewed their leaders in 1998, explained the reasons: "Since it is not possible to bring their captives back to Pakistan and the Indian government does not bargain for the return of hostages, all Indian prisoners are killed in the Occupied Valley [Indian Kashmir]. The Lashkar[56] fighter will usually execute an Indian soldier by slitting his throat. However, beheading and disemboweling are also common tactics, employed mostly for psychological reason."[57] MDI/JuD leaders say this is the tradition of the early Muslims and they are simply continuing it. MDI/JuD literature mentions many instances where the LeT mujahideen slit the throats of Hindus and Indian soldiers. In 1998, Amir Hamza narrated how the LeT mujahideen slit the throats of a Shiv Sena worker.

In mid-1995, the LeT sent Abu Haibatullah across the LoC with the mission of bringing back an Indian soldier for interrogation. Abu Haibatullah ambushed and disarmed a soldier, then killed the soldier when he tried to snatch Abu Haibatullah's gun. He then returned home with the soldier's severed head, putting it on display at the 1995 annual congregation at Muridke. He later told a journalist, "Lots of people came to see the head. Some were from the Pakistani army and they praised me for my gallantry."[58] LeT mujahideen cut the ears, lips, and nose of Mohammad Hussain, who they suspected of helping the Indian Army, at Sam Samit, Rajouri District on February 2, 2002.[59] In June of 2005, a seven-member LeT squad carried out an attack on the village of Nehoch-Dunga in Udhampur, beheading 65-year-old Abdul Ahad in the

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presence of the entire village, and then cut off the noses and ears of Roshan Din and Ghulam Rasool. They brutally beat six other villagers, including Abdul Ahad's elderly wife, Fatima Bi.[60] In early July 2006, the LeT tried terrorist-turned-informer Tanzim Ahmad for treason, severely torturing him before slitting his throat.[61] In October 2006, the LeT tortured dental surgeon Mushtaq Shah in the cornfields around the village of Nopora Kalan before they slit his throat with shaving blades in the presence of villagers.[62]

The LeT mujahideen carry out the barbaric practice of slitting throats and beheading Indian soldiers with the consent and support of their Pakistan Army handlers. In a *Voice of Islam* report, a LeT militant states, "According to the plan, the mujahideen would start firing with LMG guns and rocket launchers but when we would fire a grenade the mujahideen would freeze fire and then we would storm into the post and cut off the heads of the Indian soldiers but when [we] arrived at the bunker two soldiers were standing guards there... "[63] After the successful attack, the LeT mujahideen came back to the Pakistani side of the LoC and met with their handler, a colonel of Pakistan Army's 35 Baluch Regiment. The colonel congratulated them and told them, according to Indian Radio news, 22 Indian soldiers had died in their attack, including a captain.[64]

The Ahle Hadith in the state of Jammu and Kashmir was a small group, mainly concentrated in Srinagar, Anantnag, and Shopian. The dominant Muslim sect known as Sufi Islam had little respect for them, with Sufi *ulema* issuing several *fatawa* (pl. of *fatwa*, edict) excommunicating them. LeT's jihad endeared them to separatist Kashmiri Muslims, seeing LeT militants as guest mujahideen who are fighting and dying on their behalf. The first time when Kashmiri Muslims publicly showed their respect to the LeT was in January 2001, when more than 6,000 people held a rally to condemn the killing of the LeT terrorists who died in an attack on the airport on January 16, 2001, followed by several more protest rallies. One of the slogans at these rallies was 'Lashkar-e-Taiba *aage badho, hum tumhare saath ha in*' (Forge ahead, Lashkar-e-Taiba, we are with you).[65] On February 17, 2001, the announcement on the mosque's loud speakers warned the police that the LeT squad inside the Jama Masjid in Srinagar was prepared to use force to resist their entry when policemen tried to contain protests outside.[66]

In June 22, 2008, Indian security forces killed two LeT terrorists in the forests near Chhatterhama village in central Kashmir. The Muslim villagers decided to raise money for their burial, and turned their graves into the first shrines of the LeT. Chhatterhama village was the most unlikely place for a shrine as no residents of the village had enlisted in the jihad, as most of them supported pro-India National Conference. On June 23, one day after the killing, people led a protest rally against the transfer of land to the Shrine Board. The same afternoon they started working on erecting a shrine for the LeT. The following Friday, they observed their last rites.[67] Not only is their jihad succeeding, but their mission is as well.

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CHAPTER FIVE

JIHAD–INDIA BOUND

In mid-1985, members of the Jamaat Gorba Ahle Hadith gathered to discuss how to counter anti-Muslim communal violence in the textile town of Bhiwandi, 20 kilometers to the northeast of Mumbai. At the meeting, an obscure West Bengal cleric named Abu Masood announced the formation of what was to become LeT's Indian wing: the Tanzim Islahul Muslimeen (the Organization for the Improvement of Muslims), or TIM. The gathering included the henna-died 52-year old Abdul Karim who practiced *hikmat*, or Islamic medicine, and was known as hakim-ji,[1] and would eventually be known as Tunda after losing his left arm in a bomb-making accident a few years later. Tunda had yet to lose his left arm in a bomb-making accident and earn his nickname. Also in attendance was Mohammad Azam Ghauri, the fifth of eleven children from a poor Hyderabadi family.[2] The group Tunda and Ghauri founded on that day later morphed into a huge killing machine. The meeting was the result of the efforts of the Bahaziq brothers who had tried to create a jihadist organization in both India and Pakistan. Hamid Bahaziq's mother was an Indian Muslim from Hyderabad, the capital of the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh, and his brother was Mahmoud Bahaziq. After the failure of the Meccan rebellion, the Bahaziq brothers tried to organize Juhayman's Ikhwan in different countries, wherever they had members and supporters from behind the curtains. They spoke Urdu/Hindi fluently. They had sponsored several similar efforts in India but this was their first success.[3] The Bahaziq brothers had organized this meeting with the help of

Ghauri with whose family they were familiar. Like in Pakistan, the Jamaat Gorba Ahle Hadith in India also shared Juhaman's Ikhwan's ideology to a great extent. However, it is not clear if it had any links with Juhayman's Ikhwan. In India, the Jamaat Gorba Ahle Hadith became the first vector of Juhayman's Ikhwan's infiltration and recruitment of Indian leaders and cadres.

On December 6, 1992, Hindu zealots demolished the Babri Mosque. Jalees Ansari, a graduate of Maratha College at Nagpara and Sion Medical College, decided to leave his profession of saving lives and instead adopted the profession of killing in the name of Islam. He also joined TIM. Precisely a year later, Ansari and his group carried out 43 bombings in Mumbai and Hyderabad, and another seven on intercity trains. Fortunately, their lack of training made them amateurs, and only two were killed.[4] Central Bureau of Investigations (CBI) agents arrested Ansari only 13 days before he was to carry out another series of bombings, scheduled for India's Republic Day in 1994.[5] To take revenge on the demolition of the Babri Masjid, Ghauri's group planted bombs at the Medina Education Centre in Hyderabad, the Andhra Pradesh Express, and the Secunderabad Railway Station's reservation complex in 1994.[6]

Mohammad Ghauri, who had been hiding in Andhra Pradesh, flew to Saudi Arabia on a fake passport, and after performing *umra*, joined the LeT in Pakistan. Later, in 1995, Indian intelligence officers learnt that Hamid Bahaziq[7] had paid for his travels. Tunda, who had been on India's most wanted list since 1994, went to Kolkata in West Bengal, then on to Dhaka in Bangladesh, and joined Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi with the help of the TIM. In Dhaka, Tunda ran a madrassah that also housed an explosives manufacturing facility and other extremist groups, and from there published the jihadi magazine, 'Medina.' For the next several years, Tunda, who used the pseudonyms Abdur Rehman and Suleiman,[8] operated a huge jihadi infrastructure called the Mohammad bin-Qasim *dasta* (squad), run through the Dhaka-based Islamic Chattra Shibir (Islamic Students Organization).[9] The LeT placed Amir Hashim under Tunda's command. The Hashim family had moved to Karachi from Delhi just when he completed his seventh grade at the Mazrul Islam Higher Secondary School. In 1994, he joined the

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LeT. Under the command of Tunda, Hashim returned to India in 1996 to carry out a series of bomb explosions in Delhi, Rohtak, and Jalandhar.[10]

Mohammad Ishtiaq, from Pakistan's Punjab region, completed the LeT's commando training known as *daura-e khaasa,* then crossed into Jammu in 1995 and onto Delhi. After spending some time there attempting to garner support for the MDI, he went to Nepal, where the LeT set up contacts in Mumbai, Bhiwandi, and Delhi, finally moving to Hyderabad. There, he acquired an Indian passport and ID under the pseudonym Salim Junaid[11] with money provided by Bahaziq. Abdul Qayyum of Hyderabad took him and Kamran to Dhaka for more training in bomb making, while Ismail Qayoom, Abdul Qayoom's elder brother, paid for the safe house where they stored explosives, timers, and detonators. LeT operative Abdul Rauf employed a Pakistani LeT operative who had come with Junaid at his poultry feed company in Masheshwaram, 22 kilometers from Hyderabad. Al-Umma chief, S.A. Basha, who was arrested in Rajahmundry in late 1998, revealed that Junaid was set to take over the leadership of the SIMI next year. Al-Umma carried serial bombings in Coimbatore, indicating that the LeT had established deep roots in India outside Kashmir.

Salim Junaid set up a trucking business in Hyderabad to transport explosives, and eventually married an Indian woman, Momina Khatoon.[12] An explosive device he planted on July 23, 1997 on the Dehradun Express failed to detonate. That same year, the Border Security Force (BSF) seized a 200-kilogram RDX shipment near Jodhpur before it could reach him.[13] When Indian Intelligence Bureau forces arrested Mohammad Ishtiaq on July 1, 1998, he had 16 kilograms of RDX (research department explosive).[14] Ishtiaq's arrest left the LeT network in Andhra Pradesh dysfunctional. LeT sent Ghauri back to India in 1998, where Ghauri had to work to rebuild the network after a number of arrests and desertions of some of its members. Ghauri recruited hitman Maqbool Zubair, who had worked for Mohammad Fasiud Din. Zubair helped Ghauri raise several recruits from the local Muslim community by the end of 1999, including Mansoor Khatik, who

ran an independent LeT cell in Nanded, and Sayyed Mukhtar Ahmed Shafiq, who took care of communications for the organization's headquarters near Lahore.[15] Soon, there were bombings of theatres in Karimnagar and Nanded, and security forces defused two explosive devices planted near a Defense Research and Development Organization facility. Within two months of these bombings, Ghauri died in a police encounter.[16]

Ghauri returned to Andhra Pradesh via Bangladesh in or around May of 1998. After he received training at the LeT camps in Pakistan, he revived the remnants of the Fasiud Din mafia, a criminal and anti-Hindu organization which executed right-wing Hindu leaders Papiah Goud and Nanda Raj Goud. Ghauri raised money through criminal activities and reestablished connections with the hitman, Zubair. In 1999, at the behest of the LeT, Ghauri organized another group, the Indian Muslim Mohammadi Mujahideen (IMMM). By that November, Ghauri had recruited Mansoor Khatik, who was to handle the IMMM's operations in Nanded, and a young science graduate named Sayyed Mukhtar Ahmed Shafiq, who was to communicate with LeT headquarters in Pakistan. Sayyed Mukhtar Ahmed Shafiq kept the LeT informed of Ghauri's work, who had become involved in political networking and attending a meeting of the Students' Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) at Aurangabad in Maharashtra in November.[17]

On November 25, 1999, IMMM carried out its first terrorist action by executing a Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) worker, Devender Sharma.[18] After a string of bomb blasts in the spring of 2000, the LeT started illegally channeling cash through the *hawala* network. On February 29, 2000, the IMMM sent a one-page statement to newspaper offices in Hyderabad, which announced that they wanted to eradicate all of western culture from India, admitting that the group had bombed cinemas that showed pornographic films as a first part of this campaign.[19] In January, security forces had discovered two unexploded devices, one at Lamba Talkies and the other near the high-security Defense Research and Development Laboratory. A shop owned by an RSS sympathizer in Moghalpura in the city had also been bombed. In

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February, 2000, Venkateshwar Talkies in Karimnagar and Sharda Theatre, across the border in Nanded, were bombed. The combining of potassium nitrate, potassium permanganate, aluminum powder, and sugar, a method associated with the LeT, had been used to make these bombs.[20] When Ghauri was killed, members of his cell assassinated Mahavir Prasad, a Hyderabad jeweler, who had sparked a furor in 1997 by ordering his staff to search a *burka*-clad woman he wrongly suspected of shoplifting. Hyderabad had become very nervous concerning Islamists.[21]

After the death of Hamid Bahaziq in October 1998, Mahmoud Bahaziq replaced his elder brother as LeT's Chief of India operations. Mahmoud Bahaziq first came on the radar of the Indian police when the latter launched a hunt for, and killed Ghauri (the LeT's India commander) and his partner Tunda in April 2000. Mahmoud Bahaziq visited India in 1999 on a Saudi passport and stayed at an upscale hotel in Mumbai. During his stay in India, Mahmoud Bahaziq is suspected of having met members of SIMI and TIM, as well as Mohammed Ishtiaq (aka Saleem Junaid) a Pakistani LeT operative who was later arrested in Hyderabad, Mumbai.[22]

Ghauri had drawn the bulk of his operatives from Fasiud Din's mafia in Nalgonda. One of them, Riazur Rehman, was sent to Maulana Abdul Bari in Saudi Arabia by the LeT. Maulana Abdul Bari ran a madrassah in Saudi Arabia and was a major LeT handler of LeT operatives in India, also financing several Tamil Nadu-based LeT-affiliated groups, including the Muslim Defense Force. Bari is suspected to have ordered the bombing of a Sai Baba Temple in 2002. Riazur Rehman returned to Karnataka in October 15, 2005, and is suspected of ordering the attack on the Indian Institute of Science in Bangalore in December 2005.[23]

By the late 1990s, Tunda moved to Pakistan. LeT chief coordinator, Abdur Razzak Masood, who was arrested in August 2005 by the Delhi police, told the police that he had met Tunda in Muridke in Pakistan during his visit to Markaz Taiba in November-December 2003,[24] where Tunda was living with his two wives and sons. The son also worked for the LeT.[25] Tunda had been dividing his time between Dhaka, Kathmandu, and

Lahore, attempting to build links between the LeT and the Dawood Ibrahim mafia. Indian intelligence believed that al-Qaeda and Dawood Ibrahim had established links by 1998,[26] and that he was also trying to link Dawood Ibrahim and LeT.[27]

In late July 2006, Kenyan authorities announced that they had arrested Tunda, but a day later said they had instead arrested and deported a Nigerian national, Ismoila Olatunde Rufai. However, journalists and the Indian government doubted the revised official Kenyan version. The Nairobi-based *Kenya Times* had reported the arrest of a top terror suspect in Mombassa who had been "transferred to Nairobi under a heavy anti-terrorism police guard" before being deported to an unknown country.[28] The newspaper had also reported his links to the LeT, and news agencies quoted a Kenyan police spokesperson who named the suspect as Karim. Praveen Swami points out that the Kenyan journalists were unlikely to have any prior knowledge of Abdul Karim Tunda: "Names like Tunde or Olatunde are common in both East and West Africa. As such, the mere similarity of Rufai's middle-name with Karim's nickname is unlikely to have caused the confusion. Nor is it clear how officials in Kenya could have confused a tall Nigerian, with both hands intact, with a short South Asian with one hand missing."[29] According to Kenyan reporters Maxwell Masava and Abdullah Seif, Karim was wanted by the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) and Kenyan authorities for the 2002 bombings.[30] The Special Cell of Delhi Police finally arrested Tunda from the Indo-Nepal border on August 16, 2013. He is accused of over 40 bomb blasts in Mumbai, Hyderabad, and Delhi in the 1990s. Abdul Karim Tunda, trained in bomb-making,[31] planted the seeds of terrorism in India, which later turned India into the biggest theater of jihad.

Soon after the formation of the LeT in 1993, the MDI started preparing to take its jihad into the heart of India, seeing its jihad in Indian Kashmir as only the first stage of a global jihad against the forces of unbelief worldwide. The MDI/JuD discourse on the jihad in Indian Kashmir is presented as a conflict between

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Islam and *kufr* (unbelief). In his address to the annual MDI congregation in October 1993, Hafiz Saeed said the MDI was preparing to turn Indian Kashmir into an entry point to India, where the real jihad will be fought.[32] In his address to the annual congregation in October 1994, he announced that the MDI had succeeded in its goal and LeT mujahideen had now entered India through Indian Kashmir.[33] Five years later, on November 3, 1999, giving his Friday sermon on the last day of the annual congregation in Muridke, Hafiz Saeed went on to warn the Prime Minister of India that if he didn't withdraw Indian forces from Kashmir, the LeT mujahideen would invade his office in New Delhi. He also warned the Pakistani opponents of jihad: "Those who are not honest with Jihad don't have a place in Pakistan... The Jihad is not about Kashmir only. It encompasses all of India including [the erstwhile princely states of] Junagarh, Mavadar, and Hyderabad, etc... About 15 years ago, people might have found it ridiculous if someone told them about the disintegration of the USSR. Today, I announce the break-up of India, insha-Allah. We will not rest until the whole India is dissolved into Pakistan... May Allah bestow martyrdom on us and enter us into the higher ranks of Paradise."[34]

Pakistani MDI militants moved from the Jammu and Kashmir and soon started setting up its jihadist infrastructure across India. The aim was to break India as the mujahideen believe they had broken the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. In India, they established contacts with Islamist groups such as the Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI). In the 1990s, they helped Indian jihadist groups carry out several terrorist attacks in India "only to feel the pulse of the Indian government."[35] The claim is confirmed by the fact that the Indian security forces found out that most of the terrorist attacks they investigated could be traced back to Ahle Hadith Islamists.[36] A number of Pakistani MDI members who were sent to India were asked to establish sleeper cells. Many militants married Indian Muslim women and settled.[37] After General Pervez Musharraf restarted peace process with India in 2004, the LeT stopped sending large groups of 20 to 30 jihadists into India, and instead started sending small groups of four or five jihadists. They

were to remain inactive until they were given specific task.[38]

The first known terrorist attack by the LeT inside India from Jammu took place in the remote Chamba District in Himachal Pradesh on August 2, 1998. The people of Himachal Pradesh were celebrating the annual *Meenjai mela*, an annual festival to celebrate a good harvest. After the celebrations, the construction workers living in makeshift tents in Kalaban went to sleep, only to be woken in the middle of night by LeT terrorist suspects. They assembled the male workers in one tent where they were all shot in the head and killed. LeT militants killed twenty-four workers, sparing four of them so that they could carry their luggage. *Outlook* describes how the LeT massacred innocent civilians for their sin of not being Muslim: "The militants left the bodies, abducted another four to carry their luggage, and continued towards Satrundi village which leads to a mountain pass that would take them back to Doda. At Satrundi, the militants took out their machetes and swords. Some ten villagers were woken up, their hands, heads, legs and throats severed. One person who protested had his head blown open by an AK-47 at point blank range."[39]

In late 2000, the MDI decided to take jihad to the heart of India. Consequently, on December 22, 2000, two LeT militants managed to enter the military camp in the the Red Fort in New Delhi during a blackout, killing two soldiers and one civilian,[40] jolting India. The Red Fort is home to a battalion of a least 1,000 personnel from the army's Rajputana Rifles and is open to tourists during the day. The attack on the Red Fort came at a time when dialogues between the Indian government and Kashmiri groups were making steady progress.[41] A spokesman for the LeT, Abu Osama, threatened more attacks inside India, telling Reuters by telephone, "This is our first operation against an Indian military installation inside India. By attacking the Red Fort, we want to stress that India should stop this drama of ceasefire and talks rather, it should pull out its forces from Kashmir so that Valley's people could get their fundamental rights."[42] On December 26, 2000, Delhi police claimed to have shot one LeT militant and nabbed another in a residential area of

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South Delhi. The dead militant was identified as Abu Shawal and the captured militant as Ashaf Ali [Ashfaq Ahmed], both of whom were Pakistanis and suspected of being involved in the Red Fort attack. Police also recovered an AK-47 rifle with ammunition and two hand grenades.[43] The LeT responded with a press release threatening a suicide attack against the offices of Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee. "Our mujahideen will storm Vajpayee's office and carry out a *fidayee* (martyrdom) attack there. If our cadres can force an entry into Delhi's Red Fort, it will not be an uphill task to barge into Mr. Vajpayee's office."[44] In January 2001, police arrested three more people for helping members of LeT who attacked the army camp at Red Fort.[45]

At around 11:40 am (06:10 GMT), five gunmen wearing commando outfits, drove through the outer perimeter of the parliament complex in New Delhi, using an official white Ambassador car with fake security stickers, sirens blaring. Armed with their AK-47 rifles and grenades, the militants jumped out of the vehicle, attempting to enter the parliament building through the VIP entrance. Twelve people, including all the gunmen, died in the 40-minute shootout that followed. Nearly 300 MPs and ministers were present in the building at that time, making this the most direct attack on the Indian government by jihadists. The attack on the Indian Parliament resulted in unexpected reactions both from India and the West. India downgraded its diplomatic relations with Pakistan and announced the mobilization of its armed forces with a clear and serious threat of war. On December 21, India recalled High Commissioner Vijay Nambiar from Islamabad and closed down train and bus services between the two countries.[46] December 31, 2001, India handed a list of 20 wanted terrorists to Pakistan.[47] On December 20, in his speech to mark the 100th day of the September 11 attacks, President Bush designated the LeT and Ummah Tameer-e-Nau as terrorist groups, whose assets were to be frozen through a presidential order. He said "I also look forward to working with the governments of both India and Pakistan in a common effort to shut it (LeT) down and to bring

the killers to justice," and that "Lashkar is an extremist group based in Kashmir. LeT is a stateless sponsor of terrorism, and it hopes to destroy relations between Pakistan and India and to undermine Pakistan's President Musharraf."[48] Thus he absolved Islamabad of all complicity in terrorism inside India.

The American actions forced the State Bank of Pakistan to ask all banks to freeze the accounts of the MDI/LeT and Ummah Tameer-e-Nau on December 24, 2001. However, before the banks froze the accounts, the ISI informed all the groups to withdraw funds, leaving only symbolic amounts. Ayman al-Zawahiri, who operated the accounts of al-Qaeda, had only $252 in his bank account. *The News* reported on January 1, 2002, "The frozen accounts had a balance of $190,554 and close to Rs. 10 million till December 20, 2001. The Government has sent the details of these bank accounts, including that of the Afghan Embassy in Islamabad, to U.S. authorities. Experts said the policy to freeze the accounts in 'pieces' gave ample time to most of these account-holders to withdraw their money."[49]

In an effort to save the MDI, Hafiz Saeed announced that the name of the MDI had been changed to the Jamatud Dawa (JuD). The LeT would be separated from the MDI, would henceforth function independently of the JuD, and would be restricted to the erstwhile state of Jammu and Kashmir, with Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi becoming operational commander of the LeT.[50] Later, MDI/JuD spokesman Yahaya Mujahid stated, "the JuD is a politico-religious party just like the JeIP." Pakistani military ruler General Musharraf announced in his televised address his intention to ban the MDI and LeT on January 11, 2002. However, the JuD was allowed to operate in and out of Pakistan with impunity,[51] inheriting all the jihadi infrastructure of the MDI.

Pakistani security agencies appeared to crack down on the banned groups in the wake of the January 12 speech as they arrested Hafiz Saeed and Maulana Masood Azhar. However, by January 24, 2000, security agencies started releasing the 2010 of the 2060[52] arrested militants for "lack of evidence" and allowed them to open the 624 offices which had allegedly been closed. In reality,

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none of the offices of any jihadist group was closed down, as the ISI had simply told them to remove the signboards from the offices and change telephone numbers, and asked them to change plates on their vehicles and not wear military fatigues.[53] Security agencies had arrested militants and closed down offices of the Jaish-e-Mohammad, the LeT, the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), the Tehreek-e-Jafria Pakistan (TJP), the Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammad (TNSM), the Harakatul Mujahideen.[54] The arrested militants or closures did not include jihadists from the Hizbul Mujahideen.

In India, the MDI started building links with the groups which were at war with the state of India from the very beginning. Separatist Sikhs in Indian Punjab were the LeT's earliest allies. The ISI had been funding and training Sikh separatists since the early 1980s. In the early 1990s, the ISI connected Kashmiri and Pakistani jihadist groups to their contacts among the Sikh separatists to coordinate their activities against the Indian state. MDI/LeT is known to have worked with several separatist Sikh groups, including Babbar Khalsa International (BKI), Khalistan Commando Force (KCF), International Sikh Youth Foundation (ISYF), and Khalistan Zindabad Force (KZF).[55] LeT terrorist Tunda has told his interrogators about links between LeT and BKI.[56] Sikh separatists from India and their supporters outside India very often openly take part in MDI/JuD activities in Pakistan. Occasionally, they also get mentioned in the MDI/JuD publications. In March 2000, *Mujallah Ad-Dawa* reported that a group of Babbar Khalsa also participated in the Kashmir Day rally on February 5, 2000 in Lahore. They raised slogans against India.[57] A Sikh charity Khalsa Aid U.K. sent its volunteers to provide relief to the victims during the October 2005 earthquake in Kashmir.[58]

Many of the separatist Sikh leaders operate out of Pakistan. When India handed a list of 20 most wanted terrorists to Pakistan on December 31, 2001, five of them were separatist Khalistani leaders who included BKI's Wadhawan Singh Babbar, KZF's Ranjit Singh Neeta, KCF's Paramjeet Sign Panjwar, Lakhbeer Singh Rode,

and Dal Khalsa's Gajinder Singh.[59] Another list added the name of Lakhbir Singh Rode.

In October 2011, Haryana police seized a car parked in a parking lot of the Ambala Railway Station, which carried five kilograms of explosives, five detonators, and timers. The car apparently came from Jammu and the explosives were to be used in Delhi around Diwali which fell on October 25-26 in a joint operation of the LeT and the BKI. After the Dal Khalsa, the BKI has had the longest history of working with the ISI. After blowing up a Kanishka aircraft of Air India in June 1985, Talwinder Singh Parmar of the BKI, Vancouver, hid himself in Pakistan. He crossed into India in 1992 but died in an encounter with police. Several BKI leaders, including Wadhwa Singh, have been living in Pakistan.[60]

ISYF is also known to have planned its activities from the United States, Canada, and European countries. In 2007, ISYF, LeT, and BKI held a meeting in Berlin to coordinate their activities. They decided to provide funds and logistical support to LeT and other Sikh groups to carry out attacks inside India.[61] The Indian intelligence services have received information of growing cooperation between the Khalistan Commando Force Paramjit Singh Pajwar faction and MDI. KCF operative, Kuldip of Chak Bamu village in Hoshiarpur, is known to have trained at an MDI camp in Afghanistan.[62] The 65-year-old grey-bearded BKI leader, Wadhawa Singh Babbar, lives in the Lahore cantonment.[63]

Before the ISI assigned the LeT to train Sikh terrorists, they received training from the JeIP-run camps. JeIP is known to have established links between the Sikhs and Indian Muslim terrorists such as SIMI. In the 1980s, the JeIP arranged a meeting between SIMI activists and ISYF, Canada, commando Lal Singh, aka Manjit Singh, who was then living in Lahore. Later, Lal Singh crossed over to India but was arrested by the Gujarat Police in 1992. The JeIP asked the SIMI and the ISYF to coordinate their efforts to liberate the Sikhs of Punjab and the Kashmiris of Jammu & Kashmir under what came to be known as project "K-2," standing for Kashmir-Khalistan. Amirul Azim, then Information Secretary of the JeI, was named the coordinator of the project.[64] The Indian intelligence agencies believe the ISI is trying to get chief minister

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of Gujarat and BJP's candidate for the office of Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, by Khalistani terrorists.[65]

LeT has also established links with the Maoist Naxalites and other separatist groups in the northeast of India, believing they have a common enemy in India, helping one another in carrying out terrorist operations. According to one JuD member, the Maoist Naxalite groups not only help them cross international borders with Bangladesh and Nepal but also help create safe hideouts in the border areas. The help from separatists in the northeast comes at a price, as LeT pays huge amounts of money and sophisticated weapons to these groups.[66] In some cases, the JuD members also attend their highest level meetings. Vishwa Ranjan, Director General of Police of Chhattisgarh revealed in 2010 that two LeT operatives attended a CPI-Maoist central committee meeting as observers in April-May 2010. They met in a jungle inside Orissa, close to Bastar region of Chhattisgarh."[67]

Arrested in South Delhi on June 5, 2009, Mohammad Umar Madani, the right-hand man of Hafiz Saeed, disclosed that the LeT is hand-in-glove with the Naxalites. A police officer told Hindustan Times, "In his disclosure statement, Madani has said that they (the LeT) had approached the Naxalites with a request to use their men to trigger blasts in the country in return for sophisticated arms. According to his three-page disclosure statement, he met local Naxal leaders across Bihar, Jharkhand and West Bengal after crossing into the country from Indo-Nepal border." The officer said, "The Lashkar not only promised weapons to the Maoists but also logistical support to enable them to foray into metropolitan cities, where it had already helped other home-grown militant outfits such as the Indian Mujahideen (IM) strike."[68]

LeT selects its targets rather meticulously. Very often it targets crowded places to be able to kill the maximum number of people. When it is not targeting crowded places, it chooses military and economic targets. In March, 2005, Indian security forces killed

three LeT militants and arrested two others in New Delhi, recovering explosives and AK-47s. Police said that they were planning a suicide attack on a military training academy in Dehradun, 200 kilometers northeast of Delhi, and several software firms in the Indian city of Bangalore.[69] These terrorists had visited Bangalore in December 2004 and surveyed the locations of several software companies there, planning to target Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) facilities, and the Indian Military Academy at Dehradun.[70] "Earlier, in May 2005, the police in Delhi had arrested an engineer who had worked for the public sector HAL, and had recovered maps of HAL facilities at Kanpur and Bangalore from him."[71]

On December 26, 2005, Indian security forces arrested three terrorists in Dehli. They told their Indian interrogators that their targets included software parks in Hyderabad and Bangalore, markets and railway stations, as well as prominent politicians in Andhra Pradesh. In the same month, police in Indian Kashmir arrested an LeT member who revealed that his group had planned to target the IT infrastructure in Bangalore and Hyderabad.[72] Indian minister of state for home affairs, Mullappally Ramachandran, told Lok Sabha (lower house of the Indian Parliament), "Militant and terrorist outfits had planned to target some power plants in Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab, Himachal Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, Orissa, Maharashtra and Andhra Pradesh. Besides LeT, there are also reports of CPI (Maoist) [Communist Party of India-Maoist] having undertaken extensive recces to target CISF [Central Industrial Security Force] armory located in some power plants".[73]

On December 28, 2005, a gunman drove in the Indian Institute of Science (IIS) in the Indian city of Bangalore where an international science conference was taking place, and opened fire on the delegates. The gunman succeeded in killing Dr. M. C. Puri, age 65 and a professor of Mathematics at IIT Delhi, injuring several other delegates.[74] An attack on Bangalore is tantamount to an attack on the heart of India's military and science epicenters, as India's top defense institutions and government-run research firms, such as space organization, aircraft manufacturing facilities, and top government laboratories, are headquartered there. Later, the Indian government blamed the attack on the LeT, and in December

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2011, an Indian court sentenced six persons for plotting the attack.[75] Bangalore is India's primary city of science and technology. Police later claimed that one of the culprits, Habeeb, aka Chopdar, had planned to attack the Kaiga nuclear plant in Karnataka, Alamatti dam, and Sharavathi power lines. Moreover, the arrested LeT militants had also planned attacks on some vital installations, including some software firms in the city.[76]

On July 28, 2006, Indian National Security Adviser, M. K. Narayanan, said the Indian government had information that the LeT could target one of the atomic energy installations.[77] The threat was so serious that the Union government deployed armed forces to guard the nuclear facilities, including the BARC and Tarapur facilities. According to one report, the CIA confirmed it. "The government pressed in para-military forces including the NSG inside the nuclear complexes and the armed forces were directed to deploy on the outer periphery to ward off any 'aerial threat.' Since then, the Army, the Air Force and the Navy had switched on all their radars, activated their surface-to-air missiles (such as Pechora) and deployed shoulder-fired IGLA missile troop regiment outside the nuclear establishments... The armed forces top brass confirmed that its anti-aircraft guns, surface-to-air weapons and low-level radars were loaded to tackle the attack from the terrorists."[78]

Citing intelligence sources, *Asian Age* reported in February 2008 that the LeT had tasked two groups of terrorists to attack the Nuclear Fuel Complex in Hyderabad, and the Kaiga Nuclear Power Plant at Karwar in Karnataka. The LeT terrorists who were arrested in Lucknow in Uttar Pradesh on February 11, 2008 told their interrogators that the LeT operatives had entered India through Nepal.[79] According to an IB intercept, the LeT also plans to target the Kalpakkam nuclear power plant near Chennai and the Indian Space Research Organization station at Thumba, among other installations situated along the coast.[80] Headley also confirmed JuD's active interest in bombing nuclear installations in India. In March 2008, ISI's Major Iqbal (who he described as his handler in the ISI) ordered Headley to conduct reconnaissance around the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC). Headley told the National

Investigation Agency (NIA) that Major Iqbal asked him "to explore BARC in Mumbai and specially its staff colony as a target." Major Iqbal wanted him to explore the viability of an assault on staff housing around the complex. The targets that Headley videotaped included the Taj Presidency, World Trade Centre, Naval air station, Siddhi Vinayak Temple, Chabad Houses in many cities, Maharashtra police station, state assembly, El Al and Indian Airlines offices, Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) and Radio Club, and Shiv Sena Bhavan.[81]

The Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) and Indian Mujahideen (IM) have been important vectors of JuD's infiltration and cultivation of Indian cadres. From its earliest days, the MDI/JuD started infiltrating the SIMI, and the LeT wanted to use the SIMI not only to wage its jihad against India, but also to convert its members to Salafism. LeT played no small part in radicalizing the SIMI over the years, which led to the formation of the Indian Mujahideen.[82] Some of the SIMI members emerged as top LeT operatives. Syed Zabiuddin Syed Zakiuddin Ansari, aka Abu Jundal, was a member of the SIMI in the 1990s, and was present when JuD commanders instructed the 10-member LeT terror squad in November 2008 Mumbai attacks. Abu Jundal came on the radar of the police when he planned the failed assassination attempt of Gujarat Chief Minister, Narendra Modi. Abu Jundal had joined LeT after 2002 and became in-charge of their operations in Maharashtra. In 2005, LeT sent a huge cache of arms and ammunition to carry out a major *fidayee* attack, but the police foiled it by arresting 11 members of the LeT and SIMI. Abu Jandal, however, managed to escape the police and fled to Pakistan, setting up training camps in Maharashtra on behalf of the LeT.[83] LeT trained SIMI militants at the Abu Baseer camp, where Azeem Cheema, once a professor of Islam at the Government Degree College in Faisalabad, supervises the camp.[84]

SIMI's origins can be traced back to the Jamaat-e-Islami, founded in 1941 by Sayyed Abul Ala Maududi. In 1956, the JeII formed its students' wing, the Students' Islamic Organization (SIO).

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As the SIO started becoming radical, in April 1977, JeII founded SIMI. All Muslims under the age of 30 could become members of SIMI. Muhammad Ahmadullah Siddiqui, then a student at the Aligarh Muslim University, became its first president. SIMI also became radicalized, opposing the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and supporting the Islamic Revolution in Iran. It supported the introduction of Islamic laws in Pakistan "as the first step in the eventual global revival of Islam."[85]

In 1987, the ISI started bringing Muslim recruits from Indian Kashmir with the help of the JeIP and the JeIJ&K. The early SIMI cadres who travelled to Pakistan to train at a Hizbul Mujahideen camp in the province of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (formerly NWFP) included C. A. M. Basheer, who headed the SIMI in the 1980s. The JeIP trained this group before sending them to Afghanistan. The JeIP and ISI officials asked the group to go back and work jointly with the Kashmiri and Sikh militants.[86] Later, they made arrangements to train the SIMI militants at the Hizbul Mujahideen camps in Indian Kashmir.[87] C.A.M. Basheer is from the Indian state of Kerala, and studied in the Union Christian College, Aluva, near Kochi. He worked briefly in the Safdarjung airport of New Delhi before being involved in terrorism.[88] Later, Basheer went to Saudi Arabia where he guided the activities of the SIMI in India. MDI and ISI funded him in Saudi Arabia.[89] He also organized SIMI branches in other countries of the Gulf. In Saudi Arabia, he reportedly formed a new organization called the Muslim Development Force (MDF), which was another international front for the MDI.[90] In 1993, three SIMI-linked LeT terrorists – Jalees Ansari, Abdul Karim Tunda, and Mohammad Tufail Husaini – carried out a series of bombings across India under the name of the Mujahideen Islam-e Hind, which is thought to be the predecessor of the Indian Mujahideen.[91]

Although the SIMI was banned in 2001, it remained the principal group for the Indian Islamist radicals, operating on multiple fronts. The Indian home ministry has identified four such front groups, which include Tahreek-e-Ehyaa-e-Ummat (TEU), Tehreek-Talaba-e-Arabia (TTA), Tehrik Tahaffuz-e-Sha'aire Islam (TTSI), and Wahadat-e-Islami. In Kerala alone, 23 front groups of SIMI

are active, with eight in Maharashtra, seven in West Bengal, three in Bihar, two in Uttar Pradesh, and one each in Madhya Pradesh, Karnataka and Delhi.[92] The Pakistani jihadi groups found it much easier to recruit among the Indian Muslim diaspora in the Gulf countries till August 2003. From August 2003 onwards, after the twin bomb explosions in Mumbai, Indian intelligence discovered that the Indian Muslim youth were not resisting joining the Pakistani jihadi groups. Moreover, there was little anti-Americanism among the Indian Muslims.

There is disagreement among Indian experts as on precise linkages between SIMI and IM. Indian analysts and experts agree that hardline militants split off from SIMI and formed IM. However, they disagree on precise linkages: Some analysts say IM remains the militant wing of SIMI, while others say that IM and SIMI are separate organizations with a shared ideology. At the same time, most reports agree that both IM and SIMI enjoy the support of, and possibly personnel from, LeT and Harkat-ul-Jihad-Islami-Bangladesh (HUJI-B). IM leader Nagori admitted that the IM receives money from the ISI.[93] The IM may have emerged from SIMI as early as 2001 at what was SIMI's last public convention with some 25,000 members.[94] That convention called SIMI activists to jihad and later mobilized demonstrations in support of Osama bin Laden. Important future IM leaders continued to migrate from SIMI to IM. However, IM as an organization did not announce itself formally until November 2007 when it claimed responsibility for several simultaneous blasts in court premises in three cities in the state of Uttar Pradesh.

LeT operative Syed Zabiuddin Syed Zakiuddin Ansari, aka Abu Jundal, told his Indian interrogators that the LeT fully funds the IM and uses it as its front in India.[95] According to CNN-IBN, Muhammad Ahmad Zarar Siddibapa, aka Yasin Bhatkal, told his Indian interrogators that IM is fully funded and managed by the ISI. Yasin Bhatkal also informed investigators that the ISI created the Indian Mujahideen to give the impression of home grown terror in India, helping the ISI to hide its own terror footprint

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inside India. Yasin Bhatkal admitted to have taken part in ten terror attacks in India since 2007.[96] The ISI also had a hand in choosing targets for the IM. Bhatkal told Indian Intelligence Bureau investigators that he had received instructions from a Pakistani handler, i.e., to target Cyberabad so that the foreign companies would refrain from expanding their business in India.[97] This explains why IM tried to show itself as distinct from LeT in its manifesto. The manifesto said that the "Indian Mujahideen hereby claim the sole responsibility of the Gujarat serial blasts, planned and executed by Indians only and it is our request to Lashkar-e-Toiba and other organizations, for the sake of Allah, not to claim the responsibility for these attacks."[98]

Although it had not announced itself, the IM was ready to carry out its first bombing by 2005, which took place on a Hindu temple in the north Indian city of Varanasi.[99] In July 2006, strikes on Mumbai's suburban train system killed at least 183 people. The serial explosions in Hyderabad (Lumbini Park and Gokul Chat) on August 25, 2007 killed at least 44 people and injured 60 others.[100] Consecutive blasts in court buildings in the Indian cities of Lucknow, Varanasi, and Faizabad in the Indian state of Uttar Pradesh on November 23, 2007 killed some 15 people and injured 70 others.[101] From May 13, 2008 to July 26, 2008, there were serial explosions in succession in three BJP-ruled states. The serial bombing in Jaipur (Rajasthan) on May 13, 2008 killed some 80 people and injured 150.[102] Nine low intensity blasts killed one person in Bangalore (Karnataka) on July 25, 2008.[103] The third serial blasts took place in Ahmadabad (Gujarat) when 21 serial blasts killed 55 people on July 26, 2008.[104] On September 13, 2008, the IM carried out serial blasts in Delhi that killed 30 people and injured 100.[105] Previously unknown, the Islamic Security Force-Indian Mujahideen (ISF-IM) claimed serial explosions in northeast India's Assam and Tripura states in October 2008. Indian security agencies think ISF-IM is IM's northeastern chapter. The blast at the Pune German Bakery on February 13, 2010 killed 17, including four foreigners, and injured more than 60 people.[106] Indian investigators believed that an IM cell led by Mohammad Zarar Siddi Bawa carried out bombings in April 17, 2010 at the M. Chinnaswamy Stadium in Bangalore.[107]

They carried out an attack on Delhi Jama Masjid on September 19, 2010, and injured four Taiwanese nationals.[108] The bombing in Varanasi on December 7, 2010 killed a female child.[109] On July 13, 2011, IM is suspected of carrying out serial bombings in Mumbai.[110] In February 2013, it carried out two blasts in Dilsukhnagar near Cyberabad Hyderabad in which 17 people died and more than 100 were injured.[111]

A few minutes before bombs exploded outside court buildings in the Indian cities of Lucknow, Varanasi, and Faizabad on November 23, 2007, the IM announced itself by emailing its manifesto to the Indian media.[112] This was the first time the IM confirmed its existence, showing that the rhetoric of IM is closer to the JuD/LeT than SIMI's rhetoric. The manifesto was signed by Al Arbi (the Arab), who described himself as Guru-Al-Hindi (Indian Chief). The manifesto was addressed to both Hindus and Muslims, called upon non-Muslims to accept Islam, and addresses Hindus in very derogatory words: "Haven't you still realized that the falsehood of your 33 crore [330 million] dirty mud idols and the blasphemy of your deaf, dumb, mute and naked idols of ram, krishna and hanuman are not at all going to save your necks, Insha-Allah, from being slaughtered by our hands? Nor is your fictitious faith in monkeys, pigs and nude statues going to save you from the Wrath of Allah and His Humiliating Punishment."

The manifesto spoke in terms of the Indian state of Gujrat, which has seen repeated anti-Muslim pograms, particularly in 2002 under the Hindu right. The manifesto addresses the Hindus in Gujrat in typical offensive language, "O you Gujarati Hindus! O you filthy, shameless and foul creatures! O you Gujarati Hindus, most immoral and the most gutless cowards! Remember whom you have fought against! You have fought against the inheritors of a Messenger of Allah; of a Prophet of Allah whose terror was cast on the enemy from a distance of a month's journey. You have fought against the warriors who love death more than you love life, who fight for a cause that makes them enter a never-ending Paradise, who fight for an absolute purpose – the purpose of making Islam superior over all religions." It calls the then chief minister of Gujrat, Narendra Modi, a spineless coward who leads

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"disbelieving cowards and eunuchs." 'Eunuch' is probably the most offensive word because it challenges the manhood of an Indian man. The manifesto states that Modi is "born of illegitimate birth," and calls the RSS "nasty dogs' who can be identified by their ugly faces." The IM manifesto urges the Indian Muslims to start jihad against India, claiming it is fighting to avenge "the injustice and wrongs on the Muslims of Gujarat."[113]

Indian intelligence and police services believe that the Indian Mujahideen is "a loose network of Islamist groups tied together by a common cause and ideological affiliation" and that "the Indian Mujahideen is made up of three distinct elements: Students Islamic Movement of India volunteers, a group of Uttar Pradesh men with links to the Harkat ul-Jihad-e-Islami and the jihadist-linked crime cartel of jailed mafioso Aftab Ansari."[114] The IM is "more a cluster of several modules spread regionwise – North, West and South India – where each module works independent of the other and each has four to five sleeper cells in it. The top level of the organisation is believed to comprise educated professionals, while the footsoldiers are recruited from lower-middle-class areas, especially those that nurse grievances against Hindu organisations or states. Most IM e-mails post the blasts have quoted the 2002 Gujarat riots where Muslims suffered."[115]

One of the most important revelations made by David Coleman Headley was the existence of what came to be known as two parallel projects named after Pakistan's port city of Karachi. Later, the confessional statements of IM operatives also shed light on the two parallel Karachi Projects controlled by the ISI and JuD respectively. According to Headley, the aim of the Karachi setup is to launch operations into India by using militants of Indian origin, making it easier for the Pakistani military to deny involvement. According to Headley, the JuD's Karachi setup aimed to launch militants from the Indian states of Maharashtra and Gujrat into India, be trained in Pakistan, and use sea routes and the JuD's network of fishermen and their boats.[116] The leaders of the Karachi Projects include IM leaders Roshan Khan, aka Riyaz Bhatkal,

Amir Reza Khan, Iqbal Bhatkal,[117] and Abdul Subhan Qureshi, aka Tauqeer. The ISI project was headed by Major Abdur Rehman Pasha and the JuD project is headed by Sajid Mir (aka Sajid Majid) the deputy to Abdur Rehman Makki, head of the Department of Foreign Affairs. Headley told the Indian NIA, "Pasha has trained some Indian Muslim youths who have been asked to attack various targets in India. It is a personal set up of Pasha and it is independent of the LeT's similar set up in Karachi."[118] The Karachi Project has caused more than a dozen serious attacks on Indian soil, targeting major cities including New Delhi, Varanasi, Bangalore, Ahmedabad, and Mumbai, and at least 500 deaths between 2005 and 2010. Headley told the FBI in December 2009 that the ISI and the LeT were sheltering Bhatkal brothers Riaz and Iqbal, Mufti Sufiyan, and underworld don Yaqoob Khan (aka Rasool 'Party') in Karachi.[119]

Headley told his interrogators that Sajid Mir controls the JuD setup in Karachi, but Abu Yaqoob looks after it at the operational level. Sajid Mir became Secretary to Abdur Rehman Makki, traveling to Saudi Arabia, Dubai, Qatar, Syria, Thailand, and Canada to strengthen the JuD infrastructure.[120] The IM operative Siddibapa told their Indian operatives that the LeT project has been shut down, and Riyaz Shahbandri now commands the entire Indian jihadist network. He could not, however, identify those who pull his strings.[121] Like his father before, Major Pasha had served with the 6 Baloch regiment until 2002. He was demoted to captain when he refused to fight against Osama bin Laden's jihadists fleeing from the Tora Bora complex in Afghanistan. He left the army and joined the JuD as an instructor, training the men who included those who attacked Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's rally in Srinagar in 2004. When the JuD refused to take on the Pakistani state and western forces in Afghanistan, Major Hashim left the JuD and joined al-Qaeda's Ilyas Kashmiri.[122] Headley believes that National Defense College and Raksha Bhawan are the probable targets of Pasha's setup. During his conversation with Pasha in April 2009, Headley believes that the attack on NDC seemed imminent.[123]

Praveen Swami says that Indian law enforcement has arrested more than 70 IM operatives and dismantled much of the IM

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infrastructure. However, the key IM leadership, Abdul Subhan Qureshi, Iqbal Shahbandri, operational commander Riyaz Shahbandri, and bomb-maker Ahmed Yasin Siddibapa, fled to Pakistan and Nepal.[124] The IM became more organized and received better training in Karachi. IM operative, Mohammed Danish Ansari, told his interrogators that IM operational head, Yasin Bhatkal, was planning to carry out a *fidayee* attack on a train with foreign passengers in 2011. Members of the outfit had already conducted a reconnaissance of the train.[125] According to one report, the links between the JuD and IM broke in 2008 when the ISI took direct control of the IM network. The IM recruits are now trained in ISI training camps where they learn sophisticated assault and tactical skills.[126]

As the jihad in Indian Kashmir picked up steam in the early 1990s, communal tension between Indian Muslims and Hindus also rose. In December 1992, a Hindu mob of between 150,000 and 200,000 attacked Babri Mosque in Ayodhya, a city in the Indian state of Uttar Pradesh, in spite of rally organizers' commitment to the Indian Supreme Court that the mosque would not be harmed. The attack on the mosque led to communal riots in the large cities of India, including Mumbai and Delhi, in which more than 2,000 people were killed.[127] The attack on the mosque and ensuing attacks on the Muslims radicalized a large number of Indian Muslims, including Mumbai's Mafia lord, Dawood Ibrahim.[128] Dawood Ibrahim's group retaliated on March 12, 1993 by unleashing deadly RDX bomb blasts, which killed 257 people and injured more than 1,400.[129] Many of the Hindu members left Ibrahim's syndicate after the 1993 bombings, with some forming a competing gang.[130] In August 2007, an Indian court convicted 100 out of 138 accused in the 1993 Mumbai serial blasts case, and sentenced a total of 96 persons, including life sentences to 20 persons, and death sentences to 12 of the accused.[131]

Following the blasts, Ibrahim moved the headquarters of his D-Company syndicate to Karachi, Pakistan, where they deepened their links with the ISI and jihadist groups, including the MDI.[132] During this time, some experts say D-Company began to finance

LeT's activities, use its companies to lure recruits to LeT training camps, and give LeT operatives use of its smuggling routes and contacts.[133] The three-way alliance of the ISI, the D-Company, and the MDI/JuD (as well as other jihadist organizations) has benefited all of them. The ISI provides the jihadist organizations the state protection they need for their jihad and crime while the D-Company provides them with its expertise to smuggle men, money, and arms to India and elsewhere. The D-Company also smuggles out narcotics and makes money for both the ISI and the jihadists. Moreover, the D-Company also uses its worldwide network to smuggle in material for Pakistan's nuclear program.[134] In return, the jihadist organizations not only do jihad for the ISI, but also provide the D-Company their trained manpower. In addition to establishing links with the ISI and jihadist organizations, Dawood Ibrahim had also established links with Sri Lanka's LTTE by September 1994, when the ISI first started dealing with Kumaran Padmanabh, chief procurer of arms for the LTTE.[135] With support from the ISI and jihadist organizations, D-Company is a 5,000-member criminal syndicate operating primarily in Pakistan, India, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).[136] According to Indian police sources, law-enforcement agencies seized more than 100 kilograms of narcotics, including heroin and brown sugar, in Indian Kashmir in 2007.[137]

By the mid-1990s, many Kashmiri jihadist organizations were involved in narcotics trafficking to fund jihad, carrying most of the narcotics smuggling across the LoC into Indian Kashmir. The MDI established links with several smugglers who were involved in smuggling across the India-Pakistan international border. Many of the Pakistani smugglers help the Pakistani military in having their informants move across international borders. In return, the Pakistani military turns a blind eye to their illegal activities. The alliance between the MDI/JuD and the D-Company has been mutually and tremendously beneficial. The MDI put not only its jihadist infrastructure and manpower at the service of the D-Company, but also linked it with its network of smuggler-politicians. Consequently, the D-Company opened a 'sub-office' in the Defense Housing Authority, Lahore. Dawood Ibrahim sent his younger brother, Anees Ibrahim, to look after the Lahore 'sub-office.'

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Dawood Ibrahim also spies on India for the Pakistani military. Journalist Ghulam Hasnain states Dawood Ibrahim is ISI's main source of information from India and helps in espionage operations. A close aide of Dawood Ibrahim told Hasnain, "The ISI is thankful to [Dawood Ibrahim] Bhai for all that he has been doing for Pakistan. Let me tell you, Bhai has delivered to Pakistan what it could never dream of having. Bhai says there is nothing over there (in India) for us, so why shouldn't we do everything for the country which has given us protection."[138] JuD members actively help D-Company in gathering intelligence not only in India but in other countries as well. Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the JuD started recruiting Westernized-looking persons who can travel to foreign countries and gather intelligence for them. They include Pakistani journalists, media persons, and businessmen. Both the ISI and D-Company help them in moving across borders. The JuD focuses on the Indian Ocean region while D-Company focuses on Europe and North America.

In October 2003, the U.S. Department of Treasury designated Ibrahim as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist under Executive Order 13224.[139] Juan Zarate, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes, said, "Dawood Ibrahim, an Indian crime lord, has found common cause with Al Qaida, sharing his smuggling routes with the terror syndicate and funding attacks by Islamic extremists aimed at destabilizing the Indian government." He said Ibrahim is known to have financed the activities of LeT.[140] President George W. Bush again designated him and his D-company as a Significant Foreign Narcotics Trafficker under the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act in June 2006. On May 15, 2012, the U.S. listed Chhota Shakeel and Ibrahim "Tiger" Memon as Specially Designated Narcotics Traffickers. The OFAC announcement said, "Chhota Shakeel is Dawood's lieutenant who coordinates for D Company with other organized crime and terror groups. Ibrahim 'Tiger' Memon is a trusted lieutenant who controls the organization's businesses across South Asia and is wanted by Indian authorities for his involvement in the 1993 Mumbai bombings."[141] The U.N. also added Ibrahim's name to its list of individuals associated with al-Qaeda.[142]

Dawood Ibrahim began as a small time criminal and smuggler in Mumbai, India, in the 1970s. Later, he founded a poly-crime syndicate, which thrived in the 1980s.[143] According to *India Today*, "He has an estimated net worth of $15 billion with investments in the shipping industry, airline sector and garment factories. His business interests are spread across Karachi, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Dubai, Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and several countries in Africa. The Dawood group is well-entrenched in Singapore and Malaysia with investments in real estate and shipping."[144]

Dawood Ibrahim heads one of the biggest drug smuggling networks. According to the U.S. Department of Treasury's fact-sheet on Dawood Ibrahim, "Ibrahim's syndicate is involved in large-scale shipments of narcotics in the U.K. and western Europe. The syndicate's smuggling routes from South Asia, the Middle East and Africa are shared with Usama bin Laden and his terrorist network. Successful routes established over recent years by Ibrahim's syndicate have been subsequently utilized by bin Laden. A financial arrangement was reportedly brokered to facilitate the latter's usage of these routes. In the late 1990's, Ibrahim traveled in Afghanistan under the protection of the Taliban."[145] According to the fact-sheet, "Information, from as recent as Fall 2002, indicates that Ibrahim has financially supported Islamic militant groups working against India, such as Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT). For example, this information indicates that Ibrahim has been helping finance increasing attacks in Gujarat by LeT."[146] Much of the money made through this network goes into jihad in India. In May 1997, the Mumbai police arrested Harish Bishnoi and Mannivannan Mahadevan, aka Rubon, with 23 kilograms of heroin, worth Rs. 230 million at that time. He told his interrogators that the drug was to be shipped to Canada, that Bishnoi was acting on instructions from Karachi, and that Rubon was a Sri Lankan national with suspected LTTE links. In 1996, Indian police hauled 37.5 kilograms of heroin from a vessel at Negombo near Colombo, across the Palk Straits. The Sri Lankan Narcotics Control Bureau had alerted its Indian counterparts on the possible link between the LTTE and the mafia in Mumbai.[147]

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The ISI's jihad against India also aims at destabilizing the Indian economy. In the early 1990s, the ISI started printing counterfeit Indian currency notes and pumping them in the Indian market. Reports in the Indian press say that India seized counterfeit currency in 2005 worth more than Rs. 70 million, in 2007 worth Rs. 100 million, in 2008 worth 258.9 million, in 2009 worth 229.8 million, and in 2010 worth 258.27 million. Official estimates in 2011 said counterfeit Indian currency worth more than 2.2 billion were in circulation by 2010.[148] The Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) estimated that there had been a 400 percent increase in counterfeit Indian currency, with 423,539 incidents of counterfeit Indian currency notes with a value of more than Rs. 350 million. There were 127,781 incidents during the 2009-2010 fiscal.[149] The ISI pumped counterfeit Indian currency notes worth Rs. 16 billion in India in 2011.[150] In one case in New Delhi, police found about $460,000 in counterfeit Indian money during a search of two truckloads of fabric from Pakistan.[151]

According to the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), the number of counterfeit Indian currency notes in India grew by 9 percent to 435,607 in 2010-11 from 401,476 in 2009-10. During the same period, total banknotes in circulation grew by 14 percent to 64,577 million from 56,549,[152] with nearly 85 percent of the total seizure of counterfeit Indian currency notes in India for 2011 in the Indian state of Maharashtra. The Indian government informed the Lok Sabha (lower House of the Parliament) that the RBI and State Police had recovered counterfeit Indian currency notes worth over Rs. 810 million in Maharashtra out of a total Rs. 960 million throughout India till October 31, 2011.[153] In 2006, the RBI estimated the amount of counterfeit Indian currency notes in circulation at almost Rs. 1.7 trillion ($37.5 billion).[154] According to one recent report, the Government of India estimates that counterfeit Indian currency notes worth Rs. 160 billion are already in circulation.[155]

The ISI pushes large chunks of counterfeit currency into India directly from Pakistan, as well as through Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, UAE, Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia, and China.[156] The ISI has used Nepal so much and for so long that the Nepalese government prohibited carrying the high denomination Indian currency notes (Rs. 500 and Rs. 1,000). On January 3, 2000, Nepal arrested Pakistani diplomat Asim Saboor, Assistant Secretary at the Pakistani Mission in Kathmandu, in the act of distributing counterfeit Indian banknotes.[157] Police reportedly seized such counterfeit notes in more than 200 different places on the Indo-Nepal border over the past year. Pakistan Embassy official, Siraj Ahmed Siraj, was detained by the Nepalese Police at Kathmandu, and counterfeit currency amounting to Rs. 47,000 and $9,200 was recovered from him.[158] In what was one of the biggest seizures of counterfeit currency, Nepal arrested Abdul Wahib, aged 40, a Pakistani national who was carrying more than $250,000 in counterfeit Indian currency on July 30 at Kathmandu's Tribhuvan Airport on his arrival from Karachi. "The fake currency totaled Indian Rs. 10.2 million ($252,000) in Rs. 500 and Rs. 1,000 denominations." The bills were hidden in soap bar wrappers.[159] Nepal's Deputy Prime Minister, Bijay Gachchhadar, revealed that Nepal had recently confiscated counterfeit Indian currency notes worth Rs. 80 million in recent times.[160] According to a senior Nepalese official, these counterfeit Indian currency notes are printed using advanced technology, specialized paper, and ink. Only governments have access to such technology and material.[161]

The ISI pays a certain portion of financial support to the jihadist organizations in the form of counterfeit Indian currency notes. Since the MDI/JuD is the biggest jihadist organization, it receives the biggest chunk of counterfeit Indian currency notes from the ISI. Most jihadist commanders who receive counterfeit Indian currency notes from the ISI say the MDI/JuD had received counterfeit Indian currency notes worth billions of rupees. In 2006, a Pakistan-based Kashmiri jihadist commander who commands a couple of dozen boys said his group had received almost IRs. 20 million in counterfeit Indian currency notes from the ISI over a decade. He continued, "If I, with only a couple of dozens of boys, could receive IRs. 20 million, you can calculate how much the JuD with hundreds of thousands of members must have received during this period."[162]

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CHAPTER SIX

MUMBAI–THE SECOND KARGIL

On November 22, 2008, Pakistan's President Asif Ali Zardari was the star guest at the concluding session of the two-day Leadership Summit organized by the Hindustan Times. He was participating in the conference via video conferencing from Pakistan, when suddenly an Indian journalist asked him if Pakistan under his leadership would adopt the policy of no first-use of nuclear weapons. "I am against nuclear warfare altogether. Most definitely."[1] Euphoria of transition from military dictatorship to a democratic government had yet to die down, and President Zardari was still enjoying all the powers he believed the country's constitution gave him. He continued his answer by asking a question to the Indian journalist, "I can get my parliament to agree to it right away. Can you (India) get your parliament to agree to it? I do not feel threatened by India and India should not feel threatened from us."[2] This was the first time a Pakistani leader was publicly committing to no first-use. He and his country would pay a heavy price for this idealism.

In response to a question on economic ties between the two adversaries, President Zardari stressed free and enhanced trade and great economic integration in the framework of the South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). "I am for improving relations with India and improving trade." Hoping that India and Pakistan would one day become an economically unified zone, he said, "Yes, let's open each other's border and trade. We can both mutually benefit from trade. If you can trade with China, why not with Pakistan?"[3] Lastly, he made a pitch for introducing what he called e-card to make free travel between the two countries for the citizens of two countries possible. "I am hopeful we will find methodology. We could have special card of some sort - an e-card which you show at the border and just walk in."[4] President Zardari adopted an unconventional approach on Kashmir. He revealed that he had approached the Pakistani parliament to form a caucus on Kashmir to look into all the problems between India and Pakistan, including Kashmir. He added, "Let the people of India and let the people of Pakistan decide. Let's take the challenge to the people of India and Pakistan."[5]

President Zardari's words were music to everyone who wanted to see peace in the region and the end of jihad in the region. However, he rattled the Pakistani generals who saw India as their main enemy. This was not the first time President Zardari had expressed his desire to improve relations with India and rid the region of terrorism. A few days before his party came into power in Pakistan in March 2008, he expressed readiness to set aside the Kashmir issue and improve relations with India. He told Karan Thapar's 'Devil's Advocate' program for CNN-IBN that relations between the two countries should not be held "hostage" to the Kashmir issue. He supported postponing the resolution of the Kashmir conflict to future generations. He asked both countries to agree to disagree on U.N. resolutions and wait "till everybody grows up further. Maybe the coming generation grows up even further and then let's interact as human beings and come to a position of love."[6] In less than two weeks General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, Pakistan's Chief of Army Staff, publicly contradicted him by saying that the Pakistani Army was "committed to the Kashmir cause in line with the aspirations of Pakistani nation."[7] It was clear that from the view of the Pakistan Army, the Pakistani nation does not aspire to have good relations with India, and wants to keep using jihad as an instrument of the country's defense policy. Pakistan's military establishment has always perceived Benazir Bhutto and her family as security threats who, given a chance, would dismantle the Pakistani nuclear program at the behest of the United States. The statement by President Zardari rattled the army generals who do

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not want to abandon their right to first nuclear strike. In less than one year, on November 27, 2009, President Zardari handed over control of the National Command Authority, which oversees the country's nuclear arsenal, to Prime Minister Yusaf Raza Gillani under Pakistani military's pressure.[8]

With the help of hindsight we can now guess that President Zardari had not understood that the brief era of friendship with India under General Musharraf was over. Under General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, the Pakistan Army was back in the hands of India-centric generals. One of the first steps General Kayani took as the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) was to give the green light to jihadist organizations to re-invigorate jihad in Jammu and Kashmir.[9] There had been a steep decline in jihadi attacks in the Indian Kashmir from 2001 to 2008.[10] When the new PPP government came to power in March 2008, the LeT started installing new state-of-the-art wireless communications equipment at its control station in Kel on the Pakistani side of the the LoC with encouragement from the Pakistan Army. The LeT also revived a training camp outside of Balakote in the northwest of the country under the command of Sagir Ahmed, one of the LeT's top irregular warfare instructors, and opened another camp near Lala Moosa in central Pakistani Punjab in January 2008, run by a former Pakistan Army officer known as 'Captain Salim,' training LeT militants for jihad.[11] The pro-military Pakistani media were also in rage.[12] The last Pakistani civilian leader, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, had also tried to resolve the conflicts with India and build friendship, signing a Memorandum of Understanding with India in Lahore on February 21, 1999, known as the Lahore Declaration.[13] As the two governments signed the Lahore Declaration, the Pakistan Army was already planning a war against India, which later came to be known as the Kargil War, and Sharif was illegally removed by the Pakistan Army in October 1999. President Zardari's overtures to India led to speculation that another 'Kargil' may happen before the civilian government is dismissed again. Actually, the planning for the next 'Kargil' was already in its advanced stage, but this time it was to happen in Mumbai.

Like other jihadi groups, many LeT militants were becoming disillusioned with their *amir*'s policy of not going against the Musharraf regime, and some small groups had splintered from the JuD and joined other jihadist groups which were taking on the Pakistani state. Headley said the Mumbai attacks resulted from a conflict in the LeT-ISI partnership, and that "Disillusioned militants demanding a bigger role in fighting in Afghanistan were defecting to al Qaeda and the Taliban, while chiefs of Lashkar and the ISI tried to keep the main focus on Kashmir... In response to the dangerous internal rifts, Lashkar decided on a spectacular al Qaeda-style strike on western targets in Mumbai, and the ISI approved the shift in tactics."[14] He said, "The ISI I believe had no ambiguity of understanding the necessity to strike India [and]... shifting and minimizing the theater of violence from the domestic soil of Pakistan."[15] Headley told his interrogators that Major 'Iqbal' was a mastermind of the Mumbai terror plot, along with some other LeT chiefs. Major 'Iqbal' assigned him the last five reconnaissance missions and included the Chabad House. He told the interrogators, "Major Iqbal told me the Chabad House would be added on whatever list [of targets] there was because it was a front office for the Mossad," Israel's intelligence agency. Headley added that Major Iqbal "seemed upset the [Mumbai] airport was not included" as a target.[16]

As President Zardari spoke about the necessity of peace between India and Pakistan, a ten-member terrorist group had already reached Karachi to start their journey to Mumbai. A day before the Hindustan Times' leadership Summit on November 21, Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi had named Ismail Khan as the leader of the mission and handed him explosives and food. Ismail had distributed it among members of the group. Each backpack carried "one Kalashnikov, eight magazines, 240 rounds, eight hand grenades, one dagger, one pistol, three magazines of pistols, 21 rounds, water bottle, one kilogram dried grapes, one headphone, three 9-volt batteries, chargers and in another small sack eight kilograms of RDX, which was concealed in tiffin box."[17] A day after the

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Hindustan Times' leadership Summit, November 23, the group set sail in Al-Husseini at around noon. After sailing for nearly 30 minutes, the group pulled up Al-Husseini near the fishing trawler Kuber they saw. Pakistan Navy frogman, Hakim Saab, and Usman pulled the four men from Kuber to Al Husseini. All the ten *fidayees* moved to Kuber and ordered Captain Amarsinh Solanki to sail to Mumbai. As the Kuber neared Mumbai, Mohammed Ajmal Amir Kasab slit the throat of Captain Amarsinh Solanki and put his body in the engine room. Just off four nautical miles from Mumbai, they moved to the speedboats that took them to the coast.[18]

According to the confessional statement of Kasab,[19] Hafiz Saeed selected Kasab and nine others to carry out the Mumbai *fidayee* operation at a meeting in August 2008 in the Pakistani Kashmir town of Sevai Nala. At this meeting, Hafiz Saeed allotted them new *kunyas*,[20] and the group was told to report at the Markaz Taiba in Muridke to do *daura-e ribaat*, a one-month course in intelligence.[21] Kasab told the Indian investigators that a certain Major-General visited them twice during those courses. In one of these visits, the major general asked them if they knew how to swim. On learning that they could swim, he told Abu Qahafa, "Now give them marine training."[22] In September 2008, the group went to Karachi where they trained in the open sea under a man known as Hakim Sahab. Hakim Sahab taught them to read and use navigation maps, assess sea depth, and use GPS and fishing nets.[23] Their trainer, Abu Qahafa, took them back to Baitul Mujahideen in Muzaffarabad after the marine training, where Ismail Khan, Fahadullah, and Javed, who had been trained separately, also joined the group.[24]

Hafiz Saeed and Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi divided the group into two-member sub-groups. Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi informed his group to launch a *fidayee* attack in Mumbai on September 28, while Hafiz Saeed's group would attack places frequented by foreigners, given that foreigners are a source of income for India. Hafiz Saeed told the group, "You would have to fire and hurl grenades. While firing you have to select people from [the United States of] America, Britain, Israel because they have done injustice to the Muslims. While you fire at the VTS [Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus earlier known as Victoria Terminus] in the crowd, do not think who is a Hindu and who is a Muslim. Carry out fire bursts without any consideration. But while firing in hotels, ensure that Muslims are not harmed."[25]

Hafiz Saeed told those who were to attack the hotels, "to cause maximum damage by burning them." Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi informed his group, "Before you attack, plant RDX bombs near the targets. Because of these explosions there would be traffic jams and people and police coming for rescue would also be killed." Hafiz Saeed decided the attack should start at 7:30 pm, as "all these places are crowded." Ten *mujahideen* were taken to the control room of the media wing, from where they selected targets for Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi.[26] Zarar Shah who, along with Ibrahim, headed the JuD media wing, showed their targets to them on a big screen. On September 21, Lakhvi said that the plan to leave on September 28 had been postponed.

The ten-member militant group finally departed on November 23, arriving at the Mumbai coast at around 8:20 pm. All ten terrorists were carrying fake college identity cards and wore colored wrist threads to hide their Muslim identity.[27] They docked their inflatable dinghy at a fishermen's slum next to Mumbai's affluent Cuffe Parade neighborhood, walking to the Budhwar Park. Two of the pairs hired taxis, and the other three pairs walked to their targets a few hundred meters away. The neighborhood near the docks is teeming with people on a normal day, but people were glued to their TV sets, watching the India versus England cricket match being played in London that day. With their unusually heavy backpacks, the ten boys were a bit of an anomaly in the local community of fishermen. Ajay Mistry, who happened to be among the first to spot them described them as "smartly dressed in navy blue and black; with their heavy backpacks they look almost like college kids."[28]

Shoaeb and Nazir Ahamed then moved towards Leopold, while Javed and Hafiz Arshad to Taj Hotel in taxis. Imran Babar and Nasir walked towards Nariman House. Fahadullah and Abdul Rehman Chhota took the dingy off to the Oberoi Hotel, and Kasab and Ismail took a taxi to Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus

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(CST). Just before departing to their destinations, they planted bombs in the taxis near their respective targets. By 8.40 pm, they had already started their first *fidayee* attack. In the next ten minutes, the ten terrorists had laid siege to one of the largest cities in the world – Mumbai.[29] The government deployed a force of 477 National Security Guard (NSG) personnel, a unit of the marine commandos, six columns of the Army, and 400 members of the Mumbai Police to overcome ten men.[30] The terrorists targeted as many as eleven places in Mumbai and left 183 people dead, including 22 foreigners, six of whom were American.[31] The U.S. citizens were Ben Zion Chroman, Gavriel Holtzberg, Sandeep Jeswani, Alan Scherr, Naomi Scherr, and Aryeh Leibish Teitelbaum.[32] In 18 years since, there have been eleven major terror attacks at 40 different locations in Mumbai, with more than 700 people having died and 2,289 wounded in these terror attacks.[33]

On October 3, 2009, police arrested David Coleman Headley, né Daood Gilani, at the Chicago airport just before he could board a plane to go to Pakistan to hand over the footage of the offices of Jylland Posten to al-Qaeda leader Ilyas Kashmiri.[34] Headley's importance lies not in what he did for the JuD, but in what he revealed about the group. He had been arrested by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) in 1988 for the first time in Germany, and again arrested in 1997 for conspiring to smuggle heroin into the United States from Pakistan. He cooperated with DEA during his interrogations, giving them so much information that, in 1998, DEA prosecutors recommended a lenient sentence. They wrote in a letter to court, "He ... helped the DEA infiltrate the very close-knit Pakistani narcotics dealing community in New York."[35] The DEA sent him to Pakistan to develop intelligence on Pakistani heroin traffickers. A judge sentenced him in 1998 to 19 months in prison, but he was freed on probation in less than a year. Headley had started working as a paid DEA agent, but it is not clear when the DEA terminated his services. He was allowed to travel to Pakistan for an arranged marriage in 1999, although he was still on probation.[36]

He was married at least three times, and for a period he was married to all three wives—Ms. Outalha (a medical student half his age), a New York makeup artist, and a conservative Pakistani Muslim—at the same time.[37] Other reports said he was married to four women,[38] even if at different times. Headley married for the second time to his girlfriend of eight years in New York in December 2002, but they fell out when she discovered that he also had a wife in Pakistan. She told the Feds that he used his return visits to buy ropes, hiking boots, and military books, and to research prices for night-vision goggles. He also claimed he was a paid DEA informant, possibly to protect himself.[39] In August 2005, one of Headley's wives called the Joint Terrorism Task Force in New York and told them in three interviews that her husband/boyfriend was a member of the LeT, and that he had trained in their Pakistani camps. She also told them that he had shopped for night-vision goggles and other equipment, giving them details about his activities on behalf of the LeT and showed them "audio cassettes and ideological material and described his e-mails and calls from Pakistan and to individuals whom she thought to be extremists."[40]

A federal court discontinued his probation in December 2001 to enable him to work for the DEA in Pakistan, although it was scheduled to end in 2004. In February 2002, he was enrolled in *daura-e suffa* with LeT in Pakistan.[41] Headley continued working for the DEA in Pakistan well in the early 2000s.[42] In October 2001, one of his former girlfriends informed the Joint Terrorism Task Force that Headley and his mother sympathized with radical Pakistani Islamist groups, and that Headley was ready to go to Pakistan and fight alongside Islamist groups. In July 2002, a business owner called the FBI and told them, "Headley had told his mother that he had trained with terrorists at a Pakistani camp along with 16-year-old trainees who later died in combat."[43] In December 2007, Headley's Moroccan wife met with agents of both the State Department's Bureau of Diplomatic Security and of Immigration and Customs Enforcement in the U.S. embassy in Pakistan. She told them that Headley was planning to take part in jihad against the U.S. and that he had received terrorism training. Both the CIA

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station chief and the FBI legal attaché in Pakistan believed the allegations were too general and not actionable. She came back with more specific information in April 2008. Officials told ProPublica, "She said Headley had been given a special mission and that he had both U.S. and Pakistani passports... She said she felt she had been innocently used in an express train bombing"[44] in India in 2007. For the first time, Headley was connected not only to LeT, but also to a terrorist attack.[45]

Headley came into contact with the MDI some time in 2000 while he was visiting Pakistan. During his stay, he would go to the Qadsia mosque to say his prayers, where the MDI/JuD has its headquarters. During one of his visits to Qadsia mosque, Headley came across a poster requesting funds to wage jihad in India, and stated he was touched by the appeal and images on the poster. He called the number on the poster, and two MDI members came to his Model Town house to collect his donation. Headley gave them Rs. 50,000 ($1,000), a huge sum by Pakistani standards. The MDI workers invited Headley to a lecture Hafiz Saeed was scheduled to give on the same evening at the house of Sheikh Nadim, a businessman who also lives in Model Town and finances the JuD. The lecture of Hafiz Saeed left tremendous influence on Headley, who started regularly visiting Qadsia Mosque and Markaz Taiba at Muridke. After his return to New York in November 2000, Headley learnt that his video store was not doing well. Headley rented his video store in New York and went back to Pakistan as he had decided to join the LeT. In a meeting with Hafiz Saeed in July 2001, he offered to donate rent money to MDI. Hafiz declined and advised him to stay away from such business.[46]

Headley proved a devoted and highly trained MDI jihadist. He joined the three-week *daura-e suffa* at Muridke in February 2002, and completed the three-week *daura-e aama* in August 2002. In April 2003, Headley went to Muzaffarabad to do *daura-e khaasa* and graduated in July 2003. The following August, he joined *daura-e ribat* in Mansehra in northwestern Pakistan. In July 2004, Headley started a two-week leadership program called *daura-e tadribu musaleen* which was held in Abbottabad.[47] As he completed one course after another, he also rose

up the JuD ranks. In August 2004, Headley was moved to the cell headed by Muzaammil, and was asked to report to Sajid Mir from January 2005. Because of his U.S. citizenship and passport, Headley was a great asset for the JuD. In September 2005, the cell asked him to change his name to a western-sounding name. During his next visit to the United States, he filed an application in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and was allowed to change his name from Daood Gilani to David Coleman Headley in February 2006.[48]

In January 2006, Headley took Abdur Rehman Hashim to Khyber agency to introduce Hashim to some of his contacts from his heroin-dealing days, including Niyhat Shah, who agreed to help smuggle weapons to India. Sajid Mir went to see Niymat Shah in 2007 and paid him PRs 850,000 to smuggle weapons to India.[49] Soon after Headley returned to Lahore, ISI's Major Iqbal called him on behalf of Major Sameer Ali and asked for a meeting. Major Iqbal and another senior army officer, a Lt. Colonel, met with Headley asking him to work for the ISI as well. Headley agreed. After their first meeting, Major Iqbal assigned an NCO to train him on the basics of intelligence. After completing the training, Headley returned to the U.S. in June 2006 to obtain an Indian visa. While there, Headley also met with Tahawwur Rana who owned a travel agency in Chicago and served the city's Pakistani community. In 2002, he also started a *halal* slaughterhouse to provide *halal* meat to the city's Muslims.[50] Headley and Rana had attended the military school together in Pakistan and were very close friends, and when the DEA arrested Headley in 1988 and 1997 on heroin trafficking charges, Rana put up his house as bond. Rana's wife, Samraz Rana, told ProPublica that when the Ranas ran into financial trouble in 2005, Headley gave them a loan of more than $60,000.[51] Headley told Rana about his future mission in India and asked his permission to open a branch of his travel agency in Mumbai so that he could work there under the cover of a travel agent.[52]

Headley went back to Pakistan in August 2006 where he met both Sajid Mir and Major Iqbal. Major Iqbal gave him $25,000 to open an office in Mumbai. He left for India on September 14, 2006 and stayed there through December. He used Rana's immigration business as a cover for his travel to and long stays in

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Mumbai, India.[53] Then, Headley met with Sajid Mir, who took the footage from a memory stick, showing interest only in the Taj Hotel. Headley went to India seven times between September 2006 and November 2008, making one more visit after the Mumbai attacks. After each visit, he briefed both LeT and ISI officials. Headley then went to Chicago in June 2007 and received another Indian. During this visit, he also met Rana to inform him of his surveillance work in Mumbai. Headley also told him about his meeting with the ISI and JuD officials and their reaction to his surveillance work.[54]

Rana had met with Abdur Rehman Hashim (aka Pasha) who had informed Rana about the coming Mumbai attacks. Pasha was Headley's link to Ilyas Kashmiri. In a conversation during a car ride on September 7, 2009 Headley and Rana discussed targeting National Defense College in Delhi, India, as well as the famous temple in Somnath, Bollywood (Indian film industry), Shive Sena (A Hindu rightist political party), and targets in Denmark.[55] A federal judge sentenced Rana to 14 years in prison for his role in supporting the LeT to carry out the 2008 Mumbai attacks, and for plotting a follow-up strike in Denmark. A jury convicted Rana in 2011 for providing material support to the LeT and for plotting to attack a Danish newspaper that published cartoons of Prophet Muhammad. Rana had been acquitted of charges of serving as an accomplice in the Mumbai attacks.[56]

Under the request of Abdur Rehman, Headley travelled to India for the fifth time to conduct surveillance of the NDC in Delhi for the ISI, with Major Iqbal financing him with counterfeit Indian currency. On September 4, 2007, Headley again went to Mumbai via Delhi, where he undertook extensive videography of different places and various entries and exits of the Taj, and travelled to Pune and gathered intelligence for Major Iqbal. Until this point, the LeT had planned to target only the Taj Hotel during the annual conference. On his return to Pakistan, he went to Muzaffarabad where Headley, Sajid Mir, Abu Qahafa, and Abu Anas did a thorough reconnaissance of the area around the Taj Hotel with the help of Google Earth.[57] After his arrest, Headley disclosed to India's NIA that the LeT had surveyed and video-graphed at least

100 targets in India. He himself video-graphed some 30 targets during his nine visits between 2006 and 2008.[58]

In a meeting with Headley and other militants, a Pakistan Navy frogman, Abdur Rehman, briefed them on different landing options in Mumbai. Headley went to Mumbai again in April 2008. This was the most important visit because the JuD had decided to carry out a spectacular attack instead of just on the Taj Hotel as was initially planned. He went to India to perform surveillance, taking boat trips in and around the Mumbai harbor and entering locations in a GPS device.[59] During this visit, Headley did reconnaissance of the landing sites, including the area around the Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC), as well as the Cuffe Parade area where the attackers ultimately landed. After returning to Pakistan in April 2008, Headley met with Sajid Mir, Abu Qahafa, and Abu Anas, and discussed the landing sites for the attackers. Headley returned to Indian in July 2008, conducting extensive surveillance of the Taj Hotel, the Naval Air Station, Police Headquarters, the State Assembly building, as well as other political and religious locations. He also bought wrist bands for the attackers from the Siddivinayak temple during his stay.[60] By this time, JuD had finalized details of the operation and shared them with Headley.

Indian investigators achieved a big breakthrough when Saudi Arabia extradited Syed Zabiuddin Syed Zakiuddin Ansari (aka Abu Jundal) to India in June 2012. During interrogation, Mohammad Amjad Khwaja, a HUJI terrorist from Hyderabad, told his Indian interrogators that Abu Jundal was the *kunya*/jihadi name of Syed Zabiuddin Ansari Syed Zakiuddin Ansari, a LeT terrorist from Beed in Maharashtra, who lives in Pakistan.[61] The Indian security agencies had detected that one of the handlers of the Mumbai attackers spoke with a thick Mumbai accent. Indians were alerted when Abu Jundal spoke the word '*prashasan*,' which means "administration" in official Hindi, in his conversations with *fidayees*.[62] Abu Jundal was using an email account which was associated with the LeT, and under the watch of the Indian intelligence agencies. Abu Jundal was an important JuD official in Saudi Arabia where he recruited Indian Muslims and liaised with Indian affiliates of the

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JuD.[63] One of his important duties was to try to persuade members of the assorted terrorist outfits he had belonged to, including the IM and the SIMI, to merge with LeT.[64]

Hafiz Saeed came to give his blessing to the attack team before they left for Mumbai by sea. Abu Jundal dictated a statement for the Indian media to an attacker holed up in the Oberoi Trident Hotel. Abu Jundal had fled to Pakistan after escaping a police encounter while transporting a cache of assault rifles and explosives in Aurangabad in 2005. In a communication intercept, Abu Jundal described the safe house/command post as "a no-frills command center equipped with a satellite phone, hand-held phones, laptops, broadband Internet and at least one television."[65] He not only gave the location of the safe house, but also revealed that Major Ali of the ISI had met with the LeT plotters at the command post on November 26.[66] In one of his intercepts, he told them to tell the media, "The government must know that this is just a trailer. The real movie is still left to come. A small example. The government shall see what happens after this."[67]

After tracking him down in Saudi Arabia, India requested his arrest and extradition to India. The Saudis arrested him in May 2011, but initially refused to extradite him. Pakistani diplomats also backed his story. Abu Jundal was living in Saudi Arabia on a genuine Pakistani passport with a valid Saudi visa, issued in his pseudonym, Riyasat Ali. "The Pakistanis at a high level tried to bring out evidence that he was in reality Pakistani," an Indian official said. "They created a family history and everything. But we had a DNA sample and other evidence."[68] Finally, the Saudis agreed to deport him to India under pressure from the United States on June 21, 2012.[69] Abu Jundal had visited Saudi Arabia twice using the same passport, and had been living in Saudi Arabia for about seven months when Saudi intelligence forces arrested him in Riyadh on a tipoff by their Indian counterparts.[70] Abu Jundal told Indian interrogators that Colonel Hamza had helped him travel to Saudi Arabia and recruit Indian Muslims, and move funds for the LeT.[71]

Abu Jundal participated in the 2006 Aurangabad arms haul case in 2006.[72] Abu Jundal told his interrogators that a *'waaris'*

(heir) of the 'forces,' a reference to the Pakistan Army, oversaw the entire operation. Abu Jundal told his Indian interrogators that there were six people in the LeT control room in Karachi while the Mumbai operation was taking place, identifying them as Abu al-Qama, Abu Qahafa, Muzammil, Zarar Shah, Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi, and himself. They used four laptops in the control room to make calls through voice-over-internet-protocol (VoIP). Abu Jundal revealed he was planning a major LeT attack in India in 2012, and that he was raising funds for the attack, in addition to overseeing other logistics, including recruiting people. He first came on the radar after LeT operative Lal Baba Mohammad Sheikh was detained in the German Bakery blasts case in 2010. Sheikh named Abu Jundal as a mastermind of the February 2010 attack that left 17 people dead.[73] Hafiz Saeed was not in the command post, but did give his blessing to the attack squad before they departed by sea.[74]

Immediately after the terrorist attacks in Mumbai, Pakistani Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gillani tried to reach Indian Prime Minister Manmoham Singh. Although Prime Minister Gillani desperately tried to reach out to his Indian counterpart to offer condolences over the tragic events, the Indian prime minister took two days to speak to Prime Minister Gillani. The Indian prime minister bluntly told his Pakistani interlocutor that the attack had been launched from Karachi, and requested him to send the ISI chief, Lt. General Pasha, to India to help in the investigations. Prime Minster Gillani told *The News* correspondent, Rauf Klasra, that Pakistan would send the ISI director general to India "in the light of the two-year-old agreement between the two countries inked during the regime of General Pervez Musharraf, which requires a country to seek help of the other or use information and intelligence in their war on terrorism."[75] As the Prime Minister hung up the phone, he spoke to Army Chief, Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, who, after consulting his fellow generals, apparently gave his consent.[76] Once the Prime Minister had the consent from General Kayani, he rushed to meet President Zardari. The two decided to send Lt. General Pasha to

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India. The Prime Minister's Office announced the decision within hours of the request from the Indian prime minister.[77] However, within hours the government retracted the offer. In the late evening, a spokesman for the prime minister's house said that, "a representative of the ISI would visit India, instead of the director-general of the agency, to help in the Mumbai terrorist attack investigation."[78] The Pakistani generals, on second thoughts, must have realized the consequences of the ISI chief's visit to India.

After the initial resolve to tackle the terrorism problem, the Pakistani leaders started sliding into a state of denial. President Zardari called Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and told him he was "appalled and shocked" by the attacks. "Non-state actors wanted to force upon the governments their own agenda, but they must not be allowed to succeed."[79] Later, on November 29, 2008, in an interview with Indian journalist, Karan Thapar, for Devil's Advocate, a television program, President Zardari said, "I am hurt, I am bleeding. Your wound takes and brings attention to my wound, which is also very recent. I stand with the people of India. I stand with the leadership of India. I am sorry that you all are going through this. I can see it on the television. Today's television, today's information technology brings all the pain to us in our bedrooms in our homes."[80] "As the President of Pakistan let me assure you that [that] if any evidence points to any individual or group in my country, I shall take the strictest of actions in the light of the evidence and in front of the world."[81] About the visit of Lt. General Pasha, he said, "There was a miscommunication. We had announced that Director would come from the ISI, because it is too early for the Director-Generals to meet at the moment. Let the evidence come to light; let the investigation take its course. Then, perhaps, is the position where the Director-Generals could meet."[82]

As Pakistan retracted the offer to send the ISI director general to India, the government of Pakistan and Pakistani media also went into a state of denial. Investigative journalist, Syed Saleem Shahzad, who was later believed to have been killed by the ISI for his writings, reported that soon after the Mumbai attacks the Pakistani military gave the Pakistani media "directives to label the

Mumbai attack a conspiracy hatched by India's Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), Israel's Mossad and the U.S.'s Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to tighten the noose around Pakistan. While the George W. Bush administration was assured by army chief Ashfaq Parvez Kiani (sic) that action would be taken against the LET, the government was advised by the military to make a distinction between Jamatut [Dawa or JuD] and the LET."[83] The Pakistani media continuously claimed that the captured terrorist, Kasab, was not a Pakistani. The politicians followed suit. President Zardari told Larry King of CNN, "I very much doubt, Larry, that [the captured terrorist Kasab] he's a Pakistani."[84] He must have learnt the dynamics of the civil-military relations more in the month following the November 2008 attacks than in any period of time in politics.

As the international, and particularly U.S., pressure mounted on Pakistan to arrest the Mumbai terror attack culprits, on December 7, 2009 people in Muzaffarabad saw several military trucks moving on the rugged road that leads to Shawai Nullah, followed by gunship helicopters. The trucks disappeared into the forested areas where LeT's Baitul Mujahideen is situated. The people then heard shots fired, and soon the trucks reappeared from the forested area and drove from where they came. They claimed to have arrested several commanders of the LeT, supposedly including Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi.[85] Pakistan formally charged seven Pakistanis on the eve of the first anniversary of the assault,[86] including Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi, Hammad Amin Sadiq, who is accused of coordinating the financing, and Zarar Shah, who is described as a computer and networks expert.[87] But a report exposed the double game the Pakistan Army was playing, not only with India, but also with the civilian government of Pakistan. Journalist and author Syed Saleem Shahzad writes,

> "Amid some drama, last Sunday Pakistani helicopters flew to Shawai in Pakistan-administered Kashmir to arrest LET commander Zakiur Rahman. But LET offices and training centers had already been evacuated soon after the Mumbai attack, on the military's advice, in the event that India launched retaliatory attacks. Zakiur-

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> Rahman [Lakhvi], commander-in-chief of the LET, who lives in Islamabad in a residence provided by a Pakistani security agency, was called in on Monday morning to tender his arrest. He did so without any fuss. The same day, a day before the Muslim festival of Eid ul-Adha, Jamaatut was issued a 'No Objection Certificate' to collect sacrificial animals throughout the country. The animals raise considerable sums of money."[88]

Meanwhile, more and more information linking Pakistan to the terrorist attacks kept emerging. After denying for more than a month, Pakistan's Information Minister, Sherry Rehman, finally accepted Kasab's nationality as Pakistani on January 7, 2009, 48 hours after India handed over a 69-page dossier with damning evidence to Pakistan.[89] On February 12, 2009, Interior Minister Rehman Malik also accepted that the Mumbai attack had been partly planned in Pakistan and the government had arrested six people in that connection.[90] He also identified where the group received training, and named Hamad Ameen Sadiq as the person who facilitated transfer of funds to finance the Mumbai attack. He also admitted that Pakistani national, Javed Iqbal, bought VoIP connections from Spain. The government also tracked the shop where they bought the boat engine. The government filed FIR against the Pakistani, including Kasab.[91] Both U.S. and Indian intelligence services believe Sajid Mir lives near the Garrison Club in Lahore. Pakistan's Federal Investigations Agency never paid him a visit. Pakistan says Muzammil Bhat, who trained the terror team, is a fugitive, although two journalists who went looking for the terror commander in Muzaffarabad found him without much effort. Zakiur Rahman Lakhvi has continued to communicate with his organization from prison.[92]

Soon after the UNSC imposed sanctions on the JuD in December 2008, Pakistani journalists Amir Mir and Waqar Gillani separately visited Markaz Taiba in Muridke, outside Lahore where JuD's black-and-white flag never stopped fluttering atop its main building in defiance of the ban imposed on it. JuD guards at the Markaz Taiba told Gillani at 2.30 pm, "No government official comes here regularly. We are the custodians of this place... The government administrator comes here once a week and we are the real managers of this place."[93] This clearly belied the government claim that it had taken over the charity projects of the JuD. Mir met dozens of JuD Kalashnikov-toting militants guarding the complex. The government had placed Hafiz Saeed under house arrest in his Johar Town residence in Lahore, but he was allowed to leave the house and say his Friday prayers in the local mosque. Three days after the UNSC imposed sanctions on the JuD, Yahya Mujahid, one of the twelve JuD leaders who had been put under house arrest, held a rally in Lahore on December 14, 2008 against the UNSC on the Mall, the main artery in Lahore. Pakistan's federal interior minister, Rehman Malik, said, "If they are running schools and hospitals, what can we do? We are not in a position to shut down medical centres and schools and colleges being run by the JuD."[94] The only concrete action taken against the JuD so far has been the shutting down of its Urdu and English websites by the Cyber Crime Wing of the Federal Investigation Agency. By its actions, Pakistan has made it clear to the world that it is not ready to take any concrete action against JuD.

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CHAPTER SEVEN

ENCIRCLING INDIA

Pakistan's military intelligence agencies started building their presence in countries around its arch-enemy India for strategic reasons very early in the short history of the two countries. The process was halted for a brief period after the Bengali nationalists won the War of Independence in December 1971 against what was then West Pakistan, with the help of the Indian military. As the Pakistan Army surrendered to the invading Indian Army in what was then East Pakistan on December 16, 1971, Bangladesh emerged as an independent country in the northeast of India. Pakistan Army's surrendering to the Indian Army in 1971 clearly showed Pakistan could not win a conventional war against India. However, Pakistan's military intelligence agencies soon restarted the process of strengthening its intelligence network in and around India.

After taking over command of the Pakistan Army as the Chief of the Army Staff (COAS) in March 1976, General Mohammad Ziaul Haq started considering a covert war against India by helping the anti-Indian groups within India, particularly the Sikh separatists in the state of Punjab, Naxalites in the northeast, and separatist Muslims in Indian Kashmir. Soon after taking over power in Islamabad in a military coup d'état on July 5, 1977, General Ziaul Haq became more focused on rebuilding its intelligence network so Pakistan could help these separatist groups in India. As the Sikh separatists in the Indian state of Punjab started becoming more violent from 1978, it presented Pakistan an opportunity to kindle Sikh separatism. The India-Nepal porous

border was an ideal route for the separatist Sikhs to exfiltrate and infiltrate India after obtaining militant training in Pakistan. A large number of Sikh separatists came to Pakistan to receive militant training after crossing the India-Nepal border and returned.

Pakistan's interest in funding Sikh separatists in India coincided with the start of jihad in Afghanistan. Soon, mujahideen from different countries started coming to participate in the Afghan jihad. General Ziaul Haq started planning jihad in Indian Kashmir with the help of the JeIP, JeI-AK, and JeI-J&K as early as 1980, enlisting *amir* JeI-AK Maulana Abdul Bari in early 1980. They agreed that the JeIP, JeI-AK, and JeI-J&K would lead the jihad in Kashmir, as JeIP would be doing in Afghanistan.[1] By 1987, there were about 150 mujahideen from the Valley of Kashmir fighting in Afghanistan.[2]

The Muslims in Indian Kashmir boycotted the 1987 elections en masse. While the boycott illustrated the disillusionment of Muslims in Indian Kashmir with the Indian state, Pakistan's military ruler, General Ziaul Haq saw another opportunity to incite violence in the Valley of Kashmir.[3] Nepal was an ideal place to serve as a launching pad for militant operations, not only in Indian Kashmir, but also in other parts of India, and by 1989, Nepal had become the ISI's largest launching pad for anti-India operations for the next decade. ISI officials and Pakistani jihadist leaders held most of their meetings with Kashmiri separatists in the Nepalese capital of Kathmandu.[4] In the early 1990s, the ISI started bringing Pakistani jihadist groups into the Kashmir jihad, developing its jihadist and intelligence networks, particularly in Nepal, Bangladesh, and Myanmar. For the MDI/JuD, unlike other jihadist organizations, jihad in Nepal is a priority like the jihad in India, mentioned by name in bin Muhammad's *Jehad in Present Times*. However, jihad in Nepal has not started because it jihadist organizations and the ISI need Nepal as a springboard to launch their regional jihads in India and in the Indian Ocean region.

India shares a 1,751-kilometer long border with Nepal, running across the five Indian states of Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Sikkim, West Bengal, and Uttaranchal. The border has 19 agreed immigration check posts, 22 mutual trade routes, and 15 third country transit

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routes, but the border remains highly unguarded. Under the Peace and Friendship Treaty of 1950, the citizens of the two countries can cross the border virtually uninterrupted without their passports being stamped. Smuggling of arms, narcotics, and humans goes uninterrupted across the mostly unguarded border.[5] This makes the India-Nepal border the second most frequented route for Pakistani and Kashmiri mujahideen for infiltrating into and exfiltrating out of India.

The international funding for the Afghan jihad started pouring in to recruit mujahideen from across the globe, particularly from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, a large portion of which went into building mosques and madrassahs worldwide. Most of the states that wanted to fund the jihad in Afghanistan routed their finances through the ISI, which literally managed the Afghan jihad. As part of its covert jihad against India, the ISI invested substantially in Nepal. In late 1995, Mohammed Parvez received NRs. 140 million (approximately $3.044 million) to construct mosques and madrassahs along the India-Nepal borders. The money originated in Pakistan and was routed through Rashtriya Vanijya Bank (RVB).[6] Pakistan officially donated money to build mosques and madrassahs in Nepal, and in 1994, the then Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto donated Rs. 1 million for the development of multiple mosques and madrassahs. The Pakistani embassy in Nepal donated Rs. 75,000 and Rs. 147,000 in the same year for the construction of the Madrassah Islamia School in Kathmandu, and another madrassah in Mahottari respectively.[7]

The region on both sides of India-Nepal border saw tremendous growth in the Muslim population, making the movements of the Pakistani mujahideen even easier. In an October 2000 report, India's Task Force on Border Management revealed that there had been a four-fold increase in the Muslim population on both sides of the India-Nepal border in the Terai region.[8] Inside Indian region, the number of mosques grew to 343, and the number of madrassahs to 300. On the Nepali side, the number of mosques grew to 282, and the madrassahs to 181.[9] By 2006, the number of madrassahs had grown to 1,900 on both sides of the India-Nepal borders, of which 800 were on the Nepali side.[10]

In 1991, Muslims constituted 3.5 percent of Nepal's total population, but 12-13 percent of the Terai region bordering India.[11] By 2006, the number of Muslims in the Terai region made up 96.7 percent of Nepal's Muslims population.[12]

The ISI and the militants operate in and out of Nepal with the help of a number of Nepalese Islamist groups[13] and politicians. The Madhya Pradesh anti-terror squad arrested two Nepalese citizens on August 29, 2009, Rajesh Gupta and Ateeq Ahmad. Gupta and Ahmad revealed that they were members of a network which was being run by Nepal's former crown prince, Paras, Nepal's former King Gyanendra Singh's son, and the son of a former Nepalese forest minister, Salim Mian Ansari. They further revealed that Paras and Yunus Ansari were part of the network the ISI and Dawood Ibrahim had established in Nepal. The squad arrested the two when they were trying to board a Gorakhpur-bound train at Bhopal railway station with 22 counterfeit Indian currency notes of IRs. 500 denomination. Gupta and Ahmad also revealed that Ansari was directly linked to the ISI and Ibrahim Dawood's D-company.[14] In 1997, Ahmad, a resident of Aligarh in Uttar Pradesh, married a Nepalese girl in Nepal. After becoming a naturalized citizen, he settled down in Birganj, the largest town in Nepal's Terai region in the southeast, close to Raxaul.[15] Rajesh Gupta and Ateeq Ahmad were smuggling the counterfeit currency notes to Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Bihar, and Uttar Pradesh. They were at the head of a 40-strong group in Madhya Pradesh who spread these counterfeit notes.[16]

In a November 2006 interview with Nilova Roy Chaudhury of the Hindustan Times, Maoist chairman Pushpa Kamal Dahal (aka Prachanda [the fierce one]), claimed that in 1996, the ISI offered him assistance in the form of arms and money. Prachanda also claimed, "We must accept that the anti-India activity from Nepal (including acts like the hijack of IC814) was centred in the royal durbar [court]." About the king's links with Dawood Ibrahim, he said, "When this feudal king (Gyanendra) was just the king's brother, and a businessman, he had a business partnership with Dawood Ibrahim and conducted much of his smuggling through him." He revealed that the ISI had offered money to them also.

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He said, "When we initiated the armed movement against the corrupt rule in Nepal (in 1996), ISI-type people offered us money and arms assistance. I resisted and our council agreed to refuse the assistance because we felt our movement would lose its Nepali-people-centric approach." With the Maoists on the ascendant in Nepal, activities of the ISI are on the decline because their activities were actively encouraged by the Palace.[17]

Nepalese law enforcement agencies have been cracking down on Pakistani and Pakistan-supported militants, arresting them since the 1990s. In 1999, Nepalese security agencies arrested Mohammad Kasim Lajpuria (aka Mechanic Chacha) accused in the 1993 serial bomb blasts case that rocked Bombay in 1993.[18] In July-August 2006, Indian police arrested two suspects in the Mumbai blasts, Mohammad Kamal and Khaleel Aziz, from Madhubani in Bihar on the India-Nepal border.[19] The architect of the 2005 attack on the Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore, Sabahuddin Ahmad, had also passed through Nepal.[20] In August 2013, Indian security forces arrested IM commanders Yasin Bhatkal and Asadullah Akhtar (aka Haddi) near Raxaul in East Champaran, close to the India-Nepal border.[21] He and Asadullah Akhtar 'Haddi' were arrested in August 2013 in a joint raid by the Nepalese and Indian security agencies.[22] The Special Cell of Delhi Police arrested Abdul Karim Tunda, a founding leader of the Indian chapter of the LeT, from the Indo-Nepal border on August 16, 2013. He is accused of over 40 bomb blasts in Mumbai, Hyderabad, and Delhi in the 1990s. Abdul Karim Tunda was born in western Uttar Pradesh and trained in making improvised explosive devices.[23] IM operative Salman Ahmed (aka Chhotu) was arrested near the UP-Nepal border in March 2010. He told his interrogators that most of the IM operatives had moved their base from Bangladesh to Nepal after the massive crackdown by the Bangladesh Rapid Action Battalion after Hasina Wajid became Bangladesh's prime minister in early 2009. The statement of another IM operative, Shehjad Ahmed, who was nabbed in the first week of February 2010 from Uttar Pradesh, corroborated this.[24]

In addition to Nepal, the ISI and the jihadist groups also use Bangladesh as a launching pad for militant attacks inside India, serving as a virtual MDI/JuD headquarters for their operations inside the Arakan region of Myanmar. India shares a 4,095 kilometer long border with Bangladesh, and 2,216 kilometers of this covers the Indian state of West Bengal. At a number of points, the border is porous and large-scale illegal immigration, smuggling, drug trafficking, gun-running, and cross-filtration by terrorists take place. The rise of militant Islam has served the Pakistani jihadist groups and the ISI well.

The ISI and the jihadist organizations built a huge jihadist infrastructure in Bangladesh between 2001 and 2009. Like in Nepal, the JuD cooperated with other jihadist organizations and the ISI in Nepal. In February 2006, the Delhi police arrested two HuJI militants, Anishul Murshlin and Muhibbul Muttakin, twin brothers who had come to India to deliver explosives to terrorist Ghulam Yazdani. Yazdani was a Bangladesh-based LeT commander who was also in charge of HuJI's eastern-India operations, and was wanted by the police for his role in the assassination of Gujarat Home Minister Haren Pandya. He had joined the LeT after the communal violence in the wake of the demolition of the Babri Masjid in December 1992 by Hindu extremists. Ghulam Yazdani died in Delhi on March 8, the day of the Varanasi bombing, in an encounter with security forces.[25]

The MDI/JuD used Bangladesh not only as a launching pad to carry militant operation in India and elsewhere but also as its operational headquarters. Dhaka police arrested Mufti Obaidullah, whom India had declared a most wanted person in 1994. Obaidullah revealed that he had moved to Bangladesh in 1995.[26] In November, 2009, Bangladesh claimed to have arrested an LeT militant and foiled a *fidayee* attack against the Indian and U.S. diplomatic missions in Dhaka, which were to coincide with the Mumbai attacks on November 26. Police raided a madrassah in the mountains near Chittagong and arrested several suspects, including Shahidul Islam and Al-Amin (aka Saiful) and an influential Islamist cleric, Mufti Harun Izahar. Mufti Harun Izahar's father, Mufti Harun Izahar, was a leader of the Islami Oikya Jote [Islamic

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Unity Party]. Later, Bangladesh also arrested Mohammad Munwar, Mohammad Ashraf Ali Zahid, and Syed Abdul Qayyum who were linked to the LeT. Indian police arrested Nasir and another Indian militant who escaped during the raid in Bangladesh near the Bibir Bazar border near Comilla. India's intelligence told Frontline that Abdul Rehman Saeed, a Pakistan-based LeT commander, looks after the LeT in Bangladesh. According to police, Nasir was also a planner of the serial bombings in Bangalore. He had supplied electronic components to the IM which they used to fabricate improvised explosive devices (IEDs) used in other attacks. Nasir had allegedly recruited and sent dozens of men from Kerala to train at the LeT camps in Pakistan. In 2008, Indian security agencies killed four men from Kerala who were training with an LeT unit in the mountains of Indian Kashmir. Nasir was to be in constant contact with IM commander Riyaz Shahbandri (aka Riyaz Bhatkal). Shahbandri fled to Karachi in 2008 after the arrest of several key IM militants.[27]

The MDI/JuD also established training facilities in Bangladesh. They not only train Bangladeshi members in the Bangladeshi camps, but also Arakanese Muslims who go back to wage jihad in Arakan.[28] Police arrested several LeT militants after an attack on the Indian Institute of Science in the Indian city of Bangalore on December 28, 2005. One of them was South India Commander Abdul Rehman of Andhra Pradesh. Afsar Pasha (a native of Chintamani in Kolar) and Mohammed Irfan of Bareilly in Uttar Pradesh (an Imam in Kolar) were in possession of large quantities of explosives that included 17 detonators, 20 gelatin sticks, 120 gel sticks, three hand-grenades, and 114 iron pellets. Pasha had received jihadist training in Bangladesh in 2002-03 and was suspected of having taken part in some blasts in Dhaka in early 2003. The police said Irfan recruited people for LeT while Rehman and Habeeb arranged for their training in Pakistan and Bangladesh.[29] Abu Jundal later told the Indian police that he escaped to Pakistan in 2006 via West Bengal and Bangladesh. In Dhaka the ISI and LeT arranged a genuine Pakistani passport under the name of 'Saeed' and carried his photo. He flew to Karachi by PIA.[30]

The fall of Kabul to the Coalition forces was just as important to India as it was to the United States. Afghanistan under the Taliban had become a springboard for anti-India terrorists. Less than two years before the Coalition forces entered Kabul, Pakistani terrorists had hijacked an Indian passenger plane to Qandahar and killed one Indian passenger, and had three top terrorists released from Indian jails in exchange for the release of other passengers. One of the three, Omar Saeed Sheikh, later participated in the conspiracy to kidnap and behead Wall Street Journal journalist Daniel Pearl. When the interim administration headed by Karzai took power in Kabul on December 22, 2001, Indian Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh himself went to represent India and open the Indian embassy, which was closed only hours before the Taliban entered Kabul on September 26, 1996. Many of the new Afghan leaders had good relations with India. A number of Afghan resistance leaders had chosen India instead of Pakistan for their families to settle during the 1980s and 1990s. The families of some of the nominated members in the new administration in Kabul, including interior minister Yunus Qanuni, defense minister Mohammad Faheem Khan, labor and social affairs minister Mirwaiz Sadiq, and foreign minister Dr. Abdullah Abdullah had lived in India. President Hamid Karzai himself had done his post-graduate studies in political science from Shimla in India.[31]

Because of the importance of peace in Afghanistan, India quickly moved in with financial assistance to stabilize the Karzai government in 2002. In terms of pledged donations through 2013, India ranks fifth behind the United States, United Kingdom, Japan and Canada.[32] Between 3,000 and 4,000 Indian nationals are working on different reconstruction projects across Afghanistan. Many of them work for non-Indian companies as well.[33] According to the Indian Embassy in Kabul, of the total pledge of $750 million between 2002 and 2009, the fully committed amount is $758.21 million. India's financial assistance has gone into some of the projects, which are critically important for Afghanistan's economic future. India has constructed the strategic 218-kilometer road from Zaranj to Delaram in southwestern Afghanistan, which links the main Qandahar-Herat highway to the Iran border. This

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reduces the transit distance between the Iranian port of Chabahar and Delaram by over 600 kilometers. This ambitious project provides Afghanistan a shorter route to the sea, via Chabahar, than is currently available through Pakistan. India is building a new road connecting Zaranj to Delaram, which is on the main Herat-Kandahar road. India constructed a 220 KV Double Circuit Transmission Line from Pul-e-Khumri to Kabul and a 220/110/20 KV substation at Kabul under the North-East Power System project to bring power from neighboring countries to Kabul with an investment of $111 million. India reconstructed the Salma Dam Power Project (42 MW) in Herat province. India constructed the Afghan Parliament building.[34]

Many of the projects India had invested in were aimed at winning the hearts and minds of the people. Under the School Feeding Program, India distributed one million tons of wheat in the form of high protein biscuits to 1.4 million schoolchildren every day, administered through the World Food Program with $100 million in funding. India reconstructed the Indira Gandhi Institute of Child Health in Kabul in various phases, including reconstruction of a surgical ward/polyclinic/diagnostic center. India has dug 26 wells in northwest Afghanistan, gifted 400 buses, 200 mini-buses, and 105 municipality and 285 army vehicles, set up five public sanitation complexes in Kabul, constructed telephone exchanges in 11 provinces connecting to Kabul, and helped Afghanistan expand its National TV network by providing an uplink from Kabul and downlinks in all 34 provincial capitals.[35] The Indian Prime Minister's special envoy for Afghanistan, Satinder K. Lambah, told *Outlook* that India gives 500 scholarships for higher education to Afghan students in Indian universities, and another 500 scholarships and training slots for Afghan public servants in Indian professional institutes.[36] India also sent a number of Indian medical missions to the provinces of Herat, Mazar-e-Sharif, Jalalabad, Kandahar, and Kabul, and supplied them with ambulances.[37] Moreover, India started 84 small projects in the areas of agriculture, rural development, education, health, vocational training, and solar energy. India also gifted three Airbus aircraft along with essential spares to Ariana Afghan Airlines.[38]

India's befriending the new Afghan government, which replaced Pakistan's favorite Taliban regime, did not go well either with the ISI, or with the Pakistani Islamist radicals, including the MDI/JuD. There was no love lost between the Taliban and the MDI, which was thrown out of Afghanistan by the former. However, the MDI decided to support the lesser evil, the Taliban, against the bigger evil, the United States and its allies. Mufti Abdur Rehman, the head of the MDI's *Darul Ifta wal Qaza* (department of religious decrees), who is also the *Raees al-Qaza* (Chief Justice) of MDI's courts, had issued his fatwa just one week after the 9/11 terrorist attacks under the title, "The Decree in Support of Osama and Afghanistan." After citing several Quranic verses and other Islamic scriptures, the decree stated,

> "We want to emphasize that Osama bin Laden at present has become the symbol of Jihad all over the world. He has categorically denied his hand in the terrorist activity he is being accused of. Under these circumstances, the forces of Kufr, especially America, were blaming him for terrorist attacks (of September 11) instead of taking it as Allah's wrath and admonition. Putting the blame on Osama without proving his guilt through a court of law is virtually the beginning of the war between Islam and Kufr. It is therefore not an issue concerning an individual, it is an issue concerning the survival of the entire Muslim Ummah, an issue concerning Jihad and the Mujahideen of Islam.
>
> In the light of the clear injunctions of the Shariah, it has become obligatory for all the Muslim states in the interest of the dignity of Islam and the Muslims, to warn America and its allies in defense of Islam and the blood of the Muslims, forge unity in their own ranks and send their armies to support Jihad and Mujahideen. America has declared a war against a Muslim Mujahid and a Muslim state. Therefore, the Muslims all over the world pool their resources in support of Jihad in total submission to the Quranic verse:

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It is obligatory for the ulema (Islamic scholars) to discharge their religious obligation for waging Jihad.

In the light of the Quranic verses quoted above, we want to make it clear to the rulers of Pakistan that they are not authorised to lend any support to the forces of Kufr against Osama bin Laden or Afghanistan. On the other hand, in the light of the injunctions of the Quran and Sunnah as also the provisions of the Constitution of Pakistan of Pakistan, they are bound to support Osama and Afghanistan. And if they violate, they would be liable to be treated as rebels and traitors of Allah and his Prophet and the constitution

Jihad and the Mujahideen would ultimately triumph by the blessings of Allah while traitor would perish. We expect every member of the Muslim Ummah, especially the Muslim rulers, would not be cowed down by the threat of the forces of Kufr and instead would have a firm faith in Allah's support, as a true believer of the idea given in the verse."[39]

Jihadists, including the MDI members, had religious sanction to attack the Coalition forces and whoever came to help them. The pro-Pakistan groups started targeting Indians as soon as they started reconstruction work. There were two attacks on Indians constructing a highway in the southwest province of Nimroz in November and December 2003 in which an Indian engineer was killed.[40] In some 21 incidents of terrorist attacks, the Taliban and LeT killed more than 100 people. In some cases, they kidnapped them and dumped their bodies on roadsides. In other cases, they died from bomb attacks. Suspected Taliban carried out the first-ever suicide attack on Indians in Afghanistan and killed two Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) soldiers, and injured five others in the Razai village of Nimroz on January 3, 2008. On April 12, 2008, another suicide bomber killed two Indian nationals, M.P. Singh and C. Govindaswamy, working for the Indian Army's Border Roads Organization (BRO), and injured another seven persons, including five BRO personnel in Nimroz in Afghanistan.[41]

Some of these attacks were carried out on Indian diplomatic missions. Like the Pakistan Army, the JuD sees the Indian diplomatic missions in Afghanistan as places from where India launches attacks inside Pakistan. Both the Pakistani government and pro-military media keep repeating these allegations. However, Pakistan has not presented any evidence of Indian involvement in terrorism in Pakistan. On December 15, 2007, the Indian consulate in Jalalabad, capital of Nangarhar, came under attack when two bombs were hurled in the building. It caused no casualty or damage. On July 7, 2008, a suicide bomber with explosives packed in his vehicle rammed into an Indian diplomatic car which carried the defense attaché, Brig R. Mehta, and political counsellor, Venkateswara Rao, as they were about to enter the embassy compound.[42] The U.S. official later said that U.S. intelligence agencies had evidence that Pakistan's powerful spy service helped plan the July 7, 2008 bombing of India's embassy in Kabul. They also said the Pakistani intelligence service was "increasingly providing militants with details about the American campaign against them, in some cases allowing militants to avoid American missile strikes in Pakistan's tribal areas."[43] It killed 58 people and wounded 170.[44] In one of the major attacks on Indians, a suicide car bomber attacked the Indian embassy in Kabul on October 8, 2009. The bombing killed 17 persons, almost all of them Afghans, and injured more than 70 others, including three ITBP personnel. The attack was carried out in a street in the city center during the morning rush hour. On February 26, 2010 terrorists carried out another suicide attack on a hotel which was used by the Indian Embassy in Kabul as a transit accommodation for its staffers. The terrorist attack killed ten Indians, including army Major Dr. Laishram Jyotin Singh, Major Deepak Yadav, engineer Bhola Ram, and ITBP constable Roshan Lal. Along with the Haqqani network, India blamed LeT.[45] Afghan intelligence officials publicly blamed LeT.[46] On August 3, 2013, a suicide attack on the Indian Consulate at Jalalabad killed nine Afghans, including at least eight children, and injured another 24. Three of the attackers were also killed. The spokesperson for the Afghanistan National Intelligence Agency, Lutfullah Mashal, alleged on May 12 that an ISI officer had promised two hit-men Rs. 120,000 to kill the Indian consul general in Jalalabad.[47]

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On July 18, 2005, Indian Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh, and U.S. President George W. Bush, signed the U.S.-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and Non-proliferation Enhancement Act, or what came to be known as the U.S.–India Civil Nuclear agreement. Under this agreement, India agreed to separate its civil and military nuclear facilities, and put all of its civil nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. In return, the United States agreed to give full civil nuclear cooperation to India. The United States even amended its own domestic law called the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. On August 1, 2008, the IAEA approved the safeguards agreement with India. On September 6, 2008, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, an export-control cartel that had been formed mainly in response to India's first nuclear test in 1974, also allowed India to start civilian nuclear trade. The IAEA Board of Governors approved on August 18, 2008 and India signed an India-specific safeguards agreement with the IAEA on February 2, 2009. India became the only known country with nuclear weapons which had not signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), but is still allowed to carry out nuclear trade with other countries.

India and Pakistan had been under U.S. and international sanctions as a result of their nuclear tests in May 1998. Pakistan, which had become the closest U.S. non-NATO ally following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, felt that the United States was stabbing it in the back by signing the Civil Nuclear deal with its archenemy. As the United States and India became closer, Pakistan started loosening the leash on the jihadist groups. Slowly, the ISI started allowing the Afghan Taliban and other radical groups to carry out attacks on coalition forces and the Afghan government. Around the time of the signing of the U.S.–India Civil Nuclear deal in July 2005, the ISI started encouraging the JuD to re-enter the country of its birth. For the ISI, it was a way of settling scores with the American 'friends' who were helping its archenemy. In the next three years, dozens of JuD jihadists moved to the Pakistani tribal areas and Afghan provinces of Nuristan and Kunar to establish camps and sleeper cells. It was and remains a replay of the MDI's jihad in Afghanistan when it had to work with other groups. However, the

Americans had replaced the Russians as enemies. It took three years for the JuD to mount their first major attack on the coalition forces in Nuristan. In July 2008, more than 400 Afghan and LeT fighters carried out a deadly assault on the U.S. combat outpost in Wanat in Nuristan province, and nearly overran the post. Nine U.S. troops died, and 15 U.S. soldiers and four Afghan troops were wounded. The U.S. forces defeated the attack in the end but withdrew from the outpost days later.[48]

In the next two years, the JuD/LeT further expanded its operations in Afghanistan, setting up training camps.[49] The LeT is also believed to have cooperated with Afghan extremist groups to carry out the October 8, 2009 attack on the Indian Embassy in Kabul, which killed 17 people, as well as the December 15, 2009 attack in front of the Heetal Hotel, which killed eight people. At the time of the attack, some two dozen Indian engineers were residing either in the hotel or in a building next door. LeT is believed also to have planned and executed the February 26, 2010 car bombing and suicide attack on two guesthouses in the heart of Kabul where Indian officials stayed, and the attack on a shopping center and bank in downtown Kabul in January. Both attacks bore some resemblance to the *fidayee* attacks in Mumbai. The people outside of Afghanistan coordinated the planning of the multiple attackers on cellphones during the attacks, which were meticulously planned. Hanif Atmar, then interior minister, told the New York Times that at least two of the attackers had been speaking Urdu, a language spoken in Pakistan and parts of India. He said, "Over the past six months more than four attacks in Kabul had suicide bombers with telephones that we recovered with active numbers that were from Pakistan."[50]

On April 8, 2010 a joint American-Afghan Special Operations Force killed nine militants and captured one after a firefight in the eastern province of Nangarhar. According to a senior American military official, all of them were Pakistani and "a concentration of them were LeT."[51] In April 15, 2013, Coalition and Afghan special operations forces captured a senior LeT leader in a raid in the District of Andar in the southeastern Afghan province of Ghazni. Without identifying the nationality of the LeT militant or

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the other insurgents captured during the raid, the ISAF press release said, "The leader is alleged to have planned and participated in multiple attacks against Afghan and coalition forces throughout Kunar, Kandahar and Ghazni provinces. He is known to have links to multiple foreign fighters, and was actively planning a high-profile attack at the time of his arrest."[52] In a joint operation, the ISAF-Afghan captured a Taliban commander, a facilitator, and two other suspected insurgents in the province of Nangarhar on July 2, 2010. The Taliban commander was directly linked to the Taliban *amir* of Khogyani District and assisted with the recent influx of LeT insurgents into the province.[53] The New York Times quoted a senior NATO intelligence official who said, "'[The JuD militants] are active now in six or eight provinces" in Afghanistan. "They are currently most interested in Indian targets here, but they can readily trade attacks on international targets for money or influence or an alliance with other groups."[54]

During a raid in the Maidan Shahr district in Wardak province (which borders Kabul) Afghan Coalition forces captured the leader of "a cell of approximately 50 foreign fighters," which is part of a group known as the Kabul Attack Network, on November 1, 2010. "The target [of the raid] was wanted [by the Afghan government] for leading a cell of approximately 50 foreign fighters, serving as a suicide-attack facilitator and leading small-arms and improvised explosive device attacks against ANSF and ISAF."[55] The cell included Arab and Pakistani members of al-Qaeda, the LeT, and the Haqqani Network. In addition to Kabul, they also operate in the surrounding provinces of Logar, Wardak, Nangarhar, and Kapisa. Dawood, Taliban's shadow governor for Kabul, and Taj Mir Jawad, lead the Kabul Attack Network, and Taj Mir Jawad is a top commander in the Haqqani Network.[56]

In a joint operation, Afghan and Coalition security forces targeted and killed LeT senior leader Khatab Shafiq on June 29, 2012 in the District of Watahpur in Kunar province. He was behind several attacks against Afghan and Coalition forces, and provided money, weapons, and training to militants in the region. Khatab Shafiq also set up multiple training camps in Eastern Afghanistan. Recently, he was involved with teaching insurgents

how to build and emplace improvised explosive devices. The security forces engaged the militants with a precision airstrike in which Khatab Shafiq and multiple other militants were killed.[57] The same air strike also killed another LeT operative, Ammar. Ammar looked after a network of insurgents and directed attacks against Afghan and Coalition forces in Kunar.[58] Later, the security force identified other armed militants in the immediate area and engaged them with a second precision airstrike in which several militants were killed.[59]

Since the beginning of July 2010, the ISAF has targeted the LeT in four other raids. The ISAF has carried out operations against the LeT in Kunar, Nangarhar, and Wardak. In July 2010, ISAF acknowledged the influx of LeT fighters into the province of Nangarhar. The ISAF targeted the LeT in at least four raids between July 2010 and April 2013. In July 2010, the ISAF announced for the first time that they had captured the Taliban commanders who helped LeT members enter Afghanistan, acknowledging that the LeT was operating in Afghanistan.[60]

As the deadline to draw down U.S. and Coalition forces in Afghanistan approaches, the ISI and JuD are looking for a new role in Afghanistan. A significant number of Pakistani Deobandi militants spun out of control of the Pakistani military in wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington D.C. The Afghan Taliban have repeatedly shown their distrust of the Pakistani military since 9/11, although they have not turned their guns towards the Pakistani military or state. Since the links between the Pakistani and Afghan Taliban are very close, the Pakistani military is not ready to trust the Deobandi jihadists after the post-9/11 experience, both in Pakistan and Afghanistan. The Deobandi Taliban are equally distrustful of the Pakistani military. The JuD has replaced the jihadist Deobandi groups in India and become the most favourite of the ISI, and the ISI would like to do the same in Afghanistan in the post-2014 period. The LeT has been actively trying to have a foothold in Afghanistan since 2005 with the help of the ISI. Although the ISI will have to do with the existing Deobandi Taliban in Afghanistan in the short term, the ISI will try to replace the existing Deobandi Taliban with the LeT and its affiliates in the medium term just as the

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Taliban replaced the mujahideen in the 1990s.

Currently, the Pakistani military is trying to use the LeT and Lashkar-e-Islam, along with some other jihadi groups, to crush the anti-military Taliban in the tribal areas. If they succeed, the tribal areas will serve as a gateway to Afghanistan and raise the profile of the LeT in Pakistan. The military or the ISI is deeply involved in the LeT. They have learnt the hard lesson by letting the militant groups work unwatched. The ISI has infiltrated a large number of agents in the LeT. However, this strategy is not working as many of these ISI agents become influenced by the LeT and change their loyalties. The LeT has also learnt to handle its handlers. On the one hand, LeT is carrying out the Pakistani military's agenda in India and Afghanistan, and in the region, and on the other hand, it also has its own agenda, which it is carrying out with impunity. We have seen that the military uses its full power to crush all splinter groups of the LeT. This is the reason no splinter group can survive for very long. If the West abandoned Afghanistan and the region the way it did in 1988, Afghanistan may become the first state to be captured by the LeT in only a few years.

In Sri Lanka, Juhayman's Ikhwan had penetrated the Jamatul Tawhid, a small Salafist group, which was being looked after and funded directly by Abu Yahya Mohammad Farooq of the Al-Hayyat al-Ighasa al-Islamiyya al-Almiyya (International Islamic Relief Organization or IIRO) Ceylon Branch of Sri Lanka.[61] Abu Yahya Mohammad Farooq was a frequent visitor to the MDI offices in Pakistan. When the MDI was formed in 1987, the IIRO office in Sri Lanka virtually became MDI's headquarters in Sri Lanka.[62] MDI/JuD has succeeded in creating some sleeper cells in Sri Lanka's Eastern district of Batticaloa, especially in the Kattankudy area, where there is some influence of Wahhabism. The MDI has been training a number of young Muslims from Sri Lanka.[63] Young Muslim boys from Sri Lanka started going to *Muaskar Taiba* in Afghanistan to train.[64] The JuD also uses Colombo, the capital of Sri Lanka, as a transit city for its members to go to other countries in the region, including the Maldives and India. After the Sultan

Park bombing in the Maldives, ten members of the terror cell tried to flee to Karachi through Colombo before the bombings. Eight of them succeeded.[65] However, two other suspects, computer engineer Abdul Latheef Ibrahim and Ali Shameem, were arrested in Colombo and deported to the Maldives before they could catch an onward flight to Karachi.[66]

Indian intelligence agencies have discovered that the JuD has arranged training facilities in Sri Lanka. Rakesh Maria, the Maharashtra Anti-Terrorism Squad (ATS) chief, alleged that Mirza Himayat Baig, the alleged chief of the LeT Maharashtra cell who had been arrested in connection with the February 13 German Bakery blast in Pune, had received three-week training in Colombo, Sri Lanka in March-April 2008.[67] In Sri Lanka, Fayyaz Kagzi and Sayyad Zabiuddin Ansari trained him in explosives.[68] The U.S. military has also discovered that the JuD is expanding its operations in the Indian Ocean. In March 2010, Admiral Robert Willard, Commander of the U.S. Pacific Command, testified before the U.S. Senate and Armed Services Committee that the JuD/LeT is expanding in Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives.[69] The U.S. intelligence agencies told their Indian counterparts that there were some 200 LeT cadres in Sri Lanka who use the island country as a "staging ground" to enter India. The United States said that these 200 cadres were possibly "planners and facilitators."[70] The real importance of Sri Lanka for the MDI/JuD lies in its being a gateway to the Indian Ocean.

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CHAPTER EIGHT

BEACHHEAD–THE MDI OUTREACH

Before the Meccan rebellion in November 1979, Juhayman's Ikhwan secretly and overtly preached their creed to visiting pilgrims from all over the world. They particularly targeted the visiting Ahle Hadith/Salafist scholars of Islam who came to perform *hajj* or *umra* from other countries. By 1979, they had followers in many countries, and secret cells in some countries. The countries where they had functioning secret cells of different sizes included Egypt, Kuwait, Myanmar (Burma), Nigeria, Eritrea, Ogaden, Pakistan, Palestine, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the United States. In some countries, they had established organizational links with the local Salafist groups, including Pakistan, Egypt, Sudan, Nigeria, Philippines, Kuwait, and Myanmar. In many other countries they had individuals who supported Juhayman's Ikhwan and believed in their ideology.

Between 1979 and 1987, when they founded the MDI in Lahore, Juhayman's Ikhwan spread out in the world and kept building their organizational network. In most places they penetrated the local Salafist groups. By 1987, Juhayman's Ikhwan dominated the groups called Ansar al-Sunna al-Muhammadiyya in Egypt, Sudan, and Nigeria. In Kuwait, many of them had joined the *Jamiat ihya' al-turath al-Islami* (Revival of Islamic Heritage Society or RIHS),[1] which was designated a terrorist organization on June 13, 2008.[2] Others joined the *Al-Hayyat al-Ighasa al-Islamiyya al-Almiyya*[3] (International Islamic Relief Organization or IIRO), and many others joined the local chapter of Juhayman's Ikhwan under Jabir

al-Jalahma and Abd al-Latif al-Dirbas.[4] In Thailand, Juhayman's Ikhwan had members in the Al-Jabha al-Islamia l-Tehreer Fatani (Pattani Islamic Liberation Front or PILF) and in the Philippines in the Al-Jabha al-Tehreer al-Moro al-Islamiyya[5] (Moro Islamic Liberation Front of Philippines or MILF). In Myanmar, they worked in the Arakan Rohingya Islamic Front (ARIF), the Tehreek-e-Jihad Arakan, Jihad Organization, and RSO in Myanmar.[6] However, the RSO was heavily dominated by Juhayman's Ikhwan. In Eritrea, they worked in the Islamic Front of Eritrea, and in Ogaden under Ittehad-e Islami. In Palestine, Juhayman's Ikhwan had penetrated several Islamist parties and created cells. In the United Kingdom, Juhayman's Ikhwan dominated the Jamiat Ahyaul Minhajul Sunnah (aka Threek Minhajul Sunnah) and had also penetrated the Jamiat Ahle Hadith-U.K. In the United States, Juhayman's Ikhwan were present in or funded several Islamist groups, including the Islamic Assembly of North America (IANA), al-Kifah Refugee Center, and Care International. In Pakistan, the Jamiat Ahle Hadith Sindh[7] functioned virtually as a chapter of Juhayman's Ikhwan. However, they had penetrated some other Ahle Hadith groups, including some factions of the Jamiat Ahle Hadith.

In 1987, the MDI inherited the nascent jihadist infrastructure Juhayman's Ikhwan or supporters had erected in different parts of the world. The first department the MDI formed was the Department of International Jihad to look after that jihadist infrastructure. The MDI appointed Mahmoud Bahaziq, its head, and tasked him to strengthen Juhayman's Ikhwan in different countries, and to coordinate their efforts at the international level. Mahmoud Bahaziq had already been fighting jihad in Afghanistan alongside some Arab groups and the JDQS, and in southern Philippines alongside the MILF.

Hamid Bahaziq and Mahmoud Bahaziq wanted to create a unified MDI Indian Ocean Command before they could create a world command under the MDI. Mahmoud Bahaziq is particularly obsessed with oceanic warfare and life on islands. He looks at himself more as an admiral than as a general. He was so obsessed

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with fighting jihad in the seas and on the tiny islands, and conquering overseas territories that he took over the nickname 'Barbaros' after Heyreddin Barbarossa, a 16th century Ottoman admiral. As the MDI aimed at becoming an Oceanic power, it created a naval wing of the Department of International Jihad (DIJ) as soon as the DIJ was created under the command of Mahmoud Bahaziq. In 2010, Headley confirmed to Indian interrogators that the JuD also has a naval wing, headed by its operational commander, Abu Yaqoob.[8] However, what is not known is that this naval wing was created as a part of the DIJ. Hamid Bahaziq and Mahmoud Bahaziq wanted to use some Maldivian islands as launching pads for jihadist attacks on different Indian Ocean countries and foreign naval ships, sanctuaries, and even military stores.[9] The IM operative Siddibapa told their Indian operatives that the LeT's Karachi Project has been shut down, and Riyaz Shahbandri now commands the entire Indian jihadist network.[10] If it is true that Riyaz Shahbandri controls the IM operations in India, it means the JuD's Karachi set-up is now totally focused on the Indian Ocean now.

The first five years from 1987 to 1992 were not very eventful for the MDI. The Soviets started leaving Afghanistan within a year of its formation. However, the Communist regime survived until 1992. The MDI founders thought the jihad front in Nuristan was too small and cut off from the rest of the world. The HIA had succeeded in assassinating Sheikh Jamilur Rehman in Kunar and the Salafists were facing a bleak future in Kunar. Pakistan was closing the offices of Arab mujahideen and charities and sending the Arab mujahideen to their countries of origin, or wherever they wanted to go. The Arab fighters were feeling the earth slipping from beneath their feet as they saw no other jihad which could employ them. Abdur Rabb Rassool Sayyaf, the leading Afghan Salafist, was fighting for his political survival among the Afghan mujahideen. Juhayman's Ikhwan, among the founders of the MDI, spent these years in building closer organizational relations and links with their followers and supporters around the world. The mujahideen who went back to their countries of origin during this

period were radicalizing those societies. At several places they were preparing to start jihad. However, the jihad in the southern Philippines had picked up momentum. Juhayman's Ikhwan, which dominated the MILF leadership, were quite actively taking part in the Philippines's jihad.

The main Muslim group in the southern Philippines, MNLF, had split when it signed a peace agreement with the Philippines government in 1976, and accepted the limited autonomy offered by the Philippines government. The breakaway group of some 57 MNLF leaders formed what was known as "The New Leadership" under Hashim Salamat in 1977, which moved first to Cairo, Egypt, and in 1980 when the Afghan jihad started, to Pakistan. In Egypt, they were shielded by the Ansar-al-Sunna al-Muhammadiyya. Salamat formally formed the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in 1984. Mahmoud Bahaziq spent a lot of time in southern Philippines fighting alongside with the MILF mujahideen during these years. In Pakistan, Mahmoud Bahaziq was one of the principal financers of the MILF.[11]

Hundreds of students from the Philippines have trained at LeT training camps and studied at madrassahs run by the LeT. According to Abu Asim, a student from southern Philippines at the Jamia Abu Bakr in Karachi, some 20 students from the Philippines were studying at the madrassah.[12] Abu Asim told the interviewer that the mujahideen from the Philippines would not stop their jihad even after the liberation of [Muslim majority] areas in the Philippines, and continue their global jihad till Allah's religion becomes dominant all over the globe. Abu Hashim was sent by Hashim Salamat. Abu Hashim told the interviewer that like all other students from the Philippines, he had received jihadi training at the *Muaskar Taiba* in Afghanistan.[13] Hashim Salamat established 1,943 Islamic schools in the Philippines where 500,000 students were enrolled. He also built 3,317 mosques. In an interview, Hashim Salamat said that 325,000 men and women were memorizing the Quran in the Muslim areas.[14] In November 1995, *Mujallah Ad-Dawa* revealed that a large number of mujahideen from the Philippines had trained at LeT camps.[15] *Amir* of the Jamiat Ahle Hadith of the Philippines, Abu Saleh Mahdi Bazda, frequently

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participated in recruiting and fundraising rallies of the MDI in Pakistan.[16] The majority of Muslims in the Philippines traditionally followed the Shafi'i School of Jurisprudence. Like other Muslims of the Philippines, Abu Saleh Mahdi also followed the Shafi'i School of Jurisprudence till 1983 when he converted to Salafism. He became the founder-*amir* of the Jamiat Ahle Hadith of the Philippines.[17]

One of the least populous Muslim majority nations with a population of 309,000 Muslims in 2010,[18] the Maldives is a collection of about 1,190 big and small islands in the southwest of India and Sri Lanka in the Indian Ocean. The 1,190 islands make up the 26 natural ring-like atolls which lie in the shape of two rows of atolls in the Indian Ocean, just across the equator. Only about 200 islands are inhabited of which some 90 islands are developed for tourism, best known for their plush resorts, scuba diving, and as a luxurious honeymoon destination. The remaining 980 islands are either uninhabited or used for agricultural purposes. The total land area is over 90,000 square kilometers which make roughly only one percent of the country's territory while 99 percent of Maldives is made up of sea. One of Maldives' official websites describes the country as follows, "Each atoll in the Maldives is made of a coral reef encircling a lagoon, with deep channels dividing the reef ring. A string of islands take their places among this atoll ring; each island has its own reef encircling the island lagoon. The reefs of the islands, alive with countless types of underwater creatures and vibrant corals, protect the islands from wind and wave action of the surrounding vast oceans. This unique structure of reefs and channels makes navigation almost impossible for the passer-by without sufficient information about these waters."[19]

For the ISI, the Maldives was and remains important as a base to target India and Indian interests in the Indian Ocean. As the Maldives islands lie in the center of the Indian Ocean, their geography makes them an ideal place for a global terrorist organization. Maldivians, like some other island-based nations, are important for the JuD's grand plan for the Indian Ocean region.

The MDI/JuD leaders believe that Maldivians are much better to operate with in and across the seas as they literally experience the sea and sea life on a daily basis from cradle to grave. The MDI/JuD had little success in creating a foothold in the Maldives until 2005, when the Asian tsunami devastated the region. The society, however, had been becoming more radical with the passage of each year. Like many other nations in the Indian Ocean, the 2005 tsunami ruined the Maldives economy and took the country back by two decades in terms of socio-economic development. About 20 of the [inhabited] 199 islands were totally devastated and another 53 were severely damaged. The tsunami destroyed schools, clinics, and pharmacies in 50 islands.[20] As if on cue, Hafiz Saeed called a meeting of the JuD *shura*. The *shura* decided to collect and send as many volunteers and relief goods to the tsunami-hit countries as possible. It also constituted a Tsunami Relief Committee and appointed Amir Hamza its convener.[21] Following the Asian tsunami, the Idara Khidmat Khalq (IKK) stormed the world by launching its relief effort in the Indian Ocean region when the Asian tsunami hit.

As the Maldives government did not maintain a diplomatic mission in Islamabad, Amir Hamza decided to go to the Maldives himself under the pretext of handing cash to a private citizen who had sent a request for the installation of a water purification plant in one of the affected Maldives islands.[22] Amir Hamza and his team spent quite some time in the Maldives where they organized the Salafists. As most tsunami-hit countries refused to accept aid from the IKK, most of the aid and money went to only Sri Lanka and Maldives. According to one JuD source, the IKK transferred as much as $200,000 to the Maldives in the weeks following tsunami.[23] The group did not register themselves with the government as an aid-giving group to avoid attention. Although Amir Hamza returned to Pakistan, some of the delegation members stayed back to keep organizing the Salafists in that country. Their efforts bore fruit as Salafist violence rose in the Maldives after the tsunami. In 2005, just before leaving for South East Asia with relief goods and money on behalf of the IKK, JuD central leader Amir Hamza told me, "Allah has decided to give the

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Muslims of Maldives a great opportunity to serve Himself. By helping the Muslims of Maldives, we are only serving the cause of Allah."[24]

According to official history, which quotes the legend of conversion, Yousuf Shamsuddin-al Tabrezi, popularly known as Thabreyzgefanu, introduced Islam to the Maldives in 1153. President Maumoon Abdul Gayoom declared "the fourth day of the fourth month of the lunar calendar" as The Day Maldives Embraced Islam.[25] Almost all Muslims practice the Shafii School of Jurisprudence. The last of the Sultans, King Muhammad Fareed, assumed the title of king but was dethroned in 1968 when the Maldives became a republic. President Ibrahim Nasir, who replaced King Muhammad Fareed, governed till 1978 when he was replaced by President Maumoon Abdul Gayoom. President Gayoom governed Maldives till 2008 and was replaced by Mohamed Nasheed in the same year. President Nasheed was later replaced by President Mohammed Waheed Hassan.

The Maldives saw a steep and dangerous rise in Islamism and radicalization under President Gayoom who was a graduate of Al-Azhar University, Egypt, and a fluent speaker of the Arabic language. President Gayoom went to Nigeria to teach Islamic Studies. He wittingly and unwittingly pushed Maldivian society and Islam towards Wahhabization. After becoming President, he opened the first Islamic schools, *Mauhad* and *Arabiyya*. He also allowed the Rabitat al-Alam al-Islami to open a branch to coordinate the efforts of Islamic preachers the world over.[26] Under the 2008 Maldivian constitution, non-Muslims cannot become naturalized citizens. However, those who are born in non-Muslim Maldivian families can follow their parents' religion.[27] The journalist Aishath Velazinee has very aptly described the situation in the Maldives under President Gayoom,

> "A few islands even reverted to 'the prophet's time', attempting to emulate the Arabian dress and lifestyles of the time of Prophet Muhammad. Men grew their beards and hair, took to wearing loose robes and pyjamas, and crowned their heads with Arab-style head-cloths. Women were wrapped up in black robes. Goats were imported, and fishermen gave up their vocation to become 'shepherds'. The laws of the land were rejected, as young girls were taken out of school and married off in their early teens in religious ceremonies said to be sanctioned by Islam. Stories also began appearing in the local media of young Maldivian men and women joining organised Islamist movements involved in jihad around the world. Many have reportedly simply disappeared into that void, while one or two have surfaced at Guantanamo Bay."[28]

In December 1999, Islamists started attacking the regime. They argued that the millennium celebrations were aimed at spreading Christianity in the Maldives.[29] In 2003, posters praising Osama bin Laden appeared on the walls of a school in Edhyafushi Island. Islamists vandalized a shop in Malè which displayed Santa Clause in 2005.[30]

Maldivians had been going to Pakistan to study Islam in Pakistani madrassahs. Most of them went to Karachi, possibly because of its proximity to the sea, and many to Ahle Hadith madrassahs there. Several Maldivians also came to Pakistan in the 1980s to join jihad in Afghanistan where they fought alongside the Arab and MDI mujahideen. Their number increased in the late 1980s. After the start of the MDI's Kashmir and transnational jihad in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the MDI made an extraordinary effort to recruit Maldivian citizens. In December 2008, during his December 2008 visit to New Delhi, the President of Maldives, Mohamed Nasheed, revealed that around 150 Maldivian students were studying in Pakistani madrassahs of whom 40 students were studying in radical madrassahs in Pakistan.[31]

In March 2009, the Maldives Minister of Defense and National Security, Ameen Faisal, said that Pakistan had arrested nine men from the troubled Waziristan region of northwestern Pakistan. They included Yoosuf Izadhy (age 38, of Nicosia in the Malé atoll); Ahmed Ashraf (31, of Vaikaradhoo); Abdullah Sameer (38, of Lhaimagu); Ali Faiz (31, of Vaikaradhoo); Moosa Yoosuf (30, of Kalhaidhoo); Yoosuf Mohammed (52, also of Kalhaidhoo); Mohammad Zuhree (28, of Dhaandhoo); Ali Shafeeq (25, of

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Kandholhudhoo); and Arif Ahmed, whose personal details have not been released. According to Malé-based newspaper *Minivan News,* police had arrested Shafeeq on suspicion of having taken part in the September 2007 bombing of Malé's Sultan Park, but was later released when nothing was found against him.[32] In 2002, Pakistani security forces arrested a 28-year-old Maldivian citizen, Ibrahim Fauzee, in Karachi for allegedly having links with Al-Qaeda. He was taken to Guantanamo Bay[33] but was later released.

On January 27, 2007, Mohammed Faseehu from the Laam atoll island of Dhanbidhoo, and Shifahu Abdul Wahid of Dhiffushi island in Kaaf atoll, died in Kashmir. Faseehu and Wahid went to Pakistan in March 2005 to study at a madrassah in Karachi. From Karachi, they moved to the Jamiyya Salafiyya Islamiyya at Faisalabad. According to Mohamed Halim, who later became vice-chief of administration for the Laam atoll, they studied at Jamiyya Salafiyya in the 1980s. He said that there were 23 Maldivian students there in 1989 and dozens of others at other seminaries across Pakistan. Many of them went to join the jihadi camps.[34] Pakistan deported Ahmed Shah, a Maldivian national, who was receiving militant training at an LeT camp at Muridke, near Lahore.[35] In the spring of 2006, the Maldivian authorities announced that Sri Lankan security forces had arrested three Maldivians, two women and a man. They were on their way to Pakistan to receive jihadi training at a jihadi training camp. They accused Fatimah Nisreen, a policeman's daughter, of helping them to go to Pakistan, but she refuted this allegation. They were not prosecuted as there was not enough satisfactory evidence.[36]

The first Maldivian student who is known to have become influenced by Islamic radicalism was Mohamed Ibrahim Sheikh who returned to the Maldives after completing his studies in Pakistan in 1983. Mohamed Ibrahim Sheikh started a campaign against Shafii Islam, which President Maumoon Abdul Gayoom supported and propagated. The regime banished him from Malè to the southern atolls where he continued to preach his jihadist Salafist Islam. One of those who was influenced was the Qatar-educated cleric, Sheikh Ibrahim Fareed, who was later arrested for his links with the Sultan Park terrorists. He built Salafist mosques which

operated without legal permission required by Maldives law in Malè. By mid-2006, Fareed eventually established an Islamist mini-city on the remote southern island of Himandhoo in the Alif Alif atoll which measures only 750 meters across, and has a population of 583 residents. It is a tiny island that lies 50 miles west of Malè.[37] The rebels set up a new mosque in defiance of laws that require religious institutions to be licensed. They also imposed *sharia* codes on the people. The Islamist rebels resisted efforts to restore law. The mosque was shut down temporarily in October 2007, but rebels soon reopened it.[38] They killed a government supporter on the island, Ibrahim Shameem, two months later. There was a street battle between Islamists and police after officials attempted to close down an Islamist mosque in June 2007 in Malè.[39] In January 2007, the Maldivian media reported that the rebels in Himandhoo, Alif Alif Atoll, were issuing death threats to people who did not follow them.[40] In February that year, the rebels banned children from attending local school because of the impure influences of foreign teachers, the English language, and non-Islamic subjects.[41] They also imposed the veil on women, which is illegal in the Maldives.[42]

As the Maldives society became more and more radicalized, the establishment of an Islamist mini-city on the island of Himandhoo was followed by a terrorist attack known as the Sultan Park bombing near the Islamic Centre in Malé on September 29, 2007. The bombing injured twelve foreign tourists: eight from China and two each from Britain and Japan. The park lies in the shadow of the Maldivian Army (MNDF) Headquarters. The bomb was a relatively crude device, which was good enough to scare the nation, and the world. It consisted of a gas cylinder, a washing machine motor, and a mobile phone.[43] LeT terrorists had used similar devices in Ajmer and Hyderabad earlier. However, the LeT operatives had fixed a switch to prevent accidental detonation to counter the high incidence of wrong-number calls in the mobile networks of Maldives.[44] The day of the bombing was well chosen. A Maldivian official pointed out that the bombing had taken place on Ramadan 17, which is also the anniversary of Prophet Muhammad's victory in the battle of Badr.[45] Police arrested several

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terrorist suspects. However, police also alleged that at least 10 conspirators, including computer engineer Abdul Latif Ibrahim and Ali Shameem, absconded to Pakistan, where they learnt bomb making techniques. However, Inas and Ahmed Naseer were caught in Colombo, Sri Lanka, before they could board a connecting flight to Karachi, and were deported to Maldives.[46]

Some of the terrorists who had been arrested after the Sultan Park bombing had also received training in bomb making in Pakistan. They also received support from their associates in Pakistan and Sri Lanka.[47] On their arrival in Pakistan, the Maldivians were sent to JuD's *Muaskar Abu Baseer*.[48] One of the eight who had reached Pakistan returned later and was arrested in Malé in January 2009. Three suspects failed to escape and were sentenced to 15 years in prison in 2007. Maldivian investigators found that two of them, Ali Shameem and Abdul Latheef Ibrahim, had been planning to join the jihad in Jammu and Kashmir.[49] Indian intelligence officials believe that several Maldivian Islamist terrorists fled to Pakistan after the Sultan Park bombing of 2007 in Malè. Ali Jaleel, a Maldivian citizen, took part in the suicide attack on the ISI office in Lahore on May 27, 2009. He was a member of al-Qaeda. Maldivian security agencies recovered video CDs asking "Maldivian brothers" to join the jihad.[50] On November 9, 2007, the Office of the Attorney General issued a red notice to bring the ten fugitive terrorists from Pakistan to Maldives for trial.[51]

A small group of Ahle Hadith extremists had planned the Sultan Park bombing, the first major Islamist terror attack. They believed that President Maumoon Abdul Gayoom's regime was promoting a heretical sect of Islam and thus enjoyed no legitimacy. The planners included Saeed Ahmed, the Zeenia Manzil Masjid's leading ideologue, who had participated in street protests against the Maldivian president in 2004. He had gone to Pakistan several months earlier. He is thought to have studied at the Jamiyya Salafiyya Islamiyya, Faislabad, where dozens of religious students from the Maldives have studied.[52] The madrassah has produced many jihadists, including Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi, the LeT commander. Maldivian police investigators say the group which planned the Sultan Park bombing belonged to the Local Jamaat Ahl-e-Hadith. Maldivian

investigators believe a large part of the funding for the Sultan Park bombing came in from Pakistan and UK-based Islamist organizations. Police recovered some $1,000 from Moosa Inas, accused in the Sultan Park bombing. The police say the group would have needed thousands more to pay for the terror cell's frequent international movements, proselytization activism, and recruitment operations.

One of the suspects, Abu Issa, was a British national of South Asian origin. Abu Issa is thought to have arrived in the Maldives soon after the 2005 tsunami. He carried several thousand dollars in cash with him for victims. Indian intelligence believed Abu Issa had travelled to Mumbai and Thiruvananthapuram six months earlier where he met with Indian terror operatives. Indian intelligence services believes Issa may also have financed Ibrahim Asif, a Maldives national who had been arrested for trying to purchase weapons in the Indian state of Kerala in April 2005.[53] According to police, Moosa Inas triggered the explosive device that exploded at Sultan Park. Inas was one of the local Maldivian Islamists who was involved in distributing the relief. After the Sultan Park bombing, the Maldives Defense Forces acted against the Islamist base at Himandhoo, where they arrested Ali Shareef and Mohammad Mazeed, who had also participated in the distribution of relief. Both had earlier participated in a failed plot to bring about an Islamic revolution.[54] Moosa Inas, a Laamu atoll resident, who was charged with having triggered the explosive device which went off at the Sultan Park in Malè on September 29, had visited Thiruvananthapuram in Kerala, India in December 2005 on his way to Pakistan. Inas arrived in Kerala on a flight through Colombo, Sri Lanka, and then crossed the India-Pakistan border in Punjab. He again travelled to Pakistan in 2006, changing flights at Colombo and Dubai. A growing mass of evidence collected by Indian investigators shows that the LeT had activated its cadres in India to support the cell of which he was a part.[55]

Saeed Ahmed, the Zeenia Manzil Masjid's leading ideologue, is thought to control much of the Islamist infrastructure built with these funds. Ahmed was a key participant in the 2004 street protests against President Gayoom's regime. He left for Pakistan several

months ago. Like several other Maldives Islamists, Ahmed is believed to have studied at the Jamiyya Salafiyya Islamiyya in Faislabad.[56] The IKK claimed to have spent Rs. 17.2 million on tsunami relief operations in the region: The Maldives, Sri Lanka, and Indonesia during 2005, its single largest international charitable operation. However, the Maldivian government officials say there is no record of the IKK bringing in relief goods because it did not register for relief work with the Maldives government. In other words, the funds were channeled to Islamists who used the money to build terror infrastructure.[57] *Fiyes* magazine reporter, Ahmed Abdulla, who covered the 2005 disaster, says, "Basically, Inas and the others made it clear that they would only help those who converted to their particular form of Islam. People were desperate, so many agreed."[58]

The LeT has used Maldivian members outside their country. Sabahuddin told his Indian interrogators that the LeT had asked Ali Ahsham, a Maldivian citizen, to do reconnaissance on targets in Bangalore before they carried out the attack on the Indian Institute of Science.[59] Indian security forces arrested Asif Ibrahim, a Maldivian national, in Kerala in April 2005. Ibrahim told Indian investigators that he had been given the task of setting up a support unit for a new Maldives-based terror group, the Jamaat-ul-Muslimeen, in Thiruvananthapuram, Kerala. Asif Ibrahim's handlers wanted to set up the unit to procure bomb components more easily than in the Maldives, where there is a strict national identity card system in place. Asif Ibrahim could not set up the cell. However, the LeT activated several local operatives for the same purpose. In one case, LeT officials summoned Jamshedpur resident, Tariq Akhtar, to Dhaka in 2005, where Pakistan-based LeT commander, Abdul Aziz, told him to meet Islamists in Nepal, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives. The LeT officials asked Mumbai resident, Shami Ahmad Shah, to obtain a fake passport for Akhtar.[60] In 2008, Indian Intelligence Bureau intercepted an LeT communication. The intercept showed that the LeT had plans to target nuclear installations like the Kalpakkam nuclear power plant near Chennai and the Indian Space Research Organization station at Thumba. Other intercepts suggested they had plans to target

India from the sea. Maldives citizen, Sabahuddin, who was arrested for the attack on the CRPF camp in Rampur, Uttar Pradesh, told his interrogators at the Mumbai Anti-Terrorist Squad the LeT wanted to use Maldives citizens for such an attack. However, they had not yet selected any Maldivian youth thus far. Indian intelligence officials suggest that two islands near the Andamans, Trinket and Nancowry, are on the LeT radar.[61]

The JuD is known to have worked with other international terrorist organizations to gain expertise in naval terrorism. In early 2002, al-Qaeda planned to attack American and British warships in the Strait of Gibraltar with explosives-packed boats on the lines of the U.S. destroyer Cole in October 2000.[62] Intelligence services from the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Spain, and Morocco teamed up to uncover the plot. In March 2002, Moroccan intelligence officers interviewed 17 Moroccan prisoners at Guantanamo. Zuhair al-Hayli (aka al-Dub - the Bear), revealed that al-Qaeda was planning an attack. These interrogations helped officials to identify the planner as Zuher al-Tbaiti, a Saudi member of al-Qaeda who was married to a Moroccan woman. Surveillance of al-Tbaiti revealed that he was receiving money wired from Pakistan and instructions from someone called Abu Bilal. Police suspected Abu Bilal to be Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri. In April 2002, al-Tbaiti received a call from outside Morocco to go to Saudi Arabia for final planning. According to Time, he had been called to carry out an operation in Saudi Arabia.[63]

The Moroccan police also discovered two other Saudi plotters: Abdullah al-Ghamdi and Hilal al-Assiri. Moroccan police arrested them, along with their wives, and the sister of one of the wives on May 12, 2002, just before they were to board a plane at the Casablanca airport. They also arrested a Moroccan. They had fake passports and $10,000 in cash on them at the time of their arrests.[64] During interrogation, they revealed the name of another co-plotter, Abdallah M'Sefer Ali al-Ghamdi, who was also arrested. All of them had fought in the anti-Soviet jihad, survived the U.S. bombing of Tora Bora in October 2001, and fled to Pakistan.[65]

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Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, aka Mullah Ahmed Bilal, who had also planned the suicide attack on the USS Cole in the port of Aden in Yemen on October 12, 2000, had conceived the idea. Until his arrest, al-Nashiri was the head of al-Qaeda for Maritime Warfare and head of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. Abu Yasir al-Jazairi, who was arrested in early 2003 in Pakistan, provided them with funds and travel tickets. Later, during interrogations, Al-Ghamdi revealed that the cell received the funds from Lahore through the LeT. The money was wired from Lahore to an Arab bank account in the name of Kalthoum Haroun, the sister of Naima. However, he insisted that the funds were meant to pay for the cost of his marriage. In February 2003, a Moroccan court sentenced the three Saudis–al-Ghamdi, al-Tabayiti, and al-Assiri–to ten years in jail and the two Moroccan wives, including Naima Haroun, to six months in prison.[66]

As the plot was foiled, Whitehall sources said they had strong evidence that the plotters were plotting to carry out suicide bomb attacks on both British and U.S. warships in the Strait of Gibraltar and on the Rock itself. Quoting the Interior Ministry, Maghreb Arabe Presse (MAP) said, "The group was preparing for acts of violence ... against western ships crossing the Strait of Gibraltar." They had been planning to pack "Zodiac-style rubber speedboats with explosives and send them crashing against the hulls of passing warships in one of the world's busiest sea traffic lanes."[67] Britain's HMS Sheffield, a type-22 frigate that is the flagship of Nato's Standing Naval Force Mediterranean, was known to have been in the southwestern Mediterranean at the time. HMS Lancaster, a type-23 frigate, was also in Gibraltar. Two small Royal Navy patrol boats, Ranger and Trumpeter, were permanently based there. One of the most important bases of the US Sixth Fleet is on the southwest coast of Spain at Rota.[68]

After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, crossing the LoC became increasingly difficult. The LeT started training its members in marine commando techniques in the Mangla Dam, which lies between Pakistani Kashmir and Pakistani Punjab. The idea was to open Indian Ocean routes to India. In September 2006, Bangladesh security agencies briefly arrested an LeT militant, Faisal Haroun.

Haroun was transporting explosives to India by using the shipping network of merchant ships and small fishing boats. One of the receivers was Ghulam Yazdani, a Hyderabad [India] resident who planned and executed a number of attacks, including the one on former Gujrat home minister, Haren Pandya, and the bombing of the Delhi-Patna Shramjeevi Express in June 2005. The Indian security forces aborted Haroun's network attempt to smuggle in a large consignment of explosives by sea on the Maharashtra coast for terrorist bombings in Gujrat in 2006. Haroun and Ali Assham, a Maldives resident, were trying to establish a base on an unoccupied island in the Indian Ocean from where they could transport weapons to India.[69] In 2007, Indian security forces arrested eight LeT fidayeen as they landed off the Mumbai coast. Although they had tracked them on the ocean, they had let them land on Indian soil before they took action.[70]

By the late 1990s, Anees Ibrahim, Dawood Ibrahim's younger brother, had invested substantially in a shipping business in both East Africa and the UAE. Under the cover of their shipping business they supported their narcotics business.[71] In 2003, the U.S. Treasury Department accused Dawood Ibrahim of sharing his smuggling routes from South Asia, the Middle East, and Africa with Osama bin Laden and his terrorist network. The U.S. Treasury Department factsheet said that Ibrahim's syndicate is involved in large-scale shipments of narcotics in the United Kingdom and Western Europe. "Successful routes established over recent years by Ibrahim's syndicate have been subsequently utilized by bin Laden. A financial arrangement was reportedly brokered to facilitate the latter's usage of these routes. In the late 1990's, Ibrahim traveled in Afghanistan under the protection of the Taliban. Information, from as recent as Fall 2002, indicates that Ibrahim has financially supported Islamic militant groups working against India, such as Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT). For example, this information indicates that Ibrahim has been helping finance increasing attacks in Gujarat by LeT."[72]

On the last day of the 1999 annual congregation, as had been the custom in previous years, the MDI mujahideen displayed their

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jihadist skills. As the congregation moved towards its climax, a helicopter appeared in the middle of the compound. Some of the mujahideen came down with the help of the ropes as the helicopter became stationary. Then the helicopter flew in circles and some more mujahideen came out of the helicopter with the help of the ropes, and picked up some other mujahideen from the ground who were pretending to be injured. As the helicopter disappeared in the horizon, a small drone appeared which hovered in the air from one corner of the compound to the other. The public address system announced that the drone had been manufactured by LeT engineers, could carry up to ten kilograms of ammunition, and crash the ammunition on Indian army camps.[73] This kind of air show had been a permanent feature of the annual congregations at least since 1994 to 2000, after which it was discontinued for security reasons.[74] The LeT is known to have a deep interest in gaining remote controlled drone aircraft. In July 2000, LeT spokesman Abdullah Muntazir revealed, "Lashkar-e-Taiba also made a remote control aeroplane that was caught in Occupied [Indian] Kashmir. We are developing the modern technology. We can make modern devices."[75]

In 2002-2003, the ISI reportedly directed the LeT to replicate the 9/11 attacks at a smaller scale in Indian Kashmir by using toy planes and targeting Army posts and VVIPs. An LeT militant who had been arrested in Indian Kashmir told his interrogators that the ISI had handed over a fleet of four dozen such toy planes to the LeT. These toy planes are operated by remote control and can carry 10-15 kilograms of RDX. They can carry out attacks on military posts or helicopter gunships of the Indian Air Force within a range of 300 meters. He also told the interrogators that the LeT had put such a plane as a possible weapon at the LeT congregation in Pakistan. He said that the plane went out of his sight when it was flown. The Indian security forces recovered two such planes from District of Rajouri in Jammu region in early 2003. The arrested LeT militant said that the ISI was planning to use such drones to attack some of the forward Indian positions at the LoC and international border. The LeT militants were assembling such planes at the Markaz Taiba in Muridke in Pakistan.[76]

Investigations into the Virginia Paintball Jihad group also revealed JuD's interest in acquiring drone air power. U.S. court documents revealed that on August 8, 2001, Mohammed Ajmal Khan, a senior MDI official in its U.K. chapter, sent an e-mail to Barrday, Inc., showing his interest in buying kevlar fabric. Barrday, Inc. is a Canadian company with manufacturing facilities in the United States. Ajmal Khan, a British national of Pakistani origin, wanted to purchase kevlar fabric. He asked the cost of shipping kevlar fabric to Islamabad, Pakistan. [77] Ajmal Khan flew from Birmingham, England to the U.S. on February 11, 2002. Two days later, he sent an e-mail to the president of Vesta Technology in Wheat Ridge, Colorado, requesting an appointment to see a demonstration flight of an unmanned aerial vehicle before February 20, 2002. After an exchange of a few emails, Mohammed Ajmal Khan and the president of Vesta Technology scheduled the demonstration on February 21, 2002. Ajmal Khan met with the president of Vesta Technology in Wheat Ridge, Colorado at the latter's offices from where the two of them went to a field where the president of Vesta Technology conducted a demonstration flight of an unmanned aerial vehicle. On February 24, 2002, Ajmal Khan sent an email to the president of Vesta Technology in Wheat Ridge, Colorado, placed an order for a complete system, and requested "a remote control and video which have greater range. Five miles+ which is compatible with your system." He suggested the video system Model AAr05 with TC CMOS, which had a range of five miles and was available at www.wirelessvideocameras.com might be compatible.[78]

On March 27, 2002, Ajmal Khan tried to place an order for wireless video equipment intended for use on a remote-controlled aircraft with Wireless Video Cameras, a company located in Rancho Santa Margarita, California, but the company failed to verify the credit card, which was associated with an address in Coventry, England. In response, Ajmal Khan asked Seifullah Chapman to use his card. The next day, Chapman used a credit card to pay approximately $986 to buy a wireless video camera and amplifier for a remote controlled aircraft from Wireless Video Cameras. Wireless Video Cameras shipped wireless video equipment to

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Chapman at his home address in Alexandria, Virginia, on April 9, 2002. On April 5, 2002, Ajmal Khan placed an order with Aircraft Spruce Specialty, a company located in Corona, California, for a hand-held navigation radio, communication headsets, and other equipment, which were shipped to his address in Coventry, England on April 8, 2002.[79]

On November 27, 2002, Ajmal Khan wired approximately $3,840 from his bank account in London, England, to a bank account in the U.S. in the name of Masoud Khan. The next day, Ajmal Khan sent an e-mail to Masoud Khan, asking him for assistance in ordering one MP1000SYS airplane control module, a "Radio Controlled (RC) pilot assist," and a large quantity of paintball equipment, including eight paintball guns and 50,000 paintballs. "The MP 1000SYS system is an electronic automatic pilot system that can be installed on a model airplane. It contains a stability and control computer that can be programmed to fly an airplane with a 10-12 foot wingspan using Global Position Satellite coordinates. The system controls altitude, speed, and navigation to programmed waypoints, and also can be programmed to turn a video camera on and off when the airplane reaches certain locations. The MP1000SYS system can be used for military purposes as well as other applications, and it can be used in conjunction with a wireless video camera."[80] On December 11, 2002, Masoud Khan ordered an MP1000SYS system from Vesta Technology. On December 30, 2002, Vesta Technology shipped an MP1000SYS system to Masoud Khan at his residence in Maryland[81] for onward shipment to the JuD offices in Pakistan.

Pakistani jihadists have reportedly trained around 350,000 Rohingyas Muslims in madrassahs [and militant training camps] in Afghanistan and Pakistan since the 1980s.[82] All Pakistani jihadist groups claim they have the highest number of followers among Rohingya Muslims. However, the MDI/JuD and HuJI-Pakistan/Bangladesh have the strongest presence among Rohingya Muslims. The Pakistani military has also provided direct help to several Rohingya Muslim groups. The Pakistani military's support to Rohingya Muslims

predates Pakistani jihadists' involvement in Myanmar. Likewise, the Pakistan Army's support to the RSO predates the formation of the MDI in 1987. RSO commander, Kabeer Ansari, told *Mujallah Ad-Dawa* that the RSO had asked help from COAS General Mirza Aslam Beg who gave them support. Later, they also got in contact with the then ISI chief, Lt. General Hamid Gul, who had been supporting them.[83] The Pakistan Army's interest in and support for jihad in Myanmar stems from its proximity to Bangladesh and India, as well as Rohingya Muslims' desire to join Pakistan when Bangladesh was a part of Pakistan. Kabeer Ansari also said the RSO was planning to wage jihad alongside the LeT in the Indian states of Manipur, Nagaland, Asam, and Punjab to break India into many pieces. He also said that the RSO was planning to carry out attacks on the Burmese military in the name of the LeT.[84]

Rakhine, formerly Arakan, stretches along the eastern coast of the Bay of Bengal for almost 350 miles, and is separated from the rest of Myanmar by the difficult-to-traverse chain of hills called Arakan Yoma. The northern Rakhine or the Mayu region is a continuation of Bangladesh. Rakhine was an independent Arakanese kingdom for centuries before Burma annexed it in 1784. This explains the separate historical developments in the two regions. British colonial rule followed the annexation of Arakan in the 19th century. Burma became an independent country in 1948. With independence came chaos as the Buddhists replaced the former colonial officials, and the Buddhist refugees who had had been forced out by the Muslims started returning to Arakan. The returning Buddhists started evicting Muslims from the lands which had been snatched by the Muslims.[85]

However, the Muslims still call it Arakan. They say the word 'Arakan' comes from the Arabic word '*rukn*,' which means an article of Islamic faith. MDI/JuD ideologue Tahir Rabbani recounts the history of Arakan to justify jihad there. In March 1942, the Mugh Buddhists plundered Muslim villages and massacred nearly 100,000 Muslims. They locked thousands of Muslim men, women, and children in bamboo houses and burnt them alive. The perpetuated genocide of Muslims in Arakan has left 500,000

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Muslims dead. In January 1978, General Ne Win launched the Dragon King operation, which pushed 300,000 Muslims across the border in Bangladesh "because they are the followers of Prophet Mohammad and Islam is dearer to them than their own souls. The Muslim majority of Arakan has nothing in common with the Buddhist Burmese. They have been giving up their honor, their land, their houses, and most of all their lives for and independent Muslim state where they can live in peace."[86]

The Rohingya Muslims in Arakan region in western Myanmar started their jihad against the Buddhist regimes in the center in 1947,[87] the year Pakistan came into being, under the leadership of Jamiat Ulama-e Islam, which was then led by the Chairman Omra Meah. The number of mujahideen ranged between 2,000 and 5,000. In the 1947-61 period, Rohingya Muslims wanted to separate the Mayu frontier region of Arakan from western Burma, and annex that region with what was then East Pakistan (now Bangladesh). The War of Liberation in the former East Pakistan made arms available to the Rohingya. On July 15, 1972, Mujahid rebel leader Zaffar founded the Rohingya Liberation Party (RLP), and gathered the scattered Mujahid factions under one umbrella. In the beginning, the strength of the RLP was 200 mujahideen, which grew to 500 in the next two to three years. In 1974, former secretary of RLP, Muhammad Jafar Habib, separated and founded the Rohingya Patriotic Front (RPF) in 1974 with 70 Muslim guerrillas. In 1982, radical elements under the leadership of Muhammad Yunus, the former CEO of RPF, seceded from the Rohingya Patriotic Front (RPF) and formed the Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO). In 1986, Nurul Islam, the former Vice-Chairman of Rohingya Patriotic Front (RPF), assembled the remnants of the old RPF and members of the RSO, and founded the Arakan Rohingya Islamic Front (ARIF). Juhayman's ideology had influenced a number of Rohingya Muslims. Many of the RSO leaders, including Muhammad Yunus, were Juhayman's supporters, if not fully ikhwan. Hamid Bahaziq and Mahmoud Bahaziq were particularly interested in the jihad in Arakan. Mahmoud Bahaziq himself practically participated in the jihad in Arakan and southern Philippines. RSO has emerged as an important group recently.

Sidney Jones, an expert on Islamist extremism in Jakarta, told The Economist that the RSO "would be an organisation around which an armed resistance might coalesce."[88]

RSO President, Dr. Muhammad Yunas, was and is a frequent visitor to the MDI conventions. The three principal objectives of the RSO included jihad, *dawa*, and *khidmat-e-khalq* (social welfare). From 1982 to 1994, the RSO focused on uniting Rohingya Muslims in the name of *tawheed* (monotheism), and officially started jihad against the Burmese government on April 10, 1994. Dr. Muhammad Yunas was a member of the Rohingya Patriotic Front (RPF), a nationalist group, which was formed in 1975. The RPF went into oblivion within a few years. Dr. Muhammad Yunas claimed that the RSO had some 1,000 armed mujahideen, and had trained some 3,000 Rohingya Muslims, while thousands of Rohingyas living in the refugee camps in Bangladesh wanted to train with RSO. RSO came into contact with the JDQS and the MDI in 1989 in Afghanistan.[89] MDI sent several groups to Bangladesh in the early 1990s to erect the MDI organizational structure not only in Bangladesh, but also in and for Arakan region of Myanmar. Both India and Bangladesh have significant Rohingya Muslim refugee communities. Many MDI central leaders, including Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi and Amir Hamza, visited RSO leaders in Bangladesh over the last two decades. MDI not only trained RSO mujahideen in its camps in Pakistan, but also sent trainers to Bangladesh to train them.[90] In July-August 1996, Amir Hamza visited Bangladesh to further strengthen MDI's presence in those two countries.[91] The biggest concentration of Pakistani JuD members outside Pakistan and India is perhaps in Bangladesh and the Arakan region. Most of them are involved in imparting both religious and militant training to both Rohingya and Bangladeshi Muslims.

In June 2012, clashes between Muslim Rohingyas and Buddhist Rakhine erupted and left 78 dead. Soon, protestors descended in the streets of Pakistan to protest the deaths of thousands of Rohingya Muslims. Many of these demonstrations were led by the JuD. At the same time, a large number of doctored and misidentified photographs started circulating on social media,

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originating from Pakistan, purporting to depict violence against Rohingya Muslims. Several investigative reports showed that most of these claims are false. One photo posted on a Facebook page showed Buddhists in their traditional red robes standing in the middle of two rows of dead bodies. The caption said: "Bodies of Muslims killed by Buddhists." The picture actually showed Tibetan monks who came to help in the aftermath of an earthquake in China in 2010.[92] One photograph on social media showed a large number of charred bodies. The caption claimed that Buddhists had burnt Muslims in Burma.[93] This was actually a photograph of the charred bodies of Christians who had been burnt by Muslims. It was posted on October 15, 2011,[94] much before the May-June 2012 Muslim-Buddhist riots. Another photograph on Facebook showed a severed head of a girl on the road with a picture of the girl inset. The caption reads "*brmaa ki muslmaan lrki rozzay ki halat main... budmat nay sar qalm kr diyaa.. kb jaagoo gay*? (Buddhists beheaded a fasting Burmese Muslim girl... [O Muslims!] When will you wake up?)[95] Former BBC journalist, Sumaira Aslam, wrote, "This photo is not from Burma. This is a photo of 17-year old Zainab Abu Salem who carried a suicide attack in Palestine back in 2004."[96] Another photograph on Facebook posted by '*Islam Zindabad* (*Allaho Akbar*)' shows dead bodies floating in a flooded place. It says, "Muslim children in Burma, the only fault,,, they are Muslims!!! helped us to reach this picture for all the world within 24 hours you have not pressed the button to participate to make this picture up to the maximum point in the world, "God is enough and yes, the agent."[97] This photograph was actually released by AP and depicts the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar. It had been posted on the following website on May 12, 2008.[98] Reports in Pakistani press indicated that the JuD and JeIP were behind this campaign. The ethnic riots have continued intermittently since then.[99]

In the second half of 2012, the JuD formed the *Difa-e-Musalman Arakan-Burma Conference* (Defence of Muslims in Myanmar) to mobilize supporters for a campaign against the ruling military junta of Myanmar. On August 10, 2012, Hafiz Saeed appointed a two-member JuD spokesperson, Nadeem Awari, and a member of the JuD's publication wing, Shahid Mehmood Rehmatullah, to forge links with Islamic institutions in Bangladesh and Myanmar. A senior Indian official told the Hindustan Times, "Pakistan-based Lashkar commanders are planning to visit the restive Rakhine state in Myanmar with other outfits like Harkat ul Jihadi al Islami (HUJI), JeM and Jammaat ul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) to build relations with the Rohingya Solidarity Organisation in a bid to expand activity and establish new bases on India's eastern fringes."[100] Elements from JMB and other extremist Rohingya entities have formed a new front called the Jammaat ul Arakan (JuA). An Indian official told the Hindustan Times, "Reports indicate that the JMB could also be involved in running militant training camps in remote areas of Bandarban District of Bangladesh. They may have plans to undertake action in Myanmar."[101] According to senior Indian government sources, Pakistan-based terrorist groups were training the militant cadres and were supplying weapons through Thailand.[102]

In September 2003, Pakistan arrested 17 East Asian nationals, including 13 Malaysians, two Indonesians, and two Myanmar nationals. The arrested included Gun Gun Rusman Gunawan, aka Ahmed Hadi, the 27-year-old brother of Indonesia's Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) leader, Riduan Isamuddin 'Hambali'. Pakistani law-enforcement agencies arrested four more Indonesian students from madrassahs in Karachi. Most of these students were studying at the Jamia Abu Bakr Islamia and Jamia tut Darasatul Islamiyya in Karachi. Officials claimed that they were part of a sleeper cell of Jemaah Islamiyah, a Southeast Asian terror organization. Pakistan had given permission to Gun Gun to study at the Islamic University in Islamabad in 1999, but was admitted to the Jamiyya Abu Bakr Islamiyya. The Indonesian consulate in Karachi and Pakistani security officials had approved the change. Both Pakistan and Indonesia had consistently cleared him over the previous three years and renewed his visa. Hambali had been arrested in Thailand a month ago and handed over to the United States.[103] Gunawan was among 15,000 students from Muslim countries who came to Pakistan to

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study in Pakistani madrassahs. The Abu Bakr Islamia was founded in 1978. Some 500 students are enrolled at any given time of which around 200 are foreign nationals, mainly from Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, and African countries.[104] A series of raids followed the arrests of Gunawan and his colleagues on other madrassahs. Security forces arrested another eight Southeast Asian students from the Jamiyya Darasitul Islamiyya Madrassa, a seminary run by the JuD. This was the first time Pakistani forces arrested Jemmah Islamiyah militants on Pakistani soil.

Little is known about the JuD's links with terror groups in Indonesia, and the JuD sources say little about this subject. They only confirm that scores of Indonesian students have studied in JuD-run madrassahs. Since the JuD is active in several other neighboring countries and trying to establish bases, it is more likely than not it has sleeper cells in Indonesia as well. The leader of the Virginia Paintball Jihad group and a JuD official, Ali Al-Timimi, told his followers that America was at war with Islam and they should leave the United States. He told them that U.S. soldiers had become legitimate targets for Muslims after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. He advised them to join the LeT which is waging jihad in Kashmir, Chechnya, Afghanistan, and Indonesia.[105] JuD sources claim that they have friends in many groups in Indonesia and Malaysia. However, there are more friends in Forum Umat Islam in Indonesia than in any other Indonesian group.[106]

In Thailand, an ethnic nationalist insurgency is taking place in southern Thailand, or the Malay Pattani region. Southern Thailand includes the provinces of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat and Songkhla, which used to be a sultanate of Patani.[107] Thais conquered the former Sultanate of Patani in 1785 and have governed it since then. The Anglo-Siamese Treaty of 1909 confirmed the Thai right to rule the region. Several separatist groups are active in the region whose ideologies range from ethno-nationalism to Islamic nationalism. Juhayman's Ikhwan had members in the Al-Jabha al-Islamiyya al-Tehreer Fatani in Thailand (Patani Islamic Liberation Front or PILF) and in the Philippines in the Al-Jabha al-Tehreer al-Moro al-Islamiyya [Moro Islamic Liberation Front or MILF].[108] Both groups extensively cooperated with each other. PILF is active in southern Thailand.

In 1959, some members of the traditional Malay Muslim aristocracy, and teachers of Islam in Kelantan, founded the Patani National Liberation Front (Barisan Nasional Pembebasan Patani – BNPP). BNPP was the first armed group which called for the establishment of an Islamic state. It also has a few hundred strong guerrillas in its armed wing. It recruited Malay students who were studying in Malaysia, and sent them to Libya and Syria for further militant training. It carried out sporadic attacks on security forces in the 1960s. The BNPP splintered in 1977 after it lost its support base when the Parti Islam SeMalaysia lost power in the state of Kelantan. By the late 1980s, the number of BNPP fighters was reduced to some 50 who extorted money from Chinese businessmen to survive. In the early 1960s, another group, National Revolution Front (Barisan Revolusi Nasional or BNR), had emerged. It was dominated by religious-minded students who had studied abroad, but found no work in Thailand. The BNR proposed to found an independent Islamic Republic of Patani, but not the historical Patani Sultanate. It advocated Islamic socialism and made tactical alliances with the Thai and Malay Communist Parties, which alienated the religious Malays. Secularists founded Patani United Liberation Organization or PULO in 1968. PULO believed in ethno-nationalism and also advocated the establishment of an Islamic state. PULO was founded in India and maintained offices in Kelantan and Mecca. It aimed at recruiting Muslim students studying in Malaysia and the Middle East, and also during hajj. PULO also formed an armed wing called Patani United Liberation Army, or PULA, whose numbers ranged between 200 and 600 by 1981. PULA killed police officers and other government officers, and attacked government offices and buildings. It was funded and trained by Libya and Syria.[109]

In the early 1980s, the BRN split into three groups: BRN-Coordinate, BRN-Congress, and BRN-Ulema. In the early 1980s, PULO was also split into two groups. In 1985, many militant leaders broke from the Patani National Liberation Front (Barisan

Nasional Pembebasan Patani –BNPP) and formed Barisan Bersatu Mujahidin Patani (United Patani Mujahideen Front or BBMP). Many of them were religious teachers who were educated in Malaysia and Indonesia. In 1986, Patani National Liberation Front (Barisan Nasional Pembebasan Patani –BNPP) changed its name to Patani Islamic Liberation Front to stress its Islamic agenda. The change of name came due to intense efforts of both Hamid Bahaziq and Mahmoud Bahaziq who were involved in several Thai groups.[110] The name was changed to include Islamic to stop more members going to United Patani Mujahideen Front, or BBMP. The change of name was actually a step in the direction of turning an ethnic nationalist struggle into an Islamist nationalist struggle– in other words, jihad. In the 1990s, new groups emerged out of the fragmented and splintered earlier groups. In 1992, BRN–Congress formed Pemuda, its youth group. In 1995, another group called the New PULO came into being. In the same year (1995) veterans of the Afghan jihad formed the Patani Islamic Mujahidin Movement (Gerekan Mujahidin Islam Patani or GMIP). In 1997, the BRN, the New PULO, and GMIP formed a coalition called the Council of the Muslim People of Patani. However, the Islamist groups and violence frittered away by the end of 1990s because of certain actions of the Thai government.[111] The insurgency resurfaced in 2004, this time with a yengeance. At least 5,000 people have died since 2004.[112] The JuD reinvigorated its efforts to set up a base in in Thailand.

Since its foundation in 1987, MDI/JuD has been trying to bring the Thai Muslims into their global jihadist command. MDI/JuD wants to establish a base in southern Thailand to spread its jihad in East Asia. Headley told the Indian investigators that Sajid Mir had tried to set up a JuD base in Thailand. He sent one Abu Anas to Thailand to open a restaurant in 2006, which could serve as JuD offices, but Abu Anas did not succeed.[113] Abu Anas is in charge of an LeT safe-house in Rawalpindi. He had visited Thailand to start a restaurant there as a cover for LeT. Headley described Abu Anas in the following words, "He had met Osama bin Laden in Afghanista[n] in 1987. He is married. He originally belongs to Faisalabad, Pakistan. He had lost a brother in Kashmir. He remained very close to Sajid Mir." He was one of the organizers of the Mumbai conspiracy.[114] JuD did not abandon the struggle and has been sending western-looking operatives to settle in Thailand. According to a senior JuD official, the organization has succeeded in setting up a few small cells both in southern Thailand and Bangkok.[115]

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CHAPTER NINE

LASHKAR'S TRANSNATIONAL JIHAD

As the jihad in the southern Philippines raged, another front for jihad opened in the heart of Europe, i.e. in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Bosnia for short), where the Muslims were trying to carve out a Muslim state as the former Yugoslavia was collapsing. As early as spring 1992, the MDI decided to send its mujahideen to former Yugoslavia to help liberate Bosnia. They chose Mahmoud Bahaziq, aka Abu Abdel Aziz (born 1942), one of the founders of the MDI and the head of its Department of International Jihad, to lead the MDI mission in Europe. Mahmoud Bahaziq left for Europe in the spring of 1992 with four other Arab-Afghan mujahideen.[1] This is the time when the government of Pakistan was closing the offices of the mujahideen groups and Arab charities, and pushing the foreign mujahideen out of Pakistan under international pressure. The jihad in the heart of Europe was to provide employment to the international jihadists. Mahmoud Bahaziq left his front in southern Philippines in early 1992 and started recruiting mujahideen in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, and other countries. As the jihad in Indian Kashmir was picking up steam at the same time, the MDI decided not to send Pakistani members to Bosnia. Arab Mujahideen started going to Bosnia around August 1992 and, by December 1992, about 400 mujahideen had already reached there. IIRO and WAMY, which were heavily staffed by Juhayman's Ikhwan and their supporters, were deeply involved in the jihad in Bosnia.[2] In less than one year, Mahmoud Bahaziq gathered more than 700 mujahideen from different countries.[3]

In Bosnia, the MDI mujahideen fought under the name of 'The Muslim Forces.' The Muslim Forces was the MDI's armed wing in Bosnia, just like the LeT is the armed wing of the MDI in Indian Kashmir. The head of the MDI's Department of International Jihad, Mahmoud Bahaziq, decided to head the Muslim Forces himself. The Muslim Forces fought alongside the Bosnian Army as the two groups of foreign mujahideen: *Kateebatul Mujahideen* (Battalion of the Mujahideen), and *Majmuatul Zubairi* (Unit Zubair). *Kateebatul Mujahideen* was attached to the 3rd Division of the Bosnian Army, while the *Majmuatul Zubairi* was not permanently attached to any of the Divisions of the Bosnian Army. It could fight with any of the seven divisions of the Bosnian army. The Bosnian army soldiers who were given under the command of *Kateebatul Mujahideen* were required to do a four-month course on Islam. In this course they studied Salafist Islam.[4] The atrocities of the Muslim Forces mujahideen increased as the number of the foreign mujahideen increased in Bosnia.

The Muslim Forces mujahideen inflicted the worst kinds of atrocities on their enemies, the Serbs. Many of the atrocities reflected extreme cases of sadism. Evan F. Kohlman narrates, "In Gostovici, the bleeding and bruised men were placed in a half-completed, roofless house flooded with water. Another Serb prisoner recalled, "As soon as we arrived, the mujahideen tied us with a hose, into which they let air under pressure, to make it expand and press our legs. This cause[d] terrible pains and Gojko Vujiciae swore [to] God, so one *mujaheddin* took him aside and cut his head off. I did not see what he used for the cutting, but I know that he brought the head into the room and forced all of us to kiss it. Then the *mujaheddin* hung the head on a nail in the wall."[5]

The *Kateebatul Mujahideen* avoided working under the Bosnian army's discipline. For the *Kateebatul Mujahideen* the Bosnian liberation was a jihad, while for the Bosnian army it was a nationalist struggle. A 1994 memorandum from the Bosnian Muslim Military Security Service Department warned top Bosnian Army commanders and the BiH Ministry of Defence about the *Kateebatul Mujahideen*:

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"...The unit does not execute the Commandant's orders. They persistently refuse to provide their personal data for preparing the unit explaining that they do not trust the authorities of the RiK of the R BH Army and that they fear that the authorities of their countries of origin may find out about them. This attitude is in contrary with the advocating activities of some individuals, that they should fight the positive legal provisions of the R BH, as addition to ignoring them... Individuals treat disparagingly the educational, cultural and other features of the Bosniacs-Muslims. Neglecting the national characteristics, particularly religious traditionalism, individuals cause political damage in and outside the R BH due to not yet definitely established motives... [The refusal of the mujahideen to] provid[e] their personal data is most probably due to possible links with [intelligence agencies] or committed criminal offences in their countries of origin... in case their countries learnt about their stay here, they would demand their extradition... There is the assessment of the responsible persons from the 3rd Corps, as well, that the members of 'El-Mujahidin' Unit cause political damage to the RBH."[6]

The memorandum specifically cited a confrontation that took place on August 1, 1994 when "two armed members of 'El-Mujahidin' Unit came down to the hall of the Croats' Cultural Center of Zenica and demanded that the children should stop performing a cultural-entertainment program or they would use weapons."[7] In May 1995, the Bosnian Muslim Military Security Service issued a second major analytical report to senior Bosnian Army commanders regarding the foreign mujahideen, warning:

"these activities, although as a rule carried out under the pretext of humanitarian and military aid provided to Bosnians-Muslims, rather often served as a base for creating of the intelligence positions of the states that are not amicably inclined towards the R BiH, and even as a base for 'indoctrination' of the Bosnians-Muslims believers, in posing them the new approach to the Islam according to the 'vehabijski mesheb' [Wahhabi ideology]... Special security problem presents that the command of the unit 'El Mudzahedin' is hiding the real manpower of its unit and that all members of this unit live and act under the false names and when they arrived to our country, majority of the volunteers from this unit did not respect the law regulations to register their place of residence... A number of persons that acquired our citizenship/passport... are hiding their identity, because they are the persons from the Interpol wanted circulars... With their behavior and acting, the members of the 'El Mudzahedin' unit frequently violate current law regulations of our country and incidents are taking place every day, whose perpetrators are the members of this unit... it has the significant negative and multiple damaging consequences for the BiH state... [T]he activities of the persons from Afro-Asian countries are causing rather negative consequences, and these persons are present in BiH as members of the Army... Persons from Afro-Asian countries are the perpetrators of numerous illegal activities, thus causing the anxiety and revolt of the citizens from this area... the adequate legal measures cannot be undertaken against the perpetrators because they are hiding their identity and because of that they are not available for the bodies of prosecution..."[8]

Before starting their jihad in Bosnia, the MDI had sought support from its religious mentors who were not organizationally affiliated with the group. Mahmoud Bahaziq went to Saudi Arabia to seek their sanction. He later said, "I - alhamdulillah - met several prominent Ulema. Among them Sheikh Nasir ad-Din al-Albani, Sheikh Abdel Aziz Bin Baz and Sheikh Muhammad Bin Otheimin and others in the Gulf area. Alhamdulillah, all grace be to Allah, they all support the religious dictum that "the fighting in Bosnia is a fight to make the word of Allah supreme and protect the chastity of Muslims."[9] About Al-Albani, Mahmoud Bahaziq said, "Nasir ad-Din al-Albani-may Allah protect him. (I must note) that he is one of the great Ulema of this time and one seeks guidance

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in the light of his knowledge and view. (I say) in my last meeting with him, he was supportive of Jihad in Bosnia-Herzeg (as a religious duty). However, he told us not to attack - that is we, the Arab Mujahideen-since we were the smaller host."[10] Mahmoud Bahaziq says that Al-Albani "was afraid we might get killed in large numbers if we engaged people in the fight. However, he requested that we dig in and be at the most advanced defense-lines (Khat ad-Difa' al-Awwal) to defend those persecuted. This is a brief summary of his view - may Allah protect him."[11]

The majority of Bosnian Muslims follow the Hanafi School of jurisprudence. The Muslim Forces brought Salafism to Bosnia in the early 1990s for the first time. Moreover, the Bosnians had become Europeanized. When Mahmoud Bahaziq went there, he realized the Bosnian Muslims needed more preachers than fighters. After this experience, the MDI decided to recruit more European and American Muslims who could be trained as preachers. The MDI also adopted a policy of not fielding people with the knowledge of non-South Asian languages in the jihad. They were to work as preachers.[12] It was a big dilemma for the MDI because most of the people who joined the MDI wanted to be martyred. Mahmoud Bahaziq explained this later,

> "A very small number of brethren came from Muslim countries and despite their Islamic commitment, they have little religious knowledge to do Da'wa in the midst of these brothers and sisters. We need-and this is unfortunate - Ulema, scholars of Islam, in Bosnia. Believe me dear brother, until now, two years since we established our base there, there isn't a single scholar in our midst for us to seek his religious judgment. For the small number of youth that make it here, we ask them do Da'wa, and they reply, "We came seeking martyrdom. We did not come to sit in Mosques and public squares to teach people and educate them. We want the word of Allah to be supreme and the word of the disbelievers to be low and despised. All we wish for is a bullet that hits our chests through which we reach Shahada (the state of witness and martyrdom)."[13]

In spite of the shortage of instructors, the Muslim Forces organized 51-day *dawa* and *tarbiati dauras* (courses) for Bosnia Muslims. By the end of 1995, they held around 1,200 *dauras* and there were about 100 Bosnians in each class. Some 120,000 Bosnians underwent these *dauras*.[14]

In at least one sense, the Bosnian jihad was the continuation of the Afghan jihad. Like in Afghanistan, different groups of international mujahideen came from all over the world to fight alongside the local Muslims against the *kuffar* (unbelievers). It was different from the Afghan jihad in the sense that the mujahideen fought under one commander, MDI's Mahmoud Bahaziq, in Bosnia. In Afghanistan, there were at least nine Afghan commanders and several foreign commanders who led independent mujahideen groups. In Afghanistan, dozens of countries actively supported the Afghan and international mujahideen with money and arms while the international mujahideen were neither financed nor controlled by any state. They raised their own resources. Most credit for the Bosnian jihad goes to MDI's Mahmoud Bahaziq who was introduced to the world for the first time in 1992 as Abu Abdel Aziz, when *Newsweek* interviewed him, with a picture of him in his henna-dyed beard and Afghan-style fatigue.[15] It was followed by a front page story by a Saudi-owned, London-based daily "al-Sharq al-Awsat" on him and his activities in Bosnia. In August 1994, "Al-Sirat Al-Mustaqeem (The Straight Path)," an Islamic journal published in Pakistan (Issue No. 33), also interviewed him. Without identifying his nationality, the journal introduced him as someone who spoke perfect Urdu and who had been involved in the Kashmir jihad.

Mahmoud Bahaziq physically participated in different jihads across the world from the Philippines to Bosnia. He took his children, including his eight-year-old son, to fight jihad in Afghanistan and Bosnia.[16] His teenage son, Abdel Aziz, also physically fought in Afghanistan and Bosnia. He took time out to fundraise in the United States and Europe and to take part in the MDI's missionary activities in Pakistan. Between 1992 and 1996, he addressed a number of public meetings in Pakistan. He addressed public rallies in the Districts of Multan and Samundri in Pakistani Punjab where

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he recounted the experience of jihad in Bosnia.[17] He was one of the main speakers at the MDI's annual congregations in Muridke up to 2001. In November 1994, he was introduced to the audience at the annual congregation as "an Indian Muslim living in Saudi Arabia, who was playing a heroic role in helping the Muslims of Bosnia in their fight against the Christian Serbs and in helping the Kashmiris fighting against the Government of India."[18]

The real identity of Mahmoud Bahaziq remained a mystery at least till 2008. Most experts thought Mahmoud Bahaziq and Abu Abdel Aziz were two different persons. The usually informed Indian expert B. Raman writes about Abu Abdel Aziz: "If he was an Indian Muslim living in Saudi Arabia, as claimed by the LeT, what was his real name, to which part of India he belonged?"[19] Evan Kohlmann mistakenly claims that Abu Abdel Aziz went to Bosnia in 1992 as an al-Qaeda commander under the name of Abdul Rahman al-Dosari.[20] The government document[21] Kohlmann cites mentions Abdul Rahman al-Dosari but not Abu Abdel Aziz. Kohlmann does not say why he thinks that Abu Abdel Aziz and Abdul Rahman al-Dosari are the same person. Both the ISI and Markazi Jamiat Ahle Hadith had a vested interest in projecting Mahmoud Bahaziq as a Saudi intelligence operative. While MJAH wanted to discredit him and the MDI, the ISI wanted to make him acceptable to other mujahideen groups. An MJAH leader said he was a Saudi intelligence proxy. Some reports in the international press also make this claim without substantiating evidence.[22]

Following the Dayton agreement, the MDI asked the Muslim Forces mujahideen to settle in Bosnia and do missionary work. By 2000, some 60 members had taken Bosnian citizenship.[23] Out of 6,000 Arab volunteers who arrived during the early stages of the war, the Bosnian Foreign Ministry estimates that about 1,000 of them remained in the country as naturalized Bosnians.[24] According to another estimate, there were at least 1,500 naturalized mujahideen.[25] Many of them married local women.[26] The Bosnian government started revoking the citizenship of many of these naturalized mujahideen following the 9/11 terrorist attacks. In 2006, the Bosnian government announced plans to deport 50 naturalized citizens, mostly former Islamic fighters, and revoked 120 citizenships,

approximately 100 of them former mujahideen.[27] The government was investigating 350 more cases.[28]

The mujahideen who stayed back in Bosnia following the Dayton agreement in 1995 have emerged as challengers to the Islamic leadership, namely to the Islamska Zajednica (Islamic Community) and the Hanafi interpretation of Islam. The Islamic Community of Bosnia and Herzegovina, founded in 1878, the sole religious authority of Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina is authorized to appoint imams to approximately 1,700 mosques, and provide religious education from secondary to post-graduate level. Since March 2007, the government has stripped 661 individuals of their Bosnian citizenship, arguing that it had been granted illegally.[29]

Between 1992 and 1995, the MDI spent a substantial part of its resources on the Bosnian jihad because it looked at Bosnia as the door to Europe. The Dayton Peace Accord dampened all their hopes. If peace had not taken place, the MDI's Muslim Forces had planned to turn Bosnia into a springboard for jihad in Europe. By April 1994, the MDI had rendered financial assistance to the tune of PRs. 30 million ($1,090,910)[30] to the mujahideen fighting in Bosnia.[31] In his address to the MDI's annual congregation in October 1994, Mahmoud Bahaziq claimed that the MDI had given financial aid to the tune of PRs. 50 million ($1,818,182)[32] to Bosnian mujahideen.[33] It was not without reason. In March 1994, *Mujallah ad-Dawa*'s editorial writer asks his readers to vow "not to abandon jihad till they hoist the flag of Islam on the Red Fort in [New Delhi] [and till they hoist the flag of Islam] from Bosnia to Vatican and till they say their *Eid* prayers in the White House."[34]

The Muslim Forces, the armed wing of the MDI in Bosnia, were planning to move to Italy to fight their next jihad after winning the jihad in Bosnia. The MDI considered Bosnia a gateway to Europe, and possibly beyond.[35] Addressing an assembly of MDI-affiliated teachers and militants in the summer of 1994 in Muridke when jihad in Bosnia was at its peak, Commander of the Muslim Forces in Bosnia, Mahmoud Bahaziq, declared that the Bosnian jihad

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would continue till the conquest of Rome [and the entire territory which once formed Western Roman Empire].[36] He told the assembly that the Prophet of Islam, Muhammad, had predicted that Muslims would conquer Constantinople [formerly the Eastern Roman Empire][37] and Rome [formerly the Western Roman Empire]. He said that Muslims have conquered Constantinople [the Eastern Roman Empire] but have yet to conquer Rome [the Western Roman Empire]. If God can bring mujahideen from Afghanistan to Bosnia, which is 14 hours away by air, God can also bring them from Bosnia to Rome in one or one-and-a-half hour.[38]

It is an article of faith with Muslims in general and with the MDI/JuD in particular that the Muslims are bound to win against the Romans, people from the territories that once made the Roman Empire, with the help of God. Like most other radical Islamist groups, the MDI/JuD believes it is a religious duty for Muslims to wage jihad against Rome [the territory which once formed the Western Roman Empire] and conquer it in accordance with the wishes of the Prophet of Islam.[39] Mahmoud Bahaziq's was not a lone voice in the MDI. It was a dominant belief among the MDI leaders between 1992 and 1995 that the MDI will conquer Rome, sooner or later. In his concluding address to the annual congregation in 1995, Hafiz Saeed said, "Dear Brothers! Let us agree that the jihad in Kashmir is a gateway to India. This (Kashmir) is a base camp [for jihad in India]. Likewise, Bosnia is becoming a base camp to conquer the entire Europe. These cruel people [Americans and Europeans] are hatching conspiracies [against jihad] even there. But, God willing, Bosnia will become the base camp for jihad in Europe and [MDI] will conquer the entire Europe. Inshaallah! The [MDI] mujahideen will carry out [jihadist] attacks in the U.S. The jihadist forces in the U.S. are waking up."[40]

Rome is separated from Bosnia only by the Adriatic Sea. Historically, Rome was the capital of the original Roman Empire, which was established before Jesus Christ. The Roman Empire (27 BC-476 AD) was later divided into two empires: The Western Roman Empire (285 AD – 480 AD) and Eastern Roman Empire, or Byzantine Empire, or Byzantium (330 AD – 1453 AD).

Constantinople became the capital of the Eastern Roman Empire. The conflict between the early Muslims and Eastern Roman Empire started during the last years of the Prophet of Islam. The forces of Muhammad and the forces of the Eastern Roman Empire fought at Mu'tah, east of the Jordan River, and Karak in Karak Governorate in 629 AD. Hence it came to be known as the Battle of Mu'tah. The Prophet of Islam, Muhammad, raised a 30,000-strong army and led the military expedition in October 630 to Tabouk, now in northwestern Saudi Arabia, against the Byzantine army. Muhammad promised paradise to those who would join the first batch of Muslims who attacked the Roman Empire. According to a tradition, narrated by Khalid bin Madan, Prophet Muhammad is recorded to have said "Paradise is granted to the first batch of my followers who will undertake a naval expedition."[41] According to Islamic scriptures, the Romans will snatch Constantinople back from Muslims before Muslims reoccupy Constantinople and the rest of what was once Roman Empire. According to a *hadith*, this has to happen before the Day of Judgment.[42]

Caliph Muawiyah I (661-680 AD) is said to have sent a military expedition led by his son and the future Caliph, Yazid I (680-683 AD), against Cyzicus around 670 AD. Cyzicus was an ancient town of Mysia in Anatolia in what is now modern Turkey. The expedition paved the way for the future siege of Constantinople. It was during the reign of the Caliph Muawiyah I that the Muslims first laid siege on Constantinople in 674–678, the beginning of what came to be known as the Arab-Byzantine wars, commonly referred to as the Muslims' jihad. According to the Byzantine chronicler, Theophanes the Confessor, Arab fleets established bases along the coasts of Asia Minor in 672–673 AD, and laid siege around Constantinople. The Arab army used the peninsula of Cyzicus near Constantinople as their base to spend the winter while they launched attacks during the springs. Emperor Constantine IV used the liquid incendiary substance known as Greek fire to destroy the Arab navy. Byzantines also defeated the Arab army in Asia Minor. The Byzantine Empire survived. However, the Muslims never took their eyes off of the Roman Empires. Finally, Ottoman

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Sultan Mehmet II the Conqueror conquered Constantinople in 1453 AD. However, the Western Roman Empire and some parts of the Eastern Roman Empire were never conquered.

Soon after Mahmoud Bahaziq reached Bosnia in 1992, Sheikh Anwar Shaban, an Egyptian cleric who had taken asylum in Italy, joined him along with some other mujahideen. Shaban later emerged as Mahmoud Bahaziq's deputy in Bosnia. Shaban was born and brought up in Egypt. He fled Egypt in the 1980s, obtained asylum in Italy, and founded a mosque in Milan. He had memorized the *Sahih* by Imam Muslim, the second most authentic *hadith* narrator in Sunni Islam after Imam Bukhari's *Sahih*. He virtually became the deputy to Mahmoud Bahaziq and an ideologue for the Arab mujahideen in the Muslim Forces in Bosnia. He helped Mahmoud Bahaziq recruit a lot of Muslims from Europe to fight in the Bosnian jihad. His wife, daughter, and five sons also joined the Muslim Forces to fight the jihad in Bosnia. His twelve-year old son, Aadam, also participated in the attacks on the Serbs. The youngest two were undergoing jihadist training.[43] During the Bosnian jihad between 1992 and 1995, Mahmoud Bahaziq went to several cities of Italy to recruit mujahideen and buy arms for the jihad in Bosnia. Many a time Shaban joined him. In the Islamic centers in most European cities, between 200 and 250 Muslims gather for the Friday prayers. In the Islamic Cultural Institute of Milan,[44] 3,500 Muslims came to say their Friday prayers and listen to Mahmoud Bahaziq. Mahmoud Bahaziq also went to Rome where he addressed at least two seminars. The Islamic Center of Rome[45] had organized those seminars. Shaban later died during an encounter with the Croatian army.

In an article in *Mujallah ad-Dawa* in August 1994 when jihad in Bosnia was at its peak, Qazi Kashif Niaz cites the following hadith to justify jihad in Rome (Italy). The *hadith* predicts a victory for the invading Muslims. Hadith narrator Nafi' b. Utba reported,

> "We were with Allah's Messenger (may peace be upon him) in an expedition that there came a people to Allah's Apostle (may peace be upon him) from the direction of the west. They were dressed in woollen clothes and they stood near a hillock and they met him as Allah's Messenger (may peace be upon him) was sitting. I said to myself: Better go to them and stand between him and them that they may not attack him. Then I thought that perhaps there had been going on secret negotiation amongst them. I however, went to them and btood between them and him and I remember four of the words (on that occasion) which I repeat (on the fingers of my hand) that he (Allah's Messenger) said: You will attack Arabia and Allah will enable you to conquer it, then you would attack Persia and He would make you to Conquer it. Then you would attack Rome and Allah will enable you to conquer it, then you would attack the Dajjal and Allah will enable you to conquer him. Nafi' said: Jabir, we thought that the Dajjal would appear after Rome (Syrian territory) would be conquered.[46]

However, Qazi Kashif Niaz concludes that although Muslims have conquered Constantinople once, it has yet to be snatched back by the Romans and reconquered by the Muslims. He argues that the Muslims attacked the Roman Empire in the past by sea, and once again a small sea, the Adriatic Sea, separates the mujahideen from Rome. However, he argues that nothing could be said with certainty at that time whether the Bosnian jihad would end with the conquest of Rome. He adds that the chain of events foretells a big event.[47] The jihad in Bosnia, however, came to an end as a result of the Dayton Accords, which were concluded on November 21, 1995[48] before it could lead to the next jihad in Rome.

As the jihad in Bosnia started, the MDI decided to unite various Salafist jihadist groups across the world under one umbrella: the MDI's Department of International Jihad which supervised the Muslim Forces in Bosnia. A special meeting of the MDI took place at the Markaz Taiba in Muridke in January 1993, soon after the start of the jihad in Bosnia. The meeting decided to turn the MDI into an international *idara* (NGO). The meeting appointed Ahmad Saad al-Ghamdi, a Saudi citizen and founding official of

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the International Islamic Relief Organization, the head of the department of administration and finance, and Mahmoud Bahaziq, the head of the Department of International Affairs, Zafar Iqbal, the head of the Department of Education, Saifullah Qasuri, the head of Department of Trade, Amir Hamza, head of Department of Rabita and Nasharo Ishaat (Rabita and Publications),[49] and Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi, head of the LeT. Although Hafiz Saeed had gained some prominence because of his oratory qualities and *dawa* programs, he remained the *mudeer* (office manager) at the MDI's Lahore office. By this time, the MDI had established direct links with like-minded Salafist groups wherever they existed. The meeting also decided to send its members to countries to raise Salafist groups where they did not exist. The LeT under Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi was to wage jihad in Indian Kashmir and the rest of India, and the Department of International Jihad under Mahmoud Bahaziq in the rest of the world.

The MDI spent 1993 establishing contacts with other jihadists across the world. As a result of these efforts, in January 1994 the MDI gathered more than 500 jihadists from around the world at *Muaskar Ummul Qara*, outside Muzaffarabad. Some of the countries they came from included Pakistan, Afghanistan, Nepal, Libya, the United Kingdom, and France. According to one organizer, jihadists from over 50 countries participated in this gathering.[50] Taj Mohammad, foreign affairs head of the city state in Kunar, came from Afghanistan, and Abu Muntsar and Abu Jamil, came from the United Kingdom.[51] The meeting decided that the participants would go back to their countries and set up Salafist groups and cells and spread the message of *dawa* and jihad. Although the meeting aimed at creating a transnational jihadist organization under MDI's command, the participants were asked to use different names in different countries. The idea was that the international structure of the Salafist/jihadist organization remained out of harm's way when one national group came under attack. The attack on one national group was to be considered an attack on all of them. They were to help one another in fundraising and training, and in other fields. They were to fight jihad together wherever they thought it was needed.[52]

At that time, Pakistan was the only country which offered the most conducive atmosphere for a Salafist jihadist organization. After the end of the Afghan jihad, especially after 1990, Pakistan had started closing down all mujahideen and NGO offices. However, Pakistan was encouraging the Kashmiri jihadi groups to open offices in Pakistan. The ISI assured the MDI leaders that no action would be taken against any group that takes part in jihad in Kashmir.[53] The MDI leaders understood they could wage their international jihads behind the smokescreen of the jihad in Kashmir.

The participants went back to their countries and started sending their cadres for training to the MDI training camps in the hundreds. In May 1994, *Mujallah Ad-Dawa* claimed that hundreds of mujahideen from scores of European, Arab, and African countries, including Bosnia, Philippines, Eritrea, and Somalia, had been training at MDI-run training camps in Afghanistan and Kashmir. It also claimed that the LeT mujahideen were "descending upon the Hindu and Israeli soldiers as the wrath of Allah."[54] By 1994, *Mujallah ad-Dawa* claimed that the LeT-trained mujahideen were fighting jihad in at least eight territories, which included Kashmir, Bosnia, Palestine, the Philippines, Myanmar, Eritrea, Ogaden,[55] and Tajikistan. The cover of the October 1994 issue of *Mujallah ad-Dawa* shows a boat named *Safeena-e Dawat o Jihad* (Ship of *Dawa* and *Jihad*). The MDI logo is affixed on the side of the boat. The sails of the boat are named after the territories where the LeT-trained mujahideen were fighting jihad.[56] The issue carries a nine-page article by the editor on the same subject. The writer does not consider Eritrea and Ogaden parts of Ethiopia. He builds a case for their liberation by the mujahideen on the premise that these territories were given to Christian Ethiopia by the British colonial government at the time of decolonization in 1948. He says that the Muslims had struggled for the liberation of Eritrea but the government went to the Christians after Eritrea won freedom. The MDI supported the Muslims fighting to gain power in Eritrea. In Ogaden, the LeT supported the Ittehad-e Islami to liberate the territory from Ethiopian control.[57] At the November 1994 annual congregation, the MDI leaders also claimed that the MDI-trained mujahideen were taking part in every jihad in the world.[58]

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The efforts of the MDI to unite jihadist groups at the international level bore fruit in 1995 when it took the first major step to create an international jihad command. In early 1995, four jihadist militias decided to form a united command under Mahmoud Bahaziq, the MDI commander. In an interview with *Mujallah ad-Dawa* in July 1995, Mahmoud Bahaziq revealed that the MDI had formed *Rabita al-Jihad al-Islami*, or RJI (League of Islamic Jihad), an alliance of Salafist groups fighting in Kashmir, Bosnia, the Philippines, and Eritrea[59] at a meeting in the Philippines.[60] In the meeting, Hafiz Saeed represented MDI and Mahmoud Bahaziq represented the Muslim Forces of Bosnia. Hashim Salamat, the Chairman of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front of Philippines, and Abdul Karim, Chairman of the Islamic Front of Eritrea, represented their groups.[61] The RJI planned to fight infidels under one command all over the world. According to Mahmoud Bahaziq, the total strength of the four militias was 200,000 at the time. The alliance planned not to have any permanent headquarters and to hold one to three meetings of its top commanders annually anywhere in the world they found it convenient. He expected more Salafist groups to join the alliance.[62] RJI was also known as *Kateebatul Mujahideen* in Bosnia.[63]

Christmas Day in 1991 was the last day in the life of the former Soviet Union, one of the two superpowers at the time. The next day, 15 new states emerged on the world map, of which six were Muslim-majority states. In other states, there were a number of Muslim territories, some of which were big enough to claim statehood. Mujahideen worldwide celebrated the event and took credit for defeating and destroying a superpower. A few weeks later, the MDI *shura* discussed the repercussions of the dissolution of the Soviet Union and prospects of starting jihad in those states and territories. Over the next several months, the dissolution of the Soviet Union dominated discussions among the MDI *shura* members. There was a consensus among the MDI members that the former Soviet republics and territories presented a big opportunity for missionary work. There was a kind of Islamic

renaissance among the Muslims in the former Soviet Union. They were ready to be led by whoever came first. The MDI decided to be the first. The *shura* decided to send out many missionaries to establish contact and recruit Muslims in the former Soviet Union.

When the civil war broke out in Tajikistan in May 1992, Allama Rashdi told the *shura* to prepare to send in the boys. Over the next few months, "the MDI sent scores of mujahideen from Pakistan and Afghanistan to Tajikistan. They included both Pakistani and non-Pakistani mujahideen." In 1993, the MDI sent some of its best mujahideen to Tajikistan led by Samir al-Suwailem (aka Ibn al-Khattab) to wage jihad in Tajikistan.[64] The group waged jihad in Tajikistan for about two years and returned to Afghanistan in early 1995.[65] Ibn al-Khattab was born in Saudi Arabia in 1969. In 1987, he joined the American High School but dropped out in 1987, and went to Afghanistan to fight against the Soviets.[66] He was trained by Commander Hassan As-Sareehi, who was one of the key founders and financers of MDI.[67] The MDI mujahideen remained involved in the civil war in Tajikistan till at least the end of 1997. In May 1996, Dr. Ahmed Dawood, head of the ad-Dawa Medical Mission, appealed for donations to supply medicine to the mujahideen in Tajikistan where he said the LeT had accelerated the jihad.[68] Ad-Dawa Medical Mission sent medicine and other relief goods to Tajikistan to the tune of "tens of thousands of dollars"[69] during the jihad.

The civil war in Tajikistan put pressure on the MDI to accelerate their missionary and jihadi efforts in the former Soviet Union. In 1992, Allama Rashdi sent several groups of MDI members to Central Asian and Caucasian countries, and former Soviet republics. They were tasked to recruit Muslims who had forgotten their religion and teach them Salafist Islam. In the summer of 1992, after receiving several encouraging reports from MDI groups who had visited the former Soviet republics, Allama Rashdi sent an important group headed by Amir Hamza on a missionary journey of many former Soviet territories. The group led by Hamza first went to Afghanistan from where he went to Tashkent, Uzbekistan on August 3, 1992. He had a valid visa for Tashkent, Samarkand,

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and Bokhara from August 1, 1992 to August 15, 1992. Accompanied by three Arabic speaking Uzbeks, including Abdul Quddus and Abu Al-Rashid, they took a train for Moscow on August 7.[70] They left Moscow for Kazan on August 11. From there, the group went to Astrakhan. From Astrakhan, they went to Chechnya, Dagestan, Baku, Binu in Kazakhstan, Bokhara, and Samarkand before they returned to Pakistan.[71] The group met and recruited scores of Muslims and Muslim groups in those cities and territories.[72]

As the jihad in Tajikistan reached its peak, the First Chechen War started in December 1994, which lasted till August 1996. As the war raged to new heights in Chechnya, a delegation of Chechen mujahideen who represented Chechen Islamist guerrilla Shamil Basayev, visited the MDI headquarters in early 1995 to seek help.[73] Abu Abdur Rehman came from Chechnya in May 1996 to get aid from the MDI.[74] The MDI leaders promised to give all kinds of help to the Chechens. The MDI decided to send units of mujahideen. *Mujallah ad-Dawa* announced that the units of MDI fighters would be physically fighting in Chechnya.[75] As part of this program, the MDI sent several units of fighters to Chechnya. One of these units was led by Ibn al-Khattab who was asked to go from Tajikistan to Chechnya. Led by Ibn al-Khattab, an eight-member group of Arab veterans of Afghan jihad arrived in Chechnya. The group included Yaqub al-Ghamidi, his deputy Abu Walid al-Ghamdi, Abu Jafar al-Yemeni, Hakim al-Madani, and Abu Bakr Aqeedah.[76] Ibn al-Khattab joined Chechen Islamist guerrilla, Shamil Basayev, who was already allied with the MDI. Ibn al-Khattab's group established a foreign mujahideen battalion in Chechnya to fight alongside the Chechens. The group carried out at least five high profile military operations, including Khartashoi in 1995, Shatoi in 1996, Yashmardy in 1996, and twice in Dagestan in 1997 and 1999.[77]

Moscow claimed that the April 1996 attack at Shatoi left 223 Russian soldiers dead, including 26 senior officers, and destroyed 50 military vehicles. Only five mujahideen died in this operation.[78]

The Ibn al-Khattab group also took part in the famous operation to retake Grozny from Russian control in August 1996, as well as a high profile attack on a Russian military base some 100 kilometers inside Russian territory in December 1997. A group of 100 mujahideen attacked the headquarters of 136 Motorized Rifle Brigade of the Russian Army. They destroyed 300 military vehicles and killed scores of Russian troops at a loss of only two mujahideen, including Commander Abu Bakr Aqeedah.[79] Russia also accused Ibn al-Khattab of terrorism inside Russia, particularly in Moscow. Ibn al-Khattab said, "There is no difference between the American Army and the Russian Army. They seized our territory, and Muslims have the right to seek such a solution."[80] In 1996, after Russian troops withdrew from Chechnya, the Chechen government proclaimed Ibn al-Khattab a national hero and made him a general at a ceremony attended by Shamil Basayev and a commander of the Chechen War, Salman Raduyev.[81] This is how the First Chechen War came to an end.

In Chechnya, the MDI supported the group of Shamil Basayev. It is not clear when the first MDI mujahideen reached Chechnya to preach Islam or fight the jihad. Some MDI members were already in Chechnya when Amir Hamza visited there in August 1992 to assess the Chechen mujahideen's needs. In Chechnya, the MDI mujahideen fought under Shamil Basayev. In the late 1980s, Shamil Basayev travelled to Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh to fight against the crucifixers.[82] After the fall of the Soviet Union, Shamil Basayev took a large number of Chechen guerrillas to Afghanistan for militant training at the Arab camps. Many of his men received training at the MDI *muaskars*.[83] These mujahideen later went to Tajikistan.[84] Shamil Basayev earned his notoriety during the First Chechen War. In June 1995, he led around 100 Chechens into the southern Russian town of Budyonnovsk where they held against 15,000 Russian troops. In August 1996, he led 11,000 guerrillas and evicted the Russian army from Grozny. In August 2005, Shamil Basayev laid siege to a Beslan school and a subsequent massacre in Ingushetia, a Caucasian region adjacent to Chechnya, which ended after 330 people, mostly children, died.[85] He carried a $10 million bounty on his head.[86] In 1998, Shamil Basayev and

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Ibn al-Khattab formed the Islamic International Peacekeeping Brigade (IIPB), also known as the Islamic Peacekeeping Army. He also participated in the attack inside Dagestan, which triggered the second Chechen war in August 1999.

The Chechen Wars also produced another legendary figure, Abu al-Walid, aka Abu al-Walid al-Ghamdi (born Abd Al-Aziz Bin Ali Bin Said Al Said Al-Ghamdi). Abu al-Walid replaced Ibn al-Khattab after the latter's death. He was born in 1967, had been Ibn al-Khattab's deputy, and had fought in many countries. He went to Afghanistan in 1987 at the age of 16 and spent the next two years at the Maktab al-Khidmat, the predecessor of al-Qaeda. He went to Bosnia in the early 1990s from where he went to Tajikistan. At least a year before going to Bosnia, he joined the MDI. In 1995, he went to Chechnya where he became Ibn al-Khattab's deputy. He participated in some high profile operations led by Ibn al-Khattab, including the April 1996 attack at Shatoi, and a high profile attack on a Russian military base some 100 kilometers inside Russian territory in December 1997. On February 29, 2000, he led mujahideen in the Battle of Ulus-Kert near Ulus–Kert. The then president of the Chechen Republic Ichkeria appointed him commander of the Eastern Front in summer 2001. According to his successor, Abu Hafs al-Urdani, the Special Battalion "Vostok" (East) killed Al-Walid in Chechnya on April 16 2004.[87] Russians have accused him of several terrorist attacks. He was blamed for the apartments bombings, a series of explosions that targeted four apartment blocks in Buynask, Moscow, and Volgodonsk in September 1999 in which 293 people died and 651 were injured. Russians also blamed him for the 2002 Kaspiysk bombing and for attacking the military parade commemorating the 57th anniversary of the Soviet victory in the Second World War in the city of Kaspiysk. The attack killed 44 people, including 12 children, and injured 133. He helped organize a suicide bombing of the Chechen Republic's government offices in Grozny on December 27, 2002. The Arab mujahideen fighting in Chechnya numbered between 200 and 300. Many of them were members of the MDI. Abu al-Walid came to fight in Chechnya from Bosnia where he was fighting as a member of the Muslim Forces. He also

took part in Ibn al-Khattab's videotaped ambush and massacre of a column of the Russian 245th motorized rifle regiment in April 1996. He was named commander of the Eastern Front by Maskhadov in the summer of 2001. He and his forces made news when they shot down and captured the crew of a Russian Mi 24 Hind gunship.[88]

In August 1999, Ibn al-Khattab and Shamil Basayev teamed up to lead thousands of mujahideen guerrillas to attack neighboring Dagestan from Russian control, which ignited the second Chechen War.[89] Ibn al-Khattab was poisoned to death in March 2002 by some of his men who had been co-opted by the Russian security services.[90] Ibn al-Khattab was fond of publicity. He was followed by a crew of cameramen in almost every operation. His video library included hundreds of video cassettes from Afghanistan, Tajikistan, and Chechnya.[91] Soon after the start of the Second Chechen War, a delegation of Chechen mujahideen visited the MDI headquarters in Lahore to seek help. The MDI leaders promised to give all kinds of help to the Chechens.[92]

There have been fewer cases of terrorism in Australia compared to other countries, such as the United States and United Kingdom. The reason seems to be a comparatively smaller Muslim population. Proportionately, Australia experienced a higher rate of terrorism. However, there were no successful or near successful cases of terrorism in Australia. None of the terrorist groups reached the stage of constructing explosive devices. Only the Neath group, who were planning a Mumbai-style attack on Holsworthy army barracks in Sydney, had identified a definite target. There were 16 known cases of terrorism from September 2000 to mid-2011. There were 36 individuals involved in these cases. Twenty-seven of them were convicted in Australia and one each in Kazakhstan, Kuwait, France, and Lebanon. One of them died in Somalia. The remaining four were either not charged or had their charges dropped, although their involvement in terrorism was publicly documented.[93]

In some cases, the name of LeT also came up. The most

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prominent case in which the LeT figured was that of Faheem Khalid Lodhi, an architect-turned-jihadist. On June 19, 2006, a jury found Lodhi guilty of three of the four charges against him. The jury found that, on October 3, 2003, Lodhi collected two maps of the Australian electricity supply system at Sydney with the intention of bombing part of the system. On October 10, 2003, Lodhi "intentionally did an act in preparation for a terrorist act, namely he sought information concerning the availability of materials capable of being used for the manufacture of explosives or incendiary devices."[94] According to court documents, on October 26, 2003, "the offender possessed a document containing information concerning the ingredients for and the method of manufacture of poisons, explosives, detonators and incendiary devices connected with the preparation for a terrorist act, knowing the said connection."[95] On August 2006, the New South Wales Supreme Court confirmed the accusations and sentenced him to a term of imprisonment of 20 years for the second charge commencing on April 22, 2004, and expiring on April 21, 2024. The Court also sentenced him to ten years each in relation to count one and count two in the indictment, but he was not guilty in respect of the charge that he made a set of aerial photographs of certain Australian Defense establishments.

Willie Brigitte, aka Salahudin or Jabrille, a French citizen, arrived in Australia in mid-May 2003. He had received training at an LeT training camp at the same time as the Paintball jihadist Yong •i Kwon trained in Pakistan in late 2001. Lodhi set up a mobile phone service for Brigitte in the name of "Sam Praveen" a few days before Brigitte arrived in Australia. Lodhi went to the airport to pick up Willie Brigitte the day he arrived in Sydney. JuD operative, Sajid Mir, who was deputy to the head of the JuD Department of International Affairs, Abdur Rehman Makki, had introduced Brigitte to Lodhi in Pakistan in 2002 and 2003.[96] Both Lodhi and Brigitte were in constant touch with Sajid Mir. However, Brigitte's role in all three offences remains unclear, although the two had a close association during Brigitte's short stay in Australia, until Brigitte was arrested in October 2003. Lodhi also had keys to Brigitte's apartment. When the police raided Brigitte's flat in 2003, they found images of U.S. landmarks, and a map of Australia on which they had marked nuclear power reactors, uranium mines, and military bases. They also found articles on the Australian SAS in Afghanistan, and a receipt showing Brigitte had received € 2,000 from Sajid Mir.[97]

A week before the arrest of Brigitte, Lodhi had obtained maps of the electrical supply system from Energy Supply in Sydney. He told the company officer that he would place a wall map in his office. He gave his name as "M Rasul," his position title as "partner," the company name as "Rasul Electrical," and his postal address as "Post Office Box 2359 Smithfield." The day after Brigitte was arrested, Lodhi tried to buy some chemicals (urea and nitric acid), the components for a urea nitrate homemade bomb from Deltrex Chemicals, which manufactures these chemicals. Each time he lied. When the police raided Lodhi's house and workplace in 2003, police found a disc which contained four U.S. military training manuals on explosives and weapons, and more than 600 files on Islamic extremism. They also found notes on how to purchase a false passport and poetry on martyrdom. The ASIO also found evidence in the shape of notes in Urdu that Lodhi was ordering chemicals that are used to make explosives.[98]

Lodhi was born in Sialkot in Pakistani central Punjab in 1970. His family moved to Lahore where his father worked as a legal practitioner. He had three sisters and two brothers. One of his older brothers moved to Sydney where he worked as a teacher. One of his uncles had also moved to the Sydney region where he worked as an electrician. Lodhi studied architecture at the prestigious National College of Arts in Lahore. He moved to Sydney in 1998 at the direction of Hafiz Saeed, where he worked with Thomson Adsett Partners, and later with Bishop Hitchcock & Irvine, an Architect's firm at Alexandria, till April 2004 when he was arrested. Lodhi married in 1999 and his wife was a qualified medical doctor in Pakistan. She joined him in Australia in 2000, where she undertook additional studies to obtain registration as a doctor in New South Wales.[99].

Brigitte's flatmate in Paris, Ibrahim Keita, told judge Brugiere that the LeT Commander, Sajid Mir, had sent Brigitte back to

France to organize a sleeper cell there. He told the judge, "Brigitte did explain to me he had been sent back to France in order to make contact with a certain number of people. They were individuals who had either already fought or who had taken training in camps like him, as I understood it."[100] According to Keita, Brigitte had contacted him to join him in an unspecified terrorist plot from Australia. When Australian officials arrested Brigitte from his Wiley Park flat on October 9, they found maps of Australian nuclear sites, and the Perth headquarters of Australia's elite SAS unit. Australia repatriated him to France on October 17, where he was imprisoned in Paris's Fleury Merogis Jail.[101]

Brigitte was born in Guadeloupe and moved to Paris to continue higher education. However, he chose to join the French Navy instead in 1989. Later, he married a Syrian Muslim woman but soon divorced her. Although his wife was not particularly religious, it may have been her religion of birth that prompted Brigitte to study the Quran and Islam. In 1998, at the age of 30, he converted to Islam. He married for the second time in 1999. His second wife was a practicing Muslim of Senegalese origin. However, they also divorced.[102] In September 2001, Brigitte left for Pakistan to join LeT. He was burning with fire inside to fight the Americans in Afghanistan. In Lahore, the LeT handed him over to Sajid Mir who soon cleared him to take jihadi training in Pakistani-controlled Kashmir. Later, in his testimony in France, Brigitte described Sajid Mir as an important person in the LeT hierarchy. He was about 30 at that time. He was a pleasant and cordial person of medium build and dark complexion. He spoke English and Arabic, in addition to Urdu and Punjabi. In the training camp, Brigitte met with many foreigners and their trainers. The trainers were mostly from the Pakistan Army.[103] Although Brigitte had planned to fight Americans in Afghanistan, the LeT had no plans to join the war against the Americans in Afghanistan at that time. Sajid Mir convinced him to go back and wait for orders in France, where he created a sort of sleeper cell.

Brigitte did not have to wait for long before Sajid Mir presented him with a new jihad plan. Sajid Mir asked him to go to Australia and join Lodhi in Sydney. Lodhi was a trusted lieutenant of Sajid

Mir. Brigitte arrived in Australia in May 2003 and started a new life by marrying a former Australian army intelligence officer, Melanie Brown.[104] Brigitte's new wife was also a convert to Islam. Brigitte was given access to a lot of classified material in his new wife's possession. At the direction of Sajid Mir, he adopted a new alias and created a fictitious business to collect bomb-making material. Investigators believe that they were planning to target military or nuclear facilities. However, the French agents alerted the Australians who deported Brigitte before they could carry out the plot. They later arrested Lodhi, who was later sentenced to 20 years in prison in June 2006.[105]

In April 2012, French security forces arrested 17 terrorists, including Brigitte, in dawn raids around the country, including in the Paris region, Nantes, Marseille, Nice, and Toulouse. They were members of an Islamist group, "Forsane Alizza," or the "Knights of Pride," banned in late February 2012. France's counterespionage agency said that they "had a stash of arms, did physical training and may have been preparing a kidnapping."[106] The arrests followed what came to be known as the Toulouse and Montauban shootings. The Toulouse and Montauban shootings were a series of three gun attacks which targeted Muslim French soldiers and Jewish civilians in Montauban and Toulouse in the Midi-Pyrénées region of France in March 2012. Seven people died and five others were injured in the shootings. Police shot the perpetrator dead after a thirty-hour siege. The first attack took place in Toulouse on March 11 in which a Muslim French paratrooper was shot dead. Two uniformed soldiers were killed and one was seriously injured in Montauban in the second attack that took place on March 15. The last attack took place on March 19 in which four people, including three children, were killed at the Ozar Hatorah Jewish day school. The perpetrator was identified as Mohammed Merah, a 23-year-old French-Algerian Islamist terrorist who was previously a petty criminal. Merah attacked French Army personnel reportedly because of its involvement in the war in Afghanistan. Merah admitted anti-semitic motivations and said he attacked the Jewish school because "The Jews kill our brothers and sisters in Palestine."

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The Lodhi case aptly shows how the MDI/JuD can transfer its members from one country or continent to another as needed. Sajid Mir was the principal plotter of the terrorist attacks in Mumbai in November 2008. According to western intelligence sources, Sajid Mir and other co-plotters of the Mumbai attacks are living in a safe-house under the protection of the ISI.[107] With mounting evidence of the role of Sajid Mir in carrying out terrorist acts in France and Australia, France's leading counterterrorist judge, Jean-Louis Bruguiere, issued warrants for his arrest in October 2006. However, Pakistan refused to cooperate. In 2007, a French court sentenced Sajid Mir in absentia to ten years in prison. Jean-Louis Bruguiere had become convinced that Sajid Mir was a former or serving officer in the Pakistan Army and was protected at the highest level. "For me it was a crucial case, a turning point," Bruguiere said, "because of what it revealed about the role played by Pakistani groups in the global jihad and about the role of the Pakistani security forces in terrorism. We had the impression that Mir was protected at the highest levels of the state."[108]

Another important terrorism case where the LeT's name figures in is the 2005 Sydney Terrorism Plot. The jury found five men – Abdul Hasan, Khaled Cheikho, Mohamed Elomar, Mohammed Jamal, and Moustafa Cheikho – guilty of conspiring to commit acts in preparation for a terrorist attack. They were arrested after raids on their homes in southwest Sydney in 2005. According to Mitchell D. Silber, three of them, i.e. Abdul Hasan, Khaled Cheikho, and Moustafa Cheikho, had trained at the LeT camp.[109] During the ten-month trial, prosecutor Richard Maidment told the jury in the New South Wales Supreme Court that the men had planned to use explosive devices or firearms to commit extreme violence. The Crown argued they were stockpiling chemicals, firearms, and thousands of rounds of ammunition.[110] However, they could not complete the plan.

CHAPTER TEN

MDI GLOBAL

In its early years, the MDI started jihad in the countries and territories where opportunities drew it in, and where Juhayman's Ikhwan already had some supporters, with Bosnia being a big exception. At the same time, it started preparing ground in many other countries to kindle jihad. Jihadist leaders from all over the world frequently visited the MDI offices throughout the year. They also occasionally gathered in Pakistan to discuss their joint global strategy. The annual congregations of the MDI/JuD were always the biggest gatherings of international Islamists and jihadists. A cursory glance of the guests and guest speakers gives a clear idea of the international network of which the MDI/JuD was a part. Jihadist commanders from Eritrea and Ogaden attended the annual congregation in October 1994. Harakatul Jihad al-Islami Eritrea leader, Abu Ammar Ismail, and Abul Hasan who represented Ittehad-e Islami, addressed the annual congregation in October 1994. Both of them said that their groups were fighting jihad against the Christians who had occupied their territories, and they wanted to turn them into Islamic states.[1] In the annual congregation in 1996, those who attended included Saleem bin Eid al-Hilali, Majdy Muhsen Wardah, adviser to *Motamar al-Alam al-Islami* (World Muslim Congress) in Egypt,[2] Dr. Suhaib Hassan, Muslim Aid-U.K. and Jamiat Ahle Hadith-U.K., Abu Abdur Rehman from France, Noorul Islam (President of the Arakan Rohingya Islamic Front), Professor Zakaria (*amir* of the Rohingya Solidarity Organization, or RSO), Shoaib Ahmed and Abu Abdullah

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(of Jamiat Ahle Hadith-U.K.), Abu Mohammad from the United States, Abdullah from Denmark, Abu Muntsar (founding amir of the Jamiat Ahyaul Minhajul Sunnah), Amir Harakat ad-Dawa Islamiyya-U.K., and Sheikkh Khalifa bin Hilal al-Deehani from Kuwait, attended the annual convention.[3] Majdy Muhsen Wardah also addressed the 1997 annual convention.[4]

In 1998, those who addressed the annual congregation included Dr. Mohammad Yunus, Amir Tehreek-e-Jihad Arakan, Abdul Qahhar, amir MDI chapter in France, and Abdul Ghaffar, Vice Amir Tehreek Minhajul Sunnah-U.K., Sheikh Khalid Salim from Kuwait, and Abu Saeed Adnan, a Hamas delegate.[5] Saleem bin Eid al-Hilali also attended the annual convention in November 1999. Addressing the 1999 annual congregation, Sheikh Salim al-Hilali from Syria, who was a disciple of the late Nasir al-Din al-Albani, called upon the mujahedeen to spread the *manhaj* (path) of Quran and Sunna all over the world and to relieve the Muslims in Palestine, Bosnia, Kosovo, Kashmir, the Philippines, and Chechnya from their oppression.[6] Abdul Rauf Shakir from the United States also attended the November 1999 annual convention.[7] Abdul Qahhar also attended the annual convention in November 1999.[8] A convert to Islam, Khadija Watson, wrote an article, "Death of a nation," in the *Voice of Islam*.[9]

In November 1998, MDI spokesman Yahya Mujahid told this author that jihadists from more than 50 countries were attending the MDI annual congregation.[10] The invitation to the congregation had claimed, "You can go to any jihadi frontline in the world and you will find MDI mujahideen crushing the infidels and destroying the fortresses of the devil."[11] In an interview with international journalists before the annual convention in 1998, Hafiz Saeed told the MDI that mujahideen were working around the world. He told them, "Lashkar's members are working in oppressed and weak Muslim areas around the world especially in Kashmir where they are being victimized by the brutal Indian forces."[12] Addressing the 1999 annual congregation, Saeed Salafi Arakani, the leader of the Jihad Organization in Myanmar, noted, "We are continuing the jihad against the junta in Myanmar to the best of our resources and capabilities."[13] Saudi grand mufti Bin Baz and his deputy, Sheikh Muhammad bin Saleh Al-Usaimeen, regularly spoke at the annual congregations. In his address to the 1998 annual convention, deputy mufti Sheikh Muhammad bin Saleh Al-Usaimeen said, "Jihad is the way that ensures the predominance of Islam in the world. Markaz Ad-Daawa Wal Irshad is carrying out commendable work of Dawa and Jihad. May Allah bless their efforts!"[14] Their endorsements helped the MDI both to recruit and fundraise worldwide.

By 2007, the MDI/JuD had created secret cells in more than 100 countries. Head of Department of International Affairs, Abdur Rehman Makki, explained, "We prefer the local people to form Salafist groups and carry on *dawa* and jihad in every country. Ultimately, it is going to be the local people who will bring about Islamic revolution. In the beginning, we are ready to provide *dawa* (missionary) and jihadi training if it is needed. In some countries we do send out people to provide *dawa* and jihadi training for those who cannot travel [to Pakistan]."[15] Another MDI commander pointed out that there was a different strategy for non-Muslim countries. "If the situation becomes conducive in a country where the population is overwhelmingly non-Muslim or is not ready for jihad, the MDI would not wait for the local people to get ready to take patt in jihad. In that case, the MDI would send mujahdeen from other countries and wage jihad. After winning the jihad, the MDI would train the local people to run the country in accordance with the principles of Islamic *sharia* and hand over power to the local Muslims and withdraw to other territories."[16] This was the strategy the MDI applied in Bosnia.

If we go by symbolism, the MDI/JuD's two primary enemies were and are Jews and Hindus (*yahood o hunood*) with whom it has been at war since its birth. Hindus and Jews are represented by India and Israel respectively. The MDI/JuD's jihadist operations have focused more on India than on any other country. The only time MDI/JuD planners were known to be particularly focused on Jews was in November 2008 when they chose Nariman House in Mumbai as one of their targets. The posters, slogans, flyers, anthems, and advertisements invariably mentioned *yahood o hunood*

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(Jews and Hindus) or Israel and India, although they occasionally mentioned other countries. In 1998, Hafiz Saeed explained to journalist Zaigham Khan,

> "Our jehad is confined strictly to non-Muslims, and particularly Hindus and Jews, the two main enemies of the Muslims. The Quran too has declared these two groups to be enemies [of Islam]. These two powers are creating problems for Muslims and for Pakistan. To my mind, Hindus are what the Quran terms as *mushriks* (polytheists). This [Hinduism] is the worst form of *shirk* (polytheism), in which 30 million gods are worshipped. And from here, *shirk* has been smuggled to other nations of the world. Hindus are creating problems for us directly. If God gives us the power, we will enlarge the scope of jehad to include the Jews, who are the worst danger for the Muslims."[17]

There was little mention of the United States in MDI literature and discourse before April 2000 when, during his brief stopover in Pakistan, President Bill Clinton pressed Pakistan to roll back jihad. Between April 2000 and September 2001, the United States emerged as the third country most targeted by MDI/JuD propaganda, and has remained so till now. There is little or no evidence that the MDI particularly chose to target U.S. interests or its citizens outside Afghanistan except a couple of times when it planned to target U.S. diplomatic missions in India.[18] Apart from the aborted plan to target U.S. diplomatic missions in India, the JuD planned to target the West only one more time: attacking the Jylland Posten building and its employees in Denmark. In the 1990s, at its annual congregations, the MDI used to hang a forty-feet-plus long banner portraying the LeT's dagger penetrating the national flags of the United States, Russia, United Kingdom, India, and Israel.[19] Hafiz Saeed once told me, "*Yahood* (Jews) and the *Hunood* (Hindus) are two sides of the same coin." I jokingly asked him if the United States was the circular slim side of the same coin to which he said, "The *yahood* control the United States."[20]

In August 2004, Hafiz Saeed told the weekly Urdu magazine *Nida-e-Millat* (Voice of the Nation), "Even if the Democrats win

the elections, there will be no change in the U.S. policies. In the U.S. setup, parties are just an eyewash. In fact, the Jewish lobby decides the fate of the US. The Jews are the kingmakers. Bush is just a pawn that has been sacrificed." He does not stop at that and adds, "The Jews are the worst enemies of Islam. Therefore, there will be no pro-Muslim change. The US economy is worsening. The US is no more as powerful as it used to be. I see a good change in future. Muslim countries will have to unite. If they unite on one platform, they could cause the US's disintegration."[21]

The MDI/JuD has had close relations with Palestinian groups, including HAMAS. HAMAS delegates have been frequent visitors to the MDI/JuD headquarters in Lahore and guest speakers at the annual congregations. MDI/JuD has also commissioned casing videos of Israeli targets in the same way it got David Headley to do casing videos of potential targets before the November 2008 Mumbai terror attacks. In the early 2000s, the JuD planned to target the Israeli embassy building in New Delhi. The JuD sent an agent to New Delhi who gained access to the Israeli embassy under the guise of a Pakistani journalist who looked quite westernized, and even succeeded in entering the embassy building and interviewing a senior Israeli diplomat. He also succeeded in video-casing the Israeli embassy building. It is not clear why the JuD did not go ahead with the plan. According to one JuD source, the ISI had shot the idea down because it would have had international repercussions for the Pakistani army at that time.[22] The video is still in possession of the JuD.

In 2000, the MDI seriously considered practically taking part in jihad against Israel. On October 17, 2000 Hafiz Saeed told journalists in Rawalpindi, "Each mujahid of LeT wants to to be martyred in the holy *bait al-maqdas*... It has become obligatory for the Muslims to wage jihad against the Jews who are massacring unarmed Muslims in Kashmir and Palestine. The Muslim Ummah should wage a joint jihad against the non-believers who have unitedly invaded the Muslim countries... The real jihad is to target and kill the Jews in their own homes."[23] A three-day conference started in Karachi on October 21, 2000 to mobilize people for jihad against Israel. Hafiz Saeed said similar conferences would be held in other major cities in the next two months to mobilize

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people and recruit volunteers.[24] On October 21, 2000, the LeT formally declared jihad against Israel. Addressing an LeT conference in Karachi, Hafiz Saeed said that 20,000 LeT mujahideen had already enrolled to take part in jihad against Israel.[25] Hafiz Saeed said, "Our suicide squad is also ready to join Palestinian brothers."[26] Hafiz Saeed said that the central *shura* of the MDI had taken the decision to send thousands of fighters to struggle for the liberation of Jerusalem.[27]

On October 21, 2000, MDI issued a *fatwa* to wage jihad against Israel and the rest of the world. The *fatwa*, signed by Mufti Abdur Rehman Rehmani, *Mufti-e Azam* (Grand Mufti) and *Raees al-Qaza* (Chief Justice) of MDI's *Dar al-Ifta wal Qaza*, formally endorses a similar early fatwa of the Imam of Kaaba. It says,

> "This is an open secret that Jews have always been the worst enemies of Islam, the violators of human rights and world peace, the assassins of Prophets and
>
> disbelievers in the word of Allah. They violated the truce of Madinah, betrayed
>
> Muslims in the worst possible manner on the occasion of the battle of Ahzab. While commanding to slay these conspirators and enemies of Islam, Allah Almighty said: And fight in the way of Allah those who fight you and do not transgress. Indeed Allah likes not the transgressors. [Quran, al-Baqara, verse 190.]
>
> And then Allah decreed the general massacre of these people in no uncertain
>
> terms: And kill them wherever you find them and expel then from where they expelled you. [Quran, al-Baqara, verse 191.]
>
> And declared their mischief worst than murder and said: And mischief is worse than murders. [Quran, al-Baqara, verse 191.]
>
> In the earlier days of Islam, Christians and Jews launched concerted efforts to undermine Islam but finally Allah subdued them through Jihad and shattered their political and economic power. To maintain the predominance of Muslims and to root out evil and mischief, Allah Almighty decreed Jihad till the Day of Judgment. According to two sayings of the Prophet it is a religious obligation for Muslims to evict Jews and Christians from Arabian peninsula. The Prophet (sallallaho aliahi wasallam) said: Expell Jews and Christians from the Arabian peninsula (Bukhari, Muslim).
>
> Now the recent episode of massacre of Muslims including children and women is a clarion call to the Muslim world. The Ulema Council of Darul-Afta wal Qadha unanimously issues the verdict that Jihad has become absolutely obligatory for adult Muslims under the circumstances and now it is a religious obligation for all Muslim rulers to stand united and join Jihad against the worst enemy of humanity and Islam and destroy him.
>
> Darul Afta upholds the recent verdict by the Imams of the Sacred House, which proclaimed the obligation of Jihad and requests Amir Markaz Ad-dawah Pakistan in the light of this verdit to make preparations for Jihad in the whole world, particularly for the protection of Al-Quds. It requests him to prepare the Mujahideen of Lashkar-e-Taiba in particular for Jihad, in fact, to wage Jihad against Jews in whatever ways possible
>
> Almighty Allah is the Helper of His believer slaves and has promised success for Mujahideen "And you will dominate if you believe" Darul Afta wal Qadha's Ulema Council has issued this verdict unanimously."[28]

On October 22, 2000, a time bomb placed near the stage at the convention, which was being held in a school ground, killed three LeT activists. The LeT accused India's RAW and Israel's Mossad. Three people died and several others were injured.[29] The explosion still remains a mystery. Israel and India are unlikely to have been behind it because had it been the case, there would have been some investigation and results made public. However, the MDI postponed the jihad, at least the open jihad, against Israel.

The Pakistani military and terrorist groups' hostility towards Israel does not stem from the latter's occupation of the Arab

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lands alone. The defense and anti-terrorism cooperation between India and Israel also irks them. Both the Pakistani military and militants agree that Israeli anti-terrorism has played an important role in crushing militancy in Indian Kashmir. In the case of the MDI/JuD, the India-Israel cooperation in the field of anti-terrorism is doubly irksome because it has definite plans to wage jihad in Israel and Palestine. It understands that it would face India as well when it decides to start jihad in Israel and Palestine.

The India-Israeli cooperation started much before the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1992.[30] According to military analyst Prasun Sen Gupta, soon after India's defeat in the war with China, Israel gave India 81mm and 120mm mortars, as well as some pack howitzer artillery pieces, which were desperately needed. In 1963, Israeli General David Shaltiel, chief of the Israeli Army, visited India and signed a secret pact with India for military intelligence exchanges and supply of military hardware to each other. India reciprocated in 1967 when Israel was in the middle of a war by sending urgently needed spares for Israeli Mystere and Ouragan fighter aircraft and AMX-13 tanks. Israel helped India in the 1971 India-Pakistan war by delaying sending back some 80 Pakistani F-86 Sabres, which it had received for maintenance. Israel also tipped off India about the transfer of eleven Jordanian F-104 Star fighters to Pakistan. Israeli equipment has been fitted on to the RAW's two Boeing 707 aircraft for gathering signals intelligence. India and Israel have also been cooperating covertly on nuclear and missile technology. The December 1996 India-Israel cooperation agreement in several fields also includes technology.[31]

The generals from both countries visit each other's country more frequently than generals from any other two countries. In response to Pakistan-supported jihad in Indian Kashmir, New Delhi decided to seek defense assistance from Israel. Israel showed the counter-infiltration devices used along the borders in the Golan Heights and Negev desert to India's Vice Chief of Army Staff, Lt. Gen. Shantano Choudhary, during the former's June 2004 visit to Israel.[32] During Major General Kaplinsky's 2007 visit, the Israeli delegation, along with its Indian hosts, reviewed the performance of the Israeli equipment used along the Line of Control (LoC) in

Jammu and Kashmir.[33] In September 2008, Israeli Major General, Avi Mizrahi went on an unscheduled trip to Kashmir to review the Indian Army's strategy to counter terrorism in the Valley of Kashmir. Israel has become India's second biggest supplier of weaponry. Israel is also helping India in its counter-terrorism strategy. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) also sends "highly trained commandos to provide instruction in counter-terror and urban warfare."[34]

Soon after its formation, the JDQS started establishing jihadi infrastructure inside Pakistan and links with Sunni Muslims in Iran. In Pakistan, it focused on Pakistani tribal areas and the adjoining areas, as well as Pakistani Balochistan. In Iran, its focus was on Iranian Kurdistan and Iranian Balochistan. Before his assassination, JDQS *amir*, Jamilur Rehman, had established links with Sunni Muslims and their organizations in Iranian Kurdistan and Balochistan, two Iranian provinces where Sunni Muslims are a majority. It opened an office in Quetta to spread Salafist ideology in both Pakistani and Iranian Balochistan, and formed al-Mahad al-Shari l' Aidad ad-Dawah (the Islamic Institute for Islamic Call), which trained preachers. As part of its strategy, it opened 250 madrassahs in Quetta,[35] the capital of Pakistani Balochistan, and near the Pakistan-Iran international borders in Balochistan.[36] It also started funding Sunni Muslim groups in Iran. Jamilur Rehman also set up a chain of madrassahs in Pakistan and Afghanistan. According to Sami Ullah, who replaced Jamilur Rehman in 1991, Jamilur Rehman had set up some 500 madrassahs in his life but had to close a few due to financial problems. Some 300 madrassahs were still operating when he died.[37] Samiullah said at a press conference in Peshawar on September 3, 1991 that at the time of his death, 28,000 students were studying in these madrassahs.[38]

A large part of the JDQS jihadist infrastructure survived its amir Jamilur Rehman's death in 1991. This was the time when jihad in Kashmir was picking up and the ISI wanted to focus on it. The ISI asked the JDQS to restrict its activities to Afghanistan. The MDI took over a large part of the JDQS jihadist infrastructure. The MDI not only funded the Sunni groups in Iran, but also gave

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militant training to some of their boys.[39] At the same time, the MDI publications promoted the cause of Iranian Sunni Muslims. The Iranian intelligence discovered some of the Sunni scholars and activists who had been recruited by the JDQS and possibly the MDI. Some of them were later put to death. *Mujallah ad-Dawa* published the stories of some of them. A report in *Mujallah ad-Dawa* in June-July 1990 claimed that the Iranian government had hanged two young Ahle Hadith men for spreading Salafism. *Mujallah ad-Dawa* claimed that it had received the report from the central *shura* of the Markazi Jamaat Ahle Sunnat of Iran. One of the two hanged men was Nasir Sobhai, a religion teacher. He was a student of a prominent Iranian Salafist, Sheikh Ahmed Muftizadeh, who was also behind bars at that time. He had converted a number of Shias to Salafism, and was actively against the Iranian government. The other hanged man was Qudrat Ullah (aka Abdul Haq) who was accused of spreading Salafism in Iran. He had lived and studied in a madrassah in Pakistan for a long time and had recently returned to Iran to spread Salafism.[40]

MDI leader Amir Hamza visited Iranian Balochistan in March 1992[41] to hold meetings with the Iranian Sunni leaders and assess their financial and other needs. During his visit to Iran, Hamza visited several cities, including Zahidan, Bandar Abbas, Shiraz, Tehran, and Qom.[42] He also visited the Island of Dargahan in the province of Hormozgan. The majority of people in Dargahan follow the Shafii School of jurisprudence. Because of its close proximity to the Arab countries, many people understand Arabic in Dargahan. There are fewer differences between Salafism and the Shafii School of Jurisprudence than the Hanafi School. In Shiraz, Hamza went to see the followers of Dr. Muzzaffarian who converted to Sunni Islam and turned his 2000-square yard house into a Sunni mosque. He named the mosque as al-Husnain. The government razed it to the ground, declared Dr. Muzzaffarian an apostate, and sent him to jail.[43]

Hamza talks of an unnamed Sunni *alim* from Zahidan who was arrested from his house very late in the evening without any reason and tortured to death. Hamza claims that his torturers tied several kilograms of weight to his penis. The Iranian government

jailed a Salafist *alim*, Sheikh Ahmed Meri Sayyad, many years ago for trying to publish the Persian translation of Ibn Taymiyya's *Minhajul Sunna*. Sheikh Ahmed Meri Sayyad did his Ph.D. from the University of Medina in hadith and returned to Iranian Balochistan to spread Salafism. He named his madrassah Darul Sunnah. Hamza even went to see him in jail and discussed cooperation between their two groups. Although Sheikh Ahmed Meri Sayyad was sentenced to 15 years, he was released after six years. After his release, Sheikh Ahmed Meri Sayyad went to Saudi Arabia to perform *umra*. He was arrested when he returned from Saudi Arabia and killed.[44]

In December 1994, *Mujallah ad-Dawa* published a report which said that Iranian intelligence agencies kidnapped and killed Sheikh Zia, a Sunni *sheikh* who was campaigning for the reopening of the Husnain mosque. Sheikh Zia followed the Shafii School of Jurisprudence and owned a madrassah in Bandar Abbas. The Iranian government had closed the mosque of al-Husnain after hanging Muzzaffarian.[45] According to a faxed messaged to *Mujallah ad-Dawa* by Jamat Ahle Sunnat of Iran, the Iranian government demolished the Sunni mosque named Faiz in Mashhad on January 30, 1994, and built a parking lot at that place because Ali Khamenai lived in the same street.[46] Abu Ahmed in *Mujallah ad-Dawa* writes, "Why should they be interested in building mosques? They have built *hussainiyas* (Shia religious place) to commit *shirk* (polytheism)."[47] Abu Ahmed further writes that, in February 1994, the Jama Masjid in the Khayyam neighborhood in Zahidan decided not to celebrate the Iranian Revolution and did not put up celebratory lights to protest the demolition of the Faiz mosque. The Iranian intelligence agencies tried to persuade the Jama Masjid administration to reverse their decision, but failed. The police opened fire on unarmed worshippers and killed ten of them.[48]

During his visit to Iran, Amir Hamza established links with several Sunni groups, in addition to Markazi [Jamaat] Ahle Sunnat of Iran. In 2001 and 2006, JuD officials claimed that it had links with several Sunni groups and individuals in Iran, not only in Iranian Balochistan and Kurdistan, but also in the heart of Iran. The JuD has given militant training to very few Iranian Salafists

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because travel to Pakistan is difficult. Currently, the JuD is involved more in secret missionary work than in jihadist training in Iran where it has built some jihadist infrastructure and network with the help of local Sunni groups.

The MDI had set up a fairly large organizational infrastructure in the United Kingdom by 1996, in addition to several offices in different European countries.[49] Salafist leader from the United Kingdom are frequent visitors to the MDI/JuD headquarters in Lahore. The size of the MDI/JuD supporters in the United Kingdom can be gauged from the fact that it has been the second biggest consumer of the MDI/JuD publications. Abu Abdullah of Jamiat Ahle Hadith-U.K. told the annual congregation that there were more than 500 subscribers of the Mujallah Ad-Dawa in the United Kingdom.[50] The MDI publications also occasionally reported the activities of foreigners in their home countries after receiving militant training at MDI training camps. Muslims from the United Kingdom are frequent visitors to the MDI/JuD training camps. *Mujallah Ad-Dawa* reported January 1997 that Abu Sakhar, a resident from Halifax Great Britain, came to Pakistan and did a 21-day *daura-e aama* in 1996. On his return to Britain, he broke his television set as he was told in Pakistan. Abu Shoaib, a resident from Bradford, U.K., came on a three-day study tour to the *Muaskar Ummul Qara* where he joined the LeT. On his return, he sent his expensive pocket-size TV to be broken during the annual congregation in 1996. The writer called the TV set *"yahoodo hunood ki nasl"* and *"yahoodi agent."*[51]

In the very beginning, the MDI had decided that its members would not reveal their affiliation with the MDI. In many cases they were supposed to work with different Salafist/Ahle Hadith groups, or under different local names. There is a huge Muslim population in the United Kingdom. A large number of people from both sides of the Jammu and Kashmir are also settled there. Many of them donate large amounts of money to groups which fight to liberate Indian Kashmir. By 1979, Juhayman's Ikhwan had more followers and supporters among the Muslims in the United

Kingdom than in any other western country. By 1996, the British branch of the MDI was the most active branch outside of Pakistan. In his address at the annual congregation in 1995, Maulana Mehmood Ahmed Ghazanfar told the audience that hundreds of British citizens had trained at the *Muaskar Taiba* and were spreading the message of Allah in the land of infidels.[52] The British branch of the MDI also set up the *Falah-e-Aseeran* (Prisoners' Welfare) Department in British jails. MDI workers arranged *daroos* (Islamic lectures) for prisoners, and also set up small libraries of Islamic books. Abu Umar gave *daroos* in the jails of Long Lartond and Hewel Grang. LeT workers not only tried to convert Muslim prisoners to Salafist Islam, but also take their message to non-Muslim prisoners. As a result of these efforts, many non-Muslim prisoners in British jails accepted Islam. A report in the *Mujallah ad-Dawa* says that four non-Muslims, including three women, accepted Islam as a result of efforts of MDI workers.[53]

The MDI came in the limelight in the United Kingdom when, on December 9, 1998, the U.K. government ordered the deportation of resident and Pakistani national Imam Shafiqur Rehman. The official letter ordering his deportation said that Rehman was involved with the MDI and his continued presence in the United Kingdom represented a danger to national security.[54] Originally from Mian Channu, Pakistani Punjab, Rehman came to the United Kingdom in February 1993 to work as a Muslim cleric with the local branch of the Jamiat Ahle Hadith in Oldham.[55] According to the U.K. Secretary of State, Rehman thereafter served as the U.K. point of contact for the MDI. According to British officials, Rehman recruited at least seven British Muslim volunteers to receive militant training and in fund-raising for the LeT, and was a personal contact of Hafiz Saeed. Imam Rehman did not deny speaking at an MDI conference in Pakistan and fundraising for MDI-sponsored educational and welfare projects in Pakistan. In spite of finding certain irregularities in Rehman's case, a U.K. appeals court said that it was undisputed that Rehman "has provided sponsorship, information and advice to persons going to Pakistan for the forms of training which may have included militant or extremist training."[56]

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Hafiz Saeed visited the U.K. from August 9 to 27, 1995 to organize the MDI chapter there. He delivered lectures in different cities. The visit was organized by the Markazi Jamiat Ahle Hadith U.K. and the Jamiat Ahyaul Minhajul Sunnah. He spoke at various Islamic Centers in London, Oldham, Manchester, Leicester, Luton, Bradford, Keighley, Skipton, Huddersfield, Derby, Rochdale, Halifax, Dewsbury, Glasgow, and Birmingham. In the United Kingdom, the themes of his public lectures included *Kashmir: A Disputed Issue, Violations of United Nations Resolutions.* In his address in Oldham, he said that "the jihad which sprang from Pakistan has spread to the whole world. The United States and its allies are bent upon punishing Pakistan for this. Their way of punishing Pakistan is to bring about secular democratic governments in Pakistan. These secular democratic governments would stand by the United States and its allies against Islam. They would create artificial economic crisis to weaken Pakistan. We now have to decide how we have to live a life of honor. Pakistan's first priority should be to use its military sources, to make nuclear bombs, and to gain expertise in missile technology. We need courage to do all that. Only our religion can give us the courage to prepare for jihad and gather all kinds of powers to defend ourselves and our faith."[57] In his lectures, he also exhorted British Muslims to undergo jihadi training in Afghanistan.

On August 12 and 13, 1995, the Markazi Jamiat Ahle Hadith-U.K. held its annual international Islamic Dawa Conference in Birmingham where Hafiz Saeed shared the podium with Abu Muntsar, Ali al-Timimi, Sheikh Saleem al-Hilali, and Dr. Suhaib Hassan on the first day, and with Imam of Ka'aba, Mohammed Ibn Subeil, on the second day. In his address, Hafiz Saeed explained how the MDI/LeT was fighting jihad in Indian Kashmir, and that jihad is a movement for the supremacy of Islam in the entire world and not just a nationalist war. Jihad guarantees success for Muslims in every field. In Leicester, he told his audience that democracy and Sufism are destroying Pakistan like rot. "As long as Muslims actively waged jihad, the entire India was in their possession. When they abandoned jihad, they suffered from humiliation and oppression. Pakistan should prepare for jihad in

the subcontinent and change the geography of the region. This is possible only when they got rid of democracy and Sufism and adopt the path of jihad in the light of the Quran and Sunnah."[58] On August 26, 1995, Hafiz Saeed attended the Islamic *dawa* conference organized by Jamiat Ahyaul Minhajul Sunnah. Mahmoud Bahaziq especially travelled to the United Kingdom to speak at the conference. Other speakers included Amir Jamiat Ahle Hadith-U.S., Shaikh Mohammad Jabali, Muhammad Safwat Nuradin, Jama'at Ansar al-Sunna al-Muhammadiyya of Egypt, and Jamalud Din Zar Abu Zar.[59] Many leaders from these British Islamist parties also came to Pakistan and campaigned for jihad, along with the MDI leaders, or at the MDI rallies. Jamiat Ahle Hadith-U.K. leader Maulana Fazle Karim spoke at the *jihad fi sabeel illah* conference in Mirpur.[60]

The Global Jihad Fund (GJF) also encouraged British youth to go to LeT camps. The GJF was established in London in the mid-1990s by Saudi dissident, Dr. Mohammed al-Massari and his assistant, Mohammed Sohail. It set up a relatively sophisticated fundraising network in the London metropolitan area to fund international jihadists like Osama bin Laden, and in such places as Bosnia, Afghanistan, Kashmir, Kosovo, and Chechnya.[61] In May 2001, the GJF asked British Muslims outside of London to "Start a Jihad Support Network in your city... don't be afraid of [the tyranny of the infidels]."[62] It asked British Muslims to "send your donations directly to the Jihad Orgs in Potentially Hot Countries" and provided detailed bank account information for LeT, described as an "organization [] working in Afghanistan/ Kashmir."[63] In one e-mail conversation with British Muslims in 1999, the GJF organizer, Mohammed Sohail, wrote, "Currently jihad training is being done in Muzzaffarabad in Pakistan. It is on[ly] for 21 days and is of beginners level. It is organised by Lashkar-e-Toiba... Then there are special courses. If anyone wants to go to Afghanistan, I can also do this by arrangement."[64]

Abu Muntsar and Abu Jamil were part of the core MDI team, which conceived the global structure of the MDI at a meeting in January 1994. They were introduced to the MDI by Sheikh Abdul Hadi al-Umri, *nazim-e-aala* (chief organizer) of Jamiat

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Ahle Hadith-U.K. The pair had visited MDI/LeT offices in Lahore and spent some days at the *Muaskar Taiba* in Afghanistan. They also participated in the Jihad-e-Hind Conference in Muzaffarabad in Pakistani Kashmir. Abu Muntsar, who holds a Masters in computer sciences, was the founding *amir* of the Jamiat Ahyaul Minhajul Sunnah, which was founded around 1989. The influence of Nasir al-Din al-Albani on the Jamiat Ahyaul Minhajul Sunnah is quite obvious because the organization publishes and popularizes the works of Al-Albani. In the early 1990s, it published and distributed 20,000 copies of the English translation of Al-Albani's major work, *Sifatu Salati An-Nabiyy*. Twenty members of the Jamiat Ahyaul Minhajul Sunnah fought alongside the JDQS in Kunar in Afghanistan. It also sent five members to fight under Mahmoud Bahaziq. Two of them died in the war in Bosnia. The MDI/LeT officials in the United Kingdom, Mubarak Sialkoti and Hafiz Mohammad Yahya, introduced Jamiat Ahyaul Minhajul Sunnah to the MDI. Abu Jamil had fought in Bosnia under the command of Mahmoud Bahaziq. He had two English wives who had converted to Islam.[65] The Jamiat Ahyaul Minhajul Sunnah members routinely went to Pakistan to receive militant training at LeT-run camps. Jamiat Ahyaul Minhajul Sunnah holds a conference at the Leicester University every two years. Those who attended the conference in 1997 included, among others, Bilal Philip and Ali al-Timimi.[66]

Soon after the November 2008 Mumbai terror attacks, Sajid Mir and Headley started planning an attack on the Danish newspaper, *Jyllands Posten*, which had published blasphemous caricatures of Muhammad, the Prophet of Islam. They called the new plot 'The Mickey Mouse Project.' They met again in December, 2008.[67] Pakistan Army Major Iqbal had cut off contact with Headley after the November 2008 Mumbai attacks for security reasons. Although Headley wanted to narrow the scope of 'The Mickey Mouse Project' and kill the cartoonist and an editor only, Sajid Mir wanted a spectacular attack. According to U.S. officials and documents, he told Headley, "All Danes are responsible, which reflected the JuD mindset." Under Sajid Mir's directions, Headley traveled from

Chicago to Denmark in January 2009 under the cover of a businessman. Sajid Mir also gave Headley € 3,000 for reconnaissance in Denmark. He managed to enter the *Jyllands Posten*'s offices under the pretext of inquiring about advertising his immigration firm. He also managed to shoot a video of the area inside the *Jyllands Posten* office building. As Sajid Mir mistakenly believed the editor was Jewish, he had asked Headley to also shoot a video of a nearby synagogue, which was also to be bombed. However, the JuD had to put the plan on hold after a few weeks because Pakistan had finally arrested Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi and others.[68] Headley was a little disillusioned with the JuD and decided to turn to al-Qaeda to implement 'The Mickey Mouse Project.'

During his stay in Pakistan in February 2009, Abdur Rehman Hashim Pasha took Headley to Miranshah in the tribal areas to meet Ilyas Kashmiri. Abdur Rehman Hashim Pasha had retired from the Pakistan Army as a major and joined the JuD. He trained the mujahideen in how to carry out *fidayee* missions. He was also disillusioned with the JuD after they put the project on hold and joined Ilyas Kashmiri's group. Kashmiri gave Headley the task of conducting reconnaissance of the Chabad Houses in India. On their return to Lahore, Abdur Rehman Hashim Pasha also asked him to survey Chabad Houses and Raksha Bhawan (residential complex of the National Defense College) in Delhi. Abdur Rehman Hashim Pasha also asked him to conduct reconnaissance of a house in Goa where Israeli soldiers stay during their holidays and Osho temple in Pune. Abdur Rehman Hashim Pasha paid for his air travel to India and gave him Rs 55,000. Headley returned to India for the last time in March 2009.[69] He conducted reconnaissance of Chabad Houses in Delhi, Pushkar, Goa, and Pune. In Delhi, he video graphed Vice President House, Sena Bhawan (Army House), and the Israeli embassy building. On his return, Headley handed over the video footage to Abdur Rehman Hashim Pasha with his recommendations.

In May 2009, Headley and 'Saulat Mamu' again went to Miranshah to meet Ilyas Kashmiri again. They discussed the attack not only on the newspaper office but also a general attack on

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Copenhagen. Kashmiri gave Headley $1,500 to go to Denmark again and do more reconnaissance. In June 2009, Headley went back to the United States where he received a message from Sajid Mir that he had more plans to carry out attacks on targets in cities near Mumbai. However, Headley wanted to go to Denmark. In late July and early August 2009, Headley traveled from Chicago, Illinois, to Copenhagen, Denmark, to conduct additional surveillance of the Jyllands-Posten office and surrounding area. He took approximately 13 surveillance videos. In England, Headley met with, and attempted to gain assistance from, Kashmiri's British contacts, Bashrat (Passha) and Sufiyaan (Simon) in Derby.[70] Both of them were from Kotli in Pakistani Kashmir. They also gave him some money. Sufiyaan agreed to participate in 'The Mickey Mouse' plot.[71] Headley also went to Stockholm, Sweden, and met with Farid, a Moroccan who was Abdur Rehman Hashim Pasha's contact.[72] In Denmark, he made a lot of footage of the newspaper offices and areas around it the Jyllands-Posten building. He even succeeded to enter the offices. He then went to Aaharas offices of the newspaper. However, before they could implement their plan, U.S. security forces arrested Headley at Chicago airport on October 3, 2009, and foiled the plot when he was ready to go to Pakistan to hand over the footage to Ilyas Kashmiri.[73]

In the Sudan, Egypt, and Nigeria, Juhayman's Ikhwan had found allies in groups called Jamaat Ansar al-Sunnah al-Muhammadiyya, or simply the Ansar al-Sunnah al-Muhammadiyya by the early 1980s. All three groups sent their members to take part in jihad in Afghanistan where they fought alongside the MDI mujahideen. In the 1980s and 1990s, Juhayman's Ikhwan provided financial support to the groups in all three countries. MDI/JuD has provided militant training to both Ansar al-Sunnah al-Muhammadiyya of Sudan and of Nigeria in the 1990s and at least early 2000s.

The Jamaat Ansar al-Sunnah al-Muhammadiyyah of Egypt, the oldest of the three, was founded by a former sheikh of al-Azhar University, Muhammad Hamid al-Fiqi, in 1926. MDI had also built strong links with Egypt's Al-Gamaat Al-Islamiyya, first

in Afghanistan, and later in Bosnia, where some of the Al-Gamaat Al-Islamiyya members fought jihad under Mahmoud Bahaziq. Sheikh Abu Talal al-Qasimy, an Al-Gamaat Al-Islamiyya cleric, was one of the top commanders the Muslim Forces in Bosnia. In Afghanistan, he had been uniting the Egyptian mujahideen in Afghanistan. He also started publishing Al-Murabitun, the official mouthpiece of the Al-Gamaat Al-Islamiyya, in Afghanistan. Al-Murabitun was on sale at MDI bookstores in Pakistan, quite a rare occurrence.[74] In May 1990, Omar Abdel Rahman visited Pakistan to meet MDI officials. In Pakistan, he was the guest of the MDI, which arranged several public conferences where he spoke. Omar Abdel Rahman was highly respected by the MDI leaders and policy-makers. One of the writers in the *Mujallah ad-Dawa* calls Omar Abdel Rahman the living Ibn Taymiyya.[75]

The Jamaat Ansar al-Sunnah al-Muhammadiyyah (ASMS) of Sudan was founded in 1939. In the 1990s, Shaikh Mohammad Hashim al-Hadeeah was the *amir* of ASMS, and Sheikh Mustafa Ahmed Naji his deputy. Both are said to have been influenced by the ideology of Juhayman. The ASMS appoints the *amir* without elections. The ASMS set up Jabhatul Tahrir (Liberation Front) to help the mujahideen in Eritrea.[76] In the early 1990s, the NIF security targeted the ASMS headquarters and ASMS-controlled mosques. The clashes reached a peak in 1994 when, in response to criticism from the ASMS leaders, the security forces fired on worshippers belonging to the Ansar al-Sunna Muhammadiyya of the Sudan. Dozens of people died. The ASMS commonly provokes non-Salafist sects, especially Sufi adherents of Islam, to violence. Clashes between the ASMS and other sects are nearly a routine on non-Salafist religious festivals, particularly the birthday of the Prophet of Islam. Salafists consider celebrating the birthday of the Prophet of Islam a bid'a (reprehensible innovation). In some cases, the ASMS tried to stop such celebrations by force, causing violence.[77]

Ansar al-Sunnatul Muhammadiyya of Nigeria, little known even in Nigeria, was headed by its *amir*, Aminud Deen Abu Bakr. Aminud Deen Abu Bakr was born in Kano, Nigeria, where he studied at different schools and madrassahs. He graduated from Jamiyya Ahmed Balo in Islamic and Arabic studies. After graduating

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from Jamiyya Balo, he taught Islamic and Arabic studies at the Madrassah Daroos al-Islah. He was tremendously influenced by the works and thoughts of Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, Ibn Taymiyya, Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawziyyah, and Usman al-Suri. He did his Ph.D. on an Algerian theologian, Abdel Rehman Al-Akhdari, who had worked on, among others subjects, Imam Malik. Later, Aminud Deen Abu Bakr established a madrassah in Kano and became its principal. Although he and his group were active in Salafist *dawa* for many years, they formally founded Jamatud Dawa Nigeria in 1975. The main objectives of the Jamatud Dawa Nigeria included *dawa* and global jihad. Aminud Deen Abu Bakr came to Pakistan in 1983. After spending some time in Lahore, he went to Karachi and spent one year at the Jamiyya Abu Bakr Islamiyya,[78] where he was attracted to the ideology of Juhayman's Ikhwan. The Jamiyya Abu Bakr Islamiyya was one of the centers of Pakistani Juhayman's Ikhwan.[79] Several teachers at the Jamiyya Abu Bakr Islamiyya participated in the founding of the MDI. Jamatud Dawa Nigeria sends hundreds of its members to study in Saudi madrassahs, such as Jamiyya Islamiyya Medina, Ummul Qara University, and Malik Saud University.[80]

CHAPTER ELEVEN

JIHAD IN THE UNITED STATES

Juhayman's Ikhwan had converted many American Muslims to their creed before the Meccan rebellion in November 1979, and at least one of them was an active founder of the MDI in 1987. Many of these Americans from Juhayman's Ikhwan became active in recruiting American Muslims and fundraising for the mujahideen in Afghanistan. Most of them worked through different Islamic societies and Islamic cultural centers. Many of Juhayman's American Ikhwan were involved in recruiting and fundraising efforts by the al-Kifah Refugee Center, which was based in Brooklyn, New York, and operated out of al-Faruq Mosque. It was affiliated with Maktab al-Khidmat (MAK) and al-Qaeda and financially supported violent jihad. By 1990, when the MDI slowly started entering the jihad in Kashmir, it had established deep links with such Salafist groups in the United States. At the same time, like elsewhere in the world, the MDI supported the formation of small Salafist groups in the United States. In November 1990, *Mujallah ad-Dawa* announced the formation of such a group, Markaz ad-Dawah al-Islamiyya, in Brooklyn, New York. It was announced that Mohammad Arif was its first amir, Abdur Rehman its first chief organizer, and Chaudhary Habib its first treasurer. It did not give an address but a telephone number to contact.[1] The group seems to have been dissolved since. It seems the MDI/JuD had been sending its operatives to the United States as it did to other western countries. According to Headley, JuD official Sajid Mir had told him that one of his brothers was working in Chicago.[2]

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The United States was an important country for the MDI leaders to recruit English-speaking members and to fund raise. In several interviews and conversations in the late 1990s and early 2000s, the JuD leaders hinted that the lack of English speaking members was a big hurdle in carrying on their jihad. In mid-2000s, the JuD overcame this by hiring English-speaking people instead of recruiting them. Mahmoud Bahaziq had been a frequent visitor to the United States since the early 1980s, if not earlier, till 1995 when he participated in the Islamic conference organized by the Islamic Assembly of North America (IANA), held from December 21 to 25, 1995, in Dearborn, Michigan. He was also present at the Islamic conference in the United States in December 1994 by the IANA.

The January 1993 and January 1994 meetings at the MDI[3] that aimed at reorganizing the MDI at the international level had stressed to give more attention to organizing the group in the West, particularly in the United Kingdom and the United States. The meetings had recommended that senior leaders from Pakistan and Saudi Arabia visit the United States to do *dawa* and establish links with other Salafist groups in the world. In light of these recommendations, Hafiz Saeed himself visited the United States in 1994 at the invitation of the Cultural Center of New York (Al-Markaz al-Saqafi New York), a Salafist group staffed by Pakistanis and Bangladeshis, and the al-Quran wa Sunnah Society.[4] Another group which hosted Hafiz Saeed during his stay in the United States was Al-Tajma al-Islami of North America (IANA). In the United States he gave lectures at Islamic centers in 20 cities, including New York, Detroit, and Houston, and in seven states, including Florida, New York, and Texas. At these conferences, he shared the podium with *ulema* from Saudi Arabia, Syria, Egypt, including with Muhammad Safwat Nuradin of Jama'at Ansar al-Sunna al-Muhammadiyya of Egypt and Mahmoud Bahaziq. One of the main themes of his lectures was 'Islamic Perspectives of Raising Children.'[5] In an interview with *Mujallah ad-Dawa*, Hafiz Saeed said there were three objectives of his visit to America: 'To extend *dawa* to the Muslims in the United States, to be acquainted with its Islamist groups and individuals, and to build an infrastructure

to spread *dawa* for jihad.[6] The title of the interview was "Islam is the Future of the United States." Instead of a picture of Hafiz Saeed, the interview carried a picture of the White House with the caption, "The White House of the United States – waiting for the thumps of the mujahideen's steps."[7] This was not an aberration. Hafiz Saeed ended his article with the words, "Brother mujahideen! The dangerous situation should not affect you. The thumps of your steps can already be heard in Washington. No matter what you are to continue your journey."[8]

In November 2006, the world suddenly discovered that three of Hafiz Saeed's and Abdur Rehman Makki's real younger brothers were serving as imams in the United States when Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents picked up 33 immigrants, mostly Pakistani, including Imam Hafiz Muhammad Masood, brother of Hafiz Saeed, and Imam Abdul Hannan, brother of Abdur Rehman Makki. Although the younger sister of Abdur Rehman Makki, Rehana Masood, was also living in Sharon, Massachusetts, she did not become controversial. The arrests were made on November 15, 2006 as part of a sweep in eight states and the District of Columbia. Most of them were charged with having fraudulent religious-worker visas. Both Imam Masood and Imam Hannan had obtained their immigration papers with the help of Muhammad Khalil, the imam of a Brooklyn mosque who had been convicted in 2004 for submitting hundreds of false visa applications to smuggle people into the United States under the Religious Workers Program over more than a decade. Khalil ran his mosque out of a grocery store basement. He had sponsored more than 200 Muslims as imams who did odd jobs instead of religious work that they had legally come to the United States for. They paid Khalil fees ranging from $5,000 to $8,000 for helping them to obtain religious worker visas. U.S. authorities claimed Khalil earned more than $600,000 during the life of the scam. Khalil also advocated violent jihad, and warned his followers to arm themselves and anticipate another 9/11-style attack.[9]

In the beginning, both Imam Masood and Imam Hannan

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denied any wrongdoing. Imam Masood even disowned his brother, Hafiz Saeed, declaring, "I am not his brother," disavowing any relationship with his brother's politics and jihad.[10] The uproar that followed their arrests showed that the MDI/JuD has been well entrenched in Islamist circles in the United States. When the ICE arrested the two imams, the Muslim Students Association (MSA) sponsored an online petition in their defense, and asked its supporters to express their hopes "that immigration officials will be sensitive to their leadership positions in their communities." The petition also asked its followers to express their concern regarding "the way these cases have been handled to date and request that immediate action be taken to bring a fair and speedy resolution to this issue."[11] The MSA is a fast-growing network of 175 campus chapters that combine good works, religious studies, and leftist international politics.[12]

Imam Masood was born in Pakistan in 1958 and came to the United States in 1987 as part of the MDI's efforts to organize the Salafist community in the United States and establish a local chapter of the MDI.[13] He came on a J-1 Exchange Visitor visa, ostensibly to attend the Vanderbilt University in the fall of 1987, and transferred to Boston University, Massachusetts, in the spring of 1988 where he attended graduate school, working odd jobs, having kids, and eventually teaching at the Islamic Academy of New England (AINE) at the Islamic Center of New England (ICNE) in Sharon, Massachusetts. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) had sponsored Imam Masood's J-1 visa and paid for his expenses through the program, which amounted to some $85,800. He did not complete his MA degree at BU and did not return to Pakistan. Imam Masood had led prayers at the mosque in Sharon, Massachusetts, since 1998.[14] He became the imam at the ICNE in 2005. He was charged with two felony counts. First, he did not return to Pakistan for a two-year period as required under the provisions of the J-1 exchange visa. Second, he lied under oath about a lot of matters along the way.[15]

He claimed in repeated and sworn testimony that he returned to Pakistan from 1991 to 1993. He also claimed that he worked in a mosque in Faisalabad and taught Islamic Economics at the

University of Agriculture in Faisalabad, Pakistan between 1991 and 1993. He also said that he missed the birth of his son in March 1992. However, evidence showed that none of this was true. No record of his exit and re-entry to the United States existed. He later came up with a strange story that two white men and two possibly Pakistanis helped him avoid customs when he returned to the United States in 1993. These four men who were wearing suits but no badges helped him leave the airport through unmarked doors at the JFK airport. The University of Agriculture in Pakistan also denied in writing that they employed Imam Masood between 1991 and 1993. According to hospital records, he was present for his son's birth in March 1992 in Massachusetts. He was actually the translator for his wife who was discharged to his care.[16]

He had a wife and eight children of which three are U.S. citizens. Later, in December 2002, he changed his plea to guilty and agreed to return to Pakistan so that he could be spared imprisonment. He admitted that he falsely told authorities in an application for permanent legal residency that he returned to Pakistan from 1991 to 1993 after ending his studies.[17] On his return to Pakistan, he contracted a second marriage[18] and became one of the top central leaders of the JuD, the central information secretary of party.[19] In Pakistan, he boasted that he had sowed the seeds of jihad in the United States and his three U.S.-born children will carry out the JuD mission when they grow up.

Two other Massachusetts imams were also related to Hafiz Saeed. Imam Hafiz Mahmood Hamid[20] of the Islamic Society of Greater Worcester, Massachusetts, was also his younger brother, and Imam Abdul Hannan of the Islamic Society of Greater Lowell, Massachusetts, is the younger brother of Abdur Rehman Makki who is married to Hafiz Saeed's sister.[21] Hafiz Abdul Hannan was born in Pakistan in 1968. He graduated from Islamiyya University, Bahawalpur, in 1989. In 1994, the MDI started establishing Ad-Dawa Model Schools to recruit children. Hannan became one of the first employees of the ad-Dawa School System when he joined the Ad-Dawa Model School at Multan Road in Lahore as principal in 1994.[22] He went to Edmonton, Canada in 1996 at the

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invitation of the Universal Muslim Association (UMA) during Ramadan. One of his aunts was a member of the UMA. After one month, he went to New York. He led prayers at the Masjid Dar Ihya Essunnah on Ditmas Avenue in Brooklyn, New York. The mosque was in the basement of a grocery store which was owned by Mohammad Khalil who sponsored him as a religious worker. One year after starting to lead prayers at the Masjid Dar Ihya Essunnah, Hannan took a second job as a driver with a limo service "Company Car." Around 1999-2000, he stopped leading prayers at that mosque. In 2000, he got a job as an imam at the University of Rhode Island and moved to Rhode Island where he stayed till 2003. At the same time, he worked at Masjid al-Huda and Masjid al-Islam. He stayed in Rhode Island for around two-and-a-half years. He moved to Cambridge, Massachusetts, where he got a job as an imam at the Cambridge Jail and at Billerica House of Correction. Later, he worked at MCI Shirley as a permanent Muslim Imam. However, he left Shirley in 2005. In 2003, he joined the Islamic Center of Greater Lowell, Massachusetts. Later, his family also started a grocery store.

The prosecution wants Hannan's green card as well as some of his family members' revoked and have him and part of the family deported, presumably because he is or was a member of the MDI/JuD. To avoid deportation, he applied for asylum in the United States in early 2010, which has so far not been decided. Abdul Hannan's links with the MDI/JuD are not clear, though he denies any links with the MDI/JuD. It is not known how he has argued in favor of his case in his asylum application. However, it is almost impossible that a principal and teacher of the Ad-Dawa School System was not a member of the MDI/LeT. The *Mujallah ad-Dawa* and *Voice of Islam* had been regularly publishing the advertisements inviting applications for the posts of the teachers and parents to enroll their children in the Ad-Dawa School System. The articles and advertisements in the *Mujallah ad-Dawa* make it clear that the teachers and other employees of the Ad-Dawa School System have to be Salafists, have to become members of the MDI/JuD, and undergo jihadi training if they are not already members.[23] The initial advertisement clearly said that the children

would also receive militant training.[24] The candidates for positions in the Ad-Dawa School System were required to address their applications to MDI founder Zafar Iqbal who also interviewed the successful candidates.[25] The candidates were also required to send them to the MDI headquarters in Lahore.[26] He seems to have participated in *dawa* activities of the MDI. As part of the MDI *dawa* program, Hafiz Abdul Hannan led Friday prayers in village Shahkot in Sheikhupura on June 2, 1995.[27] All the teachers of the Ad-Dawa School System received jihadist training at the *Muaskar Taiba* [in Afghanistan] from June 10 to June 26, 1995. On their return to Pakistan, they were sent to Markaz Taiba at Muridke from July 3 to August 1995.[28] Two businessmen brothers from Lahore, Sheikh Nadim and Sheikh Nayeem financed the first branch of the Ad-Dawa School System at Multan Road in Lahore. However, they had no role in recruiting and running the school.[29] Shaikh Nadim and Shaikh Nayeem do clothing business and are known financers of the LeT.[30]

Hafiz Hamid Mahmood, a second brother of Hafiz Saeed, came to the United States in 2001 to attend a conference on Islamic financing at the Harvard Law School Islamic Finance Center. Hamid reportedly went back to Pakistan after six months or so where he obtained another visa to go back to the United States. There he assumed the position of imam at the Islamic Society of Greater Worcester, Massachusetts.[31] In June 2009, Hamid Mahmood suddenly stepped down as imam and returned to Pakistan with his wife, Mrs. Asna, three daughters, and two sons. The spokesman for the center, Tahir Ali, said that he decided not to seek an extension for his expired visa.[32] When the family tried to board a plane to Pakistan, which made a stopover in the United Kingdom, British authorities refused to offer him passage through London because Hamid Mahmood did not possess a valid U.S. visa.[33] His friends quickly took the entire family from Logan airport in Boston to New York, where they flew to Pakistan. Hamid Mahmood was an instructor at the Al Huda Academy in Worcester, Massachusetts (listed as Imam Hamid Mahmud).[34] Hamid Mahmood worked closely with the Islamic Society of Boston. Before moving to the United States, he was running an LeT safe

house at Moon Chowk, Lahore.[35] Hafiz Hamid Mahmood also emerged as a leading central leader of the JuD when he returned to Pakistan in 2009.

On January 11, 2008, a Boston federal court convicted Emadeddin Muntasser, Samir Almonla, and Muhammad Mubayid of conspiring to defraud and conceal information from the U.S. government. The defendants fraudulently used Care International, incorporated on April 13, 1993, "to solicit and obtain tax deductible donations for the purpose of supporting and promoting the mujahedin and jihad." The defendants concealed from U.S. authorities that Care International was a successor to the al-Kifah Refugee Center. Care International, Inc. used the same Boston address used by al-Kifah Refugee Center. Care International successfully raised approximately $1.7 million from 1993 to 2003. A clear sign of Care International's relationship with global jihadist groups is found in the group's edition of Azzam's publication, 'Join the Caravan.' Care International financial statements also reveal that from August 1993 to June 1995, Muntasser wired close to $167,000 in the name of Care International or al-Kifah Refugee Center to the Human Service Office (another name for MAK) in Bosnia. Care International publications and websites regularly provided updates on the fighting in various parts of the world where al-Qaeda movements operate, such as Chechnya, Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Algeria. News updates included glowing references to prominent terrorists and their attacks, including Chechnya's Shamil Basayev and Ibn Al-Khattab, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, among others.[36]

In April 2003, Jarwan and Al Wahaidy pleaded guilty to conspiring to violate U.S. sanctions regulations by sending money to Iraq. In April 2004, a federal grand jury indicted Dhafir on ten new counts. Dhafir was accused of, among other things, lying to donors that their money would be spent to feed starving children in Iraq. In reality, he invested the funds in his own businesses. He invested $300,000 in properties in Syracuse. A jury convicted Dhafir on 59 of the 60 federal charges against him and sentenced him to 22 years in prison in February 2005. HTN had given more than

$42,000 to the Global Relief Foundation and the Benevolence International Foundation (BIF), which were designated "global terrorist-support organizations" by the U.S. government.[37]

Al-Hussam, published by Care International also reported the jihadi exploits of Mahmoud Bahaziq. Kifah Wael Jayyousi allegedly used the 'Islam Report' to raise money for Muslim radicals through non-profit organizations such as Save Bosnia Now, which was later renamed American Worldwide Relief. Care International and the Padilla co-defendants, Jayoussi and Hassoun, worked together to arrange lectures and fund-raising events for jihads, such as in Bosnia. Both of them hosted the LeT Commander in Bosnia, Mahmoud Bahaziq. Care International was a de facto branch of Maktab al Khidimat. Court records state, "Hassoun represented at least six (6) mujahideen organizations, including Maktab al Khidimat, the mujahideen platoon in Bosnia, and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's mujahideen party (Hizb-e-Islami) in Afghanistan."[38] Kifah Wael Jayyousi was a supporter and follower of Omar Abdel Rahman, and frequently talked with the jailed sheik by telephone in 1994 and 1995. Kifah Wael Jayyousi was also a founder of the American Islamic Group (AIG).

The IANA was founded in 1993, with its headquarters in Ann Arbor, Michigan, by the representatives of various American and Canadian Muslim groups. They included CAIR Community Affairs Director, Bassem Khafagi.[39] According to the IANA website, the mission of IANA was to "unify and coordinate the efforts of North America's *dawah*-oriented organizations," to propagate the "correct knowledge of Islam ... and to assist its dissemination among Muslim Americans and immigrants," to review the current situation in the Muslim world, to help the oppressed Muslim workers and scholars, to produce "a serious and effective media institute to serve the Islamic presence in North America," to "create a *dawah* program ... that will protect the Islamic presence in North America" and to revive the "Islamic nation to its proper state and condition."[40]

In 2002, according to IANA's website, it sent 106 packages of Islamic literature, costing $100 a package, to prisons for prisoners to read as part of its *dawa* program. In 2003, the website said,

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IANA planned to send 250 more packages to prisons. Their goal, they say, was to reach 1,000 prisons.[41] From 2002 to 2007, under its Inmates program, it sent 530 packages to prisons. "Each package consists of seven different Islamic books, twelve audio cassettes, one copy of the Koran, and a videotape on Muslim prayers and rituals."[42] The total number of prisons is the United States is 4,575.[43] MDI also collected donations for prisoners in the U.S. and U.K. prisons. Through advertisements, MDI asked for donations to deliver Islamic *dawa* packages to prisoners in the United States and United Kingdom. The cost of the package was $50 for U.S. and £35 for prisons in Europe.[44] The MDI delivered these packages to prisoners with the help of the IANA.

Ali Al-Timimi and Khafagi had been IANA's representatives to the 1995 international women's conference in Beijing, where IANA argued against western feminism and defended female circumcision.[45] Al-Timimi was closely linked to British Islamist groups, particularly the Markazi Jamiat Ahle Hadith-U.K., and Jamiat Ahyaul Minhajul Sunnah. The Saudi-born former President of the IANA, Mohammed Alahmari,[46] said, "A knowledgeable Muslim will find it hard to integrate into a non-Islamic society of the United States." He revealed that about half of the money came from the Saudi government, and the rest from mostly private Saudi donors.[47] According to the FBI, IANA received $3 million since 1995.[48]

In late February 2003, the FBI arrested and indicted five officials of the Help the Needy (HTN), aka Help the Needy Endowment, a charity linked with the IANA. Four of them, Rafil Dhafir, Maher Zagha, Ayman Jarwan, and Osameh al Wahaidy were illegally transferring money to Iraq. Rafil Dhafir was a former IANA chairman. The HTN did not have a license to send assets to Iraq, which was a violation of executive orders 12722 and 12724.[49] The mission of HTN, founded in 1994, was to solicit "money for the starving and oppressed people of Iraq."[50] The accused solicited donations from people in the United States, deposited them in New York banks, and sent them to accounts in the Jordan Islamic Bank in Amman. They funneled more than $2.7 million through the Jordan Islamic Bank. Checks as large as

$100,000 were cut from the relief group for individuals located in Baghdad under the advice of Dhafir.[51] According to a Muslim website, which is sympathetic to HTN, they had sent close to $4 million to banks in Jordan "where the money was used to buy food and other materials that were then shipped into Iraq."[52]

The fifth, Sami Omar al-Hussayen, the son of a senior Saudi Education Ministry official, moved to the United States in the 1990s, and earned a master's degree at Ball State University. At the time of his arrest, he was doing his Ph.D. from the University of Idaho where he also served as head of the MSA. He received his educational expenses, plus a $2,700 monthly stipend from the Saudi government.[53] He was accused of knowingly concealing his affiliation and employment with IANA on his visa application before entering the United States. Moreover, during his stay in United States, he illegally worked for IANA, Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation, and Dar Al-Asr.[54] His trial began in April 2004 and lasted six weeks. He was acquitted of terrorism charges as well as three of the immigration violations. Other charges were dropped as he agreed to be deported to his native Saudi Arabia.[55] Referring to Al-Awdah and al-Hawali, one federal official told the *Seattle Post-Intelligencer*, "He's in touch with people who could pick up the phone, call UBL, and he would take the call." According to the FBI, Al-Hussayen reportedly raised at least $300,000 in five years for IANA. He opened six bank accounts to collect and disburse the money. About $100,000 came from his uncle, Saleh Abdel Rahman al-Hussayen.[56]

As the MDI/JuD started fundraising and continued taking roots in the U.S. society, it made some half-hearted efforts to carry out some terrorist attacks on U.S. interests in India which were foiled. On January 7, 1999, Delhi police arrested Syed Abu Nasir, a top LeT militant. The police said he had been conspiring to bomb the U.S. Consulates in Chennai and Calcutta. Soon after his arrest, FBI psychologist Frederick Gonnel reached New Delhi with an array of lie-detection equipment to interrogate Nasir. Nasir had made

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videotapes of the physical environment of the two Consulates, and of the patterns of activity around them with his cellphone camera. Nasir was a Bangladesh national and a literature graduate from Chittagong University, Bangladesh. Nasir had worked for the IIRO in 1991. Nasir was transferred to the IIRO office in Bangkok, Thailand, from where he was transferred to Lahore, Pakistan, apparently to enable him to establish contact with the LeT commander Azam Cheema, field commander Abdul Karim Tunda, and Hafiz Saeed. ISI officials Brigadier Malik and Colonel Farooq contacted him for the first time after he completed his training. The ISI officers wanted him to cross the India-Bangladesh border and gather information on the Indian Army's Eastern Command around Siliguri. Nasir settled in Siliguri under the alias Robi Bose. From there he sent reports to a Dubai address. LeT sent him back to Bangladesh in August 1998 to prepare to go to Calcutta and monitor the Eastern Command headquarters at Fort William. Nasir went to Dhaka via Kathmandu and Lahore on a Bangladesh passport. In mid-September 1998, LeT Commander Cheema called him to a meeting in Dhaka with Hafiz Saeed and the IIRO's Asia chairman, Sheikh Ahmad al-Ghamdi. In the meeting Cheema asked Nasir to make arrangements for a safe passage across the Bangladesh border for six LeT agents into India. The LeT operatives included four from Egypt, one each from Sudan and Arakan area of Myanmar. Nasir helped the group cross into India. However, New Delhi police arrested him in New Delhi, where he had gone for a brief trip. The fact that the MDI planned these attacks in Bangladesh without the presence of any ISI officials showed that the bombing plot was organized independently by the MDI. This also shows that the MDI/JuD also has its own agenda independent of the ISI.[57]

The LeT planned another attempt to target the U.S. intersts in India in 2004. The Indian security forces discovered the plot when, on August 29, 2004, they arrested eight suspected LeT cadres in Hyderabad who had allegedly planned to attack Americans visiting the state of Andhra Pradesh. The security forces also recovered explosives and other materials from them. They had planned to incite communal tensions through a series of explosions.[58] It is not

clear if they were planning with or without the consent of the JuD leadership.

As the JuD spread its network in the region, it made another attempt in 2010. In November 2010, Bangladeshi police investigators raided a madrassa in Chittagong in southern Bangladesh to arrest three men who were in contact with the LeT in Pakistan. They were planning to bomb the American, Indian, and British embassies in Dhaka. During the raid, they arrested the three as well as two others, including T. Nazeer, LeT's chief of South Asian operations. During the interrogations, they confessed to being LeT members. They also confessed that they had been receiving support from Pakistani intelligence agencies. The arrests led to a large number of arrests throughout the country.[59]

There were at least two cases where the JuD wanted to strike targets inside the United States. During the Paintball jihad trial, Masoud Khan told the FBI that LeT had previously asked him in early 2000s to case a chemical plant in Maryland.[60] Pakistani businessman and Guantanamo Bay detainee Saifullah Paracha reportedly told his U.S. interrogators that LeT was in touch with a U.S.-based al-Qaeda anthrax operative. He told authorities in 2008 that LeT's Qasmani was possibly discussing ways to acquire biological weapons and anthrax with a U.S. based pharmacist, Nazmut Tariq. Paracha told his interrogators that he and Tariq came from the same village, Nazimabad, in Pakistan. Tariq is a pharmacist and a member of Jamiat Islami lives in the United States. He owns stores in New York City and Boston.[61]

As the al-Qaeda suffered losses during the Global War on Terror in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the JuD emerged as a new truly global jihadist organization. The occupation of Afghanistan by the Coalition forces in 2001 deprived the potential international jihadists the access to a jihadist organization and a country where they could receive jihadist training. MDI/JuD has always been open to international jihadists. With al-Qaeda on the retreat after the 9/11 attacks, the international jihadists started looking towards the JuD. The westerners who have passed through the LeT's training

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camps include Australian al-Qaeda operative David Hicks, "shoe bomber" Richard Reid and Dhiren Barot. Barot was a Hindu British citizen who converted to Islam. Barot joined al-Qaeda and worked as an instructor at a mujahideen camp in Afghanistan. Barot has unsuccessfully tried to explode a gas-cylinder bomb in London. He also prepared detailed blueprints for al-Qaeda of buildings in New York's financial district.[62] In the United States, the security forces unearthed four major terrorist groups in which JuD operatives were fully involved. These four groups show how deeply the JuD has become part of the international jihadist movement and network and how fast the globalization of the jihadist movement is taking place.

In early 2003, the U.S. feds unearthed the biggest jihadi cell in the U.S., which was closely linked to the JuD. They were dubbed the Paintball Jihadists because they had played paintball war games as they radicalized. A U.S. federal court indicted eleven people in June 2003 for various offenses, some of which were related to their participation in the paintball training program. Ali Al-Timimi, the group's spiritual leader, was indicted in September 2004, and Ali Asad Chandia in September 2005.[63] Nine of them were U.S. citizens. At least seven, or possibly eight, of them had trained at LeT camps. Randall Todd Royer and Ibrahim Ahmed Al-Hamdi received jihadi training from LeT in 2000.[64] Al-Hamdi seems to have been visiting LeT camps. In his plea agreement, Khawaja Mahmood Hasan stated that he had seen Al-Hamdi fire at Indian soldiers while he was in Pakistan.[65] Seifullah Chapman went to Pakistan to receive militant training from the LeT in July 2001, and was still training at an LeT camp when the 9/11 attacks happened. Yong Ki Kwon, Khwaja Hasan, Muhammed Aatique, and Masaud Khan left to train at the LeT camps immediately after the September/ October meeting in which Al-Timimi strongly urged participants to go and train at the LeT training camps to fight against American troops even before they invaded Afghanistan. Chandia, formerly personal assistant to Al-Timimi, also trained at an LeT camp.[66]

Al-Timimi, a U.S. citizen, was found guilty on all counts. Six of them entered plea bargains. They included Aatique (a Pakistani), Al-Hamdi (a Yemeni), Khawaja Mahmood Hasan (a naturalized U.S. citizen), Kwon (a naturalized U.S. citizen), Randall Todd Royer (a U.S. citizen), and Donald Thomas Surratt (a U.S. citizen). Five of them were found guilty on some counts. They included Sabri Benkahla, Ali Asad Chandia (a U.S. citizen), Seifullah Chapman (a U.S. citizen), Masoud Ahmad Khan (a U.S. citizen), and Hammad Abdur-Raheem (a U.S. citizen). Mohammed Ajmal Khan (a British citizen), is serving a nine-year sentence in the United Kingdom. Snaresbrook Crown Court sentenced Ajmal Khan for nine years on March 17, 2006. He had pled guilty to conspiring "to enter into or become concerned in an arrangement as a result of which money or other property is made available or is to be made available for the purposes of terrorism."[67] He bought equipment on behalf of the LeT. Ajmal Khan also trained at an LeT training camp in Pakistan and held a senior role in the organization by September 2001.[68] One of them, Caliph Basha Ibn Abdur-Raheem, was found not guilty on February 21, 2004. A federal judge, Judge Brinkema, said Abdur-Raheem had a tangential role at most, and there was no evidence that he taught others to use firearms, tried to recruit fighters, or did much of anything "to further the goals of the conspiracy."[69]

It was Nabil Gharbieh who floated the idea of setting up a paintball group and playing paintball as part of jihadi training. Gharbieh and Al-Timimi discussed setting up the group at a dinner meeting in January 2000.[70] Ahmad Khan started practicing with firearms at a firing range in the town of York in Pennsylvania by January 2000.[71] Others joined him later.[72] In the beginning, they practiced at public courses but later moved to private farm land in Spotsylvania County in Virginia. Hammad Abdur-Raheem, Chapman, and Surratt led the group in jihadi training as they had prior military experience.[73] Hammad Abdur-Raheem became interested in Islam while serving in the U.S. Army, and officially converted in 1994.[74] Chapman belonged to the U.S. Marine Corps.

Royer visited Pakistan in April 2000 with the intention of receiving militancy training at an LeT camp. However, he abandoned

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the idea when he found out that militancy training lasted longer than he could afford to stay in Pakistan. He offered LeT to start "Taiba Bulletin," an internet based newsletter for the LeT. The offer was accepted and he started the Taiba Bulletin on April 20, 2000.[75] On August 20, 2000, Al-Hamdi left for Pakistan to receive militant training from the LeT, which had accepted him at the recommendation of Royer. He returned to the U.S. on September 25, 2000. They stopped paintball practices in late October 2000, as it was difficult to use camouflage clothes in the winter. They restarted in spring 2001 and again stopped on September 11, 2001. In a meeting at the house of Al-Timimi on October 15, 2001, Al-Hamdi talked about his experience at the LeT camp in Pakistan. He and Al-Timimi encouraged Surratt, Hammad Abdur-Raheem, and Caliph Basha Ibn Abdur-Raheem to go to Pakistan and train at an LeT camp. At another meeting in December 2001, Royer and Al-Hamdi encouraged Surratt, Hammad Abdur-Raheem, and Caliph Basha Ibn Abdur-Raheem to join the LeT in Pakistan.[76]

On September 11, 2001, Al-Timimi, the unindicted conspirator till then, asked Kwon to invite the group at his house on September 15, 2001. They made every effort to keep the meeting secret. They even drew the blinds and curtains on the windows and disconnected the telephones from the walls.[77] Al-Timimi told Royer, Mahmood Hasan, Masoud Ahmad Khan, Aatique, Hammad Abdur-Raheem, and Caliph Basha Ibn Abdur-Raheem[78] that, after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, U.S. soldiers had become legitimate targets for Muslims, and they should join the LeT in Kashmir, Chechnya, Afghanistan, and Indonesia. Al-Timimi told them that the country was at war with Islam and they should leave the United States.[79] Al-Timimi read Sheikh Humood Bin Uqla Ash-Shu'aibi' s Fatwa in Arabic entitled, *in Arabic on the Recent Events*, which stated in part that it was the duty of Muslims to assist Afghans against the expected U.S. military invasion.[80] Al-Timimi told them that that Royer could help them join the LeT and receive training at their camps in Pakistan. Kwon, Mahmood Hasan, Ahmad Khan, and Mohammed Aatique agreed to join the LeT[81] with the intent to join the Taliban and fight against the United States. Royer called his contacts in the LeT in Pakistan to inform them that they were going to get militant

training. On September 20, 2001, Ahmad Khan and Aatique, who had already planned to visit Pakistan for family reasons, reached Pakistan. On September 22, 2001, Kwon and Mahmood Hasan also reached Pakistan.[82] In September 2001, Aatique left for Pakistan. Chapman also left for Pakistan in the same month to train at a LeT training camp at the recommendation of Royer.[83]

The FBI arrested Chandia on September 15, 2005 from Maryland. Chandia and Ajmal Khan, a British citizen, were charged with providing material support to LeT. Ajmal Khan was a senior LeT official and was arrested by British law-enforcement forces. The prosecution alleged that Chandia and Ajmal Khan had met at an LeT office in Pakistan in late 2001. Khan allegedly visited the U.S. in 2002 and 2003 to purchase equipment for the LeT, both times with the help of Chandia.[84] Kwon testified that he had met Chandia at an LeT office in Lahore, Pakistan soon after Kwon had received militant training at an LeT training camp.[85]

Al-Timimi was born in Washington, D.C. His father worked as a lawyer for the Iraqi Embassy. He moved with his family to Saudi Arabia at the age of 15 years. He returned to the United States and did his Ph.D. in computational biology from George Mason University. Al-Timimi taught Islamic Studies in northern Virginia. He was also associated with the IANA.[86] Al-Timimi had been a member of the MDI/LeT international network since 1994, if not earlier, when he shared podiums with Hafiz Saeed at several Islamic conferences in the United States. According to one MDI official, Hafiz Saeed and Al-Timimi discussed establishing the MDI network in the United States during the former's visit in 1994.[87] Al-Timimi again met with Hafiz Saeed and other MDI leaders in August 1995 when the Markazi Jamiat Ahle Hadith-U.K., and Jamiat Ahyaul Minhajul Sunnah-U.K. held Islamic Dawa Conferences in the United Kingdom invited them to speak at these conferences.[88] Al-Timimi was a frequent speaker at the Islamic conference organized by the Markazi Jamiat Ahle Hadith-U.K. and Jamiat Ahyaul Minhajul Sunnah-U.K.[89] In the United Kingdom, Hafiz Saeed and Al-Timimi discussed establishing the MDI network worldwide.[90]

Royer took leave from college in 1994 to fight alongside the

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Muslims in Bosnia. In 1994-95, he joined Kateeba al-Mujahideen. Later, he joined the Abu Zubair group, which was made up of Saudi Arabians. Both battalions were commanded by Mahmoud Bahaziq. He underwent a six-week long training with the Abu Zubair group and participated in several battles. In 1999, he went to Macedonia with the intention to fight for the Albanian Muslims against Serb forces in Kosovo. However, he could not get into Kosovo and had to return to the United States.[91] Royer was a Missouri-born Muslim convert. He was associated with the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) and the Muslim American Society (MSA).[92]

Abdur Raheem was preoccupied with Chechnya before 1999 and set up a business under the name of Chechen Zakat, based in Washington D.C. Although it was a charitable business, in an email to a Chechen officer, Abdur Raheem asked for assistance to the Chechen mujahideen. "Officially, I am helping the refugees of Chechenia. In reality, however, I am helping the Mujahideen. ... When I send money, I must send it in small amounts at a time to avoid attracting the enemies of Islam. ... Also, after you have read the messages please erase them. I really don't need the wrong person getting a copy of the messages."[93]

In January 2000, Royer and Al-Hamdi also decided to go to Chechnya and fight for the Chechen Muslims. Al-Hamdi had unsuccessfully attempted to join the Chechen fighter in the past but Chechen Muslims did not accept Al-Hamdi because he was not trained to fight. Hence, the two decided to go to Pakistan and give Al-Hamdi training from the LeT, and to see if they could find contacts to reach Chechnya. Al-Hamdi could not obtain the Pakistani visa as he had a diplomatic passport. Consequently, Royer had to travel alone to Pakistan. Royer had no contacts in Pakistan and depended on the telephone number he had got from the internet. He reached Lahore on April 10, 2000. After verifying his identity and his story that he had fought in Bosnia, the LeT representative assured him that they could send him to Chechnya. As it took longer than he expected, Royer agreed to establish a bulletin board for the LeT on the internet. By April 20, 2000, he had set it up. During his stay, he

visited *muaskars* Ibne Taymiyaa, Aqsa, and Abdullah bin Masood. He also went to the LoC and fired at the Indian positions, and visited the graveyard of non-Pakistani mujahideen who had died in Kashmir fighting with LeT. On April 29, 2000, Royer returned to Lahore and spent a few days at the LeT office. He left Pakistan on May 3, 2000 and rejoined his wife in Bosnia. From Bosnia, he travelled back to the United States. There, Royer continued to edit the Taiba Bulletins. He also started a separate Yahoo! Group, "Islamic Renewal," to discuss the LeT and its jihad. He wrote and co-authored a number of messages and articles both on the Taiba Bulletin and Islamic Renewal.[94]

After he returned to Virginia in July 2000, Royer told Hammad Abdur-Raheem, Caliph Basha, Kwon, and others, his experience with the LeT in Pakistan, including his firing at Indian positions. He first played paintball with Chapman, Hammad Abdur-Raheem, and Caliph Basha Abdur-Raheem. He attended other paintball exercises over the next year.[95] Royer also created an e-list to which he sent news about the Muslim world to Kwon, Hasan, Al-Hamdi, Chapman, Hammad Abdur-Raheern, Caliph Basha, and others. Some of those news reports included reports about LeT activities in India.[96] By August 2000, Al-Hamdi had resolved his passport problem. Royer called his contact in LeT. and recommended Al-Hamdi's name for militant training, and possibly a chance to fight with the LeT in Kashmir. Al-Hamdi returned from Pakistan in late September 2000. He even went on a short mission with LeT fighters inside Indian Kashmir and fired rocket-propelled grenades and automatic weapons at Indian troops.[97]

In March 2001, Royer, Kwon, Surratt, and others went to Saudi Arabia to perform *hajj*. Royer introduced Kwon and Surratt to a representative of the LeT in Mecca. In Saudi Arabia, Royer also bought a lot of videotapes featuring jihad in places like Chechnya, Bosnia, Kashmir, and Indonesia. On his return to the United States, he watched these video tapes, along with other members of the group, including Hammad Abdur-Raheem, Caliph Basha, and Chapman.[98] In August 2001, Royer called his contact in Pakistan and recommended Chapman for training. When Chapman returned to the United States, he narrated his experience

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at the training camp. He did not have the chance to fight in Kashmir. In July 2001, Aatique also decided to go to Pakistan and train at an LeT camp. Royer called his contact in Pakistan and informed him about Aatique's desire. He also gave Aatique a letter of reference for the LeT. Aatique arrived in Pakistan in September 2001.[99]

At a dinner at Kwon's house, Royer told the attendees that he could help anyone wanting to go to Pakistan and train at an LeT camp. Kwon and Hasan showed their interest in going to train in the LeT camp. Royer called his LeT contact and gave him the physical descriptions of Kwon and Hasan who wanted to go to Pakistan. Later, Royer gave Kwon and Hasan instructions and telephone numbers to call when they reach Pakistan. On September 19, 2001, Aatique and Khan left for Pakistan to train at the LeT camp. The next day, Kwon and Hasan also left for Pakistan. In late September 2001, Royer and Al-Hamdi encouraged Hammad Abdur-Raheem, Caliph Basha, and Donald Surratt to go to an LeT camp. By September 2001, Royer decided to go to Pakistan and join the LeT. On September 28, 2001, the FBI told Royer's attorneys that they wanted to speak to him. This alerted him. He bought an air ticket to Bosnia the same day and left the United States on October 1, 2001. He took one of his children with him. His wife and two other children joined him a week later. He could not obtain a Pakistani visa.[100] As he failed to get a Pakistani visa, he returned to the U.S. on April 26, 2002.[101]

In October 2001, Kwon, Khwaja Hasan, and Masoud Khan travelled to one of the LeT camps in Muzzafarabad where Masoud Khan, Aatique, Khwaja Hasan, and Kwon each fired an "AK-47 rifle, a 12mm antiaircraft gun, a machine gun, and a rocket-propelled grenade" as part of their training to fight for Islam.

In 2002, Sajid Mir sent his British quartermaster, Abu Khalid, on four trans-Atlantic trips. According to an email sent by Abu Khalid, Abu Khalid worked with three of the Virginia militants, including Masoud Khan. They helped Abu Khalid purchase "an unmanned airborne vehicle and more paintballs than the U.S. Marine Corps needs for a year of drills."[102] Sajid Mir's buying spree continued till mid-2003 when U.S. police arrested the group. Ajmal

Khan, using the email johninformation@yahoo.co.uk, requested Masoud Khan on November 28, 2002 for help in ordering "MP1000SYS airplane control module and a large quantity of paint ball equipment, including eight paintball guns and 50,000 paintballs." On December 5, 2002, Masoud Khan bought eight paintball guns from Xtreme Fulfilment, a company based in Dayton, Ohio. He paid $1,278. Xtreme Fulfilment shipped the consignment the next day. On December 17, 2002, Masoud Khan bought 50,000 paintballs from Xtreme Fulfilment for $819. Xtreme Fulfillment shipped the order the next day. On March 13, 2003, Chandia and Ajmal Khan sent 21 boxes containing paintballs to Lahore through Inter Global Systems (IGS), an international shipping company located in Sterling, Virginia. On March 18, 2003, Ajmal Khan left the United States for Pakistan.[103]

Benkahla's case was different from the other ten defendants. He went to England in the summer of 1999, and, from there, to Pakistan, accompanied by a man called 'Abdullah.' In August 1999, he was accused of crossing into Afghanistan where he attended an LeT training camp. While at the camp, he fired an AK-47 and a rocket-propelled grenade launcher. The U.S. had not designated the LeT as a terrorist group by then. When U.S. law enforcement agencies broke the group in 2003, Benkahla had been studying Islamic law in Saudi Arabia. He had been traveling with Ahmed Omar Abu Ali, a friend from Dar al-Arqam and a member of al-Qaeda. Ahmed Omar Abu Ali was later convicted of, among other crimes, conspiracy to assassinate the U.S. President.[104] Ultimately, having waived his right to a jury trial, Benkahla appeared before the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia for a bench trial in March 2004.

The trial court's verdict indicated that he had received jihadist training, either in Pakistan or Afghanistan. The court stated that "[i]f the standard of proof for the government were by a preponderance of the evidence, I would be able to find this defendant guilty."[105] However, since prosecutors could not identify the camp in Afghanistan, nor could they establish that Benkahla had provided material support to the Taliban, there was insufficient evidence to convict him in the court's judgment. Benkahla was

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acquitted in March 2004 but Benkahla was subpoenaed within a few weeks. The government convened two grand juries to look into allegations of providing material support to terrorists. The government later compelled Benkahla to testify before both grand juries. The FBI agents met with him several times in ancillary proceedings, with immunity from criminal prosecution for truthful testimony.[106]

During the proceedings between March and November 2004, the government no longer insisted on the location of the jihadist camp. Benkahla still denied attending any such camp anywhere. In 2006, the government indicted Benkahla for making false material declarations to the two grand juries, obstructing justice on account of false declarations, and making false material statements to the FBI. Benkahla was accused of false denials that "he had participated in a jihadist training camp somewhere in August 1999; that he had handled weapons while there and observed others doing the same; and that he knew about the various people he had communicated with about training for jihad (such as "Abdullah," Al-Timimi, and other persons of interest to the FBI in terrorism-related investigations)." Benkahla tried to dismiss on collateral estoppel grounds but lost. The case went to a jury in January and February 2007.[107] The jury convicted Benkahla on all counts. However, it acquitted him of some particular allegations of falsehood. However, the court struck count II in the post-trial motions concerning whether Benkahla handled weapons at the camp.[108]

In a sting operation on May 28, 2005, the FBI arrested Tarik Shah, an expert in the Japanese art and culture of hand-to-hand combat and knife and stick fighting, and Rafi Sabir, a "doctor" who lived in Florida. They had agreed to be recruited for the jihad by an undercover FBI agent on March 4 and 5, 2004. Shah again met the undercover agent on April 1, 2, 2004 in Florida. Shah was ready to give martial arts training to jihadists and Dr. Rafi Sabir agreed to provide medical assistance to them. Shah told the undercover FBI agent that he had trained many jihadists in martial arts in the past as well. Shah had also given training to Mahmud

Faruq Brent, aka Mahmud Al Mutazzim, in the summer of 2001 and lived in the vicinity of Baltimore, Maryland. Shah had also studied with a mujahid who had previously fought a war in Malaysia in 1969. Shah had met Chapman who, along with two of his co-conspirators, was convicted in the Eastern District of Virginia on March 4, 2004, in D.C., through the paramedic. In about 2002, Al Mutazzim returned to the United States and told Shah that he had gone to a camp but did not specify to Shah what camp it had been. Al Mutazzim indicated that he had traveled to Pakistan. He entered Lahore, Pakistan, on February 25, 2002, and departed from Lahore, Pakistan, on June 4, 2002.[109]

On October 2005, British police arrested three members of a secret U.K. cyber cell: Younis Tsouli and Waseem Mughal, who holds a biochemistry degree from the University of Leicester, and Tariq al-Daour, a naturalized British citizen of Jordanian origin and a former law student, in England in October 2005. The charges against Tsouli and Mughal included conspiracy to murder and conspiracy to cause an explosion when they were indicted in November 2006. Al-Daour was charged with terror financing charges. On July 4, 2007, they were sentenced: Tsouli to 16 years, Mughal to 12 years, and Al-Daour to 10 years. Tsouli, the central player in the online network, used the alias of "Irhaby007," or "Terrorist007." He registered 180 website domains in Europe and the United States. According to the Crown Prosecution Service, Tsouli and his cell used those 180 websites "to publish daily statements and films of the murder of coalition forces, police, officials and civilians together with footage of the beheading of hostages."[110] Tsouli also administered 65 chat forums, including the Muntada al-Ansar al-Islami chat forum, Al Qaeda in Iraq's mouthpiece at that time.[111] The Crown Prosecution Service claimed that Tsouli used the forum to recruit terrorists who became "acquainted, inspired and educated from the explosives and weapons manuals and presentations, shared and available for downloading."[112]

This case is a good example of how the jihad had been

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globalized in a global village. Soon after the arrests of the U.K. cyber cell members, West Yorkshire Police officers began observing the activities of Bradford man Aabid Khan who had worked on one of Tsouli's key websites at Tibyan. Meanwhile, in the United States the Feds had been watching two young men of South Asian origin. They were discussing targeting the global positioning system. They had emailed Tsouli and Aabid Khan reconnaissance footage they filmed of targets in Washington, D.C. Aabid Khan met one of the men in Pakistan to arrange terrorism training. In Canada, officials started watching another group linked to the cell, which was considering attacking the Canadian Parliament. Khan reportedly discussed online to some of them about setting up a mini-Sharia state in a remote part of Scotland. Later, Scottish police arrested Mohammed Atif Siddique, a student, just before he boarded a flight to Pakistan to join Aabid Khan. Aabid Khan was grooming and radicalizing Siddique.[113]

In March and April 2006, the FBI arrested two members of a U.S.-based cell, Syed Haris Ahmed and Ehsanul Islam Sadequee, who were connected to the U.K. cyber cell on the internet. Haris Ahmed was born in Pakistan and naturalized in the United States. He was an engineering student at Georgia Tech. Sadequee was born in Fairfax, Virginia, in 1986 in a Bangladeshi family. They networked with young Muslims in the U.S. who wanted to engage in jihad. In early 2005, they decided to contact young Muslims in Canada. On March 6, 2005, both Haris Ahmed and Sadequee travelled to Toronto from Atlanta to contact young Muslims there. In Canada, they regularly held meetings with three men who were being monitored for terrorism by the FBI.[114] Reports have identified two of those individuals as Fahim Ahmad and Jahmaal James.[115] The third person was likely British-Pakistani Aabid Khan, aka Abu Umar, who was arrested at Manchester Airport in England in June 2006 when he returned from Pakistan.[116] Like in America, they discussed how to disrupt the worldwide Global Positioning System, attack military facilities, including Dobbins Air Reserve Base in Marieeta, Georgia, and oil refineries.[117]

The pair went to Washington D.C. in April 10-11 2005 and recorded casing videoclips of symbolic and potential terrorist attack

targets, including the Capitol Building and the Pentagon. They also videotaped the Masonic Temple in Alexandria, Virginia, and a group of large oil storage tanks near I-95 in Northern Virginia. The objective was to establish their credentials with jihadist groups including, the LeT. Sadequee conveyed these videoclips to Tsouli over the internet.[118] Tsouli, a London resident who is considered an online recruiter for al-Qaeda in Iraq, is serving a ten-year prison sentence for inciting murder on the Internet. "A copy of the video also wound up with another of the men's Internet contacts, Abid Hussain Khan, who faces terrorism charges in England." "At least five of the acquaintances the men made on the Internet have subsequently been charged in terrorism cases in the United States and abroad."[119]

Ahmed travelled to Pakistan on July 17, 2005 with the goal of receiving paramilitary training and waging jihad in Kashmir and elsewhere. Sadequee had acquired the contact information of an LeT official, Abu Umar, in Pakistan who would help him. In Pakistan, he met with Abid Hussein Khan to discuss joining the LeT.[120] However, his cousins and some Islamic teachers dissuaded him from taking this step. "They, like, put some sense into me," he later recounted. Ahmed came back the next month, August 2005.[121] He did not join the LeT, but did not abandon the way of jihad either. According to the indictment, he did research on powerful explosives. Over the next few months, the indictment says, Ahmed told two friends he wanted to go back abroad "to train for and engage in violent jihad." Sadequee left for Bangladesh on August 18, 2005. The purpose of his travel was to get married, further his schooling, and engage in jihad. In the lining of his suitcase, Sadequee had concealed two CD-ROMs: one containing a pornographic video, and the other, encrypted files. He also carried a map of Washington, D.C., that included all potential terrorist targets he and Ahmed had videotaped during their trip on April 10-11, 2005.[122]

On his return from Pakistan, Ahmed started suspecting that he and his accomplices were under government surveillance, which prompted him to do research on how to avoid this. He used all of these methods to avoid government surveillance. He stopped

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all his contacts to avoid the subject of jihad during discussions on the telephone. He did research on shaped explosive charges. In early 2006, Ahmed again made up his mind to go to Pakistan and try to join the LeT. In early 2006, the Joint Terrorism Task force interviewed him, which put him on alert. In return, Ahmed alerted Sadequee and advised him not to come back to the United States.[123] However, before Ahmed could go back to Pakistan, the FBI arrested him. FBI arrested Sadequee from Bangladesh on April 20, 2006. Ahmed told the FBI that initially his goal was to get military-style training to help oppressed Muslims in Kashmir. He said they were brainwashed from the internet. Ahmed said he was influenced by Internet radicals urging Muslims to "do something" in Washington. The pair had talked about attacking an oil installation in America. Ahmed said oil is "Muslim property and it's being stolen." He said that an attack would "raise the prices so that people over there will get more money".[124]

In June 2006, Canada busted a large terrorist network commonly known as 2006 Ontario terror Plot. They arrested 17 cell members, including Fahim Ahmad and Jahmaal James. The alleged leader was a friend of Aabid Khan's. The men deny terrorism charges in an ongoing case. The cell was planning to buy three tons of ammonium nitrate[125] and other components to make bombs. In June 2006, West Yorkshire Police and other British law enforcement units conducted raids at different places in London, Manchester, Bradford, and Dewsbury in the United Kingdom. This came to be known as Operation Praline. They arrested Sultan Mohammed, and old Hammaad Munshi. They also arrested 22-year old de-facto cell leader Aabid Khan at Manchester International Airport as he returned from Pakistan on June 6, 2006.[126] They were all British nationals. A jury trial at Blackfriars Crown Court in London found all three of them guilty of terrorism-related charges. Aabid Khan and Sultan Mohammed were sentenced to twelve and ten years respectively,[127] Aabid Khan posted on the Al-Tibbyan website and developed relationships with other members of the network. He was visiting Canada at the same time as Ahmed and Sadequee. He helped Jahmaal James attend an LeT training in Pakistan.[128]

Aabid Khan married Fahim Ahmad's sister-in-law, Saima Mohammad, herself an Islamist radical. They revealed this only after they were well into their courtship which was reflected in the public discussions on the jihadi chatrooms. Saima wished to follow the example of Hawaa Barayev, the Chechen female suicide bomber. Fahim and Aabid Khan supported her.[129]

In late 2004, the group decided to get militant training in Pakistan or Afghanistan. On June 30, 2005, Aabid Khan flew to Pakistan, apparently by himself, and returned after three months. Later, he insisted he went to marry a Pakistani cousin and visit. In June 2006, an explosives test on Aabid Khan and his belongings gave a positive result.[130] Aabid Khan was in the second phase of his plan of launching coordinated terrorist attacks before he undertook his 2005 trip to Pakistan. The laptop of Aabid Khan had two files, which were created in April 2005, and contained compressed clips of crude covert reconnaissance footage of would-be terrorist targets in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area, including the World Bank and a local Masonic. These were the same two video clips made by Ehsanul Sadequee and Syed Haris Ahmed, and described in a superseding criminal indictment filed by federal prosecutors in July 2006 in Atlanta, Georgia. The hard drive of Aabid Khan's laptop, seized in June 2006, "contained detailed images, charts and technical data on the London Underground, the London and Tower Bridges, the Washington D.C. Metro system, the New York City subway system, bridges and tunnels leading into Manhattan, truck routes in boroughs surrounding Manhattan, the New York financial district, the U.S. Capitol building, the White House, the Washington Monument, the World Bank headquarters, Masonic temples in the Washington D.C. area, the D.C. Marine Barracks, and the Golden Gate Bridge in San Francisco."[131] Aabid Khan once again left for Pakistan in January 2006 and returned on June 6 the same year. At the airport, he failed the explosives residue test. Aabid Khan's Toshiba laptop drive contained "one of the largest and most extensive collections of al-Qaida terrorist propaganda ever encountered in a single criminal investigation."[132]

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The case of Jubair Ahmad, a trained JuD terrorist, shows how desperate the JuD is about having operatives in the West. Jubair Ahmad, born in Sialkot in 1987, moved to the U.S. in February 2007 with his family and settled in Woodbridge, Virginia.[133] Jubair Ahmad communicated with Talha Saeed, Hafiz Saeed's son, on September 25, 2010. Talha Saeed asked him to prepare a video with a prayer by Hafiz Saeed calling for support for jihad. He was to show "a variety of violent images on the video while Hafiz Muhammad Saeed's prayer is heard in the background." Talha Saeed asked him to begin the video "with a number of pictures of Hafiz Muhammad Saeed, then show scenes where atrocities have been inflicted on Muslims, followed by the activities of the mujahideen in Kashmir."[134] Jubair Ahmad entitled it *'Hafiz Muhammad Saeed Qunoot e Nazila Very Emotional'* and uploaded an LeT propaganda video on September 25, 2010. The five-minute video is a compilation of "pictures and video clips spliced together, with a prayer dictated by the leader of LeT, Hafiz Saeed audibly heard in the background. Although the prayer is not in English, the words 'mujahideen' and 'jihad' can be heard throughout. The video includes images of JuD leader Hafiz Saeed, so called jihadi martyrs, and armored trucks exploding after having been hit by Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). At different points in the video, a number of terrorist logos can be seen, one of which is commonly used by LeT."[135] The same day, Jubair Ahmad called Talha Saeed and informed him about the posted video. Talha Saeed instructed Jubair Ahmad to include some picture of Hafiz Saeed being arrested and put under house arrest. Talha Saeed also instructed him not to include any photographs of Mumbai attacks.

In early October, 2010, Talha Saeed again contacted Ahmed and asked him to edit the video. In lengthy instructions, he asked him to remove the words 'Lashkar-e-Taiba' from the images in the video. Talha Saeed also asked him to show pictures of the mujahideen whenever the word 'jihad' was spoken in the prayers instead of too many pictures of Kashmir. Jubair Ahmad uploaded the revised version of the video on October 16, 2010. The video was titled *'Qunoot e nazila* by Hafiz Muhammad Saeed – Very Emotional'. The editing result in a much gorier video The edited

video is also a compilation of pictures and videos with a prayer by Hafiz Saeed in the background. "There is a picture of a dead Middle Eastern man lying on the sidewalk with blood under his chin, followed by a picture of a dead Middle Eastern man with a bullet hole in his neck. Four military soldiers are seen surrounding what appears to be three dead or injured individuals. Also shown is a detainee at the Abu Ghraib military detention facility in Iraq, wearing a hood and a poncho, standing on a box. The video also contains a picture of a naked Middle Eastern prisoner in a defensive position in front of U.S. soldiers, one of whom is restraining an attack dog."[136]

Before immigrating to the U.S., Jubair Ahmad had completed *daura-e aama* and *daura-e suffa* in 2004. He was admitted in the *daura-e khasa* but the instructors found him too young for commando training and sent him back after a week to continue his studies. Jubair Ahmad pleaded guilty to taking instructions from Talha Saeed and producing a violent jihadist video.[137] He was sentenced in April 13, 2012 to 12 years in prison for providing material support to the LeT.[138]

Some of the American members of the MDI/JuD are recent converts to Islam. MDI literature has occasionally mentioned them. One such American convert was Abu Waqas.[139] Abu Waqas was born in a very unhappy family in 1953. He converted to Islam in 1977 and started *tabligh* (preaching). The first person he converted to Islam was his girlfriend who he married. He went to Pakistan in 1985 but returned without going to Afghanistan. He came back in 1987 to Pakistan and went to Afghanistan to fight the Soviets. Later, he joined MDI.[140]

In April 1992, a recent convert to Islam visited the Markaz Taiba. He had disposed off everything in the United States and came to live in Pakistan and wage jihad, along with his wife and children. (It is not clear if he married the same Malaysian Muslim girl.) The first name of Umar Abdullah was Stephen. He was 32 years old in 1992. He had four sons and one daughter. After converting to Islam, Abdullah changed his eldest son's name to

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Muslim and adopted the *kunya* (honorific title or teknonym) of Abu Muslim. Abdullah was a resident of New Mexico where he worked in a factory that manufactured ship/airplane engines. He had tattoos of flowers on both arms. He had three children from his first marriage. After divorcing his first wife, he went to Malaysia in about 1988. In Malaysia, he proposed to a Muslim girl who refused to marry him before he converted to Islam. He returned to America, studied Islam, and converted to Islam. He was influenced by "al-Jihad," published by Khadamat of Abdullah Azzam and the Jihadi Islam.[141]

There is another one about whom we know in some detail. An American-born martyr, Abu Adam Jibreel, aka Abu Adam Jibreel al-Amreeki, went to train at the LeT training camp in November 1997. He was 19 years old at that time[142] and born in a well off family in Atlanta, Georgia.[143] He apparently converted to Islam in North Carolina Central University in Durham.[144] Apparently, in his mid-teens, he started going to the impoverished West End mosque in Atlanta, which was run by Imam Jamil al-Amin, "once known as radical civil rights activist H. Rap Brown."[145] In early 2002, Imam Al-Amin was convicted of murdering a sheriff's deputy. Abu Adam Jibreel appears to have been an African-American from the physical appearance given by Abdur Raheem As-Siddiqi. As-Siddiqi writes, "At this time he was still keeping dreadlocks as he was new to Islam and didn't know about its prohibition."[146] He started spending more and more time in the mosque and prayers. Along with prayers, he started physical training as well, including running and other exercises. He would run only in his danners that he had bought. He received a lot of help from a former U.S. army ranger in his neighborhood. He left for Kashmir in November 1997 and participated in a four-month commando training program at the LeT camp. He received frostbite on his feet during training. He also contracted serious stomach disease because of the unhygienic food he consumed. He crossed into Indian Kashmir in spring or summer of 1997, and died during a militant operation against the Indian army in Doda in Jammu the same year.[147] When news of his death reached Atlanta, his older sister, Lisa, decided to convert to Islam.[148] In the late 1990s, ICNA

held an award ceremony conference in Georgia in his memory and honor.

JuD's jihad against the United States or any other western country is different from al-Qaeda's jihad. Instaed of carrying out terrorist attacks on the United States like the al-Qaeda, the JuD seems to be planning to convert a section of society to Salafism before it launches full fledged jihadist attacks on it. For the JuD, missionary work and fundraising in the western world are more important at this time. JuD is unlikely to start a jihad before there are some Salafist governments in other parts of the world.

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CHAPTER TWELVE

CONDITIONING FOR JIHAD

Unlike other jihadist groups, the MDI/JuD is basically a prosely tizing group, for whom jihad is just another instrument of proselytizing. If they cannot convert anybody to the Salafist creed in a peaceful way, they are ready to use force for this purpose. The founders of the MDI took a lot of care to emphasize this in the names they chose: Markaz Dawat wal Irshad and Jamatud Dawah. Neither includes words such as *lashkar*, *sipah*, and *jihad*. They even made sure not to use words such as *harakat* and *hizb*. Soon after its foundation in 1987, the MDI started organizing public meetings to recruit people and fundraise.[1] This strategy continues to this day. These meetings are either as small as neighborhood meetings held at the local mosque or the MDI unit office and lasting only few hours, or as large as the three-day national annual congregation. The local meetings last a few hours while the national congregations last as long as three days. Depending on the level of these public meetings, the MDI gathers as many people as possible. These meetings are addressed by the national leaders and the best local leaders. Once the meeting is over, the local JuD workers make every effort to remain in touch with the participants. Those who take out some time to attend the JuD meetings are likely to give their lives or money to the JuD.[2]

Once these meetings are over, the local MDI cadres come into action. The primary duty of each member of the MDI is to attract new potential recruits to the group. The first step is to make friends with potential recruits. Very often they are found among

the audience at these meetings. The local unit office in the village or the neighborhood is responsible for that. This is done by meeting with people in the mosques or bazaars. Once the first contact is made, the MDI member gives one of the publications, very often one of the following: *Mujallah Ad-Dawah/Mujallah al-Haramain* or *Ghazwa Times/Jehad Times/Jarrar*, and requests his presence at some forthcoming meeting. For of women, they give out *Tayyabat/Al Sifat*, and for students, *Zarb-e-Taiba/Akhbaar-e-Taiba*. If the potential recruit cannot read or is blind,[3] they are given cassettes or CDs about the MDI/JuD. After the potential recruit feels at ease, he is invited to a *muaskar* on a study tour, which lasts between one and three days. During his brief stay at the *muaskar*, he is supposed to live the life of a trainee mujahid and taste the life he would be leading if he became a member.[4]

At the *muaskar*, the potential recruit is extremely busy. The first thing he learns is that he is in a *muaskar* (military cantonment) and not a training camp. The idea is that he is there not just to get militant training, but also to learn and practice a certain lifestyle.[5] The day starts with the call for *fajr* prayers (pre-dawn prayers). Everybody is supposed to say his prayers in congregation within minutes after waking up. Once the congregational prayers come to an end, the security guards are replaced so they can also say their prayers. *Fajr* prayers are followed by lectures on the Quran and breakfast. After breakfast, one of the trainers takes the group to the training ground for hands-on training in light arms, particularly in handling Kalashnikovs. They are also taught about other weapons they would be handling if they joined the MDI/JuD, including IEDs. Throughout the day, the hands-on training in weapons is followed by lectures on the Quran and vice versa. There are some lectures in which visitors are told about the jihad LeT is waging in Indian Kashmir. These lectures are full of anecdotes of atrocities committed by the Indian army, such as ripping out unborn babies from the wombs of pregnant Muslim women, and waving their bodies on their bayonets. Most visitors are quite impressed with the LeT by the end of the visit. Some of them agree to immediately join and many others pledge to give donations when they return.[6]

The MDI/JuD literature also carries a lot of such propaganda material, which emphasizes Muslim victimhood. Here is what Amir Hamza wrote in the *Voice of Islam*,

> "The wife of Abdul Salam, a school teacher was taken away from her house and her clothes were ripped into pieces, she was kicked out in the bazaar and beaten mercilessly but despite that, the brave woman escaped from their custody. Instead of being ashamed of their conduct, the Indian soldiers took away an aged relative of that lady. The soldiers threw that old man in their vehicle and returned to their camp. The old man was forced to drink urine and eat stool with other dirty things for about ten days in a camp situated at Patten. Daily he was beaten on the sensitive and lean parts of his body. Indian soldiers also threw petrol and chilies on his wounds and in his eyes. In cold nights of Kashmir where temperature sometimes comes down to minus-20 degree centigrade, that old man was forced to stand-up stark naked in a ground. Even after that the soldiers did every Satanic thing with that man, whose only fault was that he was a relative of that brave woman"[7]

At the end of some public rallies of the JuD, someone suddenly comes forward carrying a newly born baby, and announces he is donating the baby to the JuD for jihad. He then requests the presiding speaker, such as Hafiz Saeed, to accept the baby for jihad in the name of Allah. Very often the person donating the baby is the real father or a close relative of the baby, like an uncle, or in some cases the mothers. The presiding speaker without exception takes the baby in his arms and announces to accept the baby for jihad. This scene is unmistakably staged, but it pressures and convinces others to do the same. The baby is given back to the parents or the guardians to raise him/her in accordance with MDI/JuD principles with the help of JuD missionaries. This opens the doors for the JuD workers to the family which is also converted to the Salafist creed. The December 2008 issue of *Ghazva* claimed that more than 4,500 Pakistani mothers had donated one son each,

and 83 mothers had donated two sons each to the JuD in 2008.[8] In other words, 4,583 families had converted to the JuD creed by that time through this method.

The JuD does not hesitate to use immoral and criminal ways to recruit young boys and even kids. The *Express Tribune* reported in November 2011 that TJuD, the student wing of the JuD, deceives the parents with the help of the administration and teachers of some private schools in order to bring students to its public rallies. Students participating in a JuD rally in Lahore, some as young as ten, told the *Express Tribune* reporter that the schools had informed their parents that they would be going to a science exhibition in Faisalabad, nearly three hours' drive from Lahore. These students came from the Jhumra Sandal Islamic School, Faisalabad, and Tameer-i-Seerat Model School, Sharaqpur, nearly two hours' drive from Lahore. Instead, they were brought to Lahore to participate in a JuD rally and learn about jihad. One of the students gave the *Express Tribune* a form titled 'Field Trip Permission' that was signed by his mother. It read, "Dear Parent or Guardian, 'Your child is going on a field trip. Please read the information at the top of this form, then sign and return the permission slip at the bottom of this form." The form says that the students would go to a science exhibition at Al-Mizan School, Faisalabad, and return by 3.00 pm. However, the protest continued until 4:20 pm.[9]

The JuD/LeT employs the same criminal tactics in other places as well, such as in Indian Kashmir. In July 2003, an LeT recruiter lured six children of the National High School at the village of Vijhar near Bandipora into going to the nearby forests for militant training. When the parents of one of the children caught them, the kids said the recruiter was putting together a cricket team to play a match. This was strange logic as the school has a cricket team of its own and matches rarely begin at 7 p.m.[10] The Indian security forces rescued more than 100 children, many of them as young as twelve, from terrorist groups, including the LeT, in the first seven months of 2003, while the terrorist groups managed to lure around 500 children into forests that surround the Valley of

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Kashmir. Many of these kids receive some arms training, but work as cooks, cleaners, porters, and guides. However, few of them are sent to Pakistan for more training.[11]

The MDI had set up six *muaskars* by 2001: Two in Afghanistan, three in Pakistani Kashmir, and one in southern Pakistani Punjab. The Afghan Taliban closed the two in Afghanistan after coming into power and sent the MDI workers back to Pakistan. The two in Afghanistan were named *Muaskar Taiba* (Taiba is one of the names of the Saudi city Medina, the second holiest city of Islam), and *Muaskar al-Aqsa*, named after the grand mosque in Jerusalem. JDQS's Sheikh Jamilur Rehman donated the land for *Muaskar Taiba.*[12] *Muaskar al-Aqsa* was established to train Kashmiri boys,[13] but others were also sent there later. The two just outside Muzaffarabad were named *Muaskar Ummul Qara* (Ummul Qara, which means the mother of cities, is one of the names of Mecca), and *Muaskar Abdullah bin Masood* (named after a companion of Prophet Muhammad), while the one in the Pakistani Jammu region was named *Muaskar al-Aqsa.* They were established in 1993.[14] Another *muaskar* in southern Punjab was named *Muaskar Abu Baseer* (a companion of Prophet Muhammad).[15] This is probably the most secretive training camp of the MDI and is used for bomb making. It was rarely mentioned in MDI literature and no MDI leader official was ready to name the place where *Muaskar Abu Baseer* is located. After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, they were dispersed across the country in view of the international situation. However, the structure of the training programs remained the same.[16]

Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the JuD built several training camps, some of which have been dismantled since then. In July 2009, a private TV channel reported that the LeT had purchased 65 *kanals* of land in the Dulai area of Muzaffarabad to construct a mosque, a school, and a dispensary.[17] Other sources claimed that it had also set up a training camp at the Dulai area. According to Wilson John, "The Dulai camp is LeT's new command centre which is connected to the world with high-speed

broadband internet and other communication facilities. The camp is located in an area of about 39,325 square yards and was leased out by the terrorist group in March 2009 at a monthly rent of Rs 65,000. Since the Mumbai attack, the group has built a mosque and 14 shelters within the complex besides a middle school named Quaid-e-Azam Academy and al Shifa Free Medical centre."[18]

JuD holds several training courses. The most important is *Daura-e aama* andis the first and compulsory step towards joining the MDI/JuD. It usually starts on a Monday and lasts 21 days. The potential members reach the *muaskar* a day before. For 21 days, they live a disciplined life at the *muaskar.*[19] Most of them are not JuD members when they start the course, but most leave these *muaskars* as lifelong members. During their 21-day stay at the *muaskar*, they learn to practice the Salafist way of performing Islamic rituals, such as *salat* (any one of the five ritual prayers) and fasting. Although most of them can read the Quran in Arabic, they do not understand the meaning. They learn some parts of the Quran, particularly those dealing with jihad. The idea is to prepare them to kill and die in the name of Islam.[20]

They also learn the use of light arms, particularly Kalashnikovs and hand grenades. Most trainees are fairly good at using Kalashnikovs and hand grenades by the end of the *daura-e aama.* One of the important lessons they learn is how to make the best use of the limited amount of ammunition they would have in practical life. For instance, they are taught to fire single shots from Kalashnikovs. In addition, they are taught basic knowledge of more sophisticated weapons, such as IEDs,[21] although not its practical use. They also undergo rudimentary training for guerrilla warfare, such as how to overpower the security guards at an enemy military camp and occupy it. The *muaskars* are usually located either on hilltops or places accessible only by foot. The idea is that climbing the hills or walking long distances to and from the *muaskars* makes them physically tougher and is considered part of the training.

Few people fail to complete the 21-day *daura-e aama* and leave in the middle. After the completion of this course, they are ready

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to be full-time members of the MDI. They leave the *muaskars* with the promise and desire to lead their lives according to the Islamic principles they learned during the training. They are not sufficiently trained to go on jihad yet, but most of them are already burning with desire to go on a jihadi mission. There are a few who are selected to be sent on jihadist missions, but have to complete another longer, tougher course, *daura-e khaasa*.[22]

After the completion of the 21-day course, they are told to go back to their towns and villages and report to the local unit office. From now onwards, the local unit office would make use of their time the way they think appropriate. Most of them are asked to go back and join their families and bring them to the MDI.[23] Most are also encouraged to continue their businesses or jobs, and continue proselytizing at their places of work.[24] According to jihadist theology, Muslims are not necessarily required to live in a continuous state of jihad, but they do need to prepare for jihad all the time. Hence, many of them return to repeat the *daura-e aama* whenever they feel they are not fit enough to go on jihad.[25]

Daura-e khaasa

Those who perform best in the *daura-e aama* are selected for an advanced training course called *daura-e khasa*. This program is reserved only for those who are likely to be sent to Indian Kashmir (or even in other parts of India), or other places to wage jihad.[26] During the *daura-e aama*, the instructors at the *muaskars* observe each and every trainee and assess his physical ability to go on an armed jihad. These assessment reports are then sent to the LeT higher command. Once the trainees return to their towns and villages, the local unit office takes charge and assesses their fitness. They particularly observe how obedient he is to his superiors.[27] Based on performance during the *daura-e aama* and proselytizing work in the community, the best are selected to take part in the three to six months *daura-e khaasa*.[28]

During the *daura-e khaasa*, the trainees perfect what they learned in the *daura-e aama*. The stress remains on the use of Kalashnikovs, hand-grenades, and other light arms. They also undergo more intensive physical exercises. A very important part of the *daura-e khaasa* is staying hungry and thirsty in inhospitable environments. The trainees are also made familiar with other gadgets, such as GPS navigators they may need during jihad, and learn about it in other specialized courses. The trainees are required to deepen their knowledge of Islam in this course.[29]

There are several other courses the JuD members may study, depending on what they are required to do or specialize in. Another course is the *daura-e bait-ul-rizwan*, which normally lasts for four months. The trainees learn the un-armed forms of combat and close quarter battles in this training.[30] *Daura-e ribat* is aimed at training the JuD operatives in learning how to remain in contact with others, especially in order to recruit new members. There are around 20 trainees in one class.[31]

In the early years, the MDI organized a yearlong '*tadribud dawa*' (missionary training) courses for the graduates of madrassahs, which included jihadi training, and was divided into two semesters. The candidates received PRs. 500 and PRs. 800 for married candidates.[32] The students were required to write an *ilmi* (educational), research, and *tehreeki* (of the [Salafist] movement) dissertation in each semester.[33] In March 1992, the MDI started a brief one month religious course. The course has been held simultaneously at three places: MDI offices in Lahore, *Muaskar Taiba* in Afghanistan, and *Muaskar Ummul Qara* in Muzaffarabad. In the Lahore office, Hafiz Abdus Salam Bhutvi, Hafiz Abdul Ghaffar Awan, and Mubasher Ahmed Rabbani taught *tafseer* (exegesis). Hafiz Abdul Mannan taught hadith. Hafiz Abdur Rehman Madni taught *aqeeda* (creed) and *manhaj* (path), Mohammad Yahya taught *al-harakat wa al-afkaar* (action and thoughts). Hafiz Saeed taught *dawa* (proselytization) and jihad.[34] At *Muaskar Taiba* in Afghanistan, Maulana Abdullah Ubaid, Abdus Sattar Hammad, Mohammad Azam Cheema, and Abdur Rehman Zahbi taught a variety of courses. Similarly, in *Muaskar Ummul Qara* in Muzaffarabad, Qari Abdul Wahid and Mohammad Ramzan taught various courses.[35]

Although all members of the JuD are required to have completed *daura-e aama*, the JuD considers the religious and other

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training more important. All departments of the JuD hold *tarbiyyati* (Islamic education and upbringing) sessions at different levels from the neighborhood to the national level throughout the year. Schedules for *tarbiyyati* programs published in the JuD periodicals make it clear that these programs keep members busy virtually throughout the year without holidays. In December (Ramadan) 2000, the MDI organized at least 14,979 *tarbiyyati* programs: 12,288 in Punjab, 493 in Sindh, 1,100 in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and 55 in Baluchistan. Out of these, the department of teachers organized 46 *tarbiyyati* programs and the TMDI 997.[36] In 2000, the MDI started holding weekly *'jihad fi sabeel Allah'* conferences, which mostly start at 9 a.m. on Fridays and end with the Friday Sermon of Hafiz Mohammad Saeed or another senior MDI leader. If they take place on a day other than Friday, they end with the midday prayers.[37] TMDI regularly organizes seminars in different cities. In May 2000, it organized 18 'Mujahid Talaba' seminars.[38] The schedule shows that the JuD had planned 24 one-day *tarbiyyati* sessions at the district level from April 7, 2004 to May 10, 2004.[39] The schedule shows that the TJuD had planned 17 sessions from May 10 to June 5, 2005 (27 days).[40]

The JuD's annual budget runs into tens of millions of dollars. Contrary to the common perception among JuD/LeT experts, the ISI gives only a fraction of its budget. Yet, the ISI pays the entire amount of operational funding for jihad in Indian Kashmir to the LeT and to each group operating there. The ISI also pays a certain amount to the LeT for training each mujahid sent to Indian Kashmir. However, the LeT has to fundraise for all other activities through crime and local donations. In 2001, journalist Ghulam Hasnain estimated that it cost the JuD about $330 to give a three-week *daura-e aama* per member, and $1,700 per member to give a three-month *daura-e-khasa* training. The bulk of their funds come from crime and local donations. The ISI either helps them in that or turns a blind eye to them. The JuD owns hundreds of vehicles, most of which have been bought from car thieves at less than one-fourth of the real price. Moreover, the JuD pays no

customs, sales, or other taxes on these stolen vehicles. When a small group split from the JuD in 2004 and formed Khairun Naas, the dissenters told journalist Amir Rana that "Hafiz Saeed's son-in-law Khalid Waleed, the media head of the party, had relations with car smugglers and was damaging the party's image."[41] Before the 9/11 terrorist attacks, when they were not under close scrutiny, the MDI used green license plates, which are reserved for only government vehicles. Each JuD vehicle, like all other vehicles belonging to jihadist organizations, carries a letter by the ISI, which says the vehicle belongs to the ISI and its papers are with a certain local ISI official.[42] No police officer would dare question an ISI officer in Pakistan.

As the jihad in Indian Kashmir gathered steam in the early 1990s, the jihadist groups began carrying drugs, particularly heroine, along with their arms, to Indian Kashmir and beyond. According to a Kashmiri commander, "the ISI asked us to depute some of our boys to exclusively smuggle narcotics into India. They told us this was necessary to fund jihad in Kashmir. Almost every jihadist group has been involved in smuggling narcotics to India. The LeT gets the biggest share as it is the biggest jihadist group."[43] Another Kashmiri commander said that the ISI had asked some Kashmiri jihadist groups to fundraise exclusively through narcotics smuggling. The Jammu and Kashmir Islamic Front (JKIF) is one such group. Being the biggest jihadist organization, MDI/JuD was and is the biggest beneficiary of drug money. The MDI/JuD also benefited tremendously from its cooperation with criminal syndicates, such as the D-Company. The same Kashmiri commander said, "I have seen and been told that the JKIF, LeT and Dawood Ibrahim work together and do the bulk of narcotics smuggling to India."[44] Although jihad in Indian Kashmir has considerably waned, the drugs smuggling from Pakistan into India continues. H.S. Dhillon, director of intelligence for the Indian Punjab police, told the *Washington Post* that the smugglers simply hurl packets from the Pakistani side. He said that the packets of heroin were often tied to bundles of counterfeit Indian currency, and sometimes weapons and explosives.[45] In October 2012, Indian authorities confiscated more than 230 pounds of heroin in cement bags on a train arriving

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from Pakistan. Drug seizures rose three times in Indian Punjab in two years. The Indian Punjab accounts for more than half the heroin seized in India.[46] Indian Home Minister Sushil Kumar Shinde told Parliament in November 2012 that there had been a "disturbing increase in attempts to push drugs across the Punjab border."[47]

In October 2012, Indian Customs seized 105 kilograms of heroin. This was the highest ever quantity of narcotics sent from Pakistan in a single attempt and valued at around Rs. 5,250 million in the international market. In addition, 500 cartridges of Magnum 397 bore revolver, valued at around Rs. 200,000, were concealed in cement bags from a goods train arriving from Pakistan. Deputy commissioner of customs (rail cargo), Vijay Bahadur Singh, informed that they recovered 101 packets weighing around 105 kilograms of heroin and 500 cartridges of high-power revolver packed in two bags. Earlier, Indian customs officials had recovered two consignments of five and seven kilograms of heroin respectively, also concealed in cement bags.[48]

Soon it started raising the bulk of its funds locally through several ways. The trading and business classes are a big source of funds for the JuD. The animal hides on the *Eidul Adha* are an important source of funds. Mohammad Sharif, the Shafi Tannery's accountant, said the JuD sold 103,000 skins to Shafi Tannery in 2006. According to Mohammad Ilyas, who works at the animal skin market in Lahore, he processed and salted 100,000 pieces of hides at the JuD headquarters in 2008. According to the Pakistani tanners association, Pakistanis sacrificed around 5 million sheep and goats, and one million cows on Eidul Adha in 2010. A cow hide sells between $40 and $50 and the hides of sheep and goat fetch around $7. The hides collected on Eid account for around 45 percent of the needs of Pakistan's leather industry. JuD spokesman, Abdullah Muntazir, said in 2009 that the JuD earned about 100 million rupees (around $1.2 million at current exchange rates) from hide sales.[49]

When the U.N. blacklisted the JuD, its affiliated charities, and some of its leaders in the wake of the Mumbai terror attacks, Pakistan responded by pumping in around PRs. 83 million (more than a million dollars) to the JuD. The budget documents for the Punjab government revealed in June 2010 that it had given around PRs. 83 million to projects, including schools, mosques, hospitals, and other facilities run by the JuD after the United Nations put the group on its terror blacklist in December 2008. The Punjab government justified it by saying that it had put in money to run the facilities it had taken over after it was banned in 2008.[50] This amount included a grant of PRs. 79 million to Markaz Taiba, while PRs. 3 million went to the school system during the fiscal year 2009-2010.[51] Pakistan's Punjab province government allocated more than PRs. 61 million in a grant-in-aid in its budget for fiscal 2013-2014 for the Markaz Taiba, the largest center of the JuD. In addition, the Punjab government also allocated PRs. 350 million for establishing a "Knowledge Park" and other development initiatives in Muridke. In his budget speech in the assembly, finance minister Mujtaba Shujaur Rehman announced that the provincial government "intends to establish a Knowledge Park in Muridkey." He said the government had allocated PRs. 350 million for the park and several other initiatives in Punjab.[52] However, the truth was that the Punjab government had taken over these facilities only on paper. The JuD kept running them in reality. The JuD and the Pakistani state were never very close. These were not the only instances where the government paid huge sums of money to the JuD other than routine payments. Hussain Haqqani writes that after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the ISI paid substantial amounts in "severance pay" to jihadi leaders, such as Hafiz Saeed of LeT, Maulana Masood Azhar of Jaish-e-Muhammad, and Maulana Fazlur Rehman Khalil of Harakatul Mujahideen "in return for their agreement to remain dormant for an unspecified duration."[53]

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CONCLUSION

The MDI/JuD has grown into a huge global terrorist organization from a tiny group of Pakistani and Saudi Salafists since August 1987. It runs many training camps where it has trained nearly half a million mujahideen. The JuD is probably the first Islamist jihadist organization which truly has a global reach, far exceeding that of al-Qaeda. It has affiliates or sleeper cells in more than 50 countries. JuD-trained mujahideen have taken part in all the jihads in the world since 1990. More than 5,000 LeT mujahideen have died in Indian Kashmir.[1] Most foreigners who received training at JuD camps returned to train others in their own countries. JuD's international organizational trajectory makes it extremely difficult to eliminate it in any one country in the short term. If the JuD which operates out of Pakistan is JuD central, there are independent affiliates on every continent.

Between 1987 and 1995, the MDI was hardly known outside of its members and some Ahle Hadith groups in Pakistan. Indian security agencies first started hearing about the MDI/LeT some time in the mid-1990s, but did not realize its potential in the next couple of years. The West simply turned a blind eye to it between 1993 and 2001 as it considered the MDI/LeT as one of the terrorist organizations operating out of Pakistan, which posed a threat to only India. Even in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States, the United States and the West did little to eliminate it because it was still seen as a South Asian organization with no interest outside the region. The actions of the United States were directed at stopping the JuD from giving training to Americans and westerners. The western world finally

awoke on the evening of November 26, 2008 when ten LeT mujahideen took Mumbai hostage for more than 60 hours. The Mumbai terrorist attacks generated a lot of interest but very little action.

Even after the passage of more than five years, Pakistan has not taken any action against the perpetrators of the November 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks. The sham trial of the LeT commanders shows that Pakistan has no plans to dismantle the jihadist infrastructure. In fact, the JuD has grown far stronger since the November 2008 Mumbai attacks with the support of the Pakistan Army. The West's efforts to get Pakistan to act against the JuD seem at best half-hearted. The Pakistani military raised jihadist organizations to fight its jihad in Indian Kashmir and later in Afghanistan. Although Pakistan's primary reasons to keep supporting jihadist organizations remain the same, new reasons came as time went on. Both publicly and privately, Pakistani military officials stress the new reasons to keep supporting the JuD. The new reasons to not dismantle the JuD's jihadist infrastructure may be beneficial in the short term, but may imperil world peace in the medium and long terms beyond imagination. It is known that the JuD has also been acquiring sea and air power. However, what is less known is that it is also trying to acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

The decision of Pakistan's military regime to support the U.S.-led coalition against the Afghan Taliban in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks created an ever-widening rift between the Pakistani Deobandi mujahideen groups and the Pakistani military. The Pakistani Deobandi jihadist groups and the Afghan Taliban, who are also Deobandi, had been closely allied. Many Afghan Taliban leaders had studied under the Pakistani Deobandi teachers in Pakistani madrassahs. The military regime's decision to support the U.S.-led coalition in Afghanistan did not go well with the Pakistani Deobandi groups who turned their guns on their former masters. The Pakistani Deobandi groups justified their decision to fight the Pakistani military on the premise that they were *munafiqeen* (literally hypocrite)

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and worthy of being killed.[2] The Pakistani Taliban's campaign against the state of Pakistan has proved lethal for Pakistan. In March 2013, Pakistani spy agencies told the Supreme Court of Pakistan that 49,000 people had died between September 11, 2001 and March 2013 as a result of violence perpetuated by mujahideen groups and Pakistan's security forces' counter-terrorism missions.[3] The rift between the military and Deobandi jihadist groups proved extremely valuable for the JuD, which emerged as the ISI's most favored and favorite jihadist organization. The JuD earned this status by presenting itself as an alternative to the Deobandi orthodoxy that has turned its guns towards the Pakistani state.

One of the best exposés of the Pakistan Army's thinking on the JuD and other jihadist groups come from Hussain Nadim, a faculty member at the Department of Government and Public Policy at the National University of Science and Technology (NUST) in Islamabad, which is run by the Pakistani military. As a member of a military-run university, Nadim is well poised both to understand the Pakistani military's strategic thinking on the issue, and to air ideas the Pakistani military wants the world to hear and believe.[4] However, I believe that their thinking is, at best, naïve and inherently dangerous.[5]

In a long article, Nadim has explained why the Pakistani military will never take action against the JuD. He quotes several senior Pakistan Army officers and explains Pakistan's counterterrorism policy. Quoting a General of the Pakistan Army, Nadim writes that Pakistan's basic counterterrorism policy is fairly simple: "[E]ither kill the terrorists wherever they are found, or coerce them to support your cause against the other anti-state militants."[6] According to Nadim, Pakistan's security establishment categorizes militant organizations into three groups:

1. Groups that are a threat to Pakistan only
2. Groups that are threat to both Pakistan and the US
3. Groups that are a threat to only the US, India, or any other country

He says that Hafiz Saeed and JuD fall into the third category for Pakistan. "Moreover, if anything Hafiz Saeed has recently transformed and rebranded himself as a political and social actor

renouncing violence altogether. Could Hafiz Saeed lead to a Sinn Fein-style of transformation of militant groups in Pakistan? According to some in the power circles of Pakistan, he certainly could."[7] Nadim says, "[Hafiz] Saeed is increasingly looked upon by the security establishment as a key figure who will, after the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, mobilize the armed militants from different factions, and either pacify their animosity toward the Pakistan state, or encourage their evolution into political actors. Many in the establishment entertain the view that militants can only be dealt in their own language; in other words, by another militant on behalf of the establishment."[8]

Nadim goes on to answer why the security establishment has chosen Hafiz Saeed. He explains that "Hafiz Saeed is a perfect mix of what the establishment requires: an anti-Indian down to the bone, a patriot in the sense that he would not rise up against the Pakistani state, Saeed is considered radical enough by all types of militants, which allows him to sit down and negotiate with groups like the sectarian Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and the anti-government Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). But he is not motivated by sectarian differences - something that is particularly attractive to the security establishment in the midst of the wave of sectarian and religious violence crippling Pakistan."[9] Nadim basically presents Hafiz Saeed as "the new face of the evolution of militancy" who will move "from far right extremism to center right, and then to progressive. Saeed's evolution into a political actor, along with his charismatic ability to mobilize thousands of people, is what makes him marketable to an establishment that is desperately seeking ways to counter terrorism in Pakistan during and after the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan."[10] Nadim also quotes a senior police official as having said, "[Hafiz] Saeed has been redirected and is now being used as a tool to ensure the disarmament and evolution of militant groups in Pakistan."[11]

Nadim erroneously thinks that the formation of the DPG was meant to achieve the above-mentioned goals. This conclusion clearly shows that he is either unaware of the DPC's jihadist discourse or deliberately ignored it. He says the DPC under Hafiz Saeed "has united and mobilized followers of different radical ideologies,

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which Pakistani officials hope will create a force to broker peace between the government and militants." In other words, Hafiz Saeed is seen as a middle-man between the anti-state militants and the security establishment of Pakistan. And for this reason, Pakistan is unlikely to act against or compromise on Hafiz Saeed, despite overwhelming pressure from India, and the dossier of evidence suggesting links between Hafiz Saeed and terrorism.[12] [Hafiz] Saeed has successfully maintained his relevance and importance to the establishment of Pakistan, and is now being cultivated as a major political actor who could ensure that the militants disarm, and will negotiate peace on behalf of the establishment. It remains to be seen whether this policy will eventually work, but the fact is that Pakistan really does not seem to have any other option to fight the ever growing number of militants. And until this policy fails to bear fruit, Pakistan will have to live with the burden of being blamed for supporting militants like Hafiz Saeed.[13] Unfortunately, Nadim does not realize that it would be too late for Pakistan, if not for the world, by the time Hafiz Saeed fails.

The JuD is involved in many de-radicalization efforts in Pakistan. A top Pakistani counter-terrorism official told Reuters that the JuD has been helping the Pakistani Punjab government to run programs aimed at de-radicalizing militants. Punjab province officials say the JuD has extended full cooperation to the Punjab government's program of de-radicalization and rehabilitation of former jihadists, which involves efforts to transform militants into law-abiding citizens, although JuD had not been paid for its cooperation. A Punjab government official told Reuters, "[T]hey assured us of their intellectual input and resource materials. They also offered teachers."[14] Interviews with officials of the Punjab government show that the government and Pakistan military programs aim at taking the Deobandi mujahideen away from anti-state Deobandi ideology. This does not mean they abandon the path of jihad. The government and military give full freedom to JuD trainers and instructors to teach whatever helps them achieve this goal. According to one Punjab government official, "The only way they can do it efficiently is by reinterpreting jihad and directing them to another jihad; jihad against infidels."[15] In other words, the so-called de-radicalization programs, some of which are funded by the United States, actually convert Deobandi mujahideen into JuD/LeT mujahideen. Several JuD officials said that the syllabus at these de-radicalization programs is the same as the syllabus at the JuD training camps.[16]

The Pakistan Army has used the jihadist organizations against India and Afghanistan mostly in times of peace. The goal has been to bleed India in times of peace and avoid war. However, the Pakistan Army envisaged a far bigger role for jihadist organizations, particularly the JuD, in the post-9/11 period. Several interviews with senior Pakistan Army officers in 2012 and 2013 confirmed that this strategy is still in place. The new strategy came in the limelight in December 2002-January 2003 when, within months after tension between India and Pakistan started waning, tensions again rose and turned to missile sabre rattling due to an attack on the Indian Parliament building in December 2001.The new round of sabre rattling started when General Musharraf reportedly told Pakistan Air Force veterans that "I had personally conveyed to Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee through every international leader who came to Pakistan that if Indian troops moved a single step across the international border or the Line of Control, they should not expect a conventional war from Pakistan."[17] The unconventional war General Musharraf threatened India with was understood to be a nuclear war. General Musharraf denied he had threatened to unleash nuclear war. He said, "This is a distortion and I have been misquoted. No one in his right state of mind can talk of a nuclear war." General Musharraf said he was, in fact, talking in the context of Kashmir and had said that if any one tried to cross the LoC, then there would be guerilla warfare. He said a "freedom struggle" was going on in Indian Kashmir and if the Indian Army tried to cross the LoC there were 150,000 retired military personnel in Pakistani Kashmir who would have surrounded the Indian troops.[18]

General Musharraf's threat of unleashing a wave of jihadi attacks was not a hollow threat. The Pakistani military seemed to

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have been planning this strategy for some time by then. In early 2002, the ISI asked its jihadist proxies to prepare for long innings as it was becoming difficult to continue jihad in Indian Kashmir. The ISI advised jihadist groups to send their unmarried men to Pakistani Kashmir and settle there. The bulk of those who moved to Pakistani Kashmir were JuD militants. By 2006, hundreds of JuD militants had settled there and married local women. At the same time, the JuD also accelerated its missionary work in the areas closer to India-Pakistan borders in the Provinces of Punjab and Sindh. A senior JuD official in a small town along the India-Pakistan border explained the strategy in the following words,

> "In the event of a war with India, we would cross into India and carry out dozens of *fidayee* operations simultaneously. We never carried out more than one *fidayee* operation at the same time. Imagine ten *fidayee* operations like the one at the Badamibagh cantonment [in Indian Kashmir] taking place at ten different cantonments in India. Once these ten operations come to an end, ten more similar operations will start at ten different places. By the grace of Allah, we are heirs to more than 4,000 martyrs. We will bring India to its kneels with only a few hundred more martyrs. We started jihad because Allah has ordained it and not because the Pakistan Army wants us to wage jihad."[19]

The JuD leaders have also been publicly saying that they would not stop jihad in Indian Kashmir even if Indian Kashmir is liberated. They have publicly vowed to take revenge for the humiliating defeat the Pakistan Army suffered in 1971 umpteen times. Hafiz Saeed told *Outlook* in 2001, "Our struggle will continue even if Kashmir is liberated. We still have to take revenge for East Pakistan. The liberation of Kashmir, therefore, will not end our struggle."[20] Hafiz Saeed has also been saying that the JuD would fight alongside the Pakistan Army. In December 2008, he told *The News on Sunday* that, in case the Indians targeted the JuD offices, "It is up to the Pakistani government and the Pakistan Army to decide as to what to do and how to react to any such misadventure by the Indians. The army is responsible to safeguard

Pakistani geographical frontiers against any external aggression. And like any other patriotic Pakistani, we will also stand behind the armed forces if the Indians resorted to any aggression against the sovereignty of Pakistan."[21]

One of the earliest demands of the JuD has been to replace the Ministry of Defense with the ministry of jihad. In November 1998, Hafiz Saeed explained to me that "defense" is a non-Islamic concept and Islam ordains us to wage jihad and not defense. Under the Ministry of Jihad, the JuD intends to wage jihad not only against India but also other countries including the United States. In his address to the Kashmir Solidarity Day rally in Lahore on February 5, 2011, Abdur Rehman Makki asked the government to replace the Ministry of Defense with the Ministry of Jihad, and promised to provide "one million trained fighters who will play havoc with the lives of the Indian soldiers."[22] He also promised that the JuD would provide the entire budget for the proposed Ministry of Jihad. "The US is nobody's friend. The friends of the US are losing the war. The friends of Mohammad are winning. We will provide the government trained mujahideen and the Indian generals will be feared of them. We will provide one million fighters as the first batch and more will follows. They will not be untrained fighters. They will not be suicide bombers. But they will be trained fighters. Jamatud Dawa has made jihad's preparations after assessing the strength of the Indian army. The UN is the mistress of the US. Ban Ki Moon is just a servant of the US."[23]

The Pakistan Army's support to the JuD in the post-9/11 period is based partly on the flawed belief that the JuD will neither spin out of their control, nor wage jihad against Pakistan. The Pakistan Army's support to other jihadist groups before the 9/11 terrorist attacks was also based on similar premises. We have seen how quickly they spun out of ISI control. Their belief is actually based on JuD's public posturing and flawed understanding of some of the MDI/JuD texts. In his seminal tract, *Jehad in the Present Times*, MDI/JuD ideologue Bin Muhammad makes extreme efforts to stress that the MDI had no plan to wage jihad against the Pakistani

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state. Bin Muhammad says jihad becomes obligatory when the conflict is between Islam and unbelief. He writes that Pakistan is a Muslim country but India is a Hindu country. Explaining the differences between India and Pakistan, he writes, "We can press the Pakistani rulers to enforce Islam honouring the promise they had made in this regard. They do not at least outwardly and apparently, disown Islam though they do follow a policy based on hypocrisy towards Islam. But the Indian rulers are avowed disbelievers." Bin Muhammad disagrees with Deobandis that hypocrites deserved to be killed. To justify his viewpoint, he narrates a hadith according to which some companions of the Prophet of Islam had asked for permission to kill the hypocrites for their exceeding insolent attitude. But the Prophet of Islam did not allow them, saying the people would say in that case that Muhammad killed his own companions.[24]

However, neither Bin Muhammad nor any other JuD leader or ideologue has ever denied that they want to establish a caliphate in the world, including the Muslim world. The JuD considers Pakistan, like many other Muslim majority countries, a Muslim country, but not an Islamic state. They consider rulers of some of the Muslim-majority countries *munafiqeen* and others *taghoot*.[25] In 2002, Hafiz Saeed told this author, "Pakistan is a Muslim country because the people of Pakistan are Muslim. General Musharraf is a Muslim but the government is not. The Pakistani government is no more than one-and-a-half percent Islamic while the Saudi government may be two-and-a-half- percent Islamic."[26] At about the same time, in June/July 1990, the editorial in *Mujallah ad-Dawa* wrote that governments of *taghoot* were ruling Syria, Libya, Jordan, Egypt, Iraq, Iran, and other countries.[27] The situation in Saudi Arabia and other countries in the Gulf is worse. Hafiz Saeed wrote as early as in 1998, "A few years back, Saudi Arabia was respected as the leader of the Muslim world but that position has been affected now. The Gulf and the Middle East is practically under U.S. control now. The land, which was destined to break the shackles of others is itself in chains and in the given situation, Destiny appears to be providing a chance to Pakistan."[28] In other words, Pakistan is destined to lead the global jihad. JuD leaders

have made similar statements over the years, which make it abundantly clear that the JuD wants the governments in Muslim countries, including Pakistan, replaced with an Islamic caliphate, although they do not have any immediate designs to do that themselves. Soon after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Hafiz Saeed told journalist Amir Mir in 2002, "We are all out for a jehad to turn Pakistan into a pure Islamic state. But I have no immediate designs in Pakistan. In fact, there is no Islamic government in the world, not even in Saudi Arabia."[29] The reason is that the JuD is using Pakistan as a springboard to launch jihads in other countries as long as it can. Hafiz Saeed said as much in the same interview with Amir Mir, "My organisation's main interest in Pakistan is to pick people and train them to wage jehad in countries where un-Islamic governments are in power."[30]

The JuD may not be in a hurry to wage jihad in the Muslim countries, but it has always been preparing for taking over the leadership of the Muslim world before establishing a worldwide Islamic caliphate. In the early 1980s, as teachers of Islamic Studies at Pakistan's premier technology university, the University of Engineering and Technology (UET) in Lahore, Hafiz Saeed and Zafar Iqbal founded a student group, Salafiyya Rising Engineers, to convert students to Salafist Islam and to organize Salafist students.[31] Soon after the foundation of the MDI, its *shura* instructed the members of the Salafiyya Rising Engineers to try to join the country's nuclear science and technology institutions, such as the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) and Khan Research Laboratories (KRL), after graduating from the UET. Under this policy, *'Engineer'* Abdul Quddus *Salafi* joined the PAEC after graduating from the UET in the late 1980s. There were hardly any Salafist employees in the entire nuclear science and technology field at that time.[32] *'Engineer'* Abdul Quddus *Salafi* began preaching Salafism by leading a separate Friday congregation, preceded by a religious sermon, at the PAEC premises. The number of worshippers at this congregation kept growing slowly, but surely.[33] In December 2001, the government of Pakistan dismissed *'Engineer'* Abdul Quddus *Salafi* under U.S. pressure. However, he had already prepared a small team of Salafists by that time. Under the same

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policy, dozens of JuD members from the UET and other universities have joined Pakistan's nuclear science and technology institutions. One of the reasons why the JuD has not rebelled against the Pakistani state is that it is the fastest growing jihadist group which is penetrating even the state apparatus, including the nuclear establishment. The JuD believes it is likely to acquire access to nuclear technology by not going against the Pakistani state. It may come sooner than we can imagine given the JuD's ability to realize its plans systematically and cool-headedly.

APPENDIX

In the early 1990s, Abdus Salaam Bin Muhammad, a leading MDI ideologue, wrote his classic tract to explain why the MDI was waging jihad. This was the time when the MDI was just entering the jihad in Kashmir. Unfortunately, the tract has been understood only in the context of jihad in Kashmir. The tract *Jehad in the Present Times*[1] and other MDI/JuD publications leave no doubt, even in the mind of a casual watcher of the group, that the group plans to wage jihad around the world as a religious duty and occupy it. The group was aware of the importance of this tract for the English readers, and published its English translation soon after the publication of its original Urdu version.

In the first section, Bin Muhammad gives eight reasons to explain why the MDI wages and will continue to wage jihad. In the second section, he examines whether any of these goals have been achieved since the Quran had ordained jihad. The answer is predictably no as none of these is achievable.

The first, fourth, fifth, and sixth objectives are inter-related. The first objective is aimed at ending the persecution of Muslims wherever it takes place. "Every Muslim is bound to continue fighting against the disbelievers as long as they in any part of the world have power and strength enough to persecute the Muslims and as long as a person desiring to accept Islam is reluctant to do so just because he fears to be persecuted and tortured by the disbelievers and if he somehow enters the fold of Islam, he becomes a target of their (i.e. the disbelievers') oppression."[2] He cites the Quran, "And fight them until persecution is no more, and religion is for Allah. But if they desist, then let there be no hostility

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except against wrong doers (Al-Baqarah: 193)." The fourth objective is to help the weak and oppressed Muslims wherever they are. He cites the Quran again, "And what is wrong with you that you fight not in the Cause of Allah, and for those weak, ill-treated and oppressed among men, women and children, whose cry is: 'Our Lord! Rescue us from this town whose people are oppressors, and raise for us from you one who will protect, and raise for us from you one who will help' (Al-Nisa: 75)."

According to the fifth objective, Allah has ordained that Muslims seek revenge for the murder of a fellow Muslim. Bin Muhammad says that the Quran prescribes revenge and retribution if a Muslim is killed by a non-Muslim. However, the relatives are allowed to forgive the murderer or accept *diyyat* (monetary compensation), and forgive him if the murderer is a Muslim. However, it is binding to seek revenge on a disbeliever except when he accepts Islam. He cites the Quran, "O ye who believe 'Retribution is prescribed for you in the matter of the murderer' (Al-Baqarah: 178)." Bin Muhammad says,

The sixth objective is to punish those who violate their oaths with Muslims. Bin Muhammad says that Islam binds the Muslims to fight the nations which violate their agreements with the Muslims. He cites the Quran, "But it they violate their oaths after their covenant, and attack your religion with disapproval and criticism then fight (you) the leaders of disbelief — for surely their oaths are nothing to them — so that they may stop (evil actions) (Al-Tawba: 12)." The Quran also promises six rewards for those Muslims who fight against the nations who go back on their pledges or violate their oaths. The Quran says, "Fight against them so that (1) Allah will punish them by your hands and (2) disgrace them and (3) give you victory over them and (4) heal the breasts of a believing people, (5) and remove the anger of their (believers') hearts (6) Allah accepts the repentance of whom He wills (Al-Tawba: 14, 15)."

Bin Muhammad argues that India had the duty to protect and safeguard the life, property, and mosques of the Indian Muslims after the establishment of Pakistan. But it did not. Muslims are massacred in India in large numbers. "Their houses, shops and

factories are burnt to ashes. The Pakistan Embassy/High Commission has several times been attacked. Thousands of mosques including the historic Babri Mosque have so far been demolished in India. Last but not least, India is still not ready to honour its promise to hold a plebiscite in Kashmir." This makes jihad in India and Indian Kashmir obligatory on Muslims.

The second and third objectives are to restore the Muslim caliphate and establish the 'dominance of Islam.' Bin Muhammad writes, "Until Islam as a Way of Life dominates the whole of the world and until Allah's Law is enforced everywhere in the world, it is binding and incumbent upon the Muslims to fight on against the disbelievers."[3] He cites the Quran, "And fight them until persecution is no more, and religion is all for Allah. But if they cease, then lo! Allah is Seer of what they do (Al-Anfaal: 39)." The third objective relates to the status of non-Muslims in the caliphate. Once the Islamic caliphate is restored, according to the third objective, the Muslims will continue to force the disbelievers to pay *jizya*. He cites the Quran, "Fight against those who (1) believe not in Allah, (2) nor in the Last Day, (3) nor forbid that which has been forbidden by Allah and His Messenger, (4) and those who acknowledge not the religion of truth (i.e. Islam) among the people of the Scripture, until they pay the Jizya with willing submission, and feel themselves subdued (Al-Tawbah: 29)."

The seventh objective is to 'fight to defend' yourself. The Quran ordains the Muslims to fight against any attacking nation to defend themselves. Bin Muhammad cites the Quran again, "And fight in the Way of Allah those who fight you, but transgress not the limits. Truly, Allah likes not the transgressors (Al-Baqarah: 190)." He says, "If any Muslim state or the Muslims anywhere in the world face aggression, it is incumbent on all the Muslims to resist the aggression and fight to protect and defend their Muslim brothers and themselves."[4]

The eighth and last objective enumerated in the tract *Jihad in the Present Times* is to recapture occupied Muslim territory. Bin Muhammad says that if the disbelievers snatch any territory belonging to Muslims, it is incumbent on Muslims to drive the disbelievers out of that place and recapture that land. He finds justification in

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a Quranic verse, which says, "And slay them wherever you find them, and drive them out of the places whence they drove you out (Al-Baqarah: 191)." Bin Muhammad mentions Spain, India, Palestine/Israel, Burma, Philippine, Chechnya and Bosnia, China, Russia, Albania, Yugoslavia, and Nepal by name as territories that should be repossessed by the Muslims by waging jihad.[5]

He argues that jihad remains obligatory for Muslims even in the absence of an Islamic state and a caliph, just as other Islamic injunctions such as *azan* (call for Prayer), *iqaama* (call for congregational prayer) and congregational prayers, zakat, *sadaqaat* (alms) and *ushar* (tithe) fasting in Ramadan are obligatory. He cites a hadith from Sahih of Imam Muslim, which says, "Jabir Bin Samrah reported: Allah's Messenger said: This religion (i.e. Islam) will never cease to exist and a group of people (*Usba*) among the Muslims will continue to fight for its protection until the Hour is established." He says this hadith decides the matter once and for all that jihad will never stop, whether an Islamic state exists or not. "The Muslims will continue to perform this obligation whether with a large army or with a group of only ten or twenty people. If the existence of an Islamic state or the existence of a Caliph is declared necessary for the performance of this duty, we cannot continue, at present, to fight for the Cause of Allah because these days neither does there exist an Islamic state nor does there exist any caliph." This principle hold true even if a Muslim does not find a single companion to stand by him. He can go and fight all by himself. He gives the example of

Bin Muhammad cites Ibn-i-Qudama to show the difference between *fardh-i-ain* and *fardh-i-kifaayah*. Ibn-i-Qudama says, "Fardh-i-Ain is the strict obligation whose performance is binding on each and every Muslim personally and individually such as *salat* (prayers), and *saum* (fasting). *Fardh-i-Kifaayah* is the general obligation whose performance by an adequate number of believers absolves all of them but if it is not performed by adequate number as sinful and guilty. In the beginning, like *Fardh-i-Ain* it is incumbent on all the Muslims but afterwards a distinction is made between them. So far as *Fardh-i-Kifaayah* is concerned, if it is performed by an adequate number of people, all the Muslims are absolved of it but *Fardh-i-Ain* is the strict obligation whose performance by one does not absolve the other. (Al-Mughni Wa Asharah-al-Kabeer Li Ibn-i-Qadamah, The Book of Jihad)."

He cites several Muslim scholars and concludes that if jihad means to set out on a military expedition, it is strictly obligatory for everyone to leave. The only exceptions are those whom the *amir* himself has ordered to stay back. He will be considered to have actually fought. If the amir has not ordered everyone to leave for jihad, then it is *fardh-e-kifaayah*. If the Muslims are participating in the jihad in such proper number as is sufficient to counter the enemy, then it is not incumbent on others to set out for the War front.[6]

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CHAPTER NINE

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